Here's Tennent Bagley's entire personnel file

[Lance Payette]

I will admit, I care nothing about Bagley. However, in reviewing the vast thread that Jim DiEugenio created at the Ed Forum in 2018 specifically to deal with TG's KGB stuff (or "mole madness," as Jimbo called it), I stumbled briefly down the Bagley rabbit hole.

Here is our lad's entire CIA personnel file, from his employment in 1949 until his forced retirement in 1972: https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/jfk2025/104-10222-10038.pdf.

You will see that, until 1972, Bagley practically walked on water.

You will recall John L. Hart, the supposed "Bagley character assassin" who in 1976 came out of CIA retirement to write a huge report lambasting Bagley's handling of Nosenko (and who testified to similar effect before the HSCA in 1978). Well ... in 1970, in his capacity as Chief of the European Division, Hart was enthusiastically recommending Bagley for "supergrade" promotion to GS-17 (page 7 of the above PDF).

According to Hart, Bagley was "one of our very finest station chiefs, possessed of imagination, intellect and ability personally to handle operations which very few of his colleagues can match. He is one of those on whom the future of the Organization is going to depend, and I believe that the promotion is more than justified."

Wow, huh? "Bagley character assassin" indeed. This was, of course, written after the Nosenko dust had settled and Nosenko had been officially acknowledged as a genuine defector.

Hart's recommendation and glowing fitness report were sent to the Clandestine Service Career Board, which was responsible for promotion decisions, in May of 1970. What could do wrong?

Alas, Bagley's promotion was denied by the Board. Less than two years later, he was on his way out the door - forced into retirement as "surplus" to the Agency's needs. There is nothing in Bagley's personnel file between Hart's glowing recommendation in 1970 and the 1972 retirement paperwork.

However, it's pretty clear what happened. From 1964 to 1974, the CIA Director of Security was Howard L. Osborn. In this role, he had his fingers in all sorts of pies - the HT/LINGUAL mail intercept program, the Nosenko affair, and eventually being forced to resign for withholding Watergate material from the FBI and the Congressional investigating committee.

In October of 1970, Osborn wrote a memo to the file documenting his October 7 briefing of Col. L. K. White, Executive Director-Comptroller, concerning "certain reservations" he had about Bagley's promotion. He emphasized that his reservations had nothing to do with Bagley's security status.

Here is that memo: https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32359254.pdf.

Osborn believed that Bagley was "almost exclusively responsible" for the way the Nosenko affair had been (mis)handled. Bagley "lacked objectivity" and "displayed extremely poor judgment over a two-year period." He had handled the Nosenko matter with "extreme prejudice," with the result that the SR Division had failed to follow up on several leads provided by Nosenko which were then followed up by his office (Solie, he said) with the result that these individuals confessed to being recruited by and working with the Soviets over extended periods of time.

He also said that Bagley had exercised "extremely poor judgment" while Nosenko was held in isolation. As the individual responsible for Nosenko's care, he (Osborn) had "refused to condone" Bagley's instructions to his (Osborn's) staff who were guarding Nosenko. He cited the example of Bagley wanting Nosenko to be limited to "black bread and water" three times daily.

White assured Osborn that he would "refresh the Director's memory" about Bagley's handling of Nosenko.

What an amazing fall from grace. Because TG abolutely worships Bagley, as well as his book Spy Wars and his posthumously published article "Ghosts of Spy Wars" - literally worships, just read TG's online stuff - he will surely have his Bagleyesque explanation as to why all this isn't really what it looks like.

As for me, I have no difficulty seeing Bagley's writings as most likely a bitter old man attempting to save face and settle grudges.

Back out of the rabbit hole for me. Does anyone but TG actually care about any of this stuff?

[Steve M. Galbraith]

Nosenko could have sued the US government, the CIA, and would have won if not hundreds of thousands of dollars many tens of thousands for the abuse they inflicted on him; viz., the denial of due process, of habeas, for the isolation and harsh treatment. He could have really embarrassed the CIA - Bagley and Angleton specifically (although Angleton denied knowing about the mistreatment) - in open court to the world and done severe damage to it and the US. I'm sure the government would have to tried to settle out of court; but he could have insisted otherwise.

But he didn't. And he said he wouldn't either. I would think that a genuine KGB double agent, someone working for the Soviets and against the US, would have done exactly that. Sued, gone to court. Why wouldn't one?

