JFK Assassination Forum
Off Topic => News - Off Topic - Weird & Wacky => Topic started by: Thomas Graves on August 12, 2019, 12:18:28 AM
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Coming here soon, if I can do it on my android ...
-- MWT ;)
PS Nope. I'll have to wait until I get a new power adapter for my out-of-juice laptop.
You can find the 17-page PDF, yourself, if you google monster plot cia.
Meanwhile, here's an interesting article about it by one of my heroes, Emma Best:
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/oct/20/angleton-monster-plot/
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Here is The Monster Plot, in the recent Archives release
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10534-10205.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/9EF52AFC-1392-4C0D-9196-70AF26342C69.png?ver=1566049803303)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/DE860B8E-8AE1-4EBB-BE1C-EC9273D2050E.png?ver=1566049807636)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/672FA8FD-08F5-4E25-9DF3-4E6F46352B1B.png?ver=1566049807636)
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Coming here soon, if I can do it on my android ...
-- MWT ;)
PS Nope. I'll have to wait until I get a new power adapter for my out-of-juice laptop.
You can find the 17-page PDF, yourself, if you google monster plot cia.
Meanwhile, here's an interesting article about it by one of my heroes, Emma Best:
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/oct/20/angleton-monster-plot/
Right now, this thread is titled: THE MONSTER PLOT, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
Thomas, the report is 172 pages. Not 17 pages. Have you read it? No, you haven’t, you are a dogmatist amongst researchers, searchers and the curious.
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https://ia800801.us.archive.org/17/items/MonsterPlot/104-10534-10205.pdf
Thank you very much, Michael!
Now, would you like to know what former chief of the CIA's Soviet Russia Division's Counter- intelligence section, Tennent H. Bagley, said about Hart's opus magus in his excellent 2007 book, Spy Wars?
-- MWT ;)
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Right now, this thread is titled: THE MONSTER PLOT, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
Yes! And you'd better keep an eye on me in case I try to very deviously change the title in order to fool everyone here and thereby further the goals that the evil, evil, evil CIA has given me!
(sarcasm)
-- MWT ;)
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Well, it looks as though Michael's busy composing a monster post for this thread, so I guess I'll hold of until he finishes it so I can post my next short-but-sweet one and "cover" it!
-- MWT ;)
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Right now, this thread is titled: THE MONSTER PLOT, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
Thomas, the report is 172 pages. Not 17 pages. Have you read it? No, you haven’t, you are a dogmatist amongst researchers, searchers and the curious.
Michael,
Have I read it?
LOL
Of course I've read it. Just now. I'm a speed reader.
What would you like to know about it (from, of course, the viewpoints of Tennent H. Bagley and/or true defectors Pyotr Deriabin and Anatoliy Golitsyn, and/or Bagley's post Cold War friend, Sergei Kondrashev, et al.)?
-- MWT ;)
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Well, it looks as though Michael's busy composing a monster post for this thread, so I guess I'll hold of until he finishes it so I can post my next short-but-sweet one and "cover" it!
-- MWT ;)
It’s going to be a while. I am transcribing it.
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It’s going to be a while. I am transcribing it.
Oh, goodie!
In the meantime, while 24 of us are still waiting, is it okay if we read Tennent H. Bagley's excellent 35-page PDF, Ghosts of the Spy Wars, in which he mentions your boy Hart's brother-in-arms, Leonard MCCoy, twenty-five times?
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
Have you read it yet, btw?
Personal question:
If not, why not? Too darn busy reading Hart's totally wrong and CIA-undermining 186-page The Monster Plot?
Pity that.
-- MWT ;)
PS Did you know that Hart's wife was also CIA, and that ...
https://archive.org/details/nsia-CIAPaisleyJohnA
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....
If not, why not? Too darn busy reading Hart's totally wrong and CIA-undermining 186-page The Monster Plot?
.....
-- MWT ;)
How do you know that Hart is “Totally Wrong” if you have not read his work?
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How do you know that Hart is “Totally Wrong” if you have not read his work?
Michael,
I have read all 186 pages of Hart's Monster Plot.
It gave me a headache and made me feel nauseous because in it he says things that only a gullible, wishful-thinking person who was abjectly inexperienced in counterintelligence against the KGB and GRU would say, or even worse, that a KGB or GRU mole in the CIA would say.
I'll give him the benefit of the doubt, though, and assume that he was just a spiteful and under-endowed dude who didn't know what the hell he was talking about.
Have you read Bagley's 2007 book, Spy Wars, or even watched, in toto, John Newman's two-part Spy Wars presentation from March, 2018?
By the way, why are you so silent about the fact that Newman was so convinced by Bagley's writings that he, in turn, convinced none other than Peter Dale Scott that Bagley was correct in his assessment of Nosenko, i.e., that Nosenko was a false defector sent here to detract from what Anatoliy Golitsyn was telling CIA about possible moles and triple-agents in CIA, the FBI, and in some of our European allies' countries?
Do you think Bagley's writings somehow fooled Newman, and fooled him so thoroughly that Newman himself somehow unwittingly fooled Scott?
Why are you so silent about that, Michael?
Is it too uncomfortable an issue for you to even think about, Bagley-detractor-and-despiser that that you are? Are you too proud to admit that Bagley must have been right about Nosenko (and Cherepanov and Loginov and Kochnov and Kulak and Polyakov and ...)?
-- MWT ;)
PS Do you want me to enumerate, with commentary, everything Hart was wrong about in his magus opus?
I will, but only on one condition -- that you try to rebut -- with your own reasoning and your own words -- every single point I make, ... and we'll do them one-by-one, you and I. In other words, I ain't going on to the "next" point until you've tried to rebut the one we are on at the time.
Otherwise, why should I knock myself out knowing that you probably won't even read what I've written?
Which reminds me, have you read and understood the ten enumerated points I made about Cherepanov and Loginov, et al., in my long post about Heuer's fallacious Five Paths to Judgement?
Perhaps we should start with that, what do you say, Michael?
As I recall, my very first point was about Cherepanov ...
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Michael,
........
Thomas. Don’t you get it? Do you understand that there are those that who want to absorb information, and then there a fan-boys?
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Thomas. Don’t you get it? Do you understand that there are those that who want to absorb information, and then there a fan-boys?
Michael,
Unfortunately, there's alway's a ready supply of spiteful, under-endowed, gullible wishful-thinkers (like Heuer, McCoy, Hart, and Solie) who are more than happy to be brainwashed by someone like Yuri Nosenko or James "Jumbo Duh" DiEugenio, but you're smarter than that, aren't you, so why ally yourself with those losers?
Btw, why are so silent about John Newman's and Peter Dale Scott's epiphanies, compliments of Bagley's Spy Wars and Spy Master, about the true nature of Yuri Nosenko's "bona fides"?
Is it something that you've obliterated from your memory because it's just too doggone painful to contemplate?
Do you really think Bagley so thoroughly fooled Newman as to enable Newman to unwittingly fool Scott into believing Nosenko was a false defector, after all?
Is it something that you simply refuse to talk about in public?
-- MWT ;)
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Michael,
Unfortunately, there's alway's a ready supply of spiteful, under-endowed, gullible wishful-thinkers (like Heuer, McCoy, Hart, and Solie) who are more than happy to be brainwashed by someone like Yuri Nosenko or James "Jumbo Duh" DiEugenio, but you're smarter than that, aren't you, so why ally yourself with those losers?
Btw, why are so silent about John Newman's and Peter Dale Scott's epiphanies, compliments of Bagley's Spy Wars and Spy Master, about the true nature of Yuri Nosenko's "bona fides"?
Is it something that you've obliterated from your memory because it's just too doggone painful to contemplate?
Do you really think Bagley so thoroughly fooled Newman as to enable Newman to unwittingly fool Scott into believing Nosenko was a false defector, after all?
Is it something that you simply refuse to talk about in public?
-- MWT ;)
Thomas, Don’t you get that When it comes to dealing with you, I don’t answer questions, I ask them? Don’t you see that you have set-up this game? Do you think anyone should answer your endless, inane questions, when you answer none?
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Thomas, Don’t you get that When it comes to dealing with you, I don’t answer questions, I ask them? Don’t you see that you have set-up this game? Do you think anyone should answer your endless, inane questions, when you answer none?
Michael,
Edit: Please freshen my memory -- What specific questions about Nosenko and/or the other KGB/GRU false defectors and triple-agents would you like to ask me?
Edit: What specific questions of yours have I refused to answer? (That sounds like a spurious accusation on your part, but maybe I've forgotten or overlooked something.)
.......
How can you ask your questions (what questions?) in good faith, and continue to post your de facto KGB-approved articles and "documents," when you realize (as you must surely realize by now) that you neither know what the heck you're talking about nor what you're (unwittingly I'm pretty sure) propagandizing for?
Statement: If you don't answer questions but only ask them, doesn't that mark you as a "newbie," a stigma that you tried to disassociate yourself from as quickly as possible at the EF about two years ago?
Question: How do you reconcile, in your own mind, Bagley's, Newman's and Scott's "take" on Nosenko with your own (evidently ongoing) overall hatred/despising/disbelieving of Bagley and anything CIA (other than Kovich, Kisevalter, McCoy, Hart, Solie, Cram, Colby, Agee, and their ilk, of course)?
Question: If you aren't willing to answer my questions, why, then, do you keep chiming in on my threads and replying to my posts in others?
To ask questions? (What questions?)
To demand that I refute something that some spiteful and/or under-endowed CIA officer wrote at least 20 years before Bagley's Spy Wars was published?
To "educate" newbies before I have a chance to "get to" them with my sharing of evil, evil, evil Bagley-and-Angleton's "world view"?
LOL
Why in the world should I knock myself out doing that, when you can find the same darn answers I would give you in "Spy Wars," the 2007 book written by the first guy to interview "walk in" Nosenko in Geneva in 1962 (before probable mole and fluent Russian speaker George Kisevalter barged in to "help" Bagley, even though Golitsyn spoke good English, Bagley understood Russian, and they could communicate with each other just fine), who continued interviewing Nosenko for about five days in Geneva, who later became chief of Soviet Russia Division's Counterintelligence Section, and who not only met with and helped Nosenko "defect" to the U.S. in January 1964, but interrogated (without torturing -- sorry) Nosenko for three years in the U.S., who was, importantly given access to Golitsyn's top-secret file by none other than James Angleton, and who, most importantly, was smart enough and experienced enough to realize, upon reading said file, that there was something very fishy, indeed, about Nosenko's strangely Golitsyn-overlapping but Golitsyn-contradicting ... narrative?
I'm talking about Tennent H. Bagley, of course. His book 2007 book Spy Wars is very detailed and very well annotated and sourced, so I'm sure that it can answer all of your questions to your probable dissatisfaction, and do so even better than I could -- even though my answers would be based 100 per cent on his book.
-- MWT ;)
PS PDS's grudging "confession" come at 34:48, iirc.
PPS The sixty-four thousand dollar question: Why the heck should I continue to even communicate with you, knowing, from past experience, that the wisdom and knowledge I try to impart to you more than likely will go "in one ear and out the other"?
That is if it even gets that far.
Hmm?
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Michael,....
That is if it even gets that far.
Hmm?
Thomas,
Don’t you realize that if one wants or hear from you all they have to do is read Tenant Bagely? Don’t you see that you have kind made yourself irrelevant, and made the name “Bagely” the last name that anyone wants to hear ever again?
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Thomas,
Don’t you realize that if one wants or hear from you all they have to do is read Tenant Bagely? Don’t you see that you have kind made yourself irrelevant, and made the name “Bagely” the last name that anyone wants to hear ever again?
Michael,
I believe that those are merely suggestions, made out of sheer and utter desperation, that more open-minded readers will simply not accept.
Regardless, how can you continue to denigrate Tennent H. Bagley (and, in effect, extol false defector Yuri Nosenko and all of the other false defectors and triple agents who tried to support his "bona fides") given the fact that 1) Bagley did not imprison false defector Yuri Nosenko, 2) Bagley did not torture false defector Yuri Nosenko, and 3) Bagley convinced Professor John M. Newman (and venerable Peter Dale Scott through Newman) that false defector Yuri Nosenko was ... a false defector?
You didn't realize that Bagley had convinced Newman and Scott like that until I brought it to your attention about a month ago, yet, even though you do know it now, you continue to spew what amounts to anti-Bagley, anti-Angleton / pro-Nosenko, pro-KGB propaganda here and at the EF.
What's up with that, Michael?
Do you realize how incredibly silly, biased and ... especially with the short, non-responsive replies you tend to make ... desperate you look?
-- MWT ;)
PS You've accused me of not answering your questions.
What questions, Michael?
What questions, Michael??
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Michael,
...you continue to denigrate Tennent H. Bagley (and, in effect, extol false defector Yuri Nosenko and all of the other false defectors and triple agents who tried to support his "bona fides")
....you continue to spew what amounts to anti-Bagley, anti-Angleton / pro-Nosenko, pro-KGB propaganda here and at the EF.
.....
Do you realize how incredibly silly, biased and ... especially with the short, non-responsive replies you tend to make ... desperate you look?
-- MWT ;)
Priceless...
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Priceless...
Michael,
Exactly.
Maybe you should print it out and tape it on the ceiling directly over your bed so you can meditate on its wisdom!
Regardless, those replies to me in which you actually use your own words seem to be getting not only less frequent, but shorter and shorter, as well. Why is that, Michael?
A tangential observation and ... gasp ... a question:
Observation -- You've accused me recently of not answering your questions.
Question -- WHAT questions, Michael??
-- MWT ;)
PS How in the world are you ever going to reconcile your "world view" with the fact that a year-and-a-half ago, John Newman, having read Tennent H. Bagley's Spy Wars and Spy Master, convinced none other than Peter Dale Scott that, contrary to what Leonard McCoy, John L. Hart, Bruce Solie and Richards J. Heuer said a long, long time ago, Yuri Nosenko was ... gulp ... a false defector?
Hmm?
I mean, I mean, I mean ... Shouldn't you just "throw in the towel" and get into stamp collecting, or Jeep maintenance ... or something?
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Michael,
Why the heck should I continue to even communicate with you, knowing, from past experience, that the wisdom and knowledge I try to impart to you more than likely will go "in one ear and out the other"?
It’s not wisdom, it’s dogma. And heading in one ear and out the other is the best path through which dogma can be routed.
To be sure, coming from you, it’s dogma. Coming from PDS or Newman it’s valuable research.
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In the meantime, while 24 of us are still waiting, is it okay if we read Tennent H. Bagley's excellent 35-page PDF, Ghosts of the Spy Wars, in which he mentions your boy Hart's brother-in-arms, Leonard MCCoy, twenty-five times?
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
It is interesting that in the page you linked there is no mention made of the “Master Plot” or, obviously, “Monster Plot”.
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Newman does not think that the KGB or Cuba had anything to do with the JFK Assassination
Newman is not fully convinced of Golitsyn’s Bona Fide’s, neither is Peter Dale Scott.
Newman never mentions Heuer
Newman never mentions Hart
Newman never mentions the Monster or Master Plot
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Newman does not think that the KGB or Cuba had anything to do with the JFK Assassination
Newman is not fully convinced of Golitsyn’s Bona Fide’s, neither is Peter Dale Scott.
Newman never mentions Heuer
Newman never mentions Hart
Newman never mentions the Monster or Master Plot
Michael,
Excellent observations on your part! (Well, some of them, anyway.) But please bear in mind -- Newman didn't say the Cubbies was gonna win the World Series this year, neither.
.....
Front-and-center "stage edge" aside to the payin' audience:
What does it really matter that, in the context of our little "debate" about "The Monster Plot," that Newman (probably mistakenly) believes that the evil, evil, evil CIA was solely responsible for the assassination of our beloved president -- whom I was lucky enough to see give a commencement address on "education" at San Diego State College [sic] in June of 1963?
.....
I guess you finally got around to watching both parts (or ... ?).
Regardless, none of the "issues" you raise address the overall point, i.e., that Nosenko was a false defector, sent here to detract from and to contradict what Golitsyn was imperfectly trying, due to his having incomplete information, to tell CIA about a couple of moles -- Edward Ellis Smith, and/or someone in SR Division -- George Kisevalter? Richard Kovich? -- whom HE'D helped KGB to recruit), the never-uncovered cipher clerk "Jack" (recruited in 1949 by Sergei Kondrashev), and oodles and gobs of false defectors/triple agents in U.S. Intelligence, not to mention oodles of gobs of moles, false-defectors and triple-agents in the intelligence services of our allies (France's especially).
In other words, in retrospect there really was something to Golitsyn's "Master Plot," which plot was devised by KGB in 1959, put into effect with the dispatching of GRU colonel Dimitri Polyakov to NYC (the UN) that same year, and "activated" with Polyakov's "volunteering" (after Pekovsky had been brought back to Moscow and "cornered like a bear in its den") to secretly work for the FBI and CIA (but never contributing a dang actionable thang while stationed in the U.S.).
Hey, it may make you feel better vis-a-vis The Assassination that Nosenko's lying about KGB's "not having even interviewed LHO in the USSR" -- i.e., telling CIA what it desperately wanted to hear 7 weeks after the assassination -- was JUST a great "ice breaker" for Nosenko, whether or not the Ruskies were behind the assassination, don't you agree?
Hmm. Okay.
Just to focus on your boy Heuer for a moment --
A (if not "The") major theme in Heuer's Five Paths to Judgement is that Nosenko was a true defector, gosh darn it, and that he was unjustly accused of being a false one by Bagley and Angleton due to their foolishly and inexpertly applying five analytical "approaches" to his case, and that, concomitantly, all of the "alleged" triple-agents and false defectors (like Kulak, Cherepanov, Loginov and Kochnov, for example) who had effectively vouched for Nosenko's being a true defector were not triple-agents or false defectors at all, but actually pro-CIA good guys, pure-as-the-driven-snow and eminently trustworthy sources for CIA and the FBI!
LOL
Maybe you should watch it again (both parts), and take notes this time.
-- MWT ;)
PS You got Newman's "take" on Golitsyn all wrong, Michael.
Newman has no problems with Golitsyn' bona fides per se.
Maybe you should look up the definition of "bona fides" and watch that bit near the end of Part Two, again.
Ask yourself this question:
How could Newman question Golitsyn's bona fides on the one hand, but so totally accept what Bagley had told him (in Spy Wars and Spy Master) regarding the implications of Golitsyn's insider revelations on the other -- as to cause CTer Newman to ... gasp ... actually agree with Bagley that ... gasp ... Nosenko was a false defector, after all?
LOL
Did you intentionally mis-characterize Newman's opinions of Golitsyn, Michael?
If so, why?
Isn't that sort of thing against Forum rules?
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Note: The title of this thread, right now, is “The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!”
Michael,..............
Excellent observations on your part!
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How could Newman ...... so totally accept what Bagley had told him (in Spy Wars and Spy Master) ....?
John Hart’s “Monster Wars” was not released to the public until November of 2017. Newman’s presentation came on March 3 of 2018. Perhaps he didn’t know about it, hadn’t read it, and perhaps he never read Heuer’s “Nosenko: Five paths to judgement”. He never mentioned either. Unlike you, a credible person would want to maintain credibility with his or her peers by acknowledging the most relevant counter treatments on your subject and address the counterarguments.
You simply refer to anyone who does not agree with you as tinfoil hat wearers, traitors, liars, KGB lovers, buddies of Putin or Stalin or some other-such nonsense.
Newman is not fully convinced of Golitsyn’s Bona Fide’s, neither is Peter Dale Scott.
Newman never mentions Heuer
Newman never mentions Hart
Newman never mentions the Monster or Master Plot
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“Q. Are you convinced of Golytsin’s bona fides?
Newman: Yeah I think he probably is bona fide. But I think Peter’s point is that once you’re here so many years and and he’s getting all this special treatment from Angleton. He’s looking out for his own interest. I believe in his initial debriefing. Don’t you agree with that?
Peter Dale Scott: I don’t know.”
Michael,
Exactly.
Thanks for posting that.
"Probably is bona fide" meaning, "Yes, probably even after mid-1964, and certainly good enough before that for Bagley, Angleton, Miler, and me (John Newman) to trust and believe regarding the shenanigans of 'The Three Musketeers,' et al., to help us come to the correct conclusion that Nosenko was a false defector, and to help us see that the only way to judge the actions of Cherepanov, Ivanov, Polyakov, Kulak, and Kochnov (who fooled the pants off of Bruce Solie) et al., as they tried to decieve us into believing he was a true defector, is to realize that they were part-and-parcel of a 1959-on intertwining of KGB traditional "active measures" counterintelligence operations with brand new SCD (FSB) Department 14 "strategic deception" counterintelligence operations, waged primarily against the U.S., aka the Kremlin's "Main Adversary" as of 1959, ... so ...gasp ... yeah ... a true 'Monster Plot,' if that's what anyone wants to call it, if that'swhat turns you on, bucko."
-- MWT ;)
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Michael,
Exactly.
Thanks for posting that.
"Probably is bona fide" meaning "yes, probably even after mid-1964, and certainly good enough earlier for Bagley, Angleton, Miler, and me (John Newman) to trust and believe regarding the shenanigans of 'The Three Musketeers,' et al., to help us come to the correct conclusion that Nosenko was a false defector, and to help us see that the only way to judge the actions of Cherepanov, Ivanov, Polyakov, Kulak, and Kochnov (who fooled the pants off of Bruce Solie) et al., as they tried to decieve us into believing he was a true defector, is to realize that they were part-and-parcel of a 1959-on intertwining of KGB traditional "active measures" counterintelligence operations with brand new SCD (FSB) Department 14 "strategic deception" counterintelligence operations, waged primarily against the U.S., aka the Kremlin's "Main Adversary" as of 1959, ... so ...gasp ... yeah ... a true 'Monster Plot,' if that's what anyone wants to call it, if that'swhat turns you on, bucko."
-- MWT ;)
I just wanted to capture one of Thomas’ ever-morphing, nonsensical, impossible sentenceoids in one of it’s bizarre morphological states.
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I just wanted to capture one of Thomas’ ever-morphing, nonsensical, impossible sentenceoids in one of it’s bizarre morphological states.
Michael,
It it too complicated for you to understand? Too Russian Doll-like, too convoluted, too many Russian names?
Or is it too much like Gonzo Journalism?
(I hope so.)
If so, maybe I can edit it or rephrase it for you and make it simple enough for you to get a "handle" on, but if I do that, seein' as how you've already covered it with a short nonsensical post, I'd probably get banned again for "bumping," and you'd be the bigger loser because you'd probably ... gasp ... never "get it".
(Not that you ever could "get it," mind you, capable though you almost certainly are.)
-- MWT ;)
PS Is this how you "capture" things?
Kinda like a "screen capture" that you might forward to James "The Poser" Gordon at the EF, or just save in The Cloud or on your own Hard Drive for any future extrajudicial "case" you might bring some day?
Or did you "capture" it and post it here to impress something upon the 51 guests who were still reading this thread when I started typing this (and still are, btw) ?
PPS It's kinda funny (in a sad way) how you resort to "hijinks" like this whenever you realize that you're losing yet another "debate" with me.
Hmm.
Edit: I see you're currently composing something to post here. I guess I'll hold off until you've actually posted it before I post my next rather short (and probably nonresponsive) one to "cover" it ...
"Turnabout is fair play," eh?
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Michael,
......
... you realize that you're losing yet another "debate" with me.
I’m not losing. I’m not even debating you. I’m just throwing water on your Bagely / Spy Wars parade by pointing out that Bagely was castrated for his Nosenko failure, his folly was condemned by two CIA studies that remained classified for years, and the paranoid culture that he and Angleton propagated was lampooned. Yet, you continue to believe in the Monsters under the bed myth, that the KGB got LHO to Kill JFK and now Putin is trying to slip under YOUR bed at the first chance he gets.
I don’t have to debate you. All I have to do is present the refutations and renunciations of Bagley’s former CIA colleagues. Your theory isn’t suitable for the recycle bin, everyone is tired of hearing it, and I am simply exploring the proof that it has long been proven to be a joke. The CIA documents speak for themselves, Bagely speaks for Bagely; what would you expect.
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32359254.pdf
TOP SECRET
13 October 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: BAGELY, Tennant, Harrington
#386 38
1) On Wednesday, 7 October 1970 I briefed Colonel L. K. White, Executive Director-Controller on certain reservations I have concerning the proposed promotion of subject to a supergrade position.
2) I was very careful to explain to Colonel White at the outset that my reservations had nothing whatsoever to do with Bagely's security status. I explained that it was my conviction that Bagely was almost exclusively responsible for the manner in which the Nosenko case had been handled by our SR division. I said I considered that Bagely lacked objectivity and that he had displayed extremely poor judgment over a two year period in the handling of this case. Specifically as one example of Bagely's extreme prejudice I pointed out that the SR division had neglected to follow up several leads provided by Nosenko which subsequently had been followed up by this office (Bruce Solie) and that this lead us to individuals who have confessed their recruitment and use by the Soviets over an extensive period of time.
3) I explained further that Bagely displayed extremely poor judgment in the actions he took during that time that Nosenko was incarcerated at ISOLATION. On many occasions, as the individual responsible for Nosenko's care, I refuse to condone Bagely's instructions to my people who are guarding him. In one instance Bagely insisted that Nosenko's food ration be reduced to black bread and water three times daily. After I had briefed Colonel White, he indicated that he would refresh the Director's memory on Bagely's role in the Nosenko case at the time he reviews supergrade promotions.
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
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The Monster Plot by John Hart
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10534-10205.pdf
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Richards Heuer: Nosenko, Five Paths to Judgement
http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/
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I’m not losing. I’m not even debating you. I’m just throwing water on your Bagely / Spy Wars parade by pointing out that Bagely was castrated for his Nosenko failure, his folly was reaffirmed by two CIA studies that remained classified for years, and the paranoid culture that he and Angleton propagated was lampooned. Yet, you continue believe in the Monsters under the bed myth, that the KGB got LHO to Kill JFK and Putin is trying to slip under your bed at the first chance he gets.
I don’t have to debate you. All I have to do is present the refutations and renunciations of Bailey’s former CIA colleagues. Your theory isn’t suitable for the recycle bin, everyone is tired of hearing it, and I am simply exploring the proof that it has long been proven to be a joke. The CIA documents speak for themselves, Bagely speaks for Bagely; what would you expect.
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32359254.pdf
TOP SECRET
13 October 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: BAGELY, Tennant, Harrington
#386 38
1) On Wednesday, 7 October 1970 I briefed Colonel L. K. White, Executive Director-Controller on certain reservations I have concerning the proposed promotion of subject to a supergrade position.
2) I was very careful to explain to Colonel White at the outset that my reservations had nothing whatsoever to do with Bagely's security status. I explained that it was my conviction that Bagely was almost exclusively responsible for the manner in which the Nosenko case had been handled by our SR division. I said I considered that Bagely lacked objectivity and that he had displayed extremely poor judgment over a two year period in the handling of this case. Specifically as one example of Bagely's extreme prejudice I pointed out that the SR division had neglected to follow up several leads provided by Nosenko which subsequently had been followed up by this office (Bruce Solie) and that this lead us to individuals who have confessed their recruitment and use by the Soviets over an extensive period of time.
3) I explained further that Bagely displayed extremely poor judgment in the actions he took during that time that Nosenko was incarcerated at ISOLATION. On many occasions, as the individual responsible for Nosenko's care, I refuse to condone Bagely's instructions to my people who are guarding him. In one instance Bagely insisted that Nosenko's food ration be reduced to black bread and water three times daily. After I had briefed Colonel White, he indicated that he would refresh the Director's memory on Bagely's role in the Nosenko case at the time he reviews supergrade promotions.
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
———————————————————————-
The Monster Plot by John Hart
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10534-10205.pdf
————————————————————————
Richards Heuer: Nosenko, Five Paths to Judgement
http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/
Michael,
It's interesting, isn't it, that, as Professor John Newman says in one of those videos, Tennent H. Bagley was considered by many in CIA to be on the fast track to becoming Director of CIA, and, as I've read elsewhere (I can't remember where right now -- I hope that's okay with you) that Bagley always got excellent performance reviews and got a highly regarded commendation upon retiring.
Nosenko was ... gasp ... incarcerated ... IN ISOLATION?
Oh My God!
Uhh ... How else should he have been incarcerated, Michael, seein' as how David Murphy (the guy who had him incarcerated), Bagley, and that evil, evil, evil James Angleton were convinced, based on several "interviews" of Nosenko -- both in Geneva in 1962 and after he had "defected" to the U.S. in January, 1964 -- and by comparing Nosenko's implausible and ever-changing stories in those easy-goin' interviews (during which Nosenko drank Scotch like a fish but never got drunk) with:
1) what Bagley & Co. already knew about Nosenko's dissembling, self-contradicting ways AND about tangential cases, and
2) what true defector Golitsyn was telling CIA (and which was verified or at least deemed plausible by true defector Pyotr Deriabin) ...
