"Well ... in 1970, in his capacity as Chief of the European Division, Hart was enthusiastically recommending Bagley for "supergrade" promotion to GS-17 (page 7 of the above PDF).
According to Hart, Bagley was "one of our very finest station chiefs, possessed of imagination, intellect and ability personally to handle operations which very few of his colleagues can match. He is one of those on whom the future of the Organization is going to depend, and I believe that the promotion is more than justified." --LP, citing Hart.
Something is fishy here. Obviously, and by all accounts, Bagley was a smart guy, experienced, knowledgable, and earnest. Give him that.
One would think that someone in the CIA would say (even if this were true), "OK, Bagley went overboard on Nosenko. One mistake in a lifetime of high-quality service. Assign Bagley to an equal position elsewhere."
But instead Bagley is jettisoned.
Reminds me of the US Ambassador to Mexico, Mann, and Charles Thomas, the State Department guy in MC, both of whom thought LHO was a G2 asset.
They were jettisoned too.
There was streak there in the 1960s-70s when even suspecting KGB-G2 in the JFKA was radioactive.
That is normal?
Seems fishy like the National Aquarium.
Dear "BC,"
1970 was eight years before Hart was tasked by his former buddy at CIA Saigon, DCI William Colby (who, "ironically," seems to have had an unacknowledged relationship with a KGB agent in Vietnam), to divert attention from Nosenko's lies and contradictions by concentrating on smearing the reputations of Bagley and Chief of Soviet Russia Division, David E. Murphy, and lying profusely about how they had so grossly misunderstood and tortured him.
Of course, before Hart testified to the HSCA, he had written his anti-Golitsyn / anti-Angleton "Monster Plot" report in 1976.
ME: Who tasked John L. Hart with writing his 1976 article on Golitsyn's and Angleton's "paranoiac Monster Plot"?
GROK: John L. Hart was tasked with writing his 1976 study—titled "The Monster Plot: Counterintelligence in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" (often called the "Monster Plot" report or memo) — by CIA Director William Colby.
Hart, a retired CIA officer who had previously served in the Soviet Russia Division and handled aspects of the Nosenko case, was recalled from retirement in 1976 specifically for this assignment. The task lasted about six months and involved reviewing files, interviewing key figures (including James Angleton), and producing a critical assessment of the Counterintelligence Staff's handling of defectors Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko.
• The report argued that Angleton and Golitsyn's theories (including the "Monster Plot" or "master plot" of widespread KGB deception, moles in Western services, and Nosenko as a dispatched plant) were paranoid, unsubstantiated, and damaging to CIA personnel and operations. It defended Nosenko's bona fides and portrayed the prolonged skepticism as excessive.
• This was part of the post-Angleton era reforms under Colby (DCI 1973–1976), who had forced Angleton's dismissal in late 1974 amid mole-hunt fallout, Church Committee scrutiny, and efforts to curb counterintelligence excesses. Colby's directive aligned with broader CIA internal reviews to reevaluate controversial cases and restore balance after the "Family Jewels" exposures and congressional investigations.
• Sources confirming Colby's role include:
• Declassified CIA documents and histories (e.g., references in FOIA releases and internal memos).
• Secondary accounts, such as in Richards Heuer's analysis of the Nosenko case (where Hart is noted as recalled to investigate the "master plot" or "monster plot").
• MuckRock reporting on the "Monster Plot" report, tying it to the Colby-era reevaluation of Angleton's legacy.
• The report itself (dated December 1976) and related HSCA discussions (where it was referenced in 1978 hearings).
The study was an internal CIA document, not a public "article," though it later influenced HSCA testimony (Hart defended it before the committee in 1978). Angleton viewed it as libelous and inaccurate, as did some skeptics like Tennent Bagley, but it became a key pro-Nosenko, anti-"paranoia" counter-narrative within the agency. No sources indicate anyone other than Colby (or his office) as the tasker.
ME: What did Bagley say about Hart's "Monster Plot" report in his book,
Spy Wars?
GROK: In his 2007 book
Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games, Tennent H. "Pete" Bagley harshly criticized John L. Hart's 1976 "Monster Plot" report (formally titled "The Monster Plot: Counterintelligence in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko") as a key part of the "whitewash" of Yuri Nosenko's bona fides and an unfair attack on James Angleton, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and the skeptics (including Bagley himself).Bagley portrayed Hart's report as:
A biased, pro-Nosenko document that affirmed "total trust" in Nosenko while dismissing Angleton and Golitsyn's theories of widespread KGB deception (the so-called "Monster Plot" or "master plot" involving moles, disinformation, and Nosenko as a dispatched agent to discredit Golitsyn) as paranoid and unsubstantiated.
An attempt to discredit the counterintelligence approach by labeling it a "myth" or "paranoiac" overreach, without adequately addressing factual inconsistencies in Nosenko's accounts (e.g., on Oswald, KGB procedures, and overlaps/contradictions with Golitsyn's information).
Part of a broader bureaucratic effort under William Colby (who tasked Hart) to rehabilitate Nosenko's image, end the lingering controversy from the 1960s handling, and shift blame onto Angleton and his allies for operational damage and personnel harm during the mole hunt.
Inaccurate and damaging to reputations—Bagley viewed it (along with Hart's later 1978 HSCA testimony) as misrepresenting his own role, exaggerating or fabricating claims of mistreatment of Nosenko, and ignoring evidence that supported the "plant" theory.
Bagley did not quote the report extensively but referenced it in the context of defending Angleton/Golitsyn against what he saw as a "myth" propagated by Hart and others (e.g., Leonard McCoy, Bruce Solie). He argued that Hart's conclusions relied on selective file reviews, ignored key anomalies Bagley had documented (like his "Thousand Pager" [835 pages] of Nosenko inconsistencies), and contributed to the narrative that the skeptics' views were "sick think" or excessive paranoia—thus whitewashing Nosenko's credibility and exonerating the KGB of deeper deception.
Bagley also tied this to Hart's HSCA testimony (1978), where Hart defended Nosenko and criticized Bagley's division for bias and mishandling; Bagley rebutted this forcefully in his own HSCA appearance and letter to chief counsel G. Robert Blakey. In Spy Wars, Bagley positioned Hart's report as emblematic of the post-Angleton CIA's desire to close ranks, discredit the mole-hunt era, and prioritize operational utility over rigorous counterintelligence scrutiny.
Overall, Bagley saw the "Monster Plot" report not as objective analysis but as a partisan effort to rewrite history in favor of Nosenko's defenders, further entrenching what he called the flawed clearance under Solie.
-- "TG"