In 1975, Nosenko was asked to speak before a group of CIA agents at Langley. Here's the account in part (taken from Tom Mangold's book on Angleton):

[Lance Payette]

FWIW, here is "KGB mole" Bruce Solie's massive 1968 report exonerating Nosenko and refuting earlier reports that he was a false defector:

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2025/0318/104-10150-10004.pdf

I'll have to admit, I just can't get my mind around the "Solie as KGB mole" stuff. It seems like one of those up-is-really-down CT things: he was so obviously not a KGB mole that he must have been a KGB mole. (Both Angleton and Bagley were likewise suspected of being moles.)

I include the following just for some slightly humorous perspective. This is the obituary of Bruce Solie's wife. Is this the life of the wife of a "KGB mole"? As with Ruth Paine and numerous others we could mention, CTers in their dark and sinister speculation completely lose sight pf the fact that they are talking about real people who led real lives that just don't mesh with their dark and sinister CT portraits. (On Bruce Solie's Find-a-Grave site, CT wacko Linda - I can't remember her last name - has gratuitously inserted that he was "recently outed as Popov's mole." It almost seems like a form of mental illness. Because one good turn deserves another, here is wacko Linda's biography wherein she sets forth her theory of a South Knoll gunman and Prayer Man and whatnot: https://www.findagrave.com/user/profile/48291572. Yes, Linda, Find-a-Grave visitors really need to know your theory of the JFKA.  .)

Mary Solie
March 21, 1918 — March 7, 2009

Mary Elizabeth Matthews Solie was born March 21, 1918 on a farm near Peru, Nebraska. She was the daughter of Homer L. Matthews, Jr. and Clara Hosterman Matthews. Mary attended one room country school London District 66 and Peru Training High School. She graduated from Peru State College in 1939 with a Bachelors Degree in Education. Mary then taught school in Taylor, Nebraska. During the summer months she worked with the 4-H Club. She also attended Iowa State University for one year.

In 1943 she was employed by the Special Service of the U.S. Army at Rosecrans Field at St. Joseph, Missouri. It was here that she met Lt. Bruce L. Solie. They were married February 22, 1944 in Marion, Arkansas. The newlyweds lived in Memphis, Tennessee and Homestead, Florida until Bruce was stationed overseas. While he was serving overseas, Mary worked for United Airlines. At the conclusion of WW II, Mary and Bruce moved to Badger Village, Wisconsin where he attended the University of Wisconsin.

In 1951 they relocated to the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C. where Bruce began a career with the CIA until his retirement in 1979. Mary was active in the schools where her children attended and at Viers Mill Baptist Church. She was a Cub Scout Den Mother and a Brownie Scout Leader. She worked in Jobs Daughters and was Worthy Matron of Montgomery Chapter Order of the Eastern Star. Genealogy was a lifelong interest. She was a member of the Daughters of the American Revolution serving her Maryland chapter as Regent and the State Society as State Chaplain. She belonged to the Daughters of the War of 1812, and Colonial Dames of Seventeenth Century. She took pride in her membership in the Daughters of Founders and Patriots. After the death of her husband, Mary moved home to their farm near Brownville, Nebraska in 1995.

She belonged to the Brownville Historical Society, serving on the board and volunteering at the museum. Mary also served as Regent of Otoe Chapter of DAR. She was a member of the O.E.S. Brownville Chapter #263. She attended the Peru Community Church and Bethel Community Church.

[Benjamin Cole]

"Well ... in 1970, in his capacity as Chief of the European Division, Hart was enthusiastically recommending Bagley for "supergrade" promotion to GS-17 (page 7 of the above PDF).

According to Hart, Bagley was "one of our very finest station chiefs, possessed of imagination, intellect and ability personally to handle operations which very few of his colleagues can match. He is one of those on whom the future of the Organization is going to depend, and I believe that the promotion is more than justified." --LP, citing Hart.

Something is fishy here. Obviously, and by all accounts, Bagley was a smart guy, experienced, knowledgable, and earnest. Give him that.

One would think that someone in the CIA would say (even if this were true), "OK, Bagley went overboard on Nosenko. One mistake in a lifetime of high-quality service. Assign Bagley to an equal position elsewhere."

But instead Bagley is jettisoned.

Reminds me of the US Ambassador to Mexico, Mann, and Charles Thomas, the State Department guy in MC, both of whom thought LHO was a G2 asset.

They were jettisoned too.

There was streak there in the 1960s-70s when even suspecting KGB-G2 in the JFKA was radioactive.

That is normal?

Seems fishy like the National Aquarium.

[Tom Graves]

"Well ... in 1970, in his capacity as Chief of the European Division, Hart was enthusiastically recommending Bagley for "supergrade" promotion to GS-17 (page 7 of the above PDF).