... well, gosh darn it, they were already convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB Plant, and thought (with the exception of Angleton, who wanted to "play" Nosenko like a five-pound trout) that all they had to do was "break" him -- without ... gasp ... waterboarding or applying electric shocks to the you-know-whats, or pulling fingernails, etc -- which, btw, they darn near did ("break" him, that is), once or twice finding him reduced, after a particularly hard but non-violent line of questioning, to muttering to himself in a trance-like state, "If I admit to that, I'll be TOTALLY screwed," or words to that effect ...
Incarcerated like Jack Nicholson in One Flew Over The Cukoo's Nest, Michael? Rubbin' elbows with Big Chief and The Boyz, or maybe incarcerated like Jeffrey Epstein was ... the first time?
LOL
OMG
In Spy Wars, Bagley says that some "spiteful, under-endowed" CIA officers caused wishful-thinking/"let's move beyond this mess" CIA leadership to conclude, erroneously, that Nosenko was a true defector.
Your Howard J. Osborn had been chief of the Soviet Russia Division for a only a short time when he was replaced by David Murphy, and Osborn's boy, Bruce "Gumshoe" Solie, was not only totally snookered by triple-agent Kochnov into losing a true defector (Artamanov) in the Kittyhawk Affair, but bamboozled by triple-agent Loginov (who, btw, was still alive and doing business in Moscow in 2004, according to Bagley) into believing that Nosenko was ... gasp ... a true defector.
Nobody wants to know that they are incompetent or that they've been fooled, and when confronted with facts that tend to indicate that they are incompetent or gullible, many, like Osborn and Solie, become ... well ... spiteful.
It's an unfortunate but natural human reaction.
Question: Do you disagree with Newman and Scott that Nosenko was a false defector, Michael? If so, why? Don't you trust their expertise and judgement on such matters?
To be continued, Michael, but I gonna do it in "installments" so that I might more efficiently "cover" your since-debunked, "broken record" old CIA documents-based posts. Interested members and guests can read about some of the stuff I touched upon, above, in this excellent book:
https://archive.org/stream/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames/Spy%20Wars%20-%20Moles%2C%20Mysteries%2C%20and%20Deadly%20Games_djvu.txt
Have you read it yet, Michael?
-- Mudd Wrassler Tommy ;)
-
The first recorded dissent, therefore, came from outside SR division, and it was a tentative one. A senior Plans Directorate psychologist had been asked to interview Nosenko in depth, which he did during the series of meetings between the third and 21st of May 1965. As a result of his questioning he became convinced, that, at the very least, Nosenko was in fact Nosenko. Even this rather bland assertion, however, was met by Bagely with the statement, “there are things in this case that you do not know about.” Nonetheless, in summing up the sessions, the psychologist had this to say: I am totally at a loss to even attempt to rationalize why a story with this much pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing could be served other than to discredit the man to whom it was assigned. In some remote sense to me it might have been felt it would evoke sympathy but this is really far out and a very dangerous gamble on their part. The manner in which he has told his story and the nuances he has introduced would require great ingenuity and preparation. From my standpoint, he has been essentially convincing and accurate in general if not always truthful in detail. Here I am talking about the psychological data only, I am not prepared to express an opinion on other aspects. Within whatever frame of reference I can operate, I am forced to conclude that all the psychological evidence would indicate that he is Nosenko, the son of Ivan Nosenko. His life story is essentially as he described it. It is obviously distorted in places but in each case there is probable psychological reasons for the distortion and deception. No man is a good reporter on himself and we all use rationalization to avoid seeing ourselves as others see us. My opinion, for whatever it’s worth, is that Nosenko cannot be broken outside the context of his life story and personality structure. It should be noted here that the life story is completely compatible with the personality structure as projected by psychological tests.
The psychologist claims now that he had more doubts about the validity of the SR view of Nosenko then he felt it wise to express. The following excerpt from the memorandum of a conversation, dated fourth August 1976, gives his memory of the situation facing him:
In discussing his lengthly series of interviews with Nosenko on 3-21 May 1965, he ( The psychologist ) said that he was very hesitant to express the full extent of his doubts about the theory that Nosenko was a KGB dispatched agent. The reason for his hesitation was that, when Bagely got a hint of (the psychologist’s) doubts about the theory, Bagely told the psychologist that such doubts might make (the psychologist) suspect himself of being involved in the KGB Nosenko plan.
-
From “The Monster Plot”
The first recorded dissent, therefore, came from outside SR division, and it was a tentative one. A senior Plans Directorate psychologist had been asked to interview Nosenko in depth, which he did during the series of meetings between the third and 21st of May 1965. As a result of his questioning he became convinced, that, at the very least, Nosenko was in fact Nosenko. Even this rather bland assertion, however, was met by Bagely with the statement, “there are things in this case that you do not know about.” Nonetheless, in summing up the sessions, the psychologist had this to say: I am totally at a loss to even attempt to rationalize why a story with this much pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing could be served other than to discredit the man to whom it was assigned. In some remote sense to me it might have been felt it would evoke sympathy but this is really far out and a very dangerous gamble on their part. The manner in which he has told his story and the nuances he has introduced would require great ingenuity and preparation. From my standpoint, he has been essentially convincing and accurate in general if not always truthful in detail. Here I am talking about the psychological data only, I am not prepared to express an opinion on other aspects. Within whatever frame of reference I can operate, I am forced to conclude that all the psychological evidence would indicate that he is Nosenko, the son of Ivan Nosenko. His life story is essentially as he described it. It is obviously distorted in places but in each case there is probable psychological reasons for the distortion and deception. No man is a good reporter on himself and we all use rationalization to avoid seeing ourselves as others see us. My opinion, for whatever it’s worth, is that Nosenko cannot be broken outside the context of his life story and personality structure. It should be noted here that the life story is completely compatible with the personality structure as projected by psychological tests.
The psychologist claims now that he had more doubts about the validity of the SR view of Nosenko then he felt it wise to express. The following excerpt from the memorandum of a conversation, dated fourth August 1976, gives his memory of the situation facing him:
In discussing his lengthly series of interviews with Nosenko on 3-21 May 1965, he ( The psychologist ) said that he was very hesitant to express the full extent of his doubts about the theory that Nosenko was a KGB dispatched agent. The reason for his hesitation was that, when Bagely got a hint of (the psychologist’s) doubts about the theory, Bagely told the psychologist that such doubts might make (the psychologist) suspect himself of being involved in the KGB Nosenko plan.
Michael,
It would appear that that's what you're really good at in our little debates -- posting old, debunked CIA documents and essays.
LOL
Question: Do you agree with Newman and Scott that Nosenko was a false defector?
If so, how do you think they arrived at that conclusion?
-- MWT ;)
PS More to come. Maybe in short installments. Maybe in long installments.
(As Yogi Berra said, "It's too early to tell the future.")
-
Michael,
Shall we play "Dueling Excerpts"?
Okay
Here's my first salvo, an excerpt from chapter 20 of Tennent H. Bagley's excellent 2007 book Spy Wars. The excerpt "sets the scene" and will give members and guests an inkling of just how duplicitous and biased was your John L. Hart, CIA supporter of a KGB "defector" who swore from day one that the KGB had had nothing to do with Lee Harvey Oswald in the USSR ...
.....
For a few years after the Agency in 1968 made its official finding in Nosenko’s favor, CIA did not speak with a single voice. The leadership of its Counterintelligence Staff under James Angleton judged Nosenko to be a KGB plant, and its operations chief Newton S. (“Scotty”) Miler continued to probe into what lay behind the KGB’s operation.
Two former KGB officers, Peter Deriabin and Anatoly Golitsyn, after learning about Nosenko’s case in detail (Deriabin had even questioned him personally— see Appendix A) were certain that Nosenko had been dispatched by the KGB and was lying about his KGB activities and career. As Deriabin put it, any KGB officer knowing the facts would be equally convinced. He was right. After the Cold War a KGB officer (General Sergei Kondrashev), after reading some of CIA’s questions and Nosenko’s answers, laughed out loud and asked me an unanswerable question, “How could your service ever have trusted such a person?”
(Richard) Helms never considered the doubts truly resolved and viewed the Agency’s formal acceptance as a matter of convenience. Nosenko had to be released, and one way to do it was to clear him, at least officially. (fn 11)
These doubts faded in the second half of the 1960s with the advent of (triple-agent Igor) Kochnov and the departure from Headquarters of myself and Dave Murphy. The man who replaced Murphy as Soviet Bloc Division (SB) chief, Rolf Kingsley, had not previously focused on Soviet matters and had little patience with counterintelligence. He called for a fresh review of the case by “more neutral” officers, who concluded that Nosenko was probably genuine. (fn 12) Finally, when William E. Colby became director of Central Intelligence in September 1973, the Agency’s approach to counterintelligence changed and the shadows over Nosenko were cleaned away. (At this time I had already retired, so I learned of these events only later from those who lived through them.)
Colby gave a strong push to the growing myth surrounding the Nosenko affair (see Appendix B). In his memoirs he asserted that some former CIA people believed in an all-knowing KGB that was well on the way to dominating the world. “The [SB] Division produced operations and intelligence,” Colby wrote, "but the [counterintelligence] staff believed that those operations and intelligence were controlled by the KGB ... to mislead the United States in a massive deception program.’’ (fn 13)
Colby also derided a "paralysis” that he claimed had overtaken Soviet operations. “I sensed a major difficulty,” he wrote. “Our concern over possible KGB penetration, it seemed to me, had so preoccupied us that we were devoting most of our time to protecting ourselves from the KGB and not enough to developing the new sources and operations that we needed to learn secret information. ... I wanted to consider the KGB as something to be evaded by CIA, not as the object of our operations nor as our mesmerizing nemesis.” (fn 14)
If one were to believe one of its later chiefs, the Soviet Division in that dark earlier time “had been turning away dozens of volunteers, Soviets and Eastern Europeans who had contacted American officials with offers to work for the United States.” (fn 15) In reality the caution that Murphy -- not Angleton -- introduced into CIA’s efforts to recruit Soviets was never allowed to hinder the acceptance of a single Soviet volunteer, nor did it preclude any well-considered recruitment approach. None of these assertions of “paralysis” has cited a single rejection of a volunteer, defector, or proposal for action. Ironically, it was these latter-day critics who themselves started turning away Soviet defectors -- on the grounds that CIA had all it needed or could handle. Among those whom CIA turned away -- on specific orders from Headquarters— was Vasily Mitrokhin, who had stolen and stashed a large hunk of KGB operational archives. (fn 16)
While paying lip service to the need for vigilance, Colby saw counterintelligence mainly as an impediment to intelligence collection. His impatience and disinterest came out in the form of simplification and sarcasm.
... (fn 17)
Colby soon got to work reorganizing the Counterintelligence Staff and divesting it of some of its components. Then in 1974 the New York Times exposed the fact that in apparent violation of the Agency’s charter, Angleton’s staff had been checking international mail to and from some leftwing Americans. This gave Colby the ammunition he needed to rid himself of this nuisance. At the end of that year he demanded Angleton’s resignation and was glad to see Angleton’s chief lieutenants Raymond Rocca, William Hood, and Newton Miler follow him into retirement.
To steer a less troubling course, Colby appointed to head the Counterintelligence Staff George Kalaris, a man without experience in either counterintelligence or Soviet bloc operations, and, as his deputy, Leonard McCoy, a handler of reports, not an operations officer, who had already distinguished himself as a fierce advocate for Nosenko.
Now began an extraordinary cleanup inside the Counterintelligence Staff -- and the disappearance of evidence against Nosenko. Miler’s carefully accumulated notes on this and related cases were removed from the files and disappeared, along with a unique card file of discrepancies in Nosenko’s statements. (fn 18)
Shortly afterward Colby appointed an officer to review the files anew. John L. Hart was assisted by four officers. They worked for six months, from June to December 1976. I caught a glimpse of their aims and work methods when Hart came to Europe to interview me. He had not bothered to read what I had written (though he said nothing new had come to light on the question of Nosenko’s bona hdes) and seemed interested only in why, eight years earlier, I had warned that bad consequences might flow from Nosenko’s release. I saw that his aim was not to get at the truth but to find a way to clear Nosenko, so I refused to talk further with him.
As I later learned, Hart’s team did not even interview the Counterintelligence Staff officers who had analyzed the case and maintained files on it for nine years. Among them were two veteran analysts who, having come “cold” to the case, had concluded on their own that Nosenko was a plant -- and had written their reasons.
Hart then wrote a report that affirmed total trust in Nosenko. (fn 19, referencing HSCA Hearings Vol. II, pg. 490)
Having decreed their faith and gotten rid of disbelievers, the CIA leadership banned further debate. One experienced officer in the Soviet Bloc Division -- my old colleague Joe Westin, who knew so much about this case -- took a late stand against Nosenko’s bona hdes. He was told by higher-ups, “If you continue on this course, there will be no room for you in this Division-- and his future promotion was blocked. Peter Deriabin, who kept trying to warn Agency officials about Nosenko, was told to desist or his relations with CIA would be threatened (see Appendix A).
Nosenko’s rescuers then set out to discredit those who had distrusted him. They first labeled them as paranoid (a charge always difficult to re-
fute) and then moved on to distort the record.
One of Nosenko’s now well-placed friends told an investigative reporter that Angleton’s successor Kalaris had made the appalling discovery that the bad Angleton had ticked off the FBI’s Soviet Military Intelligence source code-named "Nicknack” as a provocateur and thus had locked away his important leads to spies abroad. The good Kalaris, said this insider, proceeded to dig out one of those leads and personally carried it to Switzerland, where the Swiss Federal Police quickly identified the spy as a brigadier named Jean-Louis Jeanmaire. They convicted him of betraying military technological secrets to the Soviets. (fn 20)
The accusation was pure invention. Angleton was impressed with Nicknack’s leads to spies abroad and had asked William Hood to be sure that they were acted upon. Hood then -- not Kalaris years later— personally carried the Swiss item to Bern.
Other misrepresentations were tacitly abetted. For instance, the new Agency leadership did little to counter Nosenko’s claim that he was drugged. This canard played for years in the media, and was allowed to circulate even in the halls of CIA. CIA director Stansfield Turner even hinted that it might be true, although his own subordinates had submitted to Congres -- as sworn testimony on his behalf -- a list of every medicament ever given to Nosenko, which proved the contrary. As I know, Nosenko was never drugged. (fn 21)
The flimsy structure of CIA’s defense of Nosenko was shaken in 1977 when investigative reporter Edward Jay Epstein got wind of the Nosenko debate. While researching a book on Lee Harvey Oswald he came upon the fact, until then hidden, that a defector named Nosenko had reported on Oswald and that some CIA veterans questioned that defector’s bona fides. Digging into this potentially explosive subject, Epstein interviewed former CIA director Richard Helms, James Angleton, Newton “Scotty” Miler, and, on Helms’s recommendation, me.
Thus in my retirement did I come back into the debate on Nosenko. I told Epstein some of the things in the preceding chapters. His book Legend. The Secret Life of Lee Harvey Oswald came out in 1978. With its evidence that Nosenko was a KGB plant, the book logically concluded that what Nosenko told the Americans about Oswald -- though presumably true in its basic message that the Soviets had not commanded Oswald’s act -- was a message from the Soviet leadership.
Coincidentally, the U.S. House of Representatives at this point appointed a Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) to re-investigate the assassinations of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King. It interviewed Nosenko five times about his knowledge of Oswald’s stay in the Soviet Union -- and simply could not believe him. In its final report the
committee stated flatly, “Nosenko was lying.” (fn 22)
Aware of the HSCA’s doubts, and by now committed to a different image of Nosenko, CIA director Turner designated a personal representative to testify. It was none other than the man who had most recently whitewashed Nosenko, John Hart.
Hart spent his entire prepared testimony of an hour and a half defending Nosenko and degrading his own colleagues who had suspected him. He attacked me viciously, to the point of accusing me publicly of contemplating murder, though he knew it was nonsense. (fn 23)
To the amazement of the HSCA members the CIA director’s designated representative did not even mention the name of Lee Harvey Oswald. When they asked him why, Hart admitted that he “knew nothing about Oswald’s case, but hoped that by explaining misunderstandings within the Agency” and by attesting to Nosenko’s ‘‘general credibility” he could "clear up the committee’s problems with Nosenko” so that “allegations concerning [Nosenko] would go away.”
But the committee’s problem was not with Nosenko, but with what Nosenko had said about Oswald. So they forced Hart to address this question. Thereupon even he admitted that he found Nosenko’s testimony "incredible,” "hard to believe,” and “doubtful.”
"I am intrigued,” House committee member (later Senator) Christopher Dodd said to Hart, "as to why you limited your remarks to the actions of the CIA and their handling of Nosenko, knowing you are in front of a committee that is investigating the death of a President and an essential part of that investigation has to do with the accused assassin in that case. Why have you neglected to bring up his name at all in your discussion?”
Hart replied that the Agency had asked him to talk “on the Nosenko case” and had accepted his unwillingness to talk about Oswald, of whom he knew nothing. “So,” concluded Dodd, "really what the CIA wanted to do was to send someone up here who wouldn’t talk about Lee Harvey Oswald.” (fn 24)
Still, the congressmen could not understand why a CIA officer, acting on the orders of the CIA leadership, would “throw up a smoke screen and get the Agency in the worst possible light as far as the newspapers are concerned.” Why would he attack his own colleagues and create “smashing anti-CIA headlines?” "Puzzled and mystified,” one congressman called “the whole scenario totally unthinkable.” He added, “no one I know in the Agency has come up with any sensible explanation.” (fn 25)
While Hart was in the process of attacking his own organization -- and me especially -- I got a phone call in the middle of the night, European time. “They’re crucifying you, Pete!” cried Yuri Rastvorov, who was watching the HSCA proceedings on C-Span television in the United States. This KGB veteran, who had defected in 1954, was outraged, having learned enough about the Nosenko case to have concluded on his own that Nosenko must be a KGB plant. I thanked him for the warning, went back to bed, and then
waited while another friend fast-shipped to me the transcript of Hart’s
statement.
Reading this intensely subjective attack and the discussions that followed it, I could sense the committee’s skepticism and wondered why they hadn’t called on me to present my side -- all the more when I learned that Helms, in his testimony, had recommended that they do so. Fearing that someone in CIA might be trying to prevent my appearing, I wrote the HSCA subcommittee chairman, Congressman Richardson Preyer, a rebuttal to Hart’s testimony, asking for the opportunity to answer in public what had been a public attack. On the side, suspecting that the subcommittee’s counsel was cooperating to keep me out, I contacted Congressman Preyer directly. Thus I was finally invited and flew from Europe to testify, pointing out Hart’s untruths and evasions. Though I appeared only in executive (closed) session, Preyer courteously saw to it that my testimony (as “Mr. D. C.” -- for “deputy chief’’ of the Soviet Bloc Division) was included in the published record of the hearings.
Now I was back in the debate, though still carrying on my business activities in Europe and writing, with Peter Deriabin, a book on the KGB. In early 1981, when newly elected President Reagan appointed William E. Casey as director of Central Intelligence, I saw it as an opportunity to reopen the case and addressed a long report to him (to which Deriabin what appears in this book as Appendix A). It was judged inadequate to overcome the Agency’s evidence supporting Nosenko.
In 1987 I was interviewed by English playwright Stephen Davies, who was writing a semifictional drama on the Nosenko case. When the him appeared on television the CIA retirees’ association published a review of it in their quarterly newsletter. (fn 26)
Neither they nor the reviewer took a position on the basic question -- was Nosenko a KGB plant? But to the CIA at that time it was heresy even to leave a wisp of suspicion hanging over the hero of the myth. Leonard McCoy jumped to Nosenko’s defense. In a passionate letter to the editor he lauded Nosenko and attacked the earlier handlers of the case in such splenetic terms that the editor (as he told me) refused to publish it until it had been toned down. McCoy’s letter was full of misstatements, as I pointed out in a rebuttal.
Both Hart and McCoy knew Nosenko personally and had studied the case from positions of direct authority. Hart boasted of his own “standards of scholarship’’ and told Congress that he would never "go beyond the bounds of certainty” nor “extrapolate from facts.” As for McCoy, on whose statements the writer Tom Mangold relied for his book Cold Warrior, Man gold described him as “a mature and meticulous intelligence officer, with an obsession about factual accuracy in all matters.” So one might expect these two to dismantle any opposing argument point by point, using sure and accurate facts. Instead, both of them twisted the very nature of the affair and concealed major aspects of it. In Hart’s sworn testimony were no fewer than thirty errors, twenty misleading statements, and ten major
omissions, and dozens in McCoy’s article . (fn 27)
They (and CIA) had made an act of faith, perhaps not the best base for judging a complex counterintelligence question. Hart stated that Nosenko had never intentionally lied -- never mind that Nosenko himself had admitted in writing a years-long inability to tell the truth to CIA. McCoy -- as deputy head of CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff -- epitomized the Agency’s position by writing that if by any mischance Nosenko had told a few fibs, ” They were not [spoken] at the behest of the KGB. ” CIA’s deputy director certified this act of faith, making it the Agency’s official position that “there is no reason to conclude that Nosenko is other than what he has claimed to be.’’
Soon after the debate in the CIA retirees’ newsletter, Nosenko and his defenders presented their case to investigative journalist Tom Mangold, who incorporated it in a book attacking James Angleton as a paranoid. Mangold acknowledged his debt to McCoy, who had “left an indelible imprint on every one of these pages .” (fn 28) His book accurately reflected CIA’s defense of Nosenko and was thus studded with error, omission, misrepresentation, and invention, and colored by emotional bias for Nosenko and against his detractors.
These misstatements congealed into a myth that by its frequent repetition has become conventional wisdom inside and outside CIA. Consecrated by the sworn testimony of high CIA officials, it is treated as serious history. It is a tale of how a band of buffoons and demons -- paranoid “fundamentalists”-- tried wickedly and vainly to discredit a shining hero. It has been taught -- without the facts on which it is supposedly based -- to CIA trainees who, thinking it true, have passed it on to later generations of CIA people. Today, a generation later, one can see it repeated in their memoirs as an “inside” fact.
To create this myth its makers had to do some fancy twisting and inventing. Dismissing massive evidence to the contrary, they asserted that Nosenko always told the truth. Not only was and is he truthful, but he has been a veritable cornucopia of "pure gold,” vast quantities of valuable information. To give substance to this wild claim, the mythmakers
resorted to pure invention. They transfigured poor “Andrey” the mechanic, for example, into a code clerk who enabled the Soviets to break America’s top-secret codes and moved dangerously into the code-breaking National Security Agency. They had Nosenko pinpointing fifty-two microphones in the American Embassy, something no one outside the KGB’s technical services could even pretend to do. They gave color to their tales by the breathtaking misstatement that Nosenko told more, and of far greater value, than had the earlier defector Golitsyn. (Golitsyn, this story goes, never uncovered a single spy in the West.)
The mythmakers dismissed onetime suspicions of Nosenko as nothing but the product of potted preconceptions and wild theorizing by since-disgraced colleagues, incompetent and paranoid "fundamentalists.”
The myth makes no mention of the underlying issues: the signs of penetration of American government and ciphers. Its focus, instead, is the been cruelly and duplicitously treated -- until his saviors came along.
Finally, the mythmakers ridiculed as "nonsense” the idea that the Soviets would mount a deceptive operation of this magnitude -- at least, after the first decade or two of Bolshevik rule -- and labeled the very idea a delusion of some “monster plot.” As a corollary, the myth asserts without a trace of evidence -- that this paranoia “paralyzed” CIA’s intelligence operations against the Soviet Union.
Because it has become history, the myth’s creation, its details, and the motives of its creators deserve attention (see Appendix B).
This myth enveloped CIA in a warm blanket of complacency (and aversion to “mole hunting”) that later contributed to the Agency’s long failure to deal effectively with even more glaring evidence of treason in its midst -- that of Aldrich Ames.
Footnotes:
11. For Helms’s testimony on this subject see HSCA Hearings, Vol. IV, 33-34, 61-63,
96, 99. He said the same thing in an interview with David Frost, 22-23 May 1978 ( Studies in
Intelligence, Special Unclassified Edition, Fall 2000, 130). Helms expressed this view again
in 2001.
12. Mangold , Cold Warrior, 175.
13. William E. Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1978), 244-45.
14. Ibid., 364. Rolfe Kingsley, Murphy's successor as Soviet Division chief, described
this (imaginary) “paralysis” in Mangold, Cold Warrior, 242.
15. Burton Gerber, cited by his deputy Milton Bearden. Milton Bearden and James
Risen, The Main Enemy (London: Century, 2003), 23.
16. Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive. The KGB in
Europe and the West (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1999).
17. Colby, Honorable Men, 364.
18. It was McCoy who took the files, as I heard from a member of the Counter-
intelligence Staff who was there. Presumably this was a part of his large-scale destruction
of the files that he himself described to a journalist (Mangold, Cold Warrior, 306).
19. HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 490.
20. Mangold, Cold Warrior, 320-21.
21. HSCA Hearings, Vol. XII, 543. While questioning Nosenko we asked a specialist
whether the much-touted “truth serum” sodium amytal would help, but were told it was
basically ineffective. This has been misrepresented in some writings as a request to use it
which was denied. I made no such “request” and am sure no one else did.
22. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Findings and Recommendations (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 20
March 1979), 102.
23. Hart's testimony is in HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 487-536. My rebuttal to that testi-
mony was printed in HSCA Hearings, Vol. XII, 573-644. The murderous thoughts Hart
attributed to me were contained in a penciled note I jotted while mulling over possible ways
to resolve Nosenko’s status. I had thought of about ten or eleven things to do— possibly
turning him back, handing him to another Western service, locating him in another coun-
try, or resettling him in some remote area of the United States. I also amused myself by
giving vent to frustration in the way a baseball fan might shout, "Kill the umpire!” and stuck
in this list such impossible and impractical things as killing him or rendering him crazy. Of
course I never sent or showed or even discussed these thoughts with anyone. I must have
inadvertently dropped my penciled jottings into the file, where Hart, with evident delight,
found them. He edited out the more serious alternatives as “insignificant” and presented
the facetious but compromising ones to the HSCA as evidence of actual CIA planning. I had
completely forgotten the note (or the ruminations) and learned of its full contents only
through the courtesy of a member of the subcommittee staff.
24. HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 509, 511.
25. HSCA Hearings, Vol. XII, 623, 642.
26. “Yuri Nosenko, KGB,” British Broadcasting Company (BBC), first shown in the
United States by Home Box Office (HBO) on 7 September 1986. Issued as DVD under the
title “Yuri Nosenko, Double Agent.”
27. HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 490, 515, 522. The original review by Mark Wyatt of the
BBC/HBO telefilm “Yuri Nosenko, KGB” appeared in the CIRA Newsletter (Spring 1987),
and McCoy's defense of Nosenko appeared that fall in Leonard V. McCoy, "Yuri Nosenko,
CIA," CIRA Newsletter XII, no. 3 (Fall 1 987): 22. I answered McCoy in the edition of Spring
1988 (vol. XIII, no. 2). See also Mangold, Cold Warrior, 270. My general appraisal of Hart’s
testimony is in HSCA Hearings, Vol. XII, 593.
28. Mangold, Cold Warrior, vi.
-----
-- MWT ;)
(to be continued ...)
-
.Bagely, in a 15 June 1965 memorandum to Helms (Who was by then DDCI, But still writing herd on the case), described the interviews as unrewarding in terms of producing new information or insights ... It was obvious that subject had given some thought ... To improving and smoothing over some of the rough spots in his story.”
By the end of 1965, there were others in the SR division who doubted the thesis, and one of them was willing to risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper in a 31 page memorandum to Bagely, commenting on the sterile version of the SR/CI’s notebook documenting the case against Nosenko. It began:
Introduction: At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko notebook and I hope you will honor my right to dissent. I find the evidence that Nosenko is a bona fide defector far more convincing than the evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as a KGB agent.
It is because I am concerned about the serious ramifications of a wrong verdict that I wish to set forth my dissenting views in considerable detail. If the present verdict of guilty is right I believe there must be satisfactory answers to the questions raised herein; if it is wrong, as I believe it is, it should be rectified as soon as possible.
Intelligence Production: There are several references to the Nosenko notebook to the extent and quality of the intelligence he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to DDP, it is asserted that “a comparison of his positive intelligence with that of other Soviet bloc intelligence officers with whom we have had an operational relationship shows that all of them were consistently better able to provide useful positive intelligence then has been Nosenko.”
Tab D the same memo states “his positive intelligence production is practically nil,” and later: “viewed overall, however, Nosenko’s positive intelligence production has been so meager for a man of his background, training and position as to cast doubts on his bona fides, without reference to other criteria.” All of these statements are incorrect.