According to Hart, Bagley was "one of our very finest station chiefs, possessed of imagination, intellect and ability personally to handle operations which very few of his colleagues can match. He is one of those on whom the future of the Organization is going to depend, and I believe that the promotion is more than justified." --LP, citing Hart.

Something is fishy here. Obviously, and by all accounts, Bagley was a smart guy, experienced, knowledgable, and earnest. Give him that.

One would think that someone in the CIA would say (even if this were true), "OK, Bagley went overboard on Nosenko. One mistake in a lifetime of high-quality service. Assign Bagley to an equal position elsewhere."

But instead Bagley is jettisoned.

Reminds me of the US Ambassador to Mexico, Mann, and Charles Thomas, the State Department guy in MC, both of whom thought LHO was a G2 asset.

They were jettisoned too.

There was streak there in the 1960s-70s when even suspecting KGB-G2 in the JFKA was radioactive.

That is normal?

Seems fishy like the National Aquarium.

Dear "BC,"

1970 was eight years before Hart was tasked by his former buddy at CIA Saigon, DCI William Colby (who, "ironically," seems to have had an unacknowledged relationship with a KGB agent in Vietnam), to divert attention from Nosenko's lies and contradictions by concentrating on smearing the reputations of Bagley and Chief of Soviet Russia Division, David E. Murphy, and lying profusely about how they had so grossly misunderstood and tortured him.

Of course, before Hart testified to the HSCA, he had written his anti-Golitsyn / anti-Angleton "Monster Plot" report in 1976.

ME: Who tasked John L. Hart with writing his 1976 article on Golitsyn's and Angleton's "paranoiac Monster Plot"?

GROK: John L. Hart was tasked with writing his 1976 study—titled "The Monster Plot: Counterintelligence in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" (often called the "Monster Plot" report or memo) — by CIA Director William Colby.

Hart, a retired CIA officer who had previously served in the Soviet Russia Division and handled aspects of the Nosenko case, was recalled from retirement in 1976 specifically for this assignment. The task lasted about six months and involved reviewing files, interviewing key figures (including James Angleton), and producing a critical assessment of the Counterintelligence Staff's handling of defectors Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko.

•   The report argued that Angleton and Golitsyn's theories (including the "Monster Plot" or "master plot" of widespread KGB deception, moles in Western services, and Nosenko as a dispatched plant) were paranoid, unsubstantiated, and damaging to CIA personnel and operations. It defended Nosenko's bona fides and portrayed the prolonged skepticism as excessive.

•   This was part of the post-Angleton era reforms under Colby (DCI 1973–1976), who had forced Angleton's dismissal in late 1974 amid mole-hunt fallout, Church Committee scrutiny, and efforts to curb counterintelligence excesses. Colby's directive aligned with broader CIA internal reviews to reevaluate controversial cases and restore balance after the "Family Jewels" exposures and congressional investigations.

•   Sources confirming Colby's role include:

•   Declassified CIA documents and histories (e.g., references in FOIA releases and internal memos).

•   Secondary accounts, such as in Richards Heuer's analysis of the Nosenko case (where Hart is noted as recalled to investigate the "master plot" or "monster plot").

•   MuckRock reporting on the "Monster Plot" report, tying it to the Colby-era reevaluation of Angleton's legacy.

•   The report itself (dated December 1976) and related HSCA discussions (where it was referenced in 1978 hearings).

The study was an internal CIA document, not a public "article," though it later influenced HSCA testimony (Hart defended it before the committee in 1978). Angleton viewed it as libelous and inaccurate, as did some skeptics like Tennent Bagley, but it became a key pro-Nosenko, anti-"paranoia" counter-narrative within the agency. No sources indicate anyone other than Colby (or his office) as the tasker.

ME: What did Bagley say about Hart's "Monster Plot" report in his book, Spy Wars?

GROK: In his 2007 book Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games, Tennent H. "Pete" Bagley harshly criticized John L. Hart's 1976 "Monster Plot" report (formally titled "The Monster Plot: Counterintelligence in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko") as a key part of the "whitewash" of Yuri Nosenko's bona fides and an unfair attack on James Angleton, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and the skeptics (including Bagley himself).Bagley portrayed Hart's report as:

A biased, pro-Nosenko document that affirmed "total trust" in Nosenko while dismissing Angleton and Golitsyn's theories of widespread KGB deception (the so-called "Monster Plot" or "master plot" involving moles, disinformation, and Nosenko as a dispatched agent to discredit Golitsyn) as paranoid and unsubstantiated.