The three persons in the clandestine services with the background and experience to make such a judgment regarding Nosenko’s production and access agree that they are incorrect. No KGB officer has been able to provide more useful intelligence than the Nosenko has; Experience has shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB officers in general is “practically nil”. Golytsin’s was Nil. Viewed in the proper context, therefore, Nosenko’s intelligence production cannot be used in his defense, but neither can it be said honestly to cast any doubt whatsoever on his bona fides. In the realm of substance, judgment regarding his bona fides must therefore be made on the basis of his counter intelligence information.
-
"Bagley, in a 15 June 1965 memo- randum to Helms (Who was by then DDCI, But still writing herd on the case), described the interviews as unrewarding in terms of producing new information or insights ... It was obvious that subject had given some thought ... To improving and smoothing over some of the rough spots in his story.”
By the end of 1965, there were others in the SR division who doubted the thesis, and one of them was willing to risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper in a 31 page memorandum to Bagely, commenting on the sterile version of the SR/CI’s notebook documenting the case against Nosenko.
It began:
"Introduction: At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko notebook and I hope you will honor my right to dissent. I find the evidence that Nosenko is a bona fide defector far more convincing than the evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as a KGB agent. It is because I am concerned about the serious ramifications of a wrong verdict that I wish to set forth my dissenting views in considerable detail. If the present verdict of guilty is right I believe there must be satisfactory answers to the questions raised herein; if it is wrong, as I believe it is, it should be rectified as soon as possible.
Intelligence Production: There are several references to the Nosenko notebook to the extent and quality of the intelligence he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to DDP, it is asserted that “a comparison of his positive intelligence with that of other Soviet bloc intelligence officers with whom we have had an operational relationship shows that all of them were consistently better able to provide useful positive intelligence then has been Nosenko.”
Tab D the same memo states “his positive intelligence production is practically nil,” and later: “viewed overall, however, Nosenko’s positive intelligence production has been so meager for a man of his background, training and position as to cast doubts on his bona fides, without reference to other criteria.”
All of these statements are incorrect. [emphasis added by mwt]
The three persons in the clandestine services with the background and experience to make such a judgment regarding Nosenko’s production and access agree that they are incorrect. No KGB officer has been able to provide more useful intelligence than the Nosenko has; Experience has shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB officers in general is “practically nil”. Golytsin’s was Nil. Viewed in the proper context, therefore, Nosenko’s intelligence production cannot be used in his defense, but neither can it be said honestly to cast any doubt whatsoever on his bona fides. In the realm of substance, judgment regarding his bona fides must therefore be made on the basis of his counter intelligence information."
Michael,
The three persons in the clandestine services who were qualified to render a judgement regarding Nosenko's production and access, or Three persons in the clandestine services who were qualified to render a judgment regarding Nosenko's production and access?
Regardless, which three persons?
Got names?
....
A 31-page memo to Bagley?
Where is it?
.....
Regarding Golitsyn's true production, please read pages 57 and 58 of Spy Wars).
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames
Bottom line: A lot
.....
Regarding Nosenko's so-called "production," please read in Spy Wars pages 97, 178-79, 208, 219, 245, 260-61; on "Zepp", 15-16, 152-53, 206. See also "Andrey"; Belitsky, B.; Dejean, M.; Johnson, R. L.; Saar Demichel, F.; Vassall, W.; Watkins, J.
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGamesottom
Bottom line: Diddley Squat. For the simple reason that no one Nosenko helped to "uncover": 1) was still actively working for the KGB/GRU, or 2) still had access to secret information, or 3) was not already suspected by CIA or the FBI.
-- MWT ;)
PS Your turn
-
Michael,
Never mind.
I'll go again.
Here are some of Tennent H. Bagley's thoughts about your boy, John L. Hart, as presented in Bagley's 71-page HSCA testimony.
Cheers!
https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol12/html/HSCA_Vol12_0288a.htm
-- MWT ;)
PS The "X" Bagley refers to is true defector Anatoly Golitsyn.
PPS On page 593 of the document, Bagley really starts laying into Hart, saying he counted 30 errors in Hart's HSCA testimony, etc., etc, etc.
-
While notionally correct, my past statements about Bagely being a sadistic torturer have been slightly hyperbolic based on the source material upon which I was commenting.
However, I now see that hint of that sadistic tendency, which came through in that document, was clearly meant to be conveyed, if muted. As I read “The Monster Plot”, that tendency, as manifested in Bagely, was clearly meant to be documented and highlighted in an alarming manner. Furthermore, it seems apparent, in my slow, deliberate read (transcription process) that the author, via his witnesses, is documenting a CIA culture affected by fear of the unknown, false fears, fear from each other, mind games and duplicitousness. “ The Monster Plot” May explain or be a model explanation for the 1960’s and beyond.
-
Howard Osborne; Director of Security wrote:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/02ED5013-2F35-4633-B55A-F6087B92AFE3.png?ver=1566051363944)
-
Michael,
....
A 31-page memo to Bagley?
Where is it?
.....
-- MWT ;)
It’s probably sitting on a shelf where John Hart’s “The Monster Plot” sat for 40 years until it was pried-out of the US Archives in 2017.
-
More from CIA Director of Security, Howard Osborne:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/EB79135B-FE9C-43D1-A388-B336E38B0FC2.jpeg?ver=1566053403000)
-
While notionally correct, my past statements about Bagely being a sadistic torturer have been slightly hyperbolic based on the source material upon which I was commenting.
However, I now see that hint of that sadistic tendency, which came through in that document was clearly meant to be conveyed, if muted. As I read “The Monster Plot”, that tendency, as manifested in Bagely, was clearly meant to be documented and highlighted in an alarming manner. Furthermore it seems apparent, in my slow, deleiberate read (transcription process) that the author, via his witnesses, is documenting a CIA culture affected by fear of the unknown, false fears, fear from each other, mind games and duplicitousness. “ The Monster Plot” May explain or be a model explanation for the 1960’s and beyond.
Michael,
Are you trying to impress us with incomprehensible verbosity?
Plain English, please, and spellcheck, too.
Trying to understand your post was sheer torture (probably worse than what your boy, Nosenko, got), even for someone like me who scored at the 98 percentile in "Verbal Intelligence".
Back in the day in 1966.
Or was it 1965?
(Not when they denied him a toothbrush, but when I took the SAT.)
-- MWT ;)
PS How is it that a former Army Intelligence analyst like John Newman could let himself be fooled by (sadistic and incompetent) Bagley into believing Yuri Nosenko was a false defector, Michael?
And ... gasp ... to believe it so strongly and so thoroughly that he, in turn, unwittingly fooled Peter Dale Scott?
-
Wait for it
-
Wait for it
Wait for even more revelations of what a horrible person commendation-recipient Tennent H. Bagley was?
-
Wait for even more revelations of what a horrible person commendation-recipient Tennent H. Bagley was?
You couldn’t wait until I fixed my link, instead of spamming the thread?
Anyway here is the link I was going to fix:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/38FC7F85-3CCB-4B3C-ADAC-7338377596C0.jpeg?ver=1566058317294)
-
Wait for even more revelations of what a horrible person commendation-recipient Tennent H. Bagley was?
Didn’t Nosenko receive commendations as well?
-
More comments by the CIA Director of Security:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/965A7786-441B-4DE8-B427-2E3441170F4B.jpeg?ver=1566059746951)
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You couldn’t wait until I fixed my link, instead of spamming the thread?
Anyway here is the link I was going to fix:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/38FC7F85-3CCB-4B3C-ADAC-7338377596C0.jpeg?ver=1566058317294)
Michael,
Please don't get all paranoiac and nasty.
I thought you were joking.
You should have written, "Please wait until I fix my link and can inundate you with even more misleading, KGB-endorsed propaganda from a spiteful, under-endowed CIA officer from the past -- Richards J. Heuer, Leonard McCoy, John L. Hart, Howard J. Osborn and/or or his xxxx-buddy, Bruce 'Gumshoe' Solie."
-- MWT ;)
PS Can't you enlarge those docs any more than that? I mean, you're a computer guy, right? (How's business, btw? Putin leasing your servers, yet?)
PPS Isn't it against Forum rules to enlarge full pages of text like that?
PPPS You never answered my question, Michael:
How is it that a former Army Intelligence analyst like John Newman could allow himself be fooled by (sadistic and incompetent) Tennent H. Bagley into believing Yuri Nosenko was a false defector, Michael? And ... gasp ... to believe it so strongly and so thoroughly that he, in turn, unwittingly fooled Peter Dale Scott?
-
Michael, .....
You should have written, "Please wait until I fix my link and can inundate you with even more misleading, KGB-endorsed propaganda from a spiteful, under-endowed CIA officer from the past -- Richards J. Heuer, Leonard McCoy, John L. Hart, Howard J. Osborn and/or or his xxxx-buddy, Bruce 'Gumshoe' Solie." .....
-- MWT ;)
Bizarre.....
Anyway, onward and upward....
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/C9795055-F375-437D-9A06-B433903F987E.jpeg?ver=1566061834779)
-
Bizarre.....
Anyway, onward and upward....
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/C9795055-F375-437D-9A06-B433903F987E.jpeg?ver=1566061834779)
Michael,
Are you intentionally over-enlarging the documents you're posting?
Are you enlarging them this much so you can "break them up" and make even more posts with them?
Isn't that against Forum rules?
-- MWT ;)
PS Regarding KGB's "deception program" (aka The Monster Plot), have you ever heard of KGB's Second Chief Directorate (today's FSB)?
Did you know that in 1959 a top-secret "KGB within the KGB "called "Department 14" or "The 14th Department" was formed in said Second Chief Directorate?
Did you know that the "mission" of SCD's 14th Department was to penetrate and actively deceive the intelligence services of The Main Enemy (aka the U.S.A.) by sending putative volunteer "double-agents," like (triple-agent) GRU colonel Dimitri Polyakov to the U.S. in 1959 (in other words, he was its very first emissary), and "defectors" like KGB "captain" or "major" or "lieutenant colonel" -- take your pick -- Yuri Nosenko to the U.S. in January 1964, in such a way as to form feedback loops with KGB's traditional (since 1921) "active measures counterintelligence operations"?
Have you ever heard of General Oleg Gribanov, the over-aggressive and somewhat bumbling head of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate who personally ran Department 14?
If not, then you really do need to read Bagley's Spy Wars and Ghosts of the Spy Wars and Spy Master so you can start to get a "handle" on all of this.
Here are their "links":
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
https://archive.org/stream/SpymasterStartlingColdWarRevelationsOfASovietKGBChief/Spymaster%20-%20Startling%20Cold%20War%20Revelations%20of%20a%20Soviet%20KGB%20Chief_djvu.txt
Cheers!
PPS A little note on Polyakov:
A few years later after he'd left the U.S. for the last time and was posted abroad (in India or Burma, iirc), Polyakov actually did start working for the CIA, and was "uncovered" after he'd retired, arrested, "tried" and ... gulp ... executed.
Interesting, isn't it, that KGB so thoroughly filmed his arrest, almost as though to say to the U.S., "This dirty rat has been a traitor to The Mother Land all along!"
Here's a pertinent excerpt from Ghosts of the Spy Wars.
(In mid-November 1958, Popov was lured back to Moscow on a ruse, secretly arrested by KGB, and) confessed. For six years he had been passing to the CIA secrets of Soviet weapons developments and tactics for atomic warfare. In addition, he had opened up his own service to the CIA: the GRU's procedures, some of its spies abroad, and hundreds of its officers. The GRU chief, General Mikhail A. Shalin, was fired, and in early December, the KGB chief Ivan Serov himself moved over to replace him and straighten things out.
But to Oleg Gribanov this shattering of the GRU looked more like opportunity than disaster.
Long experience had taught his organization that in counterintelligence work, “he who takes the initiative, all other things being equal, achieves the best results.” (fn 8)
Not to wait passively to detect spies but to go out aggressively to find them (or make them). Working on this principle, the KGB had formed, taken over, and manipulated organizations of resistance to their own regime. They had used these fraudulent structures to expose and mislead their opponents inside the country and abroad; to maneuver hostile intelligence services onto false paths, and to get into contact with their personnel with the aim of compromising them and recruited them as moles. So successful had they been that some of these operations like “Trust” and “Sindikat-2” of the 1920s became celebrated in Soviet history, novels, and films, and this “aggressive counterintelligence” [nastupatelnost'] became the KGB's “guiding principle.” (fn 9)
By the 1970s the KGB had “mastered complex undercover agent-operational schemes” and infiltrated Western intelligence services by “presenting our [Soviet] trusted agents for their recruitment, … conducting operational games using methods similar to those used in the 1920s and 1930s, [and …] recruiting staff personnel of American Intelligence.” KGB people “are obliged to carefully study this postwar experience.” (fn 10)
Gribanov was inspired by all that. Looking over the debris of Popov's betrayal he saw that this fund of GRU secrets—now exposed and no longer truly secret—offered a weapon he could turn back against American Intelligence. He code-named the Popov affair “Boomerang.”
To wield this weapon Gribanov created a new “14th Department” within his internal-counterintelligence directorate and gave it the mission of “mounting complicated counterintelligence operations and operational games to penetrate foreign intelligence services.” (fn 11)
He would direct it personally, but installed as its chief his principal assistant during their investigation and interrogation of Popov, Colonel Valentin Zvezdenkov.
Together they set out to hand the CIA yet another high GRU officer, but this time their own. He would re-use Popov's information (and a bit more) to win the CIA's trust and in the best tradition of nastupatelnost' would expose it, lead it astray, and draw its officers into compromising situations.
Here some intelligence professionals say “Stop!” Hand the enemy a spy from inside your own ranks? Unthinkable! No intelligence service would take such a risk. So firmly did the CIA leaders believe this that in the 1970s and 1980s they even adopted it as a rule of thumb to judge the bona fides of Soviet walk-ins: if one was a Soviet intelligence officer, he was ipso facto a genuine defector. (fn 12)
That false faith burns brightly in America to this day. As recently as 2013 an FBI “counterintelligence expert” stated flatly, “The KGB would never send a staff officer as a false defector.” (fn 13)
The truth was—and is—quite different. Gribanov's new 14th Department (and other KGB components) did it time and again, from within both the GRU and KGB. General Sergey Kondrashev spoke after the Cold War of “repeated” proposals for such operations in his own FCD disinformation unit. He himself had been invited to shift over to the SCD to help Gribanov run the Nosenko provocation. Another KGB veteran even thought that “most” of the CIA spies inside the KGB who were betrayed by CIA traitor Aldrich Ames in 1985 were in fact loyal staffers pretending to help the CIA. (fn 14)
The Mysterious Polyakov
For this particular enterprise Gribanov and Zvezdenkov chose GRU Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Polyakov. (fn 15)
As a first step they dispatched him in October 1959 to New York, where he had already served in the past, as a military functionary in the Soviet delegation to the United Nations. The operation was not truly launched until two years later, however, because Polyakov had first to establish himself in his cover position, and then because Gribanov delayed the operation while dealing with an unexpected complication. Having discovered a new, real traitor within the GRU, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, Gribanov had to weigh the effects on his planned operation. So not until the fall of 1961, after safely “cornering [Penkovsky] like a bear in its den,” As expressed by the Soviet Prosecutor at a press conference at the time of Penkovsky's trial in May 1963, did Gribanov feel ready to launch the operation.
Polyakov asked an American military officer to put him in touch with the CIA.
The FBI made the contact, it being their jurisdiction, and for several months they met him secretly in New York (codenaming him “Tophat”). Enthusiastic at the time about what Polyakov was revealing, fifteen years later the FBI looked back and wondered whether Polyakov had been deceiving them during those months. He had wasted their time on useless trails, and nothing he had told them had importantly damaged the Soviet Union beyond what Popov had earlier reported.
After a few months in New York, Polyakov returned to Russia in the fall of 1962 and was not heard from until years later, when he told via a Moscow dead drop, that he would soon come out again. He did, in 1966, as Soviet military attaché and GRU chief in Rangoon, Burma. Because operations abroad are the CIA's jurisdiction, the FBI soon turned over contact to the Agency, which continued to meet Polyakov in Burma from then until his tour of duty expired in 1969.
In his early meetings with Polyakov, CIA case officer Jim F. had the strong impression that he was dealing with a KGB plant, but after a time he noted such dramatic improvement in the reporting that he became convinced that Polyakov was genuinely cooperating. (fn 17)
For years thereafter, Polyakov continued direct and indirect contacts with the CIA, turning over priceless military and intelligence secrets first in Rangoon, then in Moscow, and then in two separate tours of duty in New Delhi where he enjoyed the rank of one-star general, making him the highest-ranked secret source that CIA ever had in Soviet Russia.
But then, in May 1980, the operation came to an abrupt end. On the pretext of a supposed meeting of military attachés, Polyakov was recalled to Moscow and never heard from again.
Ten years later, in 1990, out of the blue, the Soviets announced that they had arrested Polyakov, tried him in secret for being a CIA spy, and executed him. Their publicity chose to date the arrest as 1986, the trial and execution as March 1988.
It took another dozen years to begin explaining these oddities: the secret trial, so unlike Penkovsky's; the lack of even a fuzzy explanation of how the KGB had caught Polyakov; the inexplicable dates; and unusual publicity. The only KGB foreign-operations officer who had known of the SCD's operation, General Sergey Kondrashev (the KGB deputy for disinformation mentioned above), years later revealed to me that Gribanov had sent Polyakov out in the first place. (fn 18)
“But they executed Polyakov!” I said. “Why would the KGB execute a man whom they themselves had sent out to commit this treason?”
“Because they found out he was giving you more than he was supposed to.”
“Found out? How?”
Kondrashev answered: “Through some source inside American Intelligence.”
He would say no more. But the question hung there: Who could have known exactly how much Polyakov was reporting to CIA?
It had to be someone inside CIA's Soviet operations staff. And someone still undiscovered. Two Americans who knew something of the Polyakov case were later discovered to have been traitors, but neither of them could be the answer. Robert Hanssen of the FBI had told the Soviets in 1979 about Polyakov's 1962 cooperation in New York, but of course he knew nothing of what Polyakov later reported to the CIA. And even in the unlikely event that CIA traitor Aldrich Ames had learned the full details of Polyakov's reporting, Ames did not begin betraying until 1985, five years after the KGB had recalled Polyakov on a ruse and terminated the operation.
Not one of the later-discovered CIA traitors could even remotely have been aware of these details. In fact, only a handful of specially-placed CIA operatives even knew that the Agency had a relationship with Polyakov, much less what Polyakov was reporting. In each report that the CIA passed to military and other government agencies it disguised the source and attributed reports on different subjects to different sources.
The whole gamut of Polyakov's reporting could have been known only to his CIA handlers and those dealing with his raw reports.
So the question hangs: Who told the KGB what Polyakov was telling the CIA?
Footnotes:
8) Istoriya Sovetskikh Organov Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti; Uchebnik [Hereafter: The History of Soviet Organs of State Security; A Textbook] (Moscow: KGB Higher School, 1977), classified TOP SECRET. Page references are to an English translation.
9) So defined in the KGB's own in-house secret dictionary, brought out by Vasily Mitrokhin and published in English as KGB Lexicon (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 261.
10) The History of Soviet State Security Organs; A Textbook. These quotes are from Chapter 10, parts 3 and 4 and conclusions.
11) As defined by the KGB itself, per the Internet: www.soldat. ru (in Russian)
12) Milton Bearden, former head of CIA's Soviet Division (citing his predecessor Burton Gerber) and his co-author James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB (London: Century, 2003), pp. 20–23.
13) David Major, cited by David Wise in “When the FBI Spent Decades Hunting for a Soviet Spy on its Staff,” Smithsonian Magazine, October 2013.
14) Aleksandr Kouzminov , Biological Espionage: Special Operations in the Soviet and Russian Foreign Intelligence Services in the West (London: Greenhill Books, 2005), p. 59.
15) They picked him, said Kondrashev, at least partly because Polyakov had already had “a certain contact.” That might have been his contact with Popov when escorting a GRU Illegal operative named Margarita Tairova from Moscow to Berlin for Popov to dispatch onward to New York. At the time Popov expressed unease because he had never known Polyakov in illegal-support work. Another such pertinent contact would be Polyakov's contact with GRU Illegal Kaarlo Tuomi who came under FBI control but turned back later to Soviet control. (See my Spy Wars, pp. 171–172, and Spymaster, pp. 196, 216, and 291n7.)
16) As expressed by the Soviet Prosecutor at a press conference at the time of Penkovsky's trial in May 1963.
17) As Jim F. told a close colleague on the operation, who told me in 1970.
18) The circumstances of Kondrashev's revelation are described in Tennent H. Bagley, Spymaster, pp. 213–216.
.....
-
Wait for it... edit, Thomas did it again, he couldn’t wait for me to fix my links.
-
Wait for it...
Michael,
Why should I wait for anything from you in our little "debate"? Especially since I know that you haven't had enough time to read my just-finished previous post?
By the way, is that a new "covering" ploy ... Just post, "Wait for it?"
LOL
-- MWT ;)
-
FBI, as early as February of 64, was clear that Nosenko was bona fide.
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/18AE710C-9D7E-41BF-A6E3-61DB0C8FF8DD.jpeg?ver=1566068311247)
But Angleton (Chief, SI) and Bagely (Chief, SR) already had their plan set. It was going to be quick and clean, three weeks.
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/136A2539-BFA2-4B9B-9A58-1578D4643629.jpeg?ver=1566068311247)
With backslapping press conferences to celebrate:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/FE00C8B3-E80F-4024-AEAF-1ACD7086AEC2.jpeg?ver=1566068311247)
-
FBI, as early as February of 64, was clear that Nosenko was bona fide.
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/18AE710C-9D7E-41BF-A6E3-61DB0C8FF8DD.jpeg?ver=1566068311247)
But Angleton (Chief, SI) and Bagely (Chief, SR) already had their plan set. It was going to be quick and clean, three weeks.
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/136A2539-BFA2-4B9B-9A58-1578D4643629.jpeg?ver=1566068311247)
With backslapping press conferences to celebrate:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/FE00C8B3-E80F-4024-AEAF-1ACD7086AEC2.jpeg?ver=1566068311247)
Well, it looks as though you're not interested in engaging me in a rational debate about the shennagins of the new-as-of-May-1959 "Department 14" of the Second Chief Directorate (today's FSB) as they were interwoven with traditional "active measures counterintelligence operations" to form what your boy John L. Hart derisively calls "The Monster Plot", but rather to post old, grotesquely over-enlarged KGB-approved CIA documents which appear (but ... gasp ... only to the ignorant and/or ill-informed) to absolutely destroy that sadistic incompetent, Tennent H. Bagley, and his like-thinking colleagues in CIA.
So I'll just wait and see if Duncan responds to the PM I just sent him about an hour ago regarding your actions on this thread.
If not, it's "all yours," Michael ... and ... uhh ... "knock yourself out"?
Although I do reserve the right to "jump in" and "cover" a post or two of yours on this thread at some point in the future. "Turnabout is fair play; What Goes Around Comes Around" eh, Mike?
Cheers!
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Note: the title of this thread is still: “The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!”. Meaning Thomas Graves has not changed it on us, yet.
..............So I'll just wait and see if Duncan responds to the PM I just sent him about an hour ago regarding your actions on this thread. If not, it's "all yours," Michael ... and ... uhh ... "knock yourself out"? Although I do reserve the right to "jump in" and "cover" a post or two of yours on this thread at some point in the future. "Turnabout is fair play; What Goes Around Comes Around" eh, Mike? Cheers!
This thread is about the “Monster Plot”, which was released by the US Archives in 2017. You continue to post the same old Bagely stuff that you have for years, with nary a mention of Hart (except to call him a traitor) his report, or the “Master” or “Monster” Plot. I have no copy of Hart’s work from which I can copy and paste. So it has to be screenshots. I have had to also stitch them together through page breaks and I am pleased with the results. Good luck with your complaint to Duncan.
And as regards your complaint about “covering” your posts... it’s the silliest, most childlike thing I’ve ever heard. Perhaps you should warn people that you require some specific time for your posts to fester, er, I mean, age, before someone can post without you whining about it. And, lastly, do take note that you are the one who posts walls full of Bagely text. Do you really expect anyone to read it?
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And; after 2 years of confinement, Nosenko is given a short quiz:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/EC532F8D-4A07-4C9C-B239-2AD3C5284312.jpeg?ver=1566077136122)
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Note: the title of this thread is still: “The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!”. Meaning Thomas Graves has not changed it on us, yet.
This thread is about the “Monster Plot”, which was released by the US Archives in 2017. You continue to post the same old Bagely stuff that you have for years, with nary a mention of Hart (except to call him a traitor) his report, or the “Master” or “Monster” Plot. I have no copy of Hart’s work from which I can copy and paste. So it has to be screenshots. I have had to also stitch them together through page breaks and I am pleased with the results. Good luck with your complaint to Duncan.
And as regards your complaint about “covering” your posts... it’s the silliest, most childlike thing I’ve ever heard. Perhaps you should warn people that you require some specific time for your posts to fester, er, I mean, age, before someone can post without you whining about it. And, lastly, do take note that you are the one who posts walls full of Bagley text. Do you really expect anyone to read it?
Michael,
As (former Chief of CIA's Soviet Russia Division's Counterintelligence Section and handler/interrogator of Yuri Nosenko) Tennent H. Bagley and like-thinking people like myself see it, the core subject matter of Hart's 186-page so-called "Monster Plot" report is how the KGB, in 1959, started combining its traditional "active measures counterintelligence operations" with Sun Tzu-like "strategic deception counterintelligence operations" (aka "operational deception counterintelligence operations") with the goal of taking de facto control of the CIA after placing it in a veritable "wilderness of mirrors".
Thanks to your pretty obvious heroes -- (probable mole) Richard Kovich, Leonard McCoy, John L. Hart, and Bruce Solie, et al., the KGB succeeded beyond it's wildest dreams when, in 1968, CIA leadership not only deemed Nosenko a true defector, but hired him so that he might "consult" CIA and "teach" its new officers about counterintelligence (how ironic!).
Ergo, never-uncovered Edward Ellis Smith at the Hoover Institution (and someone in SR Division HE helped KGB to recruit), the never-uncovered cipher clerk "Jack" (who, among other things, unwittingly started the Korean War), et al., and Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, Oliver "Useful Idiot?" Stone and the oodles and gobs of tinfoil hat conspiracies he and paid-by-CPUSA Mark Lane engendered, Anna Chapman and the Eleven Dwarfs, Marina Butina, et al., and last-but-not-least ... Donald "I Like Putin/I'm a Useful Idiot" Trump!
-- MWT ;)
PS I see that you're still "posting" (or at least that's what your profile says you're doing), so I'll wait until I'm sure you're good-and-finished (like after two or three days of no "action" from you on this thread), and then I'll print out all 186 pages of Hart's report and highlight all of the sections you've posted so elegantly here, and I'll proceed (at 3 or 4 am Albany time when you're "out of commission") to ... uhh ... "rip you a new one," metaphorically speaking, point-by-point-by-point, by quoting to you pertinent rebuttals from Bagley's different writings and testimonies, okay?
Cheers!
PPS Bye-bye, for now.
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Last ditch effort by Bagely is received with a belly laugh from Nosenko:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/B1B33992-B24F-4FBF-B042-D1891FCBF6D3.jpeg?ver=1566082270383)
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Michael,.....
-- MWT ;)
PS ..... I'll wait until I'm sure you're good-and-finished (like after two or three days of no "action" from you on this thread), and then I'll print out all 186 pages of Hart's report and highlight all of the sections that you've posted here, and I'll proceed to "rip you a new one," metaphorically speaking, point-by-point-by-point, by quoting to you pertinent rebuttals from Bagley's different writings and testimonies, okay?
Why would you wait? The game is on, now! Unless of course the goal is to bury my posts under a 187 page wall of text, Gaalifed, with gobs of nonsense that you copy and paste from your years of pushing you paranoid false theory that was abandoned before I was even born, to the extent that any gentle reader will just keep walking on by...
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Why would you wait? The game is on, now! Unless of course the goal is to bury my posts under a 187 page wall of text, Gaalifed, with gobs of nonsense that you copy and paste from your years of pushing you paranoid false theory that was abandoned before I was even born, to the extent that any gentle reader will just keep walking on by...
No, Michael.
(Please don't get paranoiac and nasty, again.)
I'll do it in relatively short posts (hopefully), and point-by-point-by-point, with one post for each point (hopefully), okay?
Feel better now?
(This is gonna be fun!)
-- MWT Walk:
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(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/E8C83FC4-219A-462F-B492-AD0A45357115.jpeg?ver=1566093317731)
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(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/E8C83FC4-219A-462F-B492-AD0A45357115.jpeg?ver=1566093317731)
LOL
This is going to be so much fun!
You've got some more, right?
I'll wait until you've gotten them all up, Michael, and then take them on one-by-one and point out how each one of them was a burnt-out, throw-away "has-been" asset for the KGB because he was either 1) already suspected, 2) no longer actively working for the KGB/GRU, or 3) no longer had access to classified information.