An attempt to discredit the counterintelligence approach by labeling it a "myth" or "paranoiac" overreach, without adequately addressing factual inconsistencies in Nosenko's accounts (e.g., on Oswald, KGB procedures, and overlaps/contradictions with Golitsyn's information).

Part of a broader bureaucratic effort under William Colby (who tasked Hart) to rehabilitate Nosenko's image, end the lingering controversy from the 1960s handling, and shift blame onto Angleton and his allies for operational damage and personnel harm during the mole hunt.

Inaccurate and damaging to reputations—Bagley viewed it (along with Hart's later 1978 HSCA testimony) as misrepresenting his own role, exaggerating or fabricating claims of mistreatment of Nosenko, and ignoring evidence that supported the "plant" theory.

Bagley did not quote the report extensively but referenced it in the context of defending Angleton/Golitsyn against what he saw as a "myth" propagated by Hart and others (e.g., Leonard McCoy, Bruce Solie). He argued that Hart's conclusions relied on selective file reviews, ignored key anomalies Bagley had documented (like his "Thousand Pager" [835 pages] of Nosenko inconsistencies), and contributed to the narrative that the skeptics' views were "sick think" or excessive paranoia—thus whitewashing Nosenko's credibility and exonerating the KGB of deeper deception.

Bagley also tied this to Hart's HSCA testimony (1978), where Hart defended Nosenko and criticized Bagley's division for bias and mishandling; Bagley rebutted this forcefully in his own HSCA appearance and letter to chief counsel G. Robert Blakey. In Spy Wars, Bagley positioned Hart's report as emblematic of the post-Angleton CIA's desire to close ranks, discredit the mole-hunt era, and prioritize operational utility over rigorous counterintelligence scrutiny.

Overall, Bagley saw the "Monster Plot" report not as objective analysis but as a partisan effort to rewrite history in favor of Nosenko's defenders, further entrenching what he called the flawed clearance under Solie.


-- "TG"

[Tom Graves]

Nosenko could have sued the US government, the CIA, and would have won if not hundreds of thousands of dollars many tens of thousands for the abuse they inflicted on him; viz., the denial of due process, of habeas, for the isolation and harsh treatment. He could have really embarrassed the CIA - Bagley and Angleton specifically (although Angleton denied knowing about the mistreatment) - in open court to the world and done severe damage to it and the US. I'm sure the government would have to tried to settle out of court; but he could have insisted otherwise.

But he didn't. And he said he wouldn't either. I would think that a genuine KGB double agent, someone working for the Soviets and against the US, would have done exactly that. Sued, gone to court. Why wouldn't one?

In 1975, Nosenko was asked to speak before a group of CIA agents at Langley. Here's the account in part (taken from Tom Mangold's book on Angleton):

Dear Steve M.,

Tom Mangold?

The guy whose primary source was probable KGB mole Leonard V. McCoy, and in whose anti-Angleton book, Cold Warrior, Bagley found seventy errors in seven pages (142-49)?

THAT Tom Mangold?

https://archive.org/details/coldwarriorjame000mang

-- Tom

[Lance Payette]

"Well ... in 1970, in his capacity as Chief of the European Division, Hart was enthusiastically recommending Bagley for "supergrade" promotion to GS-17 (page 7 of the above PDF).

According to Hart, Bagley was "one of our very finest station chiefs, possessed of imagination, intellect and ability personally to handle operations which very few of his colleagues can match. He is one of those on whom the future of the Organization is going to depend, and I believe that the promotion is more than justified." --LP, citing Hart.

Something is fishy here. Obviously, and by all accounts, Bagley was a smart guy, experienced, knowledgable, and earnest. Give him that.

One would think that someone in the CIA would say (even if this were true), "OK, Bagley went overboard on Nosenko. One mistake in a lifetime of high-quality service. Assign Bagley to an equal position elsewhere."

But instead Bagley is jettisoned.

Reminds me of the US Ambassador to Mexico, Mann, and Charles Thomas, the State Department guy in MC, both of whom thought LHO was a G2 asset.

They were jettisoned too.

There was streak there in the 1960s-70s when even suspecting KGB-G2 in the JFKA was radioactive.

That is normal?

Seems fishy like the National Aquarium.