I hope you don't mind some more fairly long posts in my doing so.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS Shouldn't you try to convince John Newman and Peter Dale Scott that they made a really, really big mistake in concluding Nosenko was a false defector?
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LOL This is going to be so much fun! You've got some more, right? I'll wait until you've gotten them all up, Michael, and then take them on one-by-one and point out how each one of them was a burnt-out, throw-away "has-been" asset for the KGB because he was either 1) already suspected, 2) no longer actively working for the KGB/GRU, or 3) no longer had access to classified information. I hope you don't mind some more fairly long posts in my doing so.Cheers!-- MWT ;) PS Shouldn't you try to convince John Newman and Peter Dale Scott that they made a really, really big mistake in concluding Nosenko was a false defector?
Why don’t you stop spamming the thread until you have something relevant to say? Quit asking the same stupid questions over and over again. I am not going to answer them.
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Professional opinions about Nosenko rendered without sufficient information.
For background, see p. 142
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10534-10205.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/59ACFCC3-4F67-469B-8297-9AB867E679A1.jpeg?ver=1566100569927)
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Editing
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More from CIA Director of Security, Howard Osborne:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/EB79135B-FE9C-43D1-A388-B336E38B0FC2.jpeg?ver=1566053403000)
If any of this thread's 43 current guests are wondering where in the heck this "gem" came from, it's from page 140 of "spiteful and under-endowed" John L. Hart's so-called "Monster Plot" report which Hart undoubtedly wrote a long, long time ago, but which didn't become available to the public until 2017.
My nemesis on this forum, Michael Clark, posted the continuation (i.e., page 141) of Howard Osborn's (no "e") memo earlier in this thread, before he posted this one. LOL
-- Mudd Wrassler Tommy ;)
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If any of this thread's 37 current guests are wondering where in the heck this "gem" came from, it's from page 140 of "spiteful and under-endowed" John L. Hart's so-called "Monster Plot" report which Hart undoubtedly wrote a long, long time ago, but which didn't become available to the public until 2017. My nemesis on this forum, Michael Clark, posted the continuation (i.e., page 141) of Osborn's memo earlier in this thread. LOL-- Mudd Wrassler Tommy ;)
Another useless, inane post.
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If any of this thread's
37 43 45 current guests are wondering where in the heck this "gem" came from, it's from page 140 of "spiteful and under-endowed" John L. Hart's so-called "Monster Plot" report which Hart undoubtedly wrote a long, long time ago, but which didn't become available to the public until 2017.
My nemesis on this forum, Michael Clark, posted the continuation (i.e., page 141) of Osborn's memo earlier in this thread, before he posted this one. LOL
-- Mudd Wrassler Tommy ;)
Another useless, inane post.
Michael,
Well, why don't you properly source and paginate these individual monstrosities so that guests and members who are interested in reading Hart's propaganda can find them in their proper place and context in his "Monster Report"?
Is every so-grossly-blown-up thing you're posting on this thread from Hart's (virtually KGB-approved) "Monster Plot," or are you throwing stuff in from other garbage sources, as well?
Having read his 186-page p.o.s., I recognize this junk, but why assume that our kind and obviously-interested guests do?
-- MWT ;)
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Wowie Zowie!
The KGB/GRU Spies That (false defector) Yuri Nosenko (supposedly) Uncovered:
1) U.S. Army sergeant Robert L. Johnson
2) -- a buncha technical military stuff
3) U.S. Sergeant Dayle W. Smith
4) James A. Mintkenbaugh
5) Some microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow
6) William John Cristopher Vassall !
7) And last but not least, about 200 unnamed spies in unnamed European countries, as "attested to" by three unnamed CIA officer who, in so many words, had the wherewithal to know!
This is going to be so much fun, Michael!
You've got some more, right? Please let me know if this pretty much covers it.
When I get the "go-ahead" from you, I'll start taking them one-by-one and point out how each of the humans was a burnt-out, throw-away "has-been" asset for the KGB because he was either 1) already suspected, 2) no longer actively working for the KGB/GRU, or 3) no longer had access to classified information.
And the microphones? Well, I'll show you how that's a bit misleading, okay?
I hope you don't mind some more fairly long posts in my doing so.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS Shouldn't you try to convince John Newman and Peter Dale Scott that they made a really, really big mistake in concluding Nosenko was a false defector?
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If any of this thread's 37 43 45 current guests are wondering where in the heck this "gem" came from, it's from page 140 of "spiteful and under-endowed" John L. Hart's so-called "Monster Plot" report which Hart undoubtedly wrote a long, long time ago, but which didn't become available to the public until 2017. My nemesis on this forum, Michael Clark, posted the continuation (i.e., page 141) of Osborn's memo earlier in this thread, before he posted this one. LOL-- Mudd Wrassler Tommy ;) Michael, Well, why don't you properly source and paginate these individual monstrosities so that guests and members who are interested in reading Hart's propaganda can find them in their proper place and context in his "Monster Report"? Is every so-grossly-blown-up thing you're posting on this thread from Hart's (virtually KGB-approved) "Monster Plot," or are you throwing stuff in from other garbage sources, as well?
Having read his 186-page p.o.s., I recognize this junk, but why assume that our kind and obviously-interested guests do?-- MWT ;)
More spam
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And now your just posting quotes of yourself to further spam the page. You should review the rules, unless you are trying to manipulate Duncan into just deleting this whole thing. You’ve quoted your post #62 here.
-Screen Shots.... check
-Personal message, Re: Rule #6; “. Threads which descend into chaos, where the thread creator participates in the gradual development of the chaos, will be deleted.“ .... check
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/B4A16FD1-C23A-4349-933A-32B4318F0495.jpeg?ver=1566103095054)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/37CF11B7-A628-4232-8202-B390A652041A.png?ver=1566104846584)
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Wowie Zowie! Thanks for posting this info from John L. Hart's propagandistic "The Monster Plot" report, Michael!
KGB Spies Uncovered by Nosenko (... uhh ... according to John L. Hart)
1) U.S. Army sergeant Robert L. Johnson
2) -- (A buncha technical military stuff I'm not gonna research right now, but which I know was not Nosenko's "bailiwick".)
3) U.S. Sergeant Dayle W. Smith
4) James A. Mintkenbaugh
5) Some microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow
6) William John Cristopher Vassall !
7) And last but not least, about 200 unnamed spies in unnamed European countries, as "attested to" by three unnamed CIA officers who, in so many words, had the wherewithal to know!
This is going to be so much fun, Michael!
You've got some more, right? Please let me know if this pretty much covers it.
When I get the "go-ahead" from you, I'll start taking them one-by-one and point out how each of the humans was a burnt-out, throw-away "has-been" asset for the KGB because he was either 1) already suspected, 2) no longer actively working for the KGB/GRU, or 3) no longer had access to classified information.
And the microphones? Well, I'll show you how that's a bit misleading, okay?
I hope you don't mind some more fairly long posts in my doing so.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS Shouldn't you try to convince John Newman and Peter Dale Scott that they made a really, really big mistake in concluding Nosenko was a false defector?
PPS Ready when you are, Michael!
Can you think of any more spies Nosenko "uncovered" before I get started?
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Wowie Zowie! Thanks for posting this info from "The Monster Plot," Michael!
The KGB/GRU Spies That (false defector) Yuri Nosenko (supposedly) Uncovered:
1) U.S. Army sergeant Robert L. Johnson
2) -- (a buncha technical military stuff)
3) U.S. Sergeant Dayle W. Smith
4) James A. Mintkenbaugh
5) Some microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow
6) William John Cristopher Vassall !
7) And last but not least, about 200 unnamed spies in unnamed European countries, as "attested to" by three unnamed CIA officers who, in so many words, had the wherewithal to know!
This is going to be so much fun, Michael!
You've got some more, right? Please let me know if this pretty much covers it.
When I get the "go-ahead" from you, I'll start taking them one-by-one and point out how each of the humans was a burnt-out, throw-away "has-been" asset for the KGB because he was either 1) already suspected, 2) no longer actively working for the KGB/GRU, or 3) no longer had access to classified information.
And the microphones? Well, I'll show you how that's a bit misleading, okay?
I hope you don't mind some more fairly long posts in my doing so.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS Shouldn't you try to convince John Newman and Peter Dale Scott that they made a really, really big mistake in concluding Nosenko was a false defector?
PPS Ready when you are, Michael!
Can you think of any more spies Nosenko "uncovered" before I get started?
Spam away, Thomas
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/798765DC-BB31-4C70-B2E4-F72BDD301832.jpeg?ver=1566102684425)
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Michael,
Well, not hearing from you as to whether or not that list of spies allegedly uncovered by Nosenko that I drew up is comprehensive, and seein' as how you replied to my post with some difficult-to-read stuff about two of my heroes (Anatoliy Golitsyn and Pyotr Popov) in a discolored and grossly over-enlarged page from Hart's "Monster Plot," instead, I guess I'll just go ahead and start with Number 1 on the list -- U.S. Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson, okay?
Let's see what another of my heroes, Tennent H. Bagley, has to say about him, whaddaya say?
Robert L. Johnson
From page 179 of Bagley's 2007 book Spy Wars:
The spy in the Orly (Paris airport) courier center, Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, had been very important indeed -- when active. But by the time Nosenko told us about him, Johnson had lost his access to the courier center, and his mentally unhinged wife was broadcasting her knowledge that he was a Soviet spy. The case was stone-cold dead, and the KGB knew it before Nosenko handed it to us.
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP -- Sergeant Dayle W. Smith !
Dayle W. Smith
From Bagley's book Spy Master (with former KGB General Sergei Kondrashev):
Sergeant Dayle W. Smith (KGB's "Andrey") confessed to having been recruited while in Moscow during 1953-1955. But the American authorities saw no reason to prosecute him because he had had no access to sensitive information and never passed any to the Soviets. For the KGB, he was a free “give-away.”
And this from page 179 of Spy Wars:
The most important (according to Nosenko) suspect, (KGB's) "Andrey” the sergeant-mechanic of cipher machines, left service six months before Nosenko fingered him and had never had access to cipher secrets even while active.
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP: James A. Mintenbaugh ! (... Who??)
James A. Mintkenbaugh
From the Wikipedia article on Robert Lee Johnson (see above):
(Johnson) also recruited a former Army friend, James Mintkenbaugh. Johnson worked for the KGB between 1953 and 1964, and passed on information while stationed at various sites in Europe and the U.S. ... In 1964, Johnson was turned in by his wife and, like Mintkenbaugh, received a 25-year prison sentence in 1965.
Note: Bagley doesn't seem to talk about Mintkenbaugh in his books or in his PDF Ghosts of the Spy Wars, but I think it's reasonable to assume that since Robert Lee Johnson was already "toast" when Nosenko "uncovered" him, that Mintkenbaugh was "throw away" material, as well.
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP: Some Microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow!
Microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
From page 179 of Spy Wars:
Microphones in the American Embassy? Everyone from the ambassador to the janitor knew they existed -- as they do in every embassy the Politburo might be interested in. Golitsyn had confirmed that well-known fact.
Note: Bagley goes into this in some detail in his HSCA testimony. He starts talking about them at the bottom of this page:
https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol12/html/HSCA_Vol12_0299b.htm
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP: William John Cristopher Vassall !!!
William John Cristopher Vassall
For background on this dude, here's the Wikipedia article on him. I don't know how accurate the article is because I haven't read it yet. (I'll read it later today and let you know if there's anything egregiously wrong in it ...)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Vassall
And here's something on him in Bagley's Spy Wars, page 179:
By the time Nosenko walked into CIA in Geneva (in May 1962) and pinpointed the British naval source William Vassall, the KGB already knew Vassall to be compromised by Golitsyns defection (in December of 1961). They even played a game to build up Nosenko in Western eyes: after Golitsyn’s defection, against all logic, they restored their contact with Vassall, which they had suspended while the British investigated an Admiralty lead from an earlier source.(fn 1)
And this, also from Spy Wars, page 260:
Nosenko’s defenders cite his uncovering of John Vassall, the British Admiralty employee, as a great contribution although they knew that Golitsyn had previously exposed Vassall. To explain that away, they went further in inventiveness: the British weren’t really on Vassall's track at all, they said. Had it not been for Nosenko’s information the British might have mistaken Golitsyn’s lead to Vassall for a totally different Admiralty source, the Houghton-Gee-Lonsdale network earlier un- covered by Goleniewski.(fn 18) In fact, no such confusion was even remotely possible.
(There's more, but it's getting late, even here in Paradise-on-Earth known as La Jolla, California ...)
-- MWT ;)
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Spam away, Thomas (emphasis added by MWT)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/798765DC-BB31-4C70-B2E4-F72BDD301832.jpeg?ver=1566102684425)
(Preliminary comments)
Dear Michael,
If you had watched John Newman's 2018 Spy Wars presentation in it's entirety, or if you had read Bagley's 2007 book by the same title, you would realize that GRU colonel Pyotr Popov was betrayed in early 1957 by Edward Ellis Smith, a former CIA officer who had been stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow under diplomatic cover so deep that he was unknown (as a spy) to even the American Ambassador there.
You'd know that the poor guy (Smith) had been "honeytrapped" by his beautiful KGB maid in late 1956, and that, as a result of that honey-entrapment, he had been interviewed twice by said intelligence organization and ... gasp ... recruited.
Smith had been sent in 1953 by CIA to the American Embassy in Moscow so that he could set up dead drops for Popov, scheduled to return to Moscow in 1955 when Vienna was to be reconstituted, geo-politically speaking, after the end of the Axis Power's "Three Part Rule" (or whatever it was called) of that spy-infested, front-line city.
You would also know that "The Three Musketeers" (Kovshuk, Kislov and Guk) had been sent to Washington D.C. in order to reestablish contact with Smith so that they could learn who the heck he'd been setting those dead drops up for, and hey, maybe do a little recruiting work on the side I'm thinking Richard "The Snoop" Kovich, or George "Nosenko Was A True Defector!" Kisevalter.
More on them later, perhaps ...
But most importantly for purposes of understanding the true import of the page you posted, above, you would know that in 1957, the KGB had sent an "illegal" by the name of Margarita Taivova to N.Y.C. via Pyotr Popov in Berlin so that it could be made to look as though Popov had not been betrayed by Smith, but by his having betrayed Taivova's itinerary to the CIA (which he had, btw).
Lastly, you would realize that whatever, according to Hart, "Kotov" and "Zhukov" were up to or being used for vis-a-vis Popov, it was most likely designed to do the same thing: to create a scenario in which Popov could be arrested for treason in such a way as to not cast suspicion on Edward Ellis Smith, or someone he may have helped KGB to recruit in CIA's Soviet Russia Division.
-- MWT ;)
PS By the way, it was my hero, KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn, who identified the true identities and KGB positions of "The Three Musketeers" to CIA, and helped it make sense of those three movie-lovin' guys had been up to in D.C. about three years earlier in 1957.
PS For the minutia-inclined: "Illegal" Margarita Tairova "let the cat out of the bag" when she, at Popov's trial, testified falsely that American surveillance had followed her all the way from Berlin to New York City, when in fact nobody followed her in Europe, and the FBI didn't started tailing her until she'd arrived in The Big Apple.
PS The main thesis of this Wikipedia article on Popov is fundamentally wrong about how he was betrayed and arrested, but at least it mentions both Tairova and Zhukov (if it's the same Zhukov, that is), and in the correct context, i.e., that each of them could have been the putative reason KGB had come to "suspect" Popov in 1958 or so, but you and I both know now that the KGB had known, about a year earlier (thanks to Edward Ellis Smith and "The Three Muskateers" in Washington D.C.) that Popov was a Soviet traitor to the CIA.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyotr_Semyonovich_Popov
Cheers!
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Spam away, Thomas (emphasis added by Muddy Wrassler Tommy aka "Thomas")
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/798765DC-BB31-4C70-B2E4-F72BDD301832.jpeg?ver=1566102684425)
Michael,
In retrospect, I am very happy, indeed, that you decided to post (see above) an ostensible "Golitsyn-condemning" / "Nosenko-extolling" page from John L. Hart's so-called "Monster Plot" report, grossly over-enlarged and discolored as you've made it, because it gives me an opportunity to bring to the attention of our guests and interested members the true facts surrounding KGB's 1) uncovering, 2) secret arrest and "doubling" of, 3) and eventual public arrest, trial, and execution of GRU Colonel Pyotr Popov.
Here they are -- the true facts -- from Tennent H. Bagley's 2014 PDF, Ghosts of the Spy Wars.
How Did the KGB Really Catch Popov?
For some reason the KGB leaders felt the need to misinform the CIA about when and how they had caught Pyotr Popov, CIA's great spy inside Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU).
It was by sheer chance, they said. They happened to have been routinely following an American diplomat [George Winters] in Moscow when they saw him drop a letter in a street mailbox. Dredging it out, they found it addressed to Popov.
That much was true—a diplomatic helper of CIA had mailed the letter—but to assert that this mailing first put them on Popov's trail was a palpable effort to deceive.
The KGB started pumping out this deceptive story early, and continued for years:
After secretly arresting Popov in November 1958 they forced him to act as a double agent against the Americans in Moscow. In that status in September 1959 he “surreptitiously” passed a written message to his CIA contact [Russell Langelle], telling that he had been caught because of “KGB surveillance of the recontact letter mailing.”
Shortly after publicly arresting Popov in October 1959, the KGB issued a secret official brief (obzor) to its own personnel, attributing Popov's discovery to the letter-mailing. (Now any leak from inside—including purposeful ones—could “officially” confirm the tale.)
Then in late 1961 a defector from their ranks, Anatoly Golitsyn—universally agreed to be genuine—told the CIA that the KGB had actually tumbled upon Popov's treason in 1957, getting onto him from a source [recently-fired CIA officer Edward Ellis Smith] met in Washington, whom Vladislav Kovshuk, heading the KGB's work against the American Embassy in Moscow, had traveled to Washington to meet. (fn 31)
Shortly after Golitsyn defected with that new version, the KGB sent Yuri Nosenko to tell authoritatively the old KGB version (among other things). “I know how Popov was caught,” he blurted as he was leaving his first meeting with me in Geneva in late May 1962. (fn 32) He “knew” because he himself had been supervising the KGB's watch over the American who occupied the post previously held by the CIA's contact man to Popov. The truth, he said, was that the KGB had first tumbled to Popov when KGB surveillants chanced to see American Embassy officer George Winters drop a letter to him.
The mailbox story was demonstrably false. CIA knew, of course, when Winters had posted that letter. It was on 29 January 1959, more than two months after the KGB had lured Popov to Moscow on a ruse. The KGB must have arrested him on arrival on 17 November 1958, because within two weeks the GRU chief was publicly fired and replaced on 8 December by KGB Chairman Ivan Serov himself. (fn 33) That the KGB would allow Popov freedom during this time is unthinkable because, having been alerted by the public firing of his chief, he could have fled. Moreover, the KGB later admitted to having “seen” (no doubt actually controlled) Popov's meeting his CIA contact twice in January, weeks before the letter mailing. (fn 34)
The KGB didn't need to use such an obvious lie to calm the CIA, least of all through a false defector like Nosenko, where telling this obviously false story would cause suspicion. It had more plausible versions available. Once the KGB first got onto Popov in 1957, as Golitsyn revealed, the KGB found lots of clues that had been lying unconnected in their files:
1.
A secret [1957] lecture in Berlin [by Defense Marshal Zhukov] (attended by Popov) had fallen into CIA hands;
2.
Popov, after an extramarital dalliance with a Yugoslav woman in Vienna, had later recommended her as an agent for his GRU base on the Baltic;
3.
Popov had dispatched [to New York City from Berlin] an Illegal named [Margarita] Tairova who then claimed to have been surveilled by the Americans as soon as she arrived in New York and thus had fled home (only Popov knew of her travelling identity);
4.
Popov had chanced to meet and recruit an American student in Berlin in circumstances so questionable that the KGB used a discussion of this case as the pretense to lure Popov back to Moscow—and arrest.
In addition, the KGB found other past incidents, apparently insignificant at the time, like Popov's having been questioned after a late-night passage on an underground train through the American Sector of Berlin.
Even the CIA, later analyzing the case, was satisfied that all these other incidents adequately explained Popov's downfall. But from that the Agency jumped to the further conclusion that there was no further need to worry that a mole inside CIA might have betrayed him. (fn 35) The CIA accepted as genuine Popov's “surreptitious note” and Nosenko's certification of the mailbox story, and simply brushed aside Golitsyn's revelation that Kovshuk's 1957 trip had put the KGB onto Popov.
Why then did the KGB push out that evidently-false mailbox story? We don't know, but I can only suppose that, fearing the CIA would immediately accept Golitsyn's story and look into the circumstances and identify the real source of Popov's betrayal, they impulsively used the most convenient explanation at hand.
It was a blunder. All the CIA had to do was check the records (once it identified Kovshuk's traveling pseudonym) and find that the KGB had not just sent him off on a “trip” of a week or two, as Nosenko asserted, but instead had transferred him on permanent assignment to the Soviet Embassy in Washington while—as both Golitsyn and Nosenko had reported—his Moscow supervisory position was kept open for him. He actually stayed in Washington for ten months.
Nosenko “knew” that the only purpose of Kovshuk's “short” trip had been to restore contact with an American cipher-machine mechanic whom the KGB had recruited eight years earlier. In reality, not until October, at the very end of this long sojourn in Washington, did Kovshuk contact the sergeant-mechanic “Andrey” (see #4), and even then only once and accompanied by another KGB officer who did all the talking. Moreover, “Andrey” was by no means the KGB's “most important spy ever recruited in Moscow” as Nosenko had called him, nor would he have justified Kovshuk's long absence. Instead, he was an easy KGB “give-away.”
As we later deduced, (fn 36), Kovshuk had really gone to Washington to meet and debrief Edward Ellis Smith, the CIA officer who had been sent to Moscow in 1953 to find dead drops and meeting sites for Popov's eventual recall from Vienna to Moscow. In September 1956 Kovshuk had caught Ed Smith in a honey-trap with his Soviet maid and offered him a way out—cooperation with the KGB. Yuri Nosenko in 1962 told the CIA that he himself had participated with Kovshuk in confronting Smith; he even gave the KGB's nickname for Smith, “Rizhy” [Redhead], so he was evidently speaking with authority when he told the CIA that Smith had refused Kovshuk's offer.
But this was KGB deception. Even by Nosenko's own account of his career, he was not in Kovshuk's section when the pitch to Ed Smith was made—and by the time he next met the CIA a year and a half later, Nosenko had completely forgotten what he had previously been told to say. Now he denied, even when confronted with a tape of his 1962 statements, ever having heard of Ed Smith or the KGB operation against him.
Smith failed to immediately report this KGB approach, the delay being enough for the CIA to recall him to Washington in early October to explain. Distrusting his account, the Agency fired him on the spot. By early November it was clear that Smith would never return to Moscow, and that is when Kovshuk and “Aleksandr Kislov” started preparing to go to the United States. (fn 37) In the course of his service in the CIA's Soviet Division and Moscow, Ed Smith had almost certainly learned enough about the CIA's secret source to enable the KGB to identify Popov. (fn 38) (And after the Cold War the KGB admitted to having recruited him in the 1950s. (fn 39)
Any KGB-recruited CIA Soviet-operations specialist would justify a KGB deceptive effort to hide him—perhaps even five years after losing access to secrets—if he kept contact with his old CIA colleagues. And even as a scholar in California [Smith] may have offered continued possibilities for the KGB. But to make such a protective effort so long after he had lost access to secrets raises a reasonable doubt: might Ed Smith have led the KGB to recruit another CIA Soviet specialist whose continued activity was really what the KGB deception was hiding? [emphasis added]
If there was someone, neither he or she has ever been identified, nor has anyone else—except Ed Smith—who was betraying as early as 1957, when the KGB got onto Popov, or 1959 when the Soviets began the deception.
Footnotes:
(31) This was “Kovshuk's trip,” whose nature and import touch several of these “ghost stories” and hence cause confusion. Thus I will try to clarify it here, at the risk of anticipating material to be discussed later. The bare facts of the “trip” are as follows: In early November 1956 Kovshuk (under the false name “Komarov”) requested a U.S. visa for permanent assignment to the Soviet Embassy in Washington (normally a minimum two-year tour of duty). He departed for there on 7 February 1957 but, in early November, cut short his Embassy assignment without explanation and returned to Moscow. The KGB attempted to hide the fact that he was not going alone by sending his companion, using the name Aleksandr Kislov, to New York under journalist cover and separating their U.S. visa-requests and travel dates by two days each. Aside from official visa and travel records, at least five sources informed CIA of this “trip”: (1) Golitsyn, who had heard that the trip pointed the KGB to Popov's contact with CIA; (2) the FBI, who spotted him in the spring with KGB officers Yuri Guk and “Aleksandr Kislov” together so often on clandestine activity that they nicknamed them “the three musketeers”; (3) Yuri Nosenko, claiming to have been Kovshuk's deputy, who strangely did not know that the “trip” lasted more than a couple of weeks, but “knew” that Kovshuk had gone to Washington for the sole purpose of restoring contact with a U.S. sergeant cipher-machine mechanic whom he said the KGB had recruited in Moscow eight years earlier and codenamed “Andrey”; (4) that mechanic himself, who was identified and confessed to having been recruited in a sex trap but was not prosecuted because he had never had access to secrets and had freely and fully confessed; and (5) KGB General Sergey Kondashev, a former close colleague of Kovshuk, who said after the Cold War that Kovshuk's Washington stay was to meet with “an important agent—one who was never uncovered” (Tennent H. Bagley, Spymaster, page viii).
(32) Nosenko refused to tell more until a later meeting, the KGB apparently having instructed him to keep the false mailbox story separate from his equally false story of why Kovshuk had travelled to Washington. Perhaps his lips had loosened as a result of the drinks he imbibed during that first CIA meeting. See Tennent H. Bagley, Spy Wars, p. 9.
(33) That KGB Chairman Ivan Serov, taking over the GRU because of a betrayal from within, should himself be fired little more than four years later because of yet another betrayal from within the GRU, that of Oleg Penkovsky is ironic.
(34) David E. Murphy , Sergei A. Kondrashev , and George Bailey , Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 277.
(35) Such was the gist of a 300-page report by CIA analyst Renée Peyton, as recounted by Tom Mangold in Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Master Spy Hunter (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 387n.40.
(36) Tennent H. Bagley , Spy Wars, pp. 65–66.
(37) Ibid., pp. 68–71. Sergey Kondrashev was aware that Kovshuk was accompanied by a member of SCD Dept. 14 (Spymaster, p. 289n13) and not having heard the name “Kislov” recognized it as a pseudonym and proposed to me a couple of candidates, but their ages did not fit. I think “Kislov” was actually Col. Valentin Zvezdonkov or, conceivably, his colleague in the investigation of Popov, Lt. Col. Sumin.
(38) See Peer de Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence (New York: Times Books, 1978), pp. 68–69 and 94–96. Silva recruited Ed Smith for this job. The story of Smith's assignment is told by Richard H. Smith in “The First Moscow Station. An Espionage Footnote to Cold War History,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1989, pp. 333–346.
(39) A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov , Vneshnaya Razvedka Rossii [Russian Foreign Intelligence] (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2000) p. 70. KGB General Sergey A. Kondrashev knew this to be correct, but was unwilling to tell more.
-- MWT ;)
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Nosenko was pre-judged. Golitsyn walked of water, and everyone else was under threat.
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/9DA1F065-FA80-46A4-8535-5B5B9C800813.jpeg?ver=1566173219576)
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Nosenko was pre-judged. Golitsyn walked of water, and everyone else was under threat.
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/9DA1F065-FA80-46A4-8535-5B5B9C800813.jpeg?ver=1566173219576)
Michael,
I may address your new post in an hour or two, but for now let me just say that although I personally believe that you are an archetypal "lost cause," there's still hope for many inquisitive and anonymous "guests" who invariably show up on this thread whenever I've been posting on it for several minute -- still have hope in understanding how the "KGB" (today's FSB and SVR) and the GRU have been running circles around our intelligence agencies since about 1921 (with Operation Trust, Sindikat-2, etc), but especially after 1957 when a "KGB within the KGB" was formed in the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, i.e., The 14th Department, and how it began to so effectively interweave its Sun Tzu- like "strategic deception counterintelligence operations" with KGB's already-in-progress "active measures counterintelligence operations".
And it's for these inquisitive, apparently open-minded guests that I go to all of this trouble, not for you, Michael.
-- MWT ;)
PS Cheers!
......
Now for my hero, Anatoliy Golitsyn, the true defector who tried to warn CIA and the FBI about the machinations of the above-mentioned Department 14 of the Second Chief Directorate (today's FSB) ...
For inquisitive, open-minded guests and the occasional visiting member, my "take" on the excerpt (page 42) Michael Clark posted above from John L. Hart's so-called "Monster Plot" report is that it's pretty much a spot-on assessment.
If I could ask Mr. Hart whether or not, for example, the FBI had changed its mind about "true" volunteer spy, Aleksey Kulak (J. Edgar Hoover's always-believed and shielded-from-CIA "Fedora") when Hart wrote his 186-page piece of propaganda.
-- MWT ;)
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Michael,
I may address your new post in an hour or two, but for now let me just say that although I personally believe that you are an archetypal "lost cause," that the many inquisitive anonymous "guests" who invariably show up on this thread whenever I've been posting on it for several minutes still have hope in understanding what how the "KGB" (today's FSB and SVR) and the GRU have been running circles around our intelligence agencies since about 1921, but especially after 1957 when a "KGB within the KGB" was formed in the Second Chief Directorate (and named the brand new "14th Department"), and how it began to so effectively interweave its "strategic deception counterintelligence operations" with already existing "active measures counterintelligence operations".
-- MWT ;)
PS Cheers!
Incoherent nonsense and babble. You should have waited the hour or two when you might have had something relevant if not cogent to post.
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Incoherent nonsense and babble. You should have waited the hour or two when you might have had something relevant if not cogent to post.
Exactly.
Thanks for proving my point.
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Michael,
I may address your new post in an hour or two, but for now let me just say that although I personally believe that you are an archetypal "lost cause," I believe there's still hope for the many inquisitive "guests" (52 at the moment) who invariably show up on this thread whenever I've been posting on it for several minutes -- still hope that they'll continue to try to make sense out of the complexity and the confusion and the falsehoods and eventually come to understand that the "KGB" (today's FSB and SVR) and the GRU have been running circles around our intelligence agencies since about 1921 (with Operation Trust, Sindikat-2, etc), but especially so after 1957, when a top-secret "KGB within the KGB" was formed in the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, i.e., "The 14th Department of the SCD " and how it began to so effectively interweave its Sun Tzu- like "strategic deception counterintelligence operations" with KGB's traditional "active measures counterintelligence operations" against us, the KGB's "Main Enemy".
It's for these inquisitive, apparently open-minded guests that I go to all of this trouble, Michael, not for you.
Why?
Well, because I consider you a "lost cause," that's why.
-- MWT ;)
PS Cheers!
......
Now for my hero, Anatoliy Golitsyn, the true defector who tried to warn CIA and the FBI about the machinations of "Department 14" of the Second Chief Directorate (today's FSB) ...
For inquisitive, open-minded guests and the occasional visiting member, my "take" on the excerpt (page 42) Michael Clark posted above from John L. Hart's so-called "Monster Plot" report is that it's pretty much a spot-on assessment!
It would be interesting to know, however, whether or not the FBI had already changed its mind (in 1978, or so) about the long-term volunteer spy, Aleksey Kulak (J. Edgar Hoover's always-believed and shielded-from-CIA "Fedora") when John L. Hart, a CIA operations guy who had no experience whatsoever with Counterintelligence, wrote his 186-page piece of Anti- Counterintelligence Propaganda, and if so, why he left that bit, etc etc etc, ... out.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/09/03/fbi-says-its-spy-in-kgb-was-a-fake/2f5602ba-7108-473e-9d91-dbdb92746da2/
Another thing that should borne in mind is that after the so-called end of the Cold War, it was learned by Bagley in private conversations with his former adversaries that the KGB had sometimes intentionally misled its officers who were not in SCD's top-secret Department 14 so that they would unwittingly "corroborate" and reinforce the deceptive narratives that Dept. 14 was putting out and wanted The West to believe.
One such instance that comes to mind was the rumour that lots of (imaginary) high-ranking KGB officers had been fired or demoted when Nosenko "defected" to the U.S.
I'll try to look up some more examples and post them here later today.
-- MWT ;)
Edited and substantially augmented.
-- MWT ;)
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...the many inquisitive "guests" (52 at the moment) who invariably show up on this thread whenever I've been posting on it for several minutes.
-- MWT ;)
That’s beautiful. Winged fairy guests alighting on the branches and walls of the forum as Thomas arrives with his good book.
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That’s beautiful. Winged fairy guests alighting on the branches and walls of the forum as Thomas arrives with his good book.
Michael,
Books plural, actually ... and one PDF.
Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA by Mark Riebling (1994) free
https://archive.org/details/WedgeFromPearlHarborTo911HowTheSecretWarBetweenTheFBIAndCIAHasEndangeredNationalSecurity/page/n2
Spymaster by Tennent H. Bagley (2013) gotta pay
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2017.1357886?af=R&journalCode=fint20
Spy Wars by Tennent H. Bagley (2007) free
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGamesi]Spymaster[/i]https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2017.1357886?scroll=top&needAccess=true
Ghosts of the Spy Wars by Tennent H. Bagley (2014) free
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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There was no interrogation. No attempt to gather information. There was just coercion and torture, meant to elicit a confession.
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/C650430E-55EB-4CD2-A7FE-FDC8C668C466.jpeg?ver=1566258516015)
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Here's a very accurate (except for the "the conditions were worse than in any prison" bit) 1981 Reader's Digest article by Joseph Trento, most of which he adapted from Henry Hurt's book Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back.
In the annals of Soviet defections to the West, ... there is no case as bizarre or perplexing as that of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. For almost 20 years, his reputation has alternately plummeted and soared as our intelligence corps debated whether he was a true defector or a counterspy. In the end, acceptance was the verdict, and Nosenko is today a respected CIA consultant.
However, new and secret FBI findings — revealed here for the first time— declare that another Soviet, code-named Fedora, who for 15 years the FBI believed was spying for the United States, was actually a double agent under the control of Moscow. These findings raise a host of crucial questions about American intelligence operations — among them the legitimacy of other defectors, including Yuri Nosenko. Here is the story.
.....
Our story begins in 1962 ... when KGB officer Yuri Nosenko arrived in Geneva, Switzerland, with a Soviet delegation to a disarmament conference. During that trip, hemade a secret approach to the CIA and announced that he wished to work for the West. He did not want to defect, however; instead, he preferred to meet with the CIA whenever his KGB duties took him outside Russia. Then Nosenko offered information that suggested he had valuable knowledge in many areas of CIA interest, including KGB recruitment of an American ("Andrey" -- Sergeant Dwyane W. Smith) as a Soviet spy.
After this initial contact, Nosenko returned to the conference. The CIA officer(s) flew to the United States convinced that the CIA had secured the prize of all prizes in intelligence: an “agent in place” — a spy who would work for America in the very heart of the Soviet secret service.
(One of the) officer’s enthusiasm disappeared shortly after he reached CIA headquarters. There he (Tennent H. Bagley) was told a secret (by James Angleton) that only a handful of CIA officers then knew. Another KGB officer, a man named Anatoli M. Golitsin, had defected to the United States six months earlier and stated that the KGB had penetrated the CIA at a high level. He had also warned that the Soviets would send out false defectors to deceive and confuse Western intelligence and to divert anyinvestigation that would lead to the KGB spy in the CIA (Edward Ellis Smith, or someone he helped the KGB to recruit). Indeed, a number of highly placed Soviet intelligence officers. did appear, among them a United Nations diplomat whose (FBI) code-name, "Fedora" (Aleksei Kulak), would become inextricably linked with Nosenko.
The thrust of Nosenko’s information was that there was no Soviet penetration of the CIA. His leads about KGB recruitment of an American spy pointed to the U.S. military. In the following weeks, a meticulous examination was made of all that Nosenko had told the CIA officer. When it was compared to what Golitsin had revealed and to other information, the CIA was led to believe that Nosenko had been sent as a disinformation agent by the KGB. If he ever contacted the Americans again, it was agreed, there would be no hint of this determination. He would be met secretly and debriefed so that the CIA could learn what he wanted to say. But as long as these suspicions prevailed, he would never be accepted as a true defector.
Nothing was heard from Nosenko for 19 months. Then, in January of 1964, two months after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, he appeared in Geneva again. He stated that he wanted to defect to the United States — and he offered an irresistible temptation. He said that he had been in charge of the KGB file on Lee Harvey Oswald, the man who had (allegedly) assassinated President Kennedy.
A Confirmation of Lies
A crucial question centered on whether the Soviet Union had played any role in the President’s murder. For it was known that Oswald had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and had remained out of sight until his return to the United States in 1962.
All knowledge of Soviet procedures indicated that the KGB would be intensely interested in Oswald, who had arrived in Russia just after leaving the Marine Corps, where he had served as a radar operator at a military base in Japan. During that period he had visual access to the U -2 spy plane which his unit had tracked on the radar screens. The U -2 flew on covert reconnaissance missions, many of them over the Soviet Union. Upon his defection Oswald had told a U.S. embassy officer that he wanted to provide the Soviets with useful information.
Nosenko’s statements about Oswald, during his second series of clandestine meetings in Geneva, astounded the CIA in 1964 — and continue to astonish virtually everyone to this day. He declared that the KGB never had the slightest interest in Oswald and never gave him even a routine debriefing. If there were any lingering doubts that Nosenko |was dispatched by Moscow, this preposterous account quashed them. But the CIA faced a quandary. The Warren Commission would soon begin hearings on the assassination. The FBI would need to be apprised of Nosenko’s report. No one could risk turning away the only purported Soviet source who might shed light on the President’ s assassin .
As the CIA men debated the question, Nosenko steam-rollered a decision by insisting that he had received a telegram recalling him to Moscow immediately. This created urgent pressure on the Americans to reach a decision. Nosenko was spirited to American soil. When the FBI learned about Nosenko’s defection, it turned to Fedora, the Soviet U.N. diplomat who had been providing the Bureau with, information since 1962. From his inside knowledge of KG B activities, Fedora was able to confirm that Nosenko had been sent a recall telegram. When a question arose about Nosenko’s rank in the KGB, Fedora corroborated Nosenko’s claim that he was a lieutenant colonel. In general, Fedora supported Nosenko, which encouraged the FBI’s ready acceptance of the new defector.
But there was another urgent reason why the FBI wanted to accept Nosenko as legitimate: he was saying just what FBI director J. Edgar Hoover wanted to hear about Oswald’s activities in the Soviet Union. Hoover was determined that Oswald be adjudged a “lone nut” by the Warren Commission. Such an assessment would relieve any FBI responsibility for Oswald's having been on the loose in Dallas. Nothing seemed awry about Fedora’s corroboration of Nosenko’s rank — or in Fedora’s confirmation that Nosenko had received a recall telegram — until later, when Nosenko admitted that he had been only a captain in the KGB. Still later, the National Security Agency, through an analysis of cable traffic
between Moscow and Geneva, established that no recall telegram had been sent to Nosenko. Confronted, Nosenko confessed his deception.
This curious corroboration between Nosenko and Fedora of demonstrable lies — and other similar connections — gave strong support to CIA suspicions that both sources were being manipulated by Moscow. While the CIA did not have jurisdiction over Fedora, it could certainly call the shots on Nosenko. Thus began one of the strangest episodes in American espionage.
“Sent to Deceive.”
The first two months of Nosenko’s debriefing in the United States took place under normal conditions applied to any defector. The purpose was to judge the scope of his knowledge, the areas of his expertise, and to gain enough information to provide a basis for extensive debriefing over the months, even years, that would fol- low. The CIA had already found so many oddities in Nosenko’s material that the officers handling the case believed he was ? ? ? ? ? agent. But Nosenko was not told of these conclusions, and indeed the door was always open to the possibility that he could prove his bona fides. He was treated like any other defector.
One of the strangest aspects of Nosenko’s information was the overlap with material that Anatoli Golitsin had provided. Six months prior to Nosenko’s first contact, for example, Golitsin had given details of listening devices planted in the American embassy in Moscow. Independently, Nosenko gave the same information. For four years, he said, his assignment was to spy on embassy personnel. Asked if there were microphones in the new embassy wing, he said there were none. Later more than a hundred were discovered there.
Golitsin also gave leads to a high-level KGB penetration (William Vassall) of the British Admiralty. He had had only part of the picture — substantial clues that ultimately would have led to fruition. Nosenko was able to fill in a gap, which lent support to the proposition that some of his contributions were of great value. But to a trained counterintelligence eye, this dovetailing suggested a Soviet decision to promote Nosenko by giving him information on cases already compromised by Golitsin.
The significant point is that under normal debriefing, Nosenko’s credibility continued to sink in the eyes of the CIA. By April 1964, there was such an accumulation of lies on
Nosenko’s ledger sheet that the CIA concluded that its friendly efforts to elicit truthful information from him were useless. There was a unanimous feeling among the officers then handling Nosenko that he was a Soviet agent. It was clear tat he was of no value as a source for the Warren Commssion, simply because his information on Oswald was hopelessly contradictory, much of it patently false. Nosenko was placed under hostile interrogation in an effort to make him confess that he was a Soviet agent.
Fifteen years later, the officer (Tennent H. Bagley) in charge of Nosenko in the early days described the situation to a Congressional (HSCA) committee:
“Nosenko’s story of Oswald is only “one of scores of things that Nosenko said which made him appear to be a KGB plant. If the Oswald story were alone — a strange aberration in an otherwise normal performance — perhaps one could just shrug and forget it. It is not. We got the same evasions, contradictions, excuses, whenever we pinned Nosenko down. [This] included Nosenko’s accounts of his career, of his travels, of the way he learned the various items of information he reported and even accounts of his private life. All of those irregularities point to the same conclusion: that Nosenko was sent by the KGB to deceive us.”
Changes of Fortune
The years that followed were terrible for Nosenko. (According to John L. Hart he) was kept under conditions far worse than those of any modern U.S. prison. He was deprived of daily showers, television, writing, any form of entertainment. For part of the time he was even deprived of reading material and exercise. The questioning and. the detention went on for hours and days and, finally, years. But no matter how tightly knotted Nosenko’s lies and contradictions became, he refused to admit that he was a Soviet agent.
In the spring of 1966, with Nosenko still in detention, there appeared in Washington, a promising young KGB agent who came to be known as Igor (Igor Kochnov). He claimed to be eager to work for the United States. In order to enhance his position in the KGB, he successfully . solicited assistance from U.S. intelligence officials in the purported recruitment of a Soviet defector named Nicholas Shadrin (real name: Nikolai Artamonov), who was now a well-adjusted American citizen. Shadrin was put to work by the Americans as a double agent against the Soviets — pretending to have been recruited by Igor. Nine years later Shadrin vanished (while being handled in by Bruce Solie and a FBI agent), presumably into Soviet hands, while on an assignment in Vienna.
In addition to recruiting Shadrin, Igor had a potpourri of urgent business. Among other things, he told American officials quite specifically that he could vouch for the fact that Nosenko was a true defector. Igor’s certification occurred at the nadir of Nosenko’s crumpled fortunes. His story, oozing deception, was in shambles. Yet it was clear Nosenko was not going to break. There was no alternative but to bring the matter to some conclusion.
Finally, in late 1968, after years of increasingly wrenching internal debate and an official reexamination of the case (by Bruce Solie), the CIA granted Nosenko his bona fides. Though Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence during this period, approved Nosenko as an independent contractor for the CIA, he has made it clear that he intended Nosenko to be settled into American life in a manner in which he could post, no threat. Even though Helms agreed to award Nosenko his bona fides, his suspicions of the odd defector had never diminished.
For several years Nosenko, living a private life, drew a paycheck from the CIA for various non-sensitive duties. But his association with FBI was extensive. At last, the FBI could fully utilize its two mutually corroborative sources -- Nosenko and Fedora.
Meanwhile, Nosenko’s small band of supporters at CIA continued to grow, even though some of his original detractors remained strongly influential. During the mid-1970s, tumultuous changes racked the Agency, following the replacement of Richard Helms by (possible mole) William Colby. In early 1975, after the resignation (or retirement) of most of Nosenko’s chief detractors (over unrelated matters), the men who supported Nosenko moved into positions of influence. Almost at once Nosenko was brought into the Agency as a counterintelligence consultant.
The consternation among those who originally suspected Nosenko was overwhelming. It was seen, as utterly incomprehensible that a man ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? Soviet plant could suddenly be resurrected, considered rehabilitated, and placed in a position of trust in the most sensitive section of the CIA's counterintelligence services. He remains ? ? ? ? ? ?
A Serious Stumble
In the wake of the torrid debate over Nosenko, there is a quagmire of dissension. The professionals who originally suspected Nosenko are on one side. On the other are those who in subsequent years have managed to win enthusiastic support for Nosenko from the highest intelligence officials in the land. The few original doubters still in the intelligence services are mute; others, long retired, seem almost resigned to the proposition that Nosenko has won lasting acceptance. Only a few believe the case should be
reopened to examine the question of what Nosenko’s acceptance means to the U.S. intelligence services.
One of the most bizarre aspects of the matter is the fierce intensity one encounters from Nosenko supporters for merely questioning his total acceptance. According to an official statement from the CIA, Nosenko “continues to be used as a regular lecturer at counterintelligence courses of the Agency, the FBI, Air Force, and others." In this capacity, he is in direct contact with this country’s most carefully concealed covert personnel — by any standards a peculiar place to put a man with such an unprecedented background. But these supporters are stymied when they try to explain why" anyone can be reasonably sure Nosenko is a true defector. In the end, they say there is no way to show a reporter the significant reasons because doing so would reveal sensitive information. Nosenko’s friends today claim that he has provided vital information to the United States on various cases which cannot be revealed.
They suggest that he can be credited with providing information on more than 200 cases of great significance. When told of this, Nosenko’s detractors suggest that perhaps
once he was released from CIA custody Nosenko was provided with new information by the Soviets — much of it very good intelligence — to bolster his chances for full acceptance.
Whatever the truth, Nosenko is an established participant in the U.S. intelligence community, a position attained by few Soviet defectors. He is accepted by both the CIA and the FBI. But along his rocky rise to respectability, there was one serious stumble — one that might have left his supporters in a state of humiliation if not full-blown suspicion. It happened in 1978 when the House Select Committee on Assassinations, looking into the history of Lee Harvey Oswald, undertook an examination of Yuri Nosenko.
As the only nonpartisan, non-intelligence group ever to have full access to the file on Nosenko, the committee reached the official conclusion that this strange defector was a liar. The official report states: “the committee was certain Nosenko lied about Oswald — whether it was to the FBI and CIA in 1964, or to the committee in 1978, or perhaps to both.” The committee, explaining that its purpose was not to determine the validity of Nosenko other than in his statements about Oswald, stopped short of drawing wider conclusions. But it was firm in its assertion that Nosenko, the man who brought the message from Moscow that the KGB never had the slightest interest in Oswald, is a liar.
“I Was Telling the Truth”
In addition to the committee’s thorough review of the files, intelligence agents and officials were called to testify about Nosenko. At nearly every juncture, their testimony-- even
when trying to support Nosenko -- was devastating to the proposition that he was the sort of man who should be accepted by the U.S. clandestine services to give lectures on
counterintelligence and be handsomely paid. Take, for example, the testimony of Bruce Solie of the CIA Office of Security, the man who orchestrated the original clearance of Nosenko in 1968. Solie and Nosenko became friends, and later when Nosenko was married Solie served as his best man at the wedding. In a sworn deposition, Solie quickly conceded that he was uninformed about Nosenko’s positions on Oswald. But Solie agreed that the Oswald aspect of Nosenko’s testimony is “an important part to be considered” in any evaluation of Nosenko’s bona fides.
Staff counsel Kenneth Klein struggled to understand why Solie was willing to accept Nosenko’s statements on Oswald even though he claimed he had never asked him a single question about Oswald during the CIA re-examination that finally cleared Nosenko. The best answer Klein could elicit was that Solie was willing to accept whatever Nosenko said as true unless he was shown information to the contrary-- a peculiar philosophy for a security officer. Finally, Klein asked Solie if it was proved that Nosenko was lying about Oswald, “Do you think that would change your opinion as to whether he was bona fide?”
“It sure would,” Solie replied.
John Hart, a former high CIA official, was brought out of retirement in 1978 by CIA director Stansfield Turner to explain the Agency’s position on Nosenko. Curiously, Hart announced he knew almost nothing about Nosenko’s Oswald connections, even though the committee had asked the Agency to send someone to speak to that point. Pressed by an incredulous Congressman, Hart finally arrived at the following statement: “Let me express an opinion on Mr. Nosenko’s testimony about Lee Harvey Oswald. I, like many others, find Mr. Nosenko’s testimony incredible. Therefore, if I were in the position of deciding whether to use the testimony of Mr. Nosenko in this case or not, I would not use it.”
This was an odd contrast with his own statements, and with an Agency response to an interrogatory submitted to the committee two weeks earlier, asserting that the CIA believed Nosenko’s statements about Oswald were “made in good faith.” But none of this was as damaging to Nosenko as his own appearance before an executive session of the committee. Kenneth Klein opened his questioning with a summary of what Nosenko had told the staff up until that point: “You have testified that the KGB did not even speak to Lee Harvey Oswald because he was uninteresting; and that you decided he was not interesting without speaking to him.”
From that point on, staff counsel Klein elicited new and astonishing contradictions and inconsistencies. Repeatedly, Nosenko retreated to the explanation that Klein was using material that Nosenko had provided while under hostile interrogation. But when Klein asked if the hostile interrogations ever led him to lie, Nosenko stated, “No, I was telling the truth.” Indeed ? ? ? ? ? of Nosenko's information on Oswald — including details that the committee concluded were lies — is contained in an FBI report of early March 1964, a full month before Nosenko was placed under hostile interrogation.
Nosenko complained bitterly to the committee about the conditions of his long and solitary confinement. He repeatedly insinuated that his treatment went far beyond spartan conditions, even claiming that he had been improperly drugged. A number of officers from the CIA and FBI swore to the committee that they never saw any evidence that Nosenko had been drugged or physically abused. Finally, Nosenko conceded that he "had never even been slapped."
In the end, as Nosenko sunk deeper into a morass of contradictions, he begged committee chairman Louis Stokes to stop the questioning. He submitted that he should not be questioned about anything he said during the period he was under hostile interrogation, although he swore that he always told the truth about Oswald. The committee stopped the questioning. In its final report, the committee the following statement:
"[The committee] questioned Nosenko in detail about Oswald, finding significant inconsistencies in statements he had given the FBI, the CIA and the committee. For example, Nosenko told the committee that the KGB had Oswald under extensive surveillance, including mail interception, wire tap and physical observation. Yet, in 1964, he told the CIA and the FBI there had been no such surveillanceof Oswald. Nosenko indicated there had been no psychiatric examination of Oswald subsequent to his suicide attempt, while in 1978 he detailed for the committee the reports he had read about psychiatric examinations of Oswald."
In the end, the committee was unable to resolve the Noscnko matter. The fashion in which Nosenko was treated by the Agency — his interrogation and confinement — virtually ruined him as a valid source for information on the assassination. Nevertheless, the committee was certain Nosenko lied about Oswald. The reasons range from the possibility that Nosenko wanted, to exaggerate his own importance to ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? with its sinister implications.
One might expect just such a conclusion by a committee of Congress to ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? intelligence Community. Not at all. In fact, not a single major publication is known to have even mentioned that the House committee concluded that Nosenko had lied. Immediately, as if to assuage Nosenko’s hurt feelings over his humiliation before the committee, CIA director (Admiral Stansfield) Turner issued a private statement to his employees reviewing selected aspects of the case and concluding: “Today Mr. Nosenko is a
well-adjusted American citizen utilized as a consultant by CIA and is making a valuable contribution to our mission."
Fedora Unmasked
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Nosenko story is the fact that his acceptance is linked to other defectors — including Fedora (Aleksei Kulak) and "Igor" (Igor Kochnov) — who have come under intense suspicion. The thorniest of these linkages involves Fedora. Not only did this agent corroborate specific lies in Nosenko’s story, he went much
farther. He told the FBI that the KGB was so distraught over Nosenko’s defection that its operations in New York City were shut down. This odd and unsubstantiated claim looked even more peculiar when the CIA confirmed that KGB operations were continuing in Switzerland, a country where Nosenko had served and where presumably he knew of operations about which he could provide sensitive information. The basic questions about Fedora’s bona fides first were made public in 1978 by Edward Jay Epstein in Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald. Epstein revealed that the FBI had placed great faith in Fedora and fed him large quantities of U.S. secrets (cleared by a distrustful CIA, iirc) in order to enhance his position in the KGB. Showing Fedora’s links to Nosenko, Epstein concluded: “If Nosenko was now ruled a fraud, then Fedora would seem to be a part of the same Soviet deception. And if Fedora were really under Soviet control, it could bring down the entire FBI counterespionage structure like a house of cards.”
Still highly protective of its source Fedora, the FBI began a secret investigation to determine the source for Epstein’s information. In fact, there was such alarm within the intelligence community that serious stories circulated that Fedora — by then back in the Soviet Union — probably had been tortured and executed by the Soviets as a result of the revelations. The result of the search for Epstein’s source (almost certainly Tennent H. Bagley) is not known. Far more important, however, was a subsequent investigation by the FBI aimed at assessing Fedora’s bona fides. By 1980 this investigation — one of the most tightly held secrets in the intelligence community — had ended with the FBI’s electrifying conclusion that Fedora was a Soviet agent, that he was tender Moscow's control during the years of his association with the FBI, including I the period when he was giving urgent support to Nosenko. (emphasis added)
One might expect such a conclusion to lead to a re-examination of all related cases and sources, including Nosenko and one of his chief certifiers, "Igor" (Kochnov). But as of the summer of 1981, this had not happened. The finding on Fedora — until now known only to a few intelligence officials — is viewed as a piece of history unrelated to anything going on today in U.S. intelligence.
It is far from clear why officials have refused to pursue the seemingly pointed implications of the FBI’s new findings, or why they do not want to reopen the bewildering Nosenko case. And it is astounding that every sign indicates that Igor is still considered a valid source — even in light of his certification of Nosenko, even after the manipulation and the tragic loss of Nicholas Shadrin (Nikolai Artamonov).
A public revelation that any one of ? ? ? ? ? defectors is a false agent could have awesome bureaucratic repercussions. If one falls, others must fall, creating havoc inside intelligence services where crucial analyses and long-term plans may have been built upon the supposed reliability of these sources. The most ominous question is whether it has become simpler to live with Nosenko and other sources with whom he is linked, than to cast out any one of them and risk tumbling the whole internal structure of cases and strategies.
Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back, from which this
article was adapted, will be available at bookstores in November (1981).
You may also obtain a copy (postpaid) by sending a check or money
order made out to Readers Digest Press in the amount of $13.95 io
Reader’s Digest Press, 200 Park Awe., New York, N.Y. 10166.
-SHADRIN: THE SPY WHO NEVER CAME BACK." © 1981 BY THE READER'S DIGEST ASSN.. INC.. /
IS PUBLISHED AT SI 3.95 BY READER'S DIGEST PRESS. 200 PARK AVE.. N Y. 10165. AND DISTRIBUTED BY
MCGRAW-HILL BOOK CO.. 1221 AVE. OF THE AMERICAS. NEW YORK. N.Y. 10020.
THIS ARTICLE CONTAINS ADDITIONAL MATERIAL BY THE AUTHOR.
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-- MWT ;)
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(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/DB9E7C09-92E9-4F51-BB19-316AA72ADA00.jpeg?ver=1566261042017)
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(Another unpaginated-and-grossly-over-enlarged-by-Michael page of pro-KGB / anti-CIA Counterintelligence propaganda by John L. Hart in his so called "Monster Plot" report -- MWT)
Here's a truly informative newspaper article about FBI's "Fedora" (Aleksei Kulak) and the boys by Joseph Trento. It has much of the same information as the long Reader's Digest article I posted, above.
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000404610022-4.pdf
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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(Another unpaginated-and-grossly-over-enlarged-by-Michael page of pro-KGB / anti-CIA Counterintelligence propaganda by John L. Hart in his so called "Monster Plot" report -- MWT)
Here's a truly informative newspaper article about FBI's "Fedora" (Aleksei Kulak) and the boys by Joseph Trento. It has much of the same information as the long Reader's Digest article I posted, above.
.............
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
Another post from Thomas that does not say anything about the subject of the thread: John Hart’s, “The Monster Plot”. Perhaps Thomas will get around to it at some point.
In the meantime we can be thankful that the name of this thread is still:
“The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!”
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By the way, my screen shots are sized quite well for reading on a phone. Your welcome Thomas, I know how often you complain about having to work from your little Android.
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Another post from Thomas that does not say anything about the subject of the thread: John Hart’s, “The Monster Plot”. Perhaps Thomas will get around to it at some point.
In the meantime we can be thankful that the name of this thread is still:
“The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!”
Michael,
Don't you get it?
The post-1959 (i.e., post inauguration of SCD's "Department 14") shenanigans of "Fedora" (Aleksei Kulak) and "Igor" (Igor Kovshuk) and Yuri Nosenko, as described in Trento's and Hurt's articles, above, (and in other writer's articles and books like, for example, Spy Wars by Tennent H. Bagley), constituted the beginning (and very damaging part) of the (ongoing-today, imho) "Monster Plot" that true-defector Anatoliy Golitsyn tried to warn CIA about, starting in late December, 1961.