I really don't think it's fishy at all. Bagley had been almost solely (no pun intended) responsible for the handling of Nosenko. The CIA reached a conclusion that Bagley's handling and conclusions were flat-out wrong. The CIA put its weight solidly behind Nosenko's bona fides. Bagley, as we well know, wouldn't let the matter rest. It had been extremely divisive within the CIA, and the Agency finally said "Enough." Bagley willingly took retirement as an alternative to being terminated. How many other Nosenko unbelievers met the same fate, I don't know. I just thought Hart's recommendation less than two years before the forced retirement was interesting. My guess would be that he, as the European Division Chief, had no real knowledge of the Nosenko affair or of how badly Bagley had handled it. Perhaps that's precisely why Hart was brought back out of retirement to write his report.

I have posted this previously. It's a 2012 event at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and Georgetown University entitled "Moles, Defectors and Deception: James Angleton and His Influence on US Counterintelligence" -

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/event/moles_defectors_and_deceptions_james_angleton_conference_report.pdf

Bagley, Royden and many others participated. No fistfights erupted.

Bagley noted that unnamed - always unnamed - KGB sources had described to him their "handling" of Nosenko's false defection. Royden responded politely:

In response, to Mr. Bagley’s saying that he’s had
contacts in the East with former KGB officers who
have told him that, in fact, Nosenko was run by
them; I would hope that you would all have healthy
skepticism for former KGB officers telling the truth
to Tennent Bagley, who of course has always been a
supporter of the Angleton thesis. I have not found
that former KGB officers sitting in Moscow have
been good sources of honesty about their operations
against the U.S.

But I realize that attempting to bring a rational perspective to these discussions is fruitless. The KGB stuff is a virus like every other CT virus. Once it takes hold, there is no cure. (Gotta add that to my "Beginner's Guide," too!)

[Tom Graves]

I really don't think it's fishy at all. Bagley had been almost solely (no pun intended) responsible for the handling of Nosenko. The CIA reached a conclusion that Bagley's handling and conclusions were flat-out wrong. The CIA put its weight solidly behind Nosenko's bona fides. Bagley, as we well know, wouldn't let the matter rest. It had been extremely divisive within the CIA, and the Agency finally said "Enough." Bagley willingly took retirement as an alternative to being terminated. How many other Nosenko unbelievers met the same fate, I don't know. I just thought Hart's recommendation less than two years before the forced retirement was interesting. My guess would be that he, as the European Division Chief, had no real knowledge of the Nosenko affair or of how badly Bagley had handled it. Perhaps that's precisely why Hart was brought back out of retirement to write his report.

I have posted this previously. It's a 2012 event at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and Georgetown University entitled "Moles, Defectors and Deception: James Angleton and His Influence on US Counterintelligence" -

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/event/moles_defectors_and_deceptions_james_angleton_conference_report.pdf

Bagley, Royden and many others participated. No fistfights erupted.

Bagley noted that unnamed - always unnamed - KGB sources had described to him their "handling" of Nosenko's false defection. Royden responded politely:

In response, to Mr. Bagley’s saying that he’s had
contacts in the East with former KGB officers who
have told him that, in fact, Nosenko was run by
them; I would hope that you would all have healthy
skepticism for former KGB officers telling the truth
to Tennent Bagley, who of course has always been a
supporter of the Angleton thesis. I have not found
that former KGB officers sitting in Moscow have
been good sources of honesty about their operations
against the U.S.

But I realize that attempting to bring a rational perspective to these discussions is fruitless. The KGB stuff is a virus like every other CT virus. Once it takes hold, there is no cure. (Gotta add that to my "Beginner's Guide," too!)

Dear Fancy Pants Rants,

One of your big problems is that you can't seem to grasp the idea that the person who "cleared" Yuri Nosenko (via a bogus polygraph exam -- one of the worse that polygraph expert Richard O. Arther had ever seen, according to what he told the HSCA -- and a coached and specious report) was none other than probable mole Bruce Leonard Solie (look him up).

Bagley's primary source from 1994 to 2007 was former KGB General Sergey Kondrashev (look him up) who was still living when Bagley's Yale University Press book, Spy Wars, was published. Do you think he should have revealed the name of still-living Kondrashev?

As far as your boy Royden's and Pete Bagley's not exchanging haymakers, the latter was always pretty diplomatic, he was 86 years old, he was dying of cancer, and he was calling in from Brussels (where he'd chosen to be COS in 1967, and where he retired to in 1972).

You keep bringing up HSCA perjured John L. Hart.

Evidently you don't have the cajones to read Bagley's 170-page HSCA testimony in which he ripps Hart "a new one."

What's the matter?

Won't your wife let you?

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32273600.pdf

Note: "Mr. X" is KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn.


-- Tom