Not to mention the "shenanigans" of GRU Colonel Dimitri Polyakov, and KGB officer Igor Loginov, and, and, and ...so many, many others not mentioned in these particular articles.
LOL!
Michael, have I posted this article about "Fedora" and the boys yet?
Please forgive me if I have.
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/09/03/A-Soviet-KGB-intelligence-agent-who-defected-in-1964/9948368337600/
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS Are you ever going to write a letter to former Army Intelligence analyst John Newman and U.C. Berkeley professor Peter Dale Scott, chastising them for having made the really, really big mistake of believing Tennent H. Bagley when he said (in his books and his PDF) that Nosenko was a false defector?
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Michael,
Don't you get it? The post-1959 (i.e., post inauguration of SCD's "Department 14") shenanigans of "Fedora" (Aleksei Kulak) and "Igor" (Igor Kovshuk) and Yuri Nosenko, as described in Trento's and Hurt's articles, constitute the beginning (and very damaging part) of the (ongoing today, imho) "Monster Plot" that true-defector Anatoliy Golitsyn tried to warn CIA about. Not to mention the "shenanigans" of GRU Colonel Dimitri Polyakov, and KGB officer Igor Loginov, and, and, and ...so many, many others not mentioned in these particular articles. LOL!
............
Thomas, You should read John Harts’s work, the subject at hand, “The Monster Plot”, along with Richards Heuer’s “Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgement”, a little, ok, a lot more carefully. You could perhaps rest more easily and stop spamming forums like Chicken Little. The Monster Plot is a myth, formed by Bagely and Angleton who were either remarkably stupid or willing pay an enourmously, and I mean gigantonormously, high price to hide something; something as big as the assassination of a sitting American President.
Yet, incompetence and stupidity do not explain what I have highlighted in my screenshots of John Hart’s book, “The Monster Plot”.
Here is another example of willful incompetence, or a complete lack of attention to doing what was, ostensibly, their job, Gathering information. They just were not interested:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/32AC20DB-725F-4741-AFDF-A9AA0C1DD1D2.jpeg?ver=1566261254825)
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Thomas, You should read John Harts’s work, the subject at hand, “The Monster Plot”, along with Richards Heuer’s “Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgement”, a little, ok, a lot more carefully. You could perhaps rest more easily and stop spamming forums like Chicken Little. The Monster Plot is a myth, formed by Bagely and Angleton who were either remarkably stupid or willing pay an enourmously, and I mean gigantonormously, high price to hide something; something as big as the assassination of a sitting American President.
Yet, incompetence and stupidity do not explain what I have highlighted in my screenshots of John Hart’s book, “The Monster Plot”.
Here is another example of willful incompetence, or a complete lack of sttention to doing what was, ostensibly, their job, Gathering information. They just were not interested:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/32AC20DB-725F-4741-AFDF-A9AA0C1DD1D2.jpeg?ver=1566261254825)
Michael,
Would you agree that Hart's 186-page report colloquially known as "The Monster Plot" is about the large "plot" that Anatoliy Golitsyn claimed the KGB had started waging against us in 1959 when it's brand new "Department 14" of the Second Chief Directorate (today's FSB) dispatched GRU Colonel Dimitri Polyakov back to the U.N. in New York City so that he could "volunteer" to spy for the CIA and the FBI? The big "plot" that Golitsyn tried to warn CIA and even the FBI about?
Started, I said.
In other words, Operation Boomerang (as Bagley refers to the Polyakov thingy in Spy Wars) was just the very first "Department 14" op, and as such constituted just the tip of the iceberg of what was to come later, and what your boy -- gullible, brainwashed (or worse) -- CIA Operations Dude John L. Hart, derisively and ignorantly called "The Monster Plot".
Did he smoke too much opium in Saigon, or something? Meet a nice gal at a the Queen Bee?
-- MWT ;)
Do you even read the articles and excerpts I post, Michael?
If not, why not?
Because you consider them "Deep State Fake News"?
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Michael,
Would you agree that Hart's 186-page report colloquially known as "The Monster Plot" is about the large "plot" that Anatoliy Golitsyn claimed the KGB had started waging against us in 1959 when it's brand new "Department 14" of the Second Chief Directorate (today's FSB) dispatched GRU Colonel Dimitri Polyakov back to the U.N. in New York City so that he could "volunteer" to spy for the CIA and the FBI? The big "plot" that Golitsyn tried to warn CIA and even the FBI about? Started, I said. In other words, Operation Boomerang (as Bagley refers to the Polyakov thingy in Spy Wars) was just the very first "Department 14" op, and as such constituted just the tip of the iceberg of what was to come later, and what your boy, John L. Hart, derisively and ignorantly called "The Monster Plot".
....
Do you even read the articles and excerpts I post, Michael?If not, why not? Because you consider them "Deep State Fake News"?
I don’t read your ridiculous sentences. It’s painful. You also ask the same stupid questions over and over and over and over again. And you ask questions instead of communicating like a normal person. You don’t really think that anyone believes that you are actually a curious person, do you? I really just think it is some kind of self-stimulation habit of yours and I just don’t pay any attention.
I did notice that you characterized the title of Hart’s work as “Colloqiually known as...”
There is nothing colloquial about it. That is the name of the title.
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/9EF52AFC-1392-4C0D-9196-70AF26342C69.png?ver=1566049803303)
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I don’t read your ridiculous sentences. It’s painful. You also ask the same stupid questions over and over and over and over again. I really just think it is some kind of self-stimulation habit of your and I just don’t pay any attention.
Michael,
It may come as a big surprise to you, but I didn't ghostwrite Trento's articles, nor Hurt's, nor Bagley's book Spy Wars, nor his follow-up PDF Ghosts of the Spy Wars nor Riebling's Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA, etc.
The fact that you not only, as you claim, don't read my sentences, but (apparently) refuse to read even excerpts from the writings of others I've posted on this thread (you know, so that you might engage me in mind-expanding conversation about them), but instead continue to troll-ishly smother my "Monster Plot" thread with grossly over-enlarged (and un-paginated) pages chock-a-block full of the (intentional?) misstatements and misconceptions of John L. Hart that I'm trying to point out to you, could explain why you are (apparently) so doggone "ignorant" about what I'm trying to point out to you (i.e., in this case, the misstatements and misconceptions in Hart's out-of-date ostensible propaganda piece), and therefore are unable to debate me in a normal way, but feel a need to resort to troll-ish behavior, instead.
Is that because you consider everything I've posted on this thread (be t my own sentences or the sentences of other writers) regarding Hart's "Monster Plot" report is just ... "Deep State Fake News"?
-- MWT ;)
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................
You just quote me, with nothing else?
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Sorry about that, Mike.
The following was what I meant to post.
I'm putting it here so you (and the others) won't miss it because if your funny, MP video.
.............
You wrote:
I don’t read your ridiculous sentences. It’s painful. You also ask the same stupid questions over and over and over and over again. I really just think it is some kind of self-stimulation habit of your and I just don’t pay any attention.
.....
Michael,
It may come as a big surprise to you, but I didn't ghostwrite Trento's articles, nor Hurt's, nor Bagley's book Spy Wars, nor his follow-up PDF Ghosts of the Spy Wars nor Riebling's Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA, etc.
The fact that you not only, as you claim, don't read my sentences, but (apparently) refuse to read even excerpts from the writings of others I've posted on this thread (you know, so that you might engage me in mind-expanding conversation about them), but instead continue to troll-ishly smother this (mine, btw) "Monster Plot" thread with grossly over-enlarged (and un-paginated) pages chock-a-block full of the (intentional?) misstatements and misconceptions of John L. Hart that I'm trying to point out to you, could explain why you are (apparently) so doggone "ignorant" about ... gasp ... what I'm trying to point out to you (i.e., in this case, the misstatements and misconceptions in Hart's out-of-date ostensible propaganda piece), and therefore are unable to debate me in a normal way, but feel a need to resort to ... gasp ... troll-ish behavior, instead.
Is that because you consider everything I've posted on this thread (be it my own sentences, or the sentences of other writers) regarding Hart's "Monster Plot" report to be just ... "Deep State Fake News"?
-- MWT ;)
PS I've already pointed out to you in an earlier post, this thread, how Nosenko didn't "uncover" anyone who either 1) not already suspected, 2) still had access to confidential information, or 3) was still actively working for the KGB/GRu, but you don't seem to care to "debate" me about that?
Why is that, Michael?
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Michael,
It may come as a big surprise to you, but I didn't ghostwrite Trento's articles, nor Hurt's, nor Bagley's book Spy Wars, nor his follow-up PDF Ghosts of the Spy Wars nor Riebling's Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA, etc.
The fact that you not only, as you claim, don't read my sentences, but (apparently) refuse to read even excerpts from the writings of others I've posted on this thread (you know, so that you might engage me in mind-expanding conversation about them), but instead continue to troll-ishly smother my "Monster Plot" thread with grossly over-enlarged (and un-paginated) pages chock-a-block full of the (intentional?) misstatements and misconceptions of John L. Hart that I'm trying to point out to you, could explain why you are (apparently) so doggone "ignorant" about what I'm trying to point out to you (i.e., in this case, the misstatements and misconceptions in Hart's out-of-date ostensible propaganda piece), and therefore are unable to debate me in a normal way, but feel a need to resort to troll-ish behavior, instead.
Is that because you consider everything I've posted on this thread (be t my own sentences or the sentences of other writers) regarding Hart's "Monster Plot" report is just ... "Deep State Fake News"?
-- MWT ;)
Thomas, You have a fundamental misunderstanding of what is going on here. This is not your thread. You have nothing to teach me, and if you did, you don’t have the means to do it. You don’t address Hart’s work at all and, like you have for years, simply reply...”... but... Bagely”. You have been shilling his work for so long and so hard ho one even hears you.
Bagley’s folly was condemned by his peers, his superiors, professional psychiatrists, historians, the FBI an I could go on.
The Monster Plot is a joke, except the fact that some important people did believe it and they crippled themselves and their organizations and wasted gazillions of dollars and ruined lives. Yet you still believe it. You still believe that it is happening today. That’s fine, but if you feel the need to spread your paranoia far and wide, well, expect to be isolated. And Thomas, you are so nasty that very few people will have, or risk showing, any compassion or understanding to you.
This is not your thread. I will not read your ridicuoulously constructed sentences. I won’t answer the stupid questions that you ask over and over and over and over again.
So make an argument, like a man, like an adult. Put yourself at risk. See what happens. Don’t hide your fragile ego behind inane questions. Drop the dogma. Try your hand with critical arguments and drop the normative verbal tools of a four year old.
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Thomas, You have a fundamental misunderstanding of what is goin on here. This is not your thread. You have nothing to teach me, and if you did, you don’t have the means to do it. You don’t address Hart’s work at all and, lie you have for years simply reply...”... but... Bagely”. You have been shilling his work for so long and so hard ho one even hears you.
Bagley’s folly was condemned by his peers, his superiors, professional psychiatrists, historians, the FBI an I could go on.
The Monster Plot is a joke, except the fact that some important people inasmuch did believ it and they crippled themselves and their organizations and wasted gazillions of dollars and ruined lives. Yet you still believe it. You still believ that it is happening today. That’s fine, but if you feel the need to spread your paranoia far and wide, well, expect to be isolated. And Thomas, you are so nasty that very few people will have, or risk showing, any compassion or understanding to you.
This is not your thread. I will not read your ridicuoulously constructed sentences. I won’t answer the stupid questions that you ask over and over and over and over again.
So make an argument, like a man, like an adult. Put yourself at risk. See what happens. Don’t hide your fragile ego behind inane questions. Drop the dogma. Try your hand with critical arguments and drop the normative verbal tools of a four year old.
Michael,
If you would only read Spy Wars and the other works I provided links to in an earlier post, this thread, you'd realize how truly ... gasp ... full of beans you are.
-- MWT ;)
PS I guess I was sorely mistaken --this is your thread, right?
(My bad.)
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Michael,
If you would only read Spy Wars and the other works I provided links to in an earlier post, this thread, you'd realize how truly full of beans you are.
-- MWT ;)
Better beans than Kool-Aid
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Better beans than Kool-Aid
Michael,
1) Good one.
2) When are you going to write that letter to former Army Intelligence analyst and hard-core CTer, John Newman, and to U.C. Berkeley professor Peter Dale Scott, the guy who wrote the seminal essay Popov's Mole many years ago and who had a full-on epiphany about the GRU colonel just last year while listening to Newman recite from Tennent H. Bagley's Spy Wars during Newman's 2018 youtube presentation on same ... telling both uh dem guys how wrong, wrong, wrong dey is to be persuaded (by Bagley!) like dat about your hero, Nosenko?
-- MWT ;)
PS Did you delete the "... gasp ..." from my text, or, in your haste to "cover" my edited-at-the-last-minute post, get yours up before I'd had the presence of mind to insert that little jewell?
PPS Professor Scott starts having his epiphany about Popov at 9:10 in this video:
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Thomas, You should read John Harts’s work, the subject at hand, “The Monster Plot”, along with Richards Heuer’s “Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgement”, a little, ok, a lot more carefully. You could perhaps rest more easily and stop spamming forums like Chicken Little. The Monster Plot is a myth, formed by Bagely and Angleton who were either remarkably stupid or willing pay an enourmously, and I mean gigantonormously, high price to hide something; something as big as the assassination of a sitting American President. Yet, incompetence and stupidity do not explain what I have highlighted in my screenshots of John Hart’s book, “The Monster Plot”.
Here is another example of willful incompetence, or a complete lack of attention to doing what was, ostensibly, their job, Gathering information. They just were not interested:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/32AC20DB-725F-4741-AFDF-A9AA0C1DD1D2.jpeg?ver=1566261254825)
Michael,
As I've already told you, I've already read Hart's 186-page report. It gave me a headache and made me feel queasy.
Regardless, in Spy Wars, Bagley explains that when Nosenko "walked in" in Geneva in 1962 and he (Bagley) met one-on-one with him during the first session, their respective facilities with each other's native tongue (Nosenko spoke English quite well, according to Bagley) was good enough for them to understand each other, just fine.
In Bagley's HSCA testimony, he mentions that in the U.S. he brought in his own trusted native-Russian speaker (probably true-defector Pyotr Deriabin) to check the accuracy of the transcripts that had been made of Nosenko's 1962 Geneva conversations with Bagley and CIA's native Russian-speaking "super-handler" George Kisevalter (except for the very first meeting when, as mentioned above, it was just Bagley and Nosenko), and that Bagley's trusted translator had found something like 150 errors in the transcripts. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol12/html/HSCA_Vol12_0293a.htm
The sessions with Nosenko were always tape-recorded (interestingly, only Kisevalter complains about the "poor quality"), and supposedly both Bagley and Kisevalter took notes.
I've read a lot about Kisevalter recently, and, taking into consideration (among many other things) that it was he, as Hart's "the second case officer" who had made the 1962 transcripts, I believe that he (and probably his co-handler in some eventually-"blown" high-profile cases, Richard Kovich) was a KGB mole.
So, I wouldn't be surprised if it was George Kisevalter who made all of those "mistakes" in the transcripts, so as to give false-defector Nosenko that "out", if needed, kn the future.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS "A lot more carefully"? "Spamming"? What's with the attitude, Michael?
PPS You should read Spy Wars. Heck, even carelessly.
Here, why don't you give it a shot? (pardon the pun)
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames
Or at least his follow-up 35-page PDF if you find all of those Ruskie names "too much to handle". (pardon the pun)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
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Note: The title of this thread, right now, is “The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!”
John Hart’s “Monster Wars” was not released to the public until November of 2017. Newman’s presentation came on March 3 of 2018. Perhaps he didn’t know about it, hadn’t read it, and perhaps he never read Heuer’s “Nosenko: Five paths to judgement”. He never mentioned either. Unlike you, a credible person would want to maintain credibility with his or her peers by acknowledging the most relevant counter treatments on your subject and address the counterarguments.
You simply refer to anyone who does not agree with you as tinfoil hat wearers, traitors, liars, KGB lovers, buddies of Putin or Stalin or some other-such nonsense.
Newman is not fully convinced of Golitsyn’s Bona Fide’s, neither is Peter Dale Scott.
Newman never mentions Heuer
Newman never mentions Hart
Newman never mentions the Monster or Master Plot
Michael,
Yeah, you're right -- John Newman probably isn't even aware that The Hart Report and Heuer's Five Paths To Judgment exist and are available to the general public now.
(sarcasm)
Why don't you send him a letter and let him know, so he can set himself (and Peter Dale Scott) "straight" on Nosenko, et al.?
LOL
-- MWT ;)
PS Why haven't you tried to rebut, in your own words, the rebuttals to Hart I've already made in this thread? Like, for example, the fact that Nosenko didn't uncover any spies or moles, and that probable mole George Kisevalter very likely put those 150 mistakes into the 1962 transcripts so as to implicate Bagley, or to give false-defector Nosenko an "out" later, if needed?
Could it be because, not having read Spy Wars, you don't know enough about the subject matter?
Has James "Jumbo Duh" DiEugenio posted a critique of Spy Wars at the EF, or at that fount of misinformation, K&K?
How about Jefferson "Intellectually Dishonest" Morley at his website?
Certainly you can glom onto something, Michael.
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Michael,
Yeah, you're right -- John Newman probably isn't even aware that The Hart Report and Heuer's Five Paths To Judgment exist and are available to the general public now.
(sarcasm)
Why don't you send him a letter and let him know, so he can set himself (and Peter Dale Scott) "straight" on Nosenko, et al.?
I didn’t say that. I didn’t imply it.
Someone put it better than I can ( I would credit that person but I think that might imbibe that person with the dirty slimy feeling that one gets when they engage with “Mud Wrassler Tommy”:
“Michael:
Very astute of you to draw our attention to Tommy’s proclivity for altering his posts, even months after the fact.
When he’s been bested by others, he wants to diminish the extent to which it is true. Even if it means altering the context of the original flow of posts. Gaslighting by any other name is still gaslighting.
There are many things you can call a man so sneaky, none of them good.
Then there is the matter of witless posts suggesting the original conspirators would never have let Oswald appear on film during the Big Event.
This presupposes that Tommy knows what the conspirators planned (um...how?), and that their plan would fall to pieces if Oswald were observed anywhere other than the 6th floor.
Not so. And it doesn’t take an Einstein to parse it out.
The fact that others destroyed evidence, censored, altered, and lied after the fact in service of a lone gunman conclusion doesn’t mean that is what the conspirators intended.
In fact, the original charge against Oswald by the Dallas DA stipulated that he killed John Kennedy in furtherance of an international communist conspiracy.
I posit the conspirators wished to create precisely that response.
So, prima facie evidence of other weapons, other possible shooters, rendezvous with “Comrade Kostin” (aka Kostikov), membership in the FPCC, communications with the various leftist parties (Communist, Socialist, etc.) were deliberately left behind and/or “floated” by the conspirators. So long as Oswald could by tied to the putative murder weapon, given his leftist background, it didn’t really matter who fired it. He was still part of a Commie conspiracy. In fact, it was through Oswald’s purported ownership of the weapon that the Commie conspiracy was demonstrably credible, albeit fictitious.
The evidence for this conspiracy wasn’t hidden by the conspirators, but was deep-sixed by the investigators whose own reputations would suffer if a conspiracy could be proved to the nation’s satisfaction. It is by tracing who crafted damning evidence against Oswald BEFORE the Big Event that we can identify those who maneuvered him into place on 11/22/63.
Did Tommy really not consider so obvious an hypothesis before creating that thread?
Apparently not. Which tells us something about Tommy’s intellectual rigor. As in, there’s little evidence for it.
Which makes it all the more puzzling why so many Forum members take the bait and keep engaging this barnacle in discussions he will only warp through subsequent editing anyway.
I just find it odd that a number of Forum barnacles all preach various hypothesis as though they were fact, and what they all share in common is diverting interest and discussion away from prime suspects in the CIA, and direct it instead toward General Walker, or pro-Castro Cubans, or Lyndon Johnson, or the KGB.
The fact that CIA pays people like Max Holland for precisely such diversionary codswallop doesn’t mean the Forum barnacles are likewise subsidized. But, paid or not, they are, like Max Holland, doing the Agency’s bidding.
Accessories After The Fact.
Ye shall know them by their fruits.”
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Michael,
Yeah, you're right -- John Newman probably isn't even aware that The Hart Report and Heuer's Five Paths To Judgment exist and are available to the general public now.
(sarcasm)
Why don't you send him a letter to let him know that those two pieces of propaganda are available to the public? So, you know, ... he can read them and finally set himself (and Peter Dale Scott) "straight" for-once-and-for-all on Yuri Nosenko and Anatoliy Golitsyn, et al.?
-- MWT ;)
..........
I didn’t say that. I didn’t imply it.
Someone put it better than I can ( I would credit that person but I think that might imbibe that person with the dirty slimy feeling that one gets when they engage with “Mud Wrassler Tommy”:
“Michael:
Very astute of you to draw our attention to Tommy’s proclivity for altering his posts, even months after the fact.
When he’s been bested by others, he wants to diminish the extent to which it is true. Even if it means altering the context of the original flow of posts. Gaslighting by any other name is still gaslighting.
There are many things you can call a man so sneaky, none of them good.
Then there is the matter of witless posts suggesting the original conspirators would never have let Oswald appear on film during the Big Event.
This presupposes that Tommy knows what the conspirators planned (um...how?), and that their plan would fall to pieces if Oswald were observed anywhere other than the 6th floor.
Not so. And it doesn’t take an Einstein to parse it out.
The fact that others destroyed evidence, censored, altered, and lied after the fact in service of a lone gunman conclusion doesn’t mean that is what the conspirators intended.
In fact, the original charge against Oswald by the Dallas DA stipulated that he killed John Kennedy in furtherance of an international communist conspiracy.
I posit the conspirators wished to create precisely that response.
So, prima facie evidence of other weapons, other possible shooters, rendezvous with “Comrade Kostin” (aka Kostikov), membership in the FPCC, communications with the various leftist parties (Communist, Socialist, etc.) were deliberately left behind and/or “floated” by the conspirators. So long as Oswald could by tied to the putative murder weapon, given his leftist background, it didn’t really matter who fired it. He was still part of a Commie conspiracy. In fact, it was through Oswald’s purported ownership of the weapon that the Commie conspiracy was demonstrably credible, albeit fictitious.
The evidence for this conspiracy wasn’t hidden by the conspirators, but was deep-sixed by the investigators whose own reputations would suffer if a conspiracy could be proved to the nation’s satisfaction. It is by tracing who crafted damning evidence against Oswald BEFORE the Big Event that we can identify those who maneuvered him into place on 11/22/63.
Did Tommy really not consider so obvious an hypothesis before creating that thread?
Apparently not. Which tells us something about Tommy’s intellectual rigor. As in, there’s little evidence for it.
Which makes it all the more puzzling why so many Forum members take the bait and keep engaging this barnacle in discussions he will only warp through subsequent editing anyway.
I just find it odd that a number of Forum barnacles all preach various hypothesis as though they were fact, and what they all share in common is diverting interest and discussion away from prime suspects in the CIA, and direct it instead toward General Walker, or pro-Castro Cubans, or Lyndon Johnson, or the KGB.
The fact that CIA pays people like Max Holland for precisely such diversionary codswallop doesn’t mean the Forum barnacles are likewise subsidized. But, paid or not, they are, like Max Holland, doing the Agency’s bidding.
Accessories After The Fact.
Ye shall know them by their fruits.”
Michael,
Very well spoken! By whoever wrote it.
But I would still like to know when you're going to send a letter to John Newman to turn him onto Five Paths to Judgement and The Hart Report.
In order to set him straight on the true nature of (false-defector) Yuri Nosenko!
-- MWT ;)
PS Please keep us apprised on how that goes, won't you?
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
“I will start by making my personal bias clear. I became a believer in the master plot theory in 1965 when first exposed to the reasoning described above under the motive approach. Although initially a believer, I never put much stock in Bagley's Thousand Pager, as I had learned from experience to be skeptical of conclusions based on the anomalies and inconsistencies approach to counterintelligence analysis. My first doubts arose when, one by one, various expectations failed to materialize, which is the reasoning described above under the predictive test approach. Subsequently, for reasons discussed under the cost accounting approach-the high volume of significant intelligence being received through multiple sources-I rejected the master plot theory and concluded that Nosenko was not acting under KGB control. This conclusion was recently reinforced when, in doing research for this study, I learned how the many anomalies and contradictions were eventually explained.”
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
“I will start by making my personal bias clear. I became a believer in the master plot theory in 1965 when first exposed to the reasoning described above under the motive approach. Although initially a believer, I never put much stock in Bagley's Thousand Pager, as I had learned from experience to be skeptical of conclusions based on the anomalies and inconsistencies approach to counterintelligence analysis. My first doubts arose when, one by one, various expectations failed to materialize, which is the reasoning described above under the predictive test approach. Subsequently, for reasons discussed under the cost accounting approach-the high volume of significant intelligence being received through multiple sources-I rejected the master plot theory and concluded that Nosenko was not acting under KGB control. This conclusion was recently reinforced when, in doing research for this study, I learned how the many anomalies and contradictions were eventually explained.”
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
Wow, that's quite a testimonial.
From a gullible, wishful-thinking person who, unlike spiteful and under-endowed Howard J. Osborn, also was spiteful and under-endowed but had absolutely no experience whatsoever with Soviet Russia/Soviet Block Counterintelligence efforts.
LOL
-- MWT ;)
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
Dismissal of the top CI Staff leadership encouraged those pushing for Nosenko's total exoneration and his recognition as an important and valuable source. In 1976, John Hart was recalled from retirement to spend six months investigating the Nosenko case and its effects on CIA. Hart became incensed by what he perceived as an inhuman approach to handling Nosenko and the prosecutorial approach to assessing his bona fides. At DCI Stansfield Turner's request, Hart gave CIA senior officers a series of lectures on lessons learned from the case, and he testified on the subject before Congress.
Hart's study, entitled "The Monster Plot," concluded that doubts about Nosenko's bona fides were of our own making. Much of his study was devoted to demonstrating that those who handled the case were "not objective, dispassionate seekers of truth," and that the case was mishandled because the goal from its inception was to obtain proof that Nosenko was guilty, not to determine whether he was or not. Hart effectively documented much of what went wrong-errors in the transcripts of the initial meetings with Nosenko, faulty assumptions about the KGB, and the preconceptions that made it virtually impossible at that time for any source on Soviet intelligence to establish his bona fides in the eyes of SB Division or the CI Staff. But Hart did not really answer the arguments of those who claimed Nosenko was dispatched by the KGB. Hart believed that those initially responsible for the Nosenko case were so thoroughly discredited by the way they handled it that it was unnecessary to answer their arguments in any detail.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
Dismissal of the top CI Staff leadership encouraged those pushing for Nosenko's total exoneration and his recognition as an important and valuable source. In 1976, John Hart was recalled from retirement to spend six months investigating the Nosenko case and its effects on CIA. Hart became incensed by what he perceived as an inhuman approach to handling Nosenko and the prosecutorial approach to assessing his bona fides. At DCI Stansfield Turner's request, Hart gave CIA senior officers a series of lectures on lessons learned from the case, and he testified on the subject before Congress.
Hart's study, entitled "The Monster Plot," concluded that doubts about Nosenko's bona fides were of our own making. Much of his study was devoted to demonstrating that those who handled the case were "not objective, dispassionate seekers of truth," and that the case was mishandled because the goal from its inception was to obtain proof that Nosenko was guilty, not to determine whether he was or not. Hart effectively documented much of what went wrong-errors in the transcripts of the initial meetings with Nosenko, faulty assumptions about the KGB, and the preconceptions that made it virtually impossible at that time for any source on Soviet intelligence to establish his bona fides in the eyes of SB Division or the CI Staff. But Hart did not really answer the arguments of those who claimed Nosenko was dispatched by the KGB. Hart believed that those initially responsible for the Nosenko case were so thoroughly discredited by the way they handled it that it was unnecessary to answer their arguments in any detail.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
Michael,
I really think you should turn John Newman onto this as soon as possible, before he can screw up some other heavyweight researchers (and students!) and get them to swallow hook-line-and-sinker the crazy, "Deep State" idea that Nosenko was false defector! And Fedora and Top Hat and Kochnov, et al., too! (Or triple-agents, actually.)
-- MWT ;)
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
“The election of President Reagan and the subsequent appointment of William Casey as DCI led to the sixth full-scale study of the Nosenko case- 17 years after his defection. Tennant Bagley, who had retired nine years earlier, sought to use the opportunity of a new administration with a harder line on the Soviet Union to reopen the case. In March 1981 he sent the new DCI a lengthy study entitled "Why Nosenko Is a Plant-and Why It Matters." He argued that acceptance of Nosenko indicated continued high-level penetration and manipulation of CIA by the KGB. Director Casey named Jack Fieldhouse to investigate Bagley'S allegations.
In August 1981, Fieldhouse produced a study entitled "An Examination of the Bagley Case Against Yuriy Nosenko." Whereas previous analysts had focused exclusively on Nosenko's statements and his handling, Fieldhouse recognized the importance of the historical context in which the case transpired. He noted at the outset, for example, that the foundation of the problem was laid before Nosenko ever arrived, as this was at a time when fear of the power of the KGB was perhaps at an all-time high. This historical context, and the reasons for the fear, are discussed in detail below. Fieldhouse's report refutes Bagley's arguments point by point; identifies what went wrong and how it was possible for so many capable CIA officers to be so wrong for so long; and describes the serious adverse impact the master plot theory had on the handling of many other Soviet cases.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
“The election of President Reagan and the subsequent appointment of William Casey as DCI led to the sixth full-scale study of the Nosenko case- 17 years after his defection. Tennant Bagley, who had retired nine years earlier, sought to use the opportunity of a new administration with a harder line on the Soviet Union to reopen the case. In March 1981 he sent the new DCI a lengthy study entitled "Why Nosenko Is a Plant-and Why It Matters." He argued that acceptance of Nosenko indicated continued high-level penetration and manipulation of CIA by the KGB. Director Casey named Jack Fieldhouse to investigate Bagley'S allegations.
In August 1981, Fieldhouse produced a study entitled "An Examination of the Bagley Case Against Yuriy Nosenko." Whereas previous analysts had focused exclusively on Nosenko's statements and his handling, Fieldhouse recognized the importance of the historical context in which the case transpired. He noted at the outset, for example, that the foundation of the problem was laid before Nosenko ever arrived, as this was at a time when fear of the power of the KGB was perhaps at an all-time high. This historical context, and the reasons for the fear, are discussed in detail below. Fieldhouse's report refutes Bagley's arguments point by point; identifies what went wrong and how it was possible for so many capable CIA officers to be so wrong for so long; and describes the serious adverse impact the master plot theory had on the handling of many
other Soviet cases.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
Yes! Yes! Yes!
The Cold War is over!
-- MWT ;)
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Yes! Yes! Yes!
The Cold War is over!
-- MWT ;)
Wise men know when to keep their mouths shut..
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Wise men know when to keep their mouths shut..
"A wise man learns from others' mistakes, the average man learns from his own mistakes, and then, of course, there's Michael Clark."
-- ancient proverb
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
Golitsyn elaborated on this report with his own speculation, which played a major role in development of the master plot theory. (It should be noted at this point that Golitsyn was a highly egocentric individual with an extremely conspiratorial turn of mind; after his defection, he became certifiably paranoid.) Golitsyn felt that his information was so important and damaging to the KGB that the Soviets would feel compelled to send out another source to discredit him or his information. In short, Golitsyn predicted the appearance of someone like Nosenko as a KGB plant. Golitsyn also predicted that a KGB penetration of American intelligence would be assisted by other KGB agents, false - defectors and double agents-who would provide information designed to bolster the penetration's position and access in the service. The penetration, in turn, would be in a position to help authenticate the other agents. Golitsyn's speculation became the core of the master plot theory.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
Golitsyn elaborated on this report with his own speculation, which played a major role in development of the master plot theory. (It should be noted at this point that Golitsyn was a highly egocentric individual with an extremely conspiratorial turn of mind; after his defection, he became certifiably paranoid.) Golitsyn felt that his information was so important and damaging to the KGB that the Soviets would feel compelled to send out another source to discredit him or his information. In short, Golitsyn predicted the appearance of someone like Nosenko as a KGB plant. Golitsyn also predicted that a KGB penetration of American intelligence would be assisted by other KGB agents, false - defectors and double agents-who would provide information designed to bolster the penetration's position and access in the service. The penetration, in turn, would be in a position to help authenticate the other agents. Golitsyn's speculation became the core of the master plot theory.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
Michael,
Do you truly believe Nosenko was a true defector, or are you just putting me on?
-- MWT ;)
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Michael,
Do you truly believe Nosenko was a true defector, or are you just putting me on?
-- MWT ;)
Quoting MWT because: “Which makes it all the more puzzling why so many Forum members take the bait and keep engaging this barnacle (Thomas) in discussions he will only warp through subsequent editing anyway.” From post 103.
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Quoting MWT because: “Which makes it all the more puzzling why so many Forum members take the bait and keep engaging this barnacle (Thomas) in discussions he will only warp through subsequent editing anyway.” From post 103.
Michael,
Have you read this New York Times book review yet?
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/books/review/Thomas-t.html?smid=fb-share&fbclid=IwAR3DFCdKLxdD1th4r92OnDOqYywS1KJYo75lHfM4pKwyb_zQyFsqPRM8YNs
The author of the book, Tennent H. Bagley, has some juicy criticisms of your boy John L. Hart, author of "The Hart Report," aka "The Monster Plot Report," in it. In the book, that is.
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames
Cheers!
-- MWT. ;)
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
Some of these assumptions were erroneous - based on an exaggerated view of overall KGB capabilities. This made possible a series of discoveries of "duplicity" by Nosenko and other counterintelligence sources who could rarely measure up to CIA's expectations of what they ought to have known, accomplished, or said. An important example concerns the gaps in Nosenko's knowledge of operations against the American Embassy in 1960 and 1961, while he was deputy chief of the responsible section. The interrogators developed their own job description for a deputy chief of a section, then used this as a criterion for judging what Nosenko should have known. The job description was faulty, as it was based on the American concept of a deputy who is fully informed, has authority paralleling the chief, and who automatically fills in for the chief when he is absent.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
Some of these assumptions were erroneous - based on an exaggerated view of overall KGB capabilities. This made possible a series of discoveries of "duplicity" by Nosenko and other counterintelligence sources who could rarely measure up to CIA's expectations of what they ought to have known, accomplished, or said. An important example concerns the gaps in Nosenko's knowledge of operations against the American Embassy in 1960 and 1961, while he was deputy chief of the responsible section. The interrogators developed their own job description for a deputy chief of a section, then used this as a criterion for judging what Nosenko should have known. The job description was faulty, as it was based on the American concept of a deputy who is fully informed, has authority paralleling the chief, and who automatically fills in for the chief when he is absent.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
Michael,
You don't read The New York Times?
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/books/review/Thomas-t.html?smid=fb-share&fbclid=IwAR3DFCdKLxdD1th4r92OnDOqYywS1KJYo75lHfM4pKwyb_zQyFsqPRM8YNs
Way too "Deep State-ish" for you and James "Jumbo Duh" DiEugenio at the so-called Education Forum?
-- MWT ;)
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Michael,
You don't read The New York Times?
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/books/review/Thomas-t.html?smid=fb-share&fbclid=IwAR3DFCdKLxdD1th4r92OnDOqYywS1KJYo75lHfM4pKwyb_zQyFsqPRM8YNs
.......
-- MWT ;)
MWT, why don’t you give us a critical analysis, instead of posting a link over and over and over and over again? It’s probably because your such a small person inside; afraid that he is putting himself out there, facing criticism: and I mean the real criticism, that you might be wrong, and your reasoning is unsound. I’m not talking about the “criticism” that engaging you is a creepy, dirty ordeal, “Mud Wrassler Tommy”, we know that you thrive on that.
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MWT, why don’t you give us a critical analysis, instead of posting a link over and over and over and over again?
Michael,
Because Evan Thomas writes so much better than I do.
And because I figure you're much more likely to listen to him than you are to me.
And because, like you, I'm not very good at critical analysis, or even ... gasp ... rebutting other peoples' arguments with my own words.
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/books/review/Thomas-t.html?smid=fb-share&fbclid=IwAR3DFCdKLxdD1th4r92OnDOqYywS1KJYo75lHfM4pKwyb_zQyFsqPRM8YNs
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
Nosenko provided identification of, or leads to, some 238 Americans and about 200 foreign nationals in whom the KGB had displayed varying degrees of interest, and against whom they had enjoyed varying degrees of success. He provided information on about 2,000 KGB staff officers and 300 Soviet national agents or contacts of the KGB. His information on the methods and scope of Second Chief Directorate operations against foreign diplomats and journalists in Moscow and visitors to the Soviet Union filled a large gap in our knowledge and had an enormous impact on the raising of CIA's consciousness of these operations; the result was important improvements in the physical security of U.S. installations and the personal security of U.S. officials and advisors to the USSR. The Soviet Union suffered additional costs through the adverse publicity and deterrent effect of Nosenko's defection and the arrest of several agents he identified.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
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From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
Nosenko provided identification of, or leads to, some 238 Americans and about 200 foreign nationals in whom the KGB had displayed varying degrees of interest, and against whom they had enjoyed varying degrees of success. He provided information on about 2,000 KGB staff officers and 300 Soviet national agents or contacts of the KGB. His information on the methods and scope of Second Chief Directorate operations against foreign diplomats and journalists in Moscow and visitors to the Soviet Union filled a large gap in our knowledge and had an enormous impact on the raising of CIA's consciousness of these operations; the result was important improvements in the physical security of U.S. installations and the personal security of U.S. officials and advisors to the USSR. The Soviet Union suffered additional costs through the adverse publicity and deterrent effect of Nosenko's defection and the arrest of several agents he identified.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
Michael,
Well, at least Paul "My Father Was A Nice Communist" Brancato at the so-called Education Forum likes Heuer's Five Paths To Judgement as much as you do.
(He actually said that about his father a couple of years ago at the EF.)
I betcha James "Jumbo Duh" DiEugenio loves it, too.
I expect you'll get far more "traction" for your goofball ideas on Nosenko and Golitsyn at that den of Tinfoil Hat Conspiracy Theorists than you will here, Mike.
-- MWT ;)
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Thomas, You have a fundamental misunderstanding of what is going on here. This is not your thread. You have nothing to teach me, and if you did, you don’t have the means to do it. You don’t address Hart’s work at all and, like you have for years, simply reply...”... but... Bagely”. You have been shilling his work for so long and so hard ho one even hears you.
Bagley’s folly was condemned by his peers, his superiors, professional psychiatrists, historians, the FBI an I could go on.
The Monster Plot is a joke, except the fact that some important people did believe it and they crippled themselves and their organizations and wasted gazillions of dollars and ruined lives. Yet you still believe it. You still believe that it is happening today. That’s fine, but if you feel the need to spread your paranoia far and wide, well, expect to be isolated. And Thomas, you are so nasty that very few people will have, or risk showing, any compassion or understanding to you.
This is not your thread. I will not read your ridicuoulously constructed sentences. I won’t answer the stupid questions that you ask over and over and over and over again.
So make an argument, like a man, like an adult. Put yourself at risk. See what happens. Don’t hide your fragile ego behind inane questions. Drop the dogma. Try your hand with critical arguments and drop the normative verbal tools of a four year old.
Michael,
No, although you don't realize it yet, you are the joke, my friend.
And a bad one, at that. One without a serviceable "punch line". Mortifying stand-up comedy on amateur night.
By the way, according to Hart's HSCA testimony "The Monster Plot Report" was written between mid June and late December, 1976.
I guess the CIA didn't release it until 2017 because they knew it stunk to high heaven, seein' as how, for example, the FBI finally realized in 1980 that "Fedora" (one of the Ruskies who vouched for Nosenko's "bona fides") was a triple-agent, after all, etc, etc, etc.
https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/html/HSCA_Vol2_0247b.htm
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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Michael Clark loves to post long excerpts from Richards J. Heuer's 1987 essay Five Paths to Judgement and John L. Hart's 1976 The Monster Plot Report.
I like to post long excerpts from my "bible," Tennent H. Bagley's 2007 book Spy Wars.
From the chapter "Lingering Debate":
John L. Hart was assisted by four officers. They worked for six months, from June to December 1976. I caught a glimpse of their aims and work methods when Hart came to Europe to interview me. He had not bothered to read what I had written (though he said nothing new had come to light on the question of Nosenko’s bona fides) and seemed interested only in why, eight years earlier, I had warned that bad consequences might flow from Nosenko’s release. I saw that his aim was not to get at the truth but to find a way to clear Nosenko, so I refused to talk further with him. As I later learned, Hart’s team did not even interview the Counterintelligence Staff officers who had analyzed the case and maintained files on it for nine years. Among them were two veteran analysts who, having come “cold” to the case, had concluded on their own that Nosenko was a plant— and had written their reasons.
Hart then wrote a report (THE MONSTER PLOT REPORT) that affirmed total trust in Nosenko. 19
Having decreed their faith and gotten rid of disbelievers, the CIA leadership banned further debate. One experienced officer in the Soviet Bloc higher-ups, “If you continue on this course, there will be no room for you in this Division”— and his future promotion was blocked. Peter Deriabin, who kept trying to warn Agency officials about Nosenko, was told to desist or his relations with CIA would be threatened (see Appendix A).
Nosenko’s rescuers then set out to discredit those who had distrusted him. They first labeled them as paranoid (a charge always difficult to refute) and then moved on to distort the record.
One of Nosenko’s now well-placed friends told an investigative reporter that Angleton’s successor Kalaris had made the appalling discovery that the bad Angleton had ticked off the FBI’s Soviet Military Intelligence source code-named "Nicknack” as a provocateur and thus had locked away his important leads to spies abroad. The good Kalaris, said this insider, proceeded to dig out one of those leads and personally carried it to Switzerland, where the Swiss Federal Police quickly identified the spy as a brigadier named Jean-Louis Jeanmaire. They convicted him of betraying military technological secrets to the Soviets. 20 The accusation was pure invention. Angleton was impressed with Nicknack’s leads to spies abroad and had asked William Hood to be sure that they were acted upon. Hood then— not Kalaris years later— personally carried the Swiss item to Bern.
Other misrepresentations were tacitly abetted. For instance, the new Agency leadership did little to counter Nosenko’s claim that he was drugged. This canard played for years in the media, and was allowed to circulate even in the halls of CIA. CIA director Stansfield Turner even hinted that it might be true, although his own subordinates had submitted to Congress— as sworn testimony on his behalf— a list of every medicament ever given to Nosenko, which proved the contrary. As I know, Nosenko was never drugged. 21
The flimsy structure of CIA’s defense of Nosenko was shaken in 1977 when investigative reporter Edward Jay Epstein got wind of the Nosenko debate. While researching a book on Lee Harvey Oswald he came upon the fact, until then hidden, that a defector named Nosenko had reported on Oswald and that some CIA veterans questioned that defector’s bona fides. Digging into this potentially explosive subject, Epstein interviewed former CIA director Richard Helms, James Angleton, Newton “Scotty” Miler, and, on Helms’s recommendation, me.
Thus in my retirement did I come back into the debate on Nosenko. I told Epstein some of the things in the preceding chapters. His book Legend. The Secret Life of Lee Harvey Oswald came out in 1978. With its evidence that Nosenko was a KGB plant, the book logically concluded that what he told the Americans about Oswald— though pre- sumably true in its basic message that the Soviets had not commanded Oswald’s act— was a message from the Soviet leadership.
Coincidentally, the U.S. House of Representatives at this point ap pointed a Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) to reinvestigate the assassinations of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King. It inter viewed Nosenko five times about his knowledge of Oswald’s stay in the Soviet Union— and simply could not believe him. In its final report the committee stated flatly, “Nosenko was lying.” 22
Aware of the HSCA’s doubts, and by now committed to a different image of Nosenko, CIA director Turner designated a personal representative to testify. It was none other than the man who had most recently whitewashed Nosenko, John Hart. Hart spent his entire prepared testimony of an hour and a half defending Nosenko and degrading his own colleagues who had suspected him. He attacked me viciously, to the point of accusing me publicly of contemplating murder, though he knew it was nonsense. 23 To the amazement of the HSCA members the CIA director’s designatedrepresentative did not even mention the name of Lee Harvey Oswald. When they asked him why, Hart admitted that he “knew nothing about Oswald’s case, but hoped that by explaining misunderstandings within the Agency” and by attesting to Nosenko’s ‘‘general credibility” he could "clear up the committee’s problems with Nosenko” so that “allegations concerning [Nosenko] would go away.” But the committee’s problem was not with Nosenko, but with what Nosenko had said about Oswald. So they forced Hart to address this question. Thereupon even he admitted that he found Nosenko’s testimony "in- credible,” "hard to believe,” and “doubtful.”
"I am intrigued,” House committee member (later Senator) Christopher Dodd said to Hart, "as to why you limited your remarks to the actions of the CIA and their handling of Nosenko, knowing you are in front of a committee that is investigating the death of a President and an essential part of that investigation has to do with the accused assassin in that case. Why have you neglected to bring up his name at all in your discussion?” Hart replied that the Agency had asked him to talk “on the Nosenko case” and had accepted his unwillingness to talk about Oswald, of whom he knew nothing. “So,” concluded Dodd, "really what the CIA wanted to do was to send someone up here who wouldn’t talk about Lee Harvey Oswald.” 24 Still, the congressmen could not understand why a CIA officer, acting on the orders of the CIA leadership, would “throw up a smoke screen and get the Agency in the worst possible light as far as the newspapers are concerned.” Why would he attack his own colleagues and create “smashing anti-CIA headlines?” "Puzzled and mystified,” one congressman called “the whole scenario totally unthinkable.” He added, “no one I know in the Agency has come up with any sensible explanation.” 25
While Hart was in the process of attacking his own organization— and me especially— I got a phone call in the middle of the night, European time. “They’re crucifying you, Pete!” cried Yuri Rastvorov, who was watching the HSCA proceedings on C-Span television in the United States. This KGB veteran, who had defected in 1954, was outraged, having learned enough about the Nosenko case to have concluded on his own that Nosenko must be a KGB plant. I thanked him for the warning, went back to bed, and then waited while another friend fast-shipped to me the transcript of Hart’s statement.
Reading this intensely subjective attack and the discussions that followed it, I could sense the committee’s skepticism and wondered why they hadn’t called on me to present my side— all the more when I learned that Helms, in his testimony, had recommended that they do so. Fearing that someone in CIA might be trying to prevent my appearing, I wrote the HSCA subcommittee chairman, Congressman Richardson Preyer, a rebuttal to Hart’s testimony, asking for the opportunity to answer in public what had been a public attack. On the side, suspecting that the subcommittee’s counsel was cooperating to keep me out, I contacted Congressman Preyer directly. Thus I was finally invited and flew from Europe to testify, pointing out Hart’s untruths and evasions. Though I appeared only in executive (closed) session, Preyer courteously saw to it that my testimony (as “Mr. D. C.”— for “deputy chief’’ of the Soviet Bloc Division) was included in the published record of the hearings.
Now I was back in the debate, though still carrying on my business activities in Europe and writing, with Peter Deriabin, a book on the KGB. In early 1981, when newly elected President Reagan appointed William E. Casey as director of Central Intelligence, I saw it as an opportunity to reopen the case and addressed a long report to him (to which Deriabin contributed what appears in this book as Appendix A). It was judged inadequate to overcome the Agency’s evidence supporting Nosenko.
In 1987 I was interviewed by English playwright Stephen Davies, who was writing a semi-fictional drama on the Nosenko case. When the him appeared on television the CIA retirees’ association published a review of it in their quarterly newsletter. 26 Neither he nor the reviewer took a position on the basic question —was Nosenko a KGB plant? But to the CIA at that time it was heresy even to leave a wisp of suspicion hanging over the hero of the myth. Leonard McCoy jumped to Nosenko’s defense. In a passionate letter to the editor he lauded Nosenko and attacked the earlier handlers of the case in such splenetic terms that the editor (as he told me) refused to publish it until it had been toned down. McCoy’s letter was full of misstatements, as I pointed out in a rebuttal.
Both Hart and McCoy knew Nosenko personally and had studied the case from positions of direct authority. Hart boasted of his own “standards of scholarship’’ and told Congress that he would never "go beyond the bounds of certainty” nor “extrapolate from facts.” As for McCoy, on whose statements the writer Tom Mangold relied for his book Cold Warrior, Mangold described him as “a mature and meticulous intelligence officer, with an obsession about factual accuracy in all matters.” So one might expect these two to dismantle any opposing argument point by point, using sure and accurate facts. Instead, both of them twisted the very nature of the affair and concealed major aspects of it. In Hart’s sworn testimony were no fewer than thirty errors, twenty misleading statements, and ten major omissions, and dozens in McCoy’s article . 27
They (and CIA) had made an act of faith, perhaps not the best base for judging a complex counterintelligence question. Hart stated that Nosenko had never intentionally lied— never mind that Nosenko himself had admitted in writing a years-long inability to tell the truth to CIA. McCoy— as deputy head of CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff— epitomized the Agency’s position by writing that if by any mischance Nosenko had told a few fibs, ” They were not [spoken] at the behest of the KGB. ” CIA’s deputy director certified this of faith, making it the Agency’s official position that “there is no reason to conclude that Nosenko is other than what he has claimed to be.’’
Soon after the debate in the CIA retirees’ newsletter, Nosenko and his defenders presented their case to investigative journalist Tom Mangold, who incorporated it in a book attacking James Angleton as a paranoid. Mangold acknowledged his debt to McCoy, who had “left an indelible impression every one of these pages .” 28 His book accurately reflected CIA’s defense of Nosenko and was thus studded with error, omission, misrepresentation, and invention, and colored by emotional bias for Nosenko and against his detractors.
These misstatements congealed into a myth that by its frequent repetition has become conventional wisdom inside and outside CIA. Conse- crated by the sworn testimony of high CIA officials, it is treated as serious history. It is a tale of how a band of buffoons and demons— paranoid “fundamentalists”— tried wickedly and vainly to discredit a shining hero. It has been taught— without the facts on which it is supposedly based— to CIA trainees who, thinking it true, have passed it on to later generations of CIA people. Today, a generation later, one can see it repeated in their memoirs as an “inside” fact. To create this myth its makers had to do some fancy twisting and inventing. Dismissing massive evidence to the contrary, they asserted that Nosenko always told the truth. Not only was and is he truthful, but he has been a veritable cornucopia of "pure gold,” vast quantities of valuable information. To give substance to this wild claim, the mythmakers resorted to pure invention. They transfigured poor “Andrey” the mechanic,
for example, into a code clerk who enabled the Soviets to break America’s top-secret codes and moved dangerously into the code-breaking National Security Agency. They had Nosenko pinpointing fifty-two microphones in the American Embassy, something no one outside the KGB’s technical services could even pretend to do. They gave color to their tales by the breathtaking misstatement that Nosenko told more, and of far greater value, than had the earlier defector Golitsyn. (Golitsyn, this story goes, never uncovered a single spy in the West.) The mythmakers dismissed onetime suspicions of Nosenko as nothing but the product of potted preconceptions and wild theorizing by since-disgraced colleagues, incompetent and paranoid "fundamentalists.” The myth makes no mention of the underlying issues: the signs of penetration of American government and ciphers. Its focus, instead, is the pathos of the fate of a stupidly misunderstood, genuine defector who had been cruelly and duplicitously treated— until his saviors came along.
Finally, the mythmakers ridiculed as "nonsense” the idea that the Soviets would mount a deceptive operation of this magnitude— at least, after the first decade or two of Bolshevik rule— and labeled the very idea a delu-sion of some “monster plot.” As a corollary, the myth asserts— without a trace of evidence— that this paranoia “paralyzed” CIA’s intelligence operations against the Soviet Union. Because it has become history, the myth’s creation, its details, and the motives of its creators deserve attention (see Appendix B).
This myth enveloped CIA in a warm blanket of complacency (and aversion to “mole hunting”) that later contributed to the Agency’s long failure to deal effectively with even more glaring evidence of treason in its midst— that of Aldrich Ames.
Footnotes
19. Mangold, Cold Warrior, 145 (as noted elsewhere, this book acknowledges McCoy's imprint on its every page).
20. Hart, The CIA's Russians.
21. Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 495.
22. Ibid.; Hart, The CIA’s Russians, 139.
23. McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22.
24. FBI testimony, HSCA Hearings, Vol. XII, 539.
25. Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 492.
26. Hart, The CIA’s Russians.
27. Turner, Secrecy and Democracy.
28. HSCA Hearings, Vol. 2, 496.
.......
-- MWT ;)
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(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/B72A3084-1DC2-4BC2-9BA3-1B4DF24673BE.jpeg?ver=1566434998191)
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Bagley had more "choice" things to say about John L. Hart (and Bruce Solie, and Leonard McCoy) in other parts of his book.
Can you find Hart and Solie and McCoy in the following excerpts, or shall I "highlight" them for you?
PAGE 258 -- APPENDIX B
But because Washington ordained it, they had to accept Nosenko’s defection (in January 1964 in Geneva) and fly him to the United States. There, from behind the scenes, the earlier defector Golitsyn “was masterminding the examinations [of Nosenko] in many ways.” "Angleton showed Golitsyn all the CIA’s reports of Nosenko’s debriefing, from which [Golitsyn] concocted a wide range of accusations to challenge Nosenko’s reliability. This achieved its purpose so completely that the agency turned on its defector [Nosenko].” "Angleton led [others] to the light: Golitsyn infallible, Nosenko phony” and Golitsyn’s theories became "the definitive view.” “For six years whatever Yuri [Nosenko] said was submitted for final judgment by” Golitsyn. 7
These “anti-Nosenko plot adherents . . . prejudged Nosenko’s bona fides before they ever debriefed him. ” Their “treatment of Nosenko was never . . . devoted to learning what . . . Nosenko said. What they really wanted was only to break him." They made a “convoluted effort to make Nosenko the living incarnation of [their] theory. ” They set out to “prepare a case against Nosenko . . . not to get information but to pin on [him ] the label of a KGB agent sent to deceive us." 8
To make their case, these sick-thinking Cl A fundamentalists subjected Nosenko to a hostile interrogation. Of course— because he was innocent— Nosenko failed to confirm their theories. So they put him in a “torture vault" or “dungeon” for years, and drugged him.
There were wiser and cooler heads in CIA who opposed this mistreatment of an honest defector, so an “internal warfare" ensued that “split the CIA” for several years until CIA director Richard Helms’s “intervention brought it to an end” and common sense and professionalism finally prevailed. The “fundamentalists” were removed and more reasonable CIA officers set out to re-question Nosenko and re-examine the case against him. They found logical explanations for “all” the apparent discrepancies in Nosenko’s stories, particularly “the two most controversial ones" involving the recall telegram and his KGB rank. They also found that the “fundamentalists” had “deliberately suppressed" solid leads from Nosenko.
In sum, the Nosenko “case” boils down to a simple matter of incompetent CIA handling. “Even the most cursory examination would have demonstrated Nosenko’s innocence. ” 9
Happily, after years of confusion, CIA finally arrived at the truth: the whole case against Nosenko had been “sheer nonsense. ” 10
In early October 1968, after months spent reviewing the case and consulting with Nosenko, CIA security officer Bruce Solie submitted a long report that wiped out all doubts about Nosenko. Within hours, evidently without taking the time to assess the validity of the report, CIA made its “final decision.” Its deputy director ruled "that Nosenko was a legitimate defector. . . . [He] has not knowingly and willfully withheld information from us and there is no conflict between what we have learned from him and what we have learned from other defectors or informants that would cast any doubts on his bona fides." 11
This decision was validated by yet another CIA review (by John L. Hart) of the Nosenko case in 1976. Just how firmly it supported Nosenko’s bona fides was demonstrated two years later when the CIA director sent the leader of that review process to testify for him before Congress in September 1978. As described above, the director’s spokesman (Hart) testified under oath to Nosenko’s complete honesty and the incompetence and failure of those who distrusted him. 12
CIA’s adamant state of denial was baldly expressed by one of its top counterintelligence officials. He declared flatly that if Nosenko ever told fibs, they “were not [spoken] at the behest of the KGB" but only “to inflate his personal prestige, . . . self-serving braggadocio ... [to make himself] more important, more decent, perhaps more like what his father would have wished him to be.” 13
To these findings a director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, gave his top-level authority. He proclaimed to CIA personnel in writing that “it was eventually determined that [Nosenko] had defected of his own free will, had not sought to deceive us and had indeed supplied very valuable intelligence information to the U.S. Government. The hypothesis which had led to the original . . . [conclusion that Mr. Nosenko had defected under KGB orders] was found to have been based on inadequate evidence.” In his memoirs, moreover, Turner described those who had distrusted Nosenko as “a group of Agency paranoids.” 14
How did this happen? How did truth get buried and fiction become doctrine?
The first, essential step for anyone anxious to believe in Nosenko and to clear him of suspicions was to suppress the facts of the case.
Not one of Nosenko’s defenders addressed the questions raised by, for example, Nosenko’s association with Guk and Kislov in Geneva, or the clash between Nosenko’s (authoritative) account and the real circumstances of Kovshuk's trip to Washington, or the connections of Nosenko’s stories with the KGB’s uncovering of CIA’s great spies Pyotr Popov and Oleg Penkovsky. In presenting a “true" version of Nosenko's life and career they failed to mention that it was a sixth or seventh version (and not the last).
Ignoring the inconvenient aspects, the myth-makers fabricated a wholly new picture. They did this by 1) misrepresenting Nosenko the man and his truthfulness, 2) grossly exaggerating the value of his reporting, 3) building a straw man of (false) reasons for suspecting him, then knocking the straw man down rather than addressing the real reasons, 4) vilifying CIA colleagues who suspected Nosenko, 5) diverting attention from the real issues, and 6) ridiculing the very idea of Soviet deception.
1. Misrepresenting Nosenko’s truthfulness:
Nosenko’s defenders abandoned objectivity, consistency, and truth in extolling his personal qualities. One wrote of the "fundamental nobility” of his nature while another testified under oath that “anything that [Nosenko] has said has been said in good faith.” Nosenko “neither embroidered nor distorted” and "had no knack for lying or dissembling.” Indeed it had been his very honesty that had caused his temporary downfall at the hands of CIA. There is “no reason to think that [Nosenko] has ever told an untruth,” except due to forgetfulness, ignorance, or drunken exaggeration. Any little white lies, as noted above, were mere braggadocio. Though Nosenko's defender Hart found him “hard to believe" on the subject of Oswald, he falsely called that a one-time aberration. Though he had studied the file, he could not remember anything substantive that Nosenko said that had been proven to be incorrect. 15
In fact, Nosenko's sworn testimony on Lee Harvey Oswald was so evasive and contradictory that the congressional committee, having questioned him at length, recognized and officially declared that Nosenko was lying. Ten years afterward his defenders tried to wipe that out, evidently relying on the ignorance or forgetfulness of readers. No, Hart wrote, Nosenko's testimony on Oswald was not at all incredible. On the contrary, Nosenko “was telling the truth about his involvement in Oswald’s case." 16
Had Nosenko’s reporting on Oswald been the only aberration in an otherwise normal performance, as the CIA spokesman testified that it was, it might indeed have been shrugged off. But CIA officers who interviewed Nosenko encountered the same sorts of evasion, contradiction, and excuses from Nosenko whenever he was pinned down on practically any subject— just as the House Select Committee on Assassinations did on his Oswald story. This included his KGB career and activities, his travels and contacts, how he had learned what he told us, and even his private life.
Nosenko himself admitted that he had lied repeatedly about KGB activities and about the career that gave him authority to tell of them. In a written statement dated 23 April 1966 he said he had simply been unable to tell the truth throughout 1964 and 1965. But he was never willing to tell which of his statements were lies, except his KGB rank and certain of his claims to have recruited foreigners and the commendation these acts had earned him. This confession in no way inhibited his continued lying. He proceeded to tell tales no more believable than the earlier ones. Moreover, several witnesses from Moscow since the Cold War have belied Nosenko’s KGB career and his claimed knowledge of Oswald.
2. Misstating the value of Nosenko’s reporting:
Nosenko, said one of his defenders, was "the most valuable defector from the KGB yet to come over to the West.” He provided a “solid layer of counterintelligence gold.” Another delivered, under oath, the breathtaking misstatement that Nosenko provided “quantitatively and qualitatively” far greater information than Golitsyn did. 17
Nosenko’s defenders cite his uncovering of John Vassall, the British Admiralty employee, as a great contribution although they knew that Golitsyn had previously exposed Vassall. To explain that away, they went further in inventiveness: the British weren’t really on Vassall's track at all, they said. Had it not been for Nosenko’s information the British might have mistaken Golitsyn’s lead to Vassall for a totally different Admiralty source, the Houghton-Gee-Lonsdale network earlier uncovered by Goleniewski. 18 In fact, no such confusion was even remotely possible.
They pumped up Sergeant “Andrey,” (Army Sgt. Dayle W. Smith) Nosenko’s "most important lead" in 1962, to unrecognizable proportions. So little access to secrets did the sergeant really have that the KGB had dropped contact with him even before he retired from the army, and American authorities found that he could not have betrayed secrets and saw no reason to prosecute him. But Nosenko’s cleansers magically transformed this KGB reject into a “code clerk" who “had supplied the Soviets with top secret U.S. military codes," permitting the KGB to break “the most sensitive U.S. communi-cations. [ Even worse:] ‘Andrey’ had later transferred to the super-sensitive communications agency NSA that would give him even greater access to cipher information.” 19
In fact, Nosenko uncovered nothing that truly harmed the Soviet regime. He did not uncover a single KGB asset that the KGB could not have sacrificed— not one that had current access to NATO governmental secrets, was actively cooperating at the time, and had previously been unsuspected by Western counterintelligence agencies.
3. Distorting the reasons Nosenko fell under suspicion:
Nosenko’s CIA defenders repeated publicly that their CIA predecessors had wrongly “prejudged” him even before debriefing him and without “even the most cursory examination,” which would have demonstrated Nosenko's innocence. Essentially, they “fabricated a case” to incriminate Nosenko. 20
They only suspected Nosenko because of paranoid theorizing by the earlier defector Anatoly Golitsyn. Having adopted Golitsyn’s theories, Nosenko’s handlers didn’t even try to find out what Nosenko had to say but simply set out to break him. 21
This aspect of the myth required its creators to invent a role for Golitsyn in the Nosenko investigation. One of the mythmakers testified under oath that Golitsyn had "a substantial influence on the case” and “was masterminding the examinations [of Nosenko] in many ways. It is with this in mind that we have to approach everything that happened.” Golitsyn was "made part of [the anti-Nosenko] investigating team,” Golitsyn had current access to the debriefing of Nosenko, and “for six years whatever Yuri [Nosenko] said was submitted for final judgment by" Golitsyn. 22
Pure invention. No member of the “investigating team” (which was in Soviet Block Division) ever saw Golitsyn or asked or got information or comment from him. He was being handled by the Cl Staff and even they did not give him details of the case before 1967, aside from the fact of Nosenko's defection and his claimed biography. This was long after the Soviet Bloc Division's interrogation and conclusions. Even then Golitsyn declined to comment because he had not read the file. How, then, could he have ever exercised even an influence, much less a “final judgment”?
It was not until 1968 that Golitsyn reviewed transcripts of meetings. Then he stated unequivocally that Nosenko was a plant.
Because there is no substance to the myth’s claim that Golitsyn participated or influenced anything, we need not dwell here on the myth-makers’ denigration of Golitsyn— as a paranoid with “mind-boggling pipe dreams” and "outlandish theories." However, it is worth noting their own truly mind-boggling falsehood, that Golitsyn “never compromised any important Soviet agent.” 23
The myth-makers never revealed details of how Nosenko’s reports overlapped those of Golitsyn. They dismissed the question by claiming Golitsyn learned a few facts from his brief orientation period in Nosenko’s directorate, all of which Nosenko naturally knew better. This was a subterfuge: in reality, the Golitsyn tips that Nosenko diverted had nothing to do with Golitsyn’s “orientation period” but were from his service in Finland and his handling of reports from spies within NATO governments.
The mythmakers reached out even further to misrepresent why Nosenko fell under suspicion.
• Drunkenness: One, under oath, testified that CIA came to suspect Nosenko because he had made some drunken misstatements. Yet the only time in all those years that Nosenko might have been drunk while reporting anything whatsoever to CIA was during one meeting in 1962, and even then he showed no sign of being under the influence.
• Language problems : In sworn testimony the representative of CIA’s director asserted that language difficulties in Geneva caused "crucial misunderstandings.” Yet he knew that a native Russian speaker had been present at all but the first meeting and even during that meeting the only misunderstandings involved one school Nosenko claimed to have attended and one detail about his father. The FBI had no problem debriefing Nosenko in English. 24
• Faulty transcripts: CIA’s representative testified that "discrepancies” in the transcriptions of the recordings of the 1962 meetings were “very important in the history of this case because [they] gave rise to charges within the Agency that Nosenko was not what he purported to be." 25 But the witness, who had studied the case, must have known that no discrepancies ever gave rise to any such charge. Moreover, any errors in the transcripts were early detected and corrected by Peter Deriabin.
4. Vilifying those who suspected Nosenko:
Why, asked a congressman in 1978, would CIA director Stansfield Turner let his representative "create smashing anti-CIA headlines” by publicly attacking his own former colleagues?
The answer was that, lacking substantive arguments, CIA’s spokesmen fell back on ad hominem attacks on Nosenko’s detractors.
In sworn testimony the director’s personal envoy publicly accused his former colleagues of fabricating a case, torturing, misusing Agency techniques, and contemplating murder. He rated their performance as “zero,” “miserable,” and “abominable." They were “naive,” "utterly insensitive,” “extremist,” prone to “fanatic theories,” blindly biased, “paranoid,” and of “muddled mind.” 26 Lumped into a never-defined category of “fundamentalists,” they were derided as “zealots” and “true believers." A CIA director ticked off Nosenko’s early handlers— whom he had never met— as “a group of Agency paranoids." 27
So far gone in paranoia was this "group" that they thought “CIA could not have a bona fide Soviet operation" and turned away honest people who were offering to become spies for CIA. Nosenko’s defenders never cited a single example because in fact CIA had never turned down any volunteer from a Soviet bloc government who met normal security criteria. It even accepted ones it knew to be provocateurs, like the Soviet lieutenant of the “Sasha and Olga” case I mention in Chapter 4, simply to get their stories.
John Hart, a former division chief in CIA, was under oath when he told Congress that the two top officers of the Soviet Division (David Murphy, its chief, and me, its deputy chief) “had been discredited" for their work on the Nosenko case and that this had “caused them to be transferred out ... to foreign assignments." 28 But as the Headquarters supervisor of both these posts abroad, Hart knew that we had both opted for those challenging and prestigious assignments long before any “discrediting" began.
Never did Nosenko’s defenders mention any positive results of the hostile interrogation. Indeed, the CIA director’s spokesman testified that it had "failed miserably.” In fact, it was by confronting Nosenko under circumstances he could not evade and where he could get no outside coaching that CIA established firmly that Nosenko was a KGB plant and documented some of the KGB’s purposes in planting him.
5. Diverting attention from the underlying issue:
Nosenko’s defenders presented his case as essentially "a human phenomenon” and that the "human factors involved have a direct bearing on some of the contradictions which have appeared in the case.” As one put it, any questions of Nosenko’s truthfulness are “poignantly overshadowed by Nosenko’s personal
tragedy, arising from CIA’s handling of his defection.” "We may not allow our-selves to forget," he wrote, “that this story deals with a living person.” 29
The central issue of the case, they were implying, was CIA’s mistreatment of Nosenko. They expressed outrage that “duplicity” had been practiced against Nosenko and that the polygraph machine had been used more as an instrument of interrogation than as a fair test of Nosenko’s truth. They misrepresented the reason Nosenko was incarcerated. They raised a horrifying vision of his being thrown into a “torture vault," as one put it, or a “dungeon,” in another’s words. By 1989 the former CIA senior officer John Hart had so lost touch with the truth that he asserted in writing that the interrogators had deprived Nosenko of sensory stimuli for more than three years, and another told an investigative reporter that Nosenko had been starving and close to death. 30 They must have been aware that Nosenko had regular (as I remember, weekly) visits by a doctor to ascertain his health and the adequacy of his diet. He was never ill, much less "close to death.”
They were contradicting the documented record. CIA director Richard Helms and Nosenko’s former handlers testified under oath that Nosenko had been incarcerated only to prevent him from evading questions about contradictions and anomalies in his stories. (These were the ones that touched upon Oswald, the possible breaking of American ciphers, and penetration of American Intelli-gence.) We were preventing what happened in 1985, when the later defector Vitaly Yurchenko walked out and back to the KGB.
Whereas this case had damning interconnections with other cases like that of Kulak/“Fedora,” Nosenko’s defenders avoided this subject. One mentioned the cases of Cherepanov and Loginov only to imply that they, like Nosenko, were innocent individuals whom CIA had stupidly misunderstood. 31
6. Ridiculing the “theory” of Soviet deception:
CIA spokesmen conveyed the idea that Soviet deception was a figment of paranoia. Golitsyn, said one, “was given to building up big, fantastic plots, and he eventually built up a plot . . . which was centered around the idea that the KGB had vast resources which it was using to deceive . . . Western governments. This plot was able to deceive the West . . . because [the KGB] had penetrations at high levels . . . within the intelligence services of these countries, including our own.” They displayed contempt for those who believed in such a crazy idea as “a plot against the West," an idea that stemmed only from “historical research.” “I don’t happen to be able to share this kind of thing,” said one. “The so-called plot was sheer nonsense.” 32 Thus did CIA’s official spokesman dismiss as mad fantasy the documented history of sixty years of such KGB "plots" of the sort described in
Chapters 10, 11, and 12 of this book.
A top CIA counterintelligence officer attacked this “historical research” from a different angle. He admitted that Soviet deception operations had indeed taken place— but by Nosenko’s time they were irrelevant. The classic prewar deception operation “Trust,” he wrote, had existed “in a ‘totally different KGB and a totally different world." He pointed out that in those distant days [the KGB] had had to deal with large-scale resistance from elements of the population who got support from emigration groups abroad. But both the resistance and the groups had since dwindled away— and with them, the need for this sort of operation. 33
This denial became CIA doctrine— but not the KGB’s. As set out explicitly in the KGB’s in-house secret history of 1977, there was an unbroken continuum from “Operation Trust" to the present day. The KGB was teaching today’s officers that this “aggressive counterintelligence” was the best way to succeed in counterintelligence work.
The myth thus created was accepted not only by investigative reporters who could not know the truth but also by reputable historians— and even CIA personnel.
A writer in the 1990s, after talking to Agency insiders, could say with no fear of being contradicted, "Although [Nosenko] was in fact a genuine defector, Angleton became convinced that he was a fake.” 34 A BBC interviewer asked a reputable British historian about the doubts that had circulated concerning Nosenko’s bona fides. The historian answered confidently that there had never been genuine doubts but only paranoid views that had been fully discredited. Later this same historian wrote that CIA’s suspicions of Nosenko were a “horrendous misjudgment" and its investigation “appallingly mishandled.” 35
Another prestigious historian in 1994 described “Lieutenant Colonel” Nosenko as “the highest-ranking officer of the KGB to fall into CIA hands." Though CIA had kept Nosenko “in sub-human conditions for five years, his evidence is now regarded as far more reliable than all that Angleton’s protege Golitsyn ever provided.” 36 The myth became doctrine within CIA itself. So deeply rooted did this fiction become that even later chiefs of the Soviet operations division adopted it and passed it on with their special authority. Two successive chiefs had so little knowledge of the Nosenko case that they propagated the myth that “Angleton . . . persuaded others at the CIA that [Nosenko] had been sent by Moscow to tie them in knots about Oswald and dozens of other sensitive cases. He was encouraged in his paranoia by an earlier KGB defector, Anatoly Golitsyn, who had told Angleton that every defector after him would be a double agent. . . . Angleton had managed to co-opt key officials in the Soviet Division, convincing them that virtually all of the spies they were running were double agents sent against them by the KGB. . . . Those who . . . challenged the prevailing paranoia were in danger of coming under suspicion of being Soviet agents themselves. . . . The end result of these mind games was virtual paralysis in the CIA’s operations against the Soviet Union. . . . CIA officers largely stopped trying to target Soviets [and] the Soviet Division had been turning away dozens of ‘volunteers, ’ Soviets and Eastern Europeans [. . . offering] to work for the United States .” 37 As stated in Chapter 20, this was unfounded nonsense, and not a single Soviet volunteer was turned away.
Other CIA officers, without access to the files, typically knew only what they had been taught. One wrote, "The KGB defector Yuri Nosenko was badly and illegally mistreated . . . because James Angleton and the CIA were mesmerized by the paranoid ravings of a previous defector, Anatoly Golitsyn." 38
Wrote another CIA veteran a generation afterward, “When Nosenko offered a version of Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination that didn't fit the agency’s corporate view, he was sent to solitary confinement . . . for three years.” 39
With historians accepting it and CIA insiders reciting it, and with its high- level sponsorship, the myth has prevailed. Wishful thinking triumphed.
.....
Plus these short "bios" --
Hart, John L.: CIA officer who had served in the Far East and later became head of its European division. With assistants, he reviewed the Yuri Nosenko* case in 1976 and cleared Nosenko of any suspicions lingering after the Bruce Solie* report of 1968. In 1978, as personal representative of CIA director Turner, testified to HSCA during its review of President Kennedy’s assassination— instructed (as he admitted under oath) not to talk about the assassin Oswald but to denigrate CIA personnel who had doubted Nosenko's bona fides.
and this
McCoy, Leonard V.: CIA reports officer who handled information coming into Soviet Block Division* from Pyotr Popov* and later Oleg Penkovsky*. (Note: Both of whom were uncovered by the KGB and executed. - MWT) Later became deputy chief of the Counterintelligence Staff. He became a ferocious defender of Yuri Nosenko's* bona fides and published and fed to investigative reporters false information promoting this viewpoint and attacking those with differing views.
and this
Solie, Bruce: CIA security officer who worked on personnel security matters. Was assigned as case officer for (Note: triple-agent) Igor Kochnov* in 1966 and came to believe Yuri Nosenko* was a genuine defector. Criticized the 1967 report by CIA’s Soviet Block Division and then spent months devising a new story with Nosenko. Solie wrote a report that, by 1 October 1968, finally cleared away CIA official doubts about Nosenko’s bona fides.
.....
Footnotes:
7. Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II; Hart obituary; McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22; Hart, The ClA's Russians, 139.
8. Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 495.
9. Hart obituary; Mangold, Cold Warrior, 175.
10. Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 519.
11 . Memorandum of deputy director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor, 4 October 1968. HSCA Hearings, Vol. IV, 46.
12. HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 508, 510, 526, 527.
13. McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22.
14. Stansfield Turner, Notes from the Director, no. 30, 21 September 1978, and his Secrecy and Democracy— The CIA in Transition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1 985).
15. Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 508, 510, 526, 527. “Fundamental nobility” were the words of Leonard McCoy, deputy head of CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff, in McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22.
16. McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22.
17. McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22, 18; Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 495.
18. McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22.
19. Mangold, Cold Warrior, 145 (as noted elsewhere, this book acknowledges McCoy's imprint on its every page).
20. Hart, The CIA's Russians.
21. Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 495.
22. Ibid.; Hart, The CIA’s Russians, 139.
23. McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22.
24. FBI testimony, HSCA Hearings, Vol. XII, 539.
25. Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 492.
26. Hart, The CIA’s Russians.
27. Turner, Secrecy and Democracy.
28. HSCA Hearings, Vol. 2, 496.
29. Hart, HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 490; McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22.
30. Hart, The CIA’s Russians; Mangold, Cold Warrior.
31. McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22.
32. HSCA Hearings, Vol. II, 494, 519, 535; Vol. XII, 581 and 586.
33. McCoy, “Yuri Nosenko, CIA,” 22; Mangold, Cold Warrior, 39-40.
34. Mangold, Cold Warrior, 3.
35. Christopher Andrew, speaking on the BBC and in two other books in which he quoted Nosenko in ways that demonstrated the author's complete confidence in the myth.
36. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy. The Life of Allen Dulles (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), 551.
37. Milton Bearden, talking of himself and Burton Gerber. Milton Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy (London: Century, 2003), 20-23.
38. Frederick L. Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1 3, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 267. The author is there
described as “a retired . . . [CIA] operations officer [who] managed clandestine operations in Europe and Africa."
39. Robert Baer, See No Evil. The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (New York: Crown, 2002), 256-57.
.....
Cheers!
-- Mudd Wrassler Tommy ;)
-
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/D18DFCF0-EF6E-4514-85A5-8E9EFE23E7BA.jpeg?ver=1566442720511)
Bagley had more choice things to say about John L. Hart (and Bruce "Gumshoe" Solie, and Tommy Mangold's buddy Leonard "I Have No Counterintelligence Experience" McCoy) in the remainder of his book.
Can you find them in these excerpts, or shall I "highlight" them for you?
In early October 1 968, after months spent reviewing the case and consulting with
Nosenko, CIA security officer Bruce Solie submitted a long report that wiped out
all doubts about Nosenko. Within hours, evidently without taking the time to
assess the validity of the report, CIA made its “final decision.” Its deputy director
ruled "that Nosenko was a legitimate defector. . . . [He] has not knowingly and
willfully withheld information from us and there is no conflict between what we
have learned from him and what we have learned from other defectors or infor-
mants that would cast any doubts on his bona fides." 11
This decision was validated by yet another CIA review of the Nosenko case in
1976. Just how firmly it supported Nosenko’s bona fides was demonstrated two
years later when the CIA director sent the leader of that review process to testify
for him before Congress in September 1978. As described above, the director’s
spokesman (John L. Hart) testified under oath to Nosenko’s complete honesty
and the incompetence and failure of those who distrusted him. 12
APPENDIX B 259
CIA’s adamant state of denial was baldly expressed by one of its top coun-
terintelligence officials. He declared flatly that if Nosenko ever told fibs, they
“were not [spoken] at the behest of the KGB" but only “to inflate his personal
prestige, . . . self-serving braggadocio ... [to make himself] more important, more
decent, perhaps more like what his father would have wished him to be.” 13
To these findings a director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, gave
his top-level authority. He proclaimed to CIA personnel in writing that “it was
eventually determined that [Nosenko] had defected of his own free will, had not
sought to deceive us and had indeed supplied very valuable intelligence informa-
tion to the U.S. Government. The hypothesis which had led to the original . . .
[conclusion that Mr. Nosenko had defected under KGB orders] was found to have
been based on inadequate evidence.” In his memoirs, moreover, Turner described
those who had distrusted Nosenko as “a group of Agency paranoids.” 14
How did this happen? How did truth get buried and fiction become doctrine?
The first, essential step for anyone anxious to believe in Nosenko and to clear
him of suspicions was to suppress the facts of the case.
Not one of Nosenko’s defenders addressed the questions raised by, for exam-
ple, Nosenko’s association with Guk and Kislov in Geneva, or the clash between
Nosenko’s (authoritative) account and the real circumstances of Kovshuk's trip to
Washington, or the connections of Nosenko’s stories with the KGB’s uncovering
of CIA’s great spies Pyotr Popov and Oleg Penkovsky. In presenting a “true" ver-
sion of Nosenko's life and career they failed to mention that it was a sixth or
seventh version (and not the last).
Ignoring the inconvenient aspects, the mythmakers fabricated a wholly new
picture. They did this by 1) misrepresenting Nosenko the man and his truthful-
ness, 2) grossly exaggerating the value of his reporting, 3) building a straw man of
(false) reasons for suspecting him, then knocking the straw man down rather
than addressing the real reasons, 4) vilifying CIA colleagues who suspected No-
senko, 5) diverting attention from the real issues, and 6) ridiculing the very idea
of Soviet deception.
1. Misrepresenting Nosenko’s truthfulness:
Nosenko’s defenders abandoned objectivity, consistency, and truth in extol-
ling his personal qualities. One wrote of the "fundamental nobility” of his nature
while another testified under oath that “anything that [Nosenko] has said has
been said in good faith.” Nosenko “neither embroidered nor distorted” and "had
no knack for lying or dissembling.” Indeed it had been his very honesty that had
caused his temporary downfall at the hands of CIA. There is “no reason to think
that [Nosenko] has ever told an untruth,” except due to forgetfulness, ignorance,
or drunken exaggeration. Any little white lies, as noted above, were mere brag-
gadocio. Though Nosenko's defender Hart found him “hard to believe" on the
subject of Oswald, he falsely called that a one-time aberration. Though he had
studied the file, he could not remember anything substantive that Nosenko said
that had been proven to be incorrect. 15
In fact, Nosenko's sworn testimony on Lee Harvey Oswald was so evasive
and contradictory that the congressional committee, having questioned him at
length, recognized and officially declared that Nosenko was lying. Ten years after-
ward his defenders tried to wipe that out, evidently relying on the ignorance or
forgetfulness of readers. No, Hart wrote, Nosenko's testimony on Oswald was not
260 APPENDIX B
at all incredible. On the contrary, Nosenko “was telling the truth about his in-
volvement in Oswald’s case." 16
Had Nosenko’s reporting on Oswald been the only aberration in an otherwise
normal performance, as the CIA spokesman testified that it was, it might indeed
have been shrugged off. But CIA officers who interviewed Nosenko encountered
the same sorts of evasion, contradiction, and excuses from Nosenko whenever he
was pinned down on practically any subject— just as the House Select Committee
on Assassinations did on his Oswald story. This included his KGB career and
activities, his travels and contacts, how he had learned what he told us, and even
his private life.
Nosenko himself admitted that he had lied repeatedly about KGB activities
and about the career that gave him authority to tell of them . In a written statement
dated 23 April 1 966 he said he had simply been unable to tell the truth throughout
1964 and 1965. But he was never willing to tell which of his statements were lies,
except his KGB rank and certain of his claims to have recruited foreigners and the
commendation these acts had earned him. This confession in no way inhibited his
continued lying. He proceeded to tell tales no more believable than the earlier
ones. Moreover, several witnesses from Moscow since the Cold War have belied
Nosenko’s KGB career and his claimed knowledge of Oswald.
2. Misstating the value of Nosenko ’s reporting:
Nosenko, said one of his defenders, was "the most valuable defector from
the KGB yet to come over to the West.” He provided a “solid layer of counter-
intelligence gold.” Another delivered, under oath, the breathtaking misstatement
that Nosenko provided “quantitatively and qualitatively” far greater information
than Golitsyn did. 17
Nosenko’s defenders cite his uncovering of John Vassall, the British Admi-
ralty employee, as a great contribution although they knew that Golitsyn had
previously exposed Vassall. To explain that away, they went further in inventive-
ness: the British weren’t really on Vassall's track at all, they said. Had it not been for
Nosenko’s information the British might have mistaken Golitsyn’s lead to Vassall for
a totally different Admiralty source, the Houghton-Gee-Lonsdale network earlier un-
covered by Goleniewski. 18 In fact, no such confusion was even remotely possible.
They pumped up Sergeant “Andrey,” Nosenko’s most important lead in 1962,
to unrecognizable proportions. So little access to secrets did the sergeant really
have that the KGB had dropped contact with him even before he retired from the
army and American authorities found that he could not have betrayed secrets
and saw no reason to prosecute him. But Nosenko’s cleansers magically trans-
formed this KGB reject into a “code clerk" who “had supplied the Soviets with top
secret U.S. military codes," permitting the KGB to break “the most sensitive U.S.
communications. [ Even worse:] ‘Andrey’ had later transferred to the super-sensitive
communications agency NSA that would give him even greater access to cipher
information. ” 19
In fact, Nosenko uncovered nothing that truly harmed the Soviet regime. He
did not uncover a single KGB asset that the KGB could not have sacrificed— not
one that had current access to NATO governmental secrets, was actively coop-
erating at the time, and had previously been unsuspected by Western counter-
intelligence agencies.
3. Distorting the reasons Nosenko fell under suspicion:
Nosenko’s CIA defenders repeated publicly that their CIA predecessors had
APPENDIX B 261
wrongly “prejudged” him even before debriefing him and without “even the most
cursory examination,” which would have demonstrated Nosenko's innocence.
Essentially, they “fabricated a case” to incriminate Nosenko. 20
They only suspected Nosenko because of paranoid theorizing by the earlier
defector Anatoly Golitsyn. Having adopted Golitsyn’s theories, Nosenko’s han-
dlers didn’t even try to find out what Nosenko had to say but simply set out to
break him. 21
This aspect of the myth required its creators to invent a role for Golitsyn
in the Nosenko investigation. One of the mythmakers testified under oath that
Golitsyn had "a substantial influence on the case” and “was masterminding the
examinations [of Nosenko] in many ways. It is with this in mind that we have
to approach everything that happened.” Golitsyn was "made part of [the anti-
Nosenko] investigating team,” Golitsyn had current access to the debriefing of
Nosenko, and “for six years whatever Yuri [Nosenko] said was submitted for final
judgment by" Golitsyn. 22
Pure invention. No member of the “investigating team” (which was in SB
Division) ever saw Golitsyn or asked or got information or comment from him.
He was being handled by the Cl Staff and even they did not give him details of the
case before 1967, aside from the fact of Nosenko's defection and his claimed
biography. This was long after the Soviet Bloc Division's interrogation and con-
clusions. Even then Golitsyn declined to comment because he had not read the
file. How, then, could he have ever exercised even an influence, much less a “final
judgment”?
It was not until 1968 that Golitsyn reviewed transcripts of meetings. Then he
stated unequivocally that Nosenko was a plant.
Because there is no substance to the myth’s claim that Golitsyn participated
or influenced anything, we need not dwell here on the mythmakers’ denigration
of Golitsyn— as a paranoid with “mind-boggling pipe dreams” and "outlandish
theories." However, it is worth noting their own truly mind-boggling falsehood,
that Golitsyn “never compromised any important Soviet agent.” 23
The mythmakers never revealed details of how Nosenko’s reports overlapped
those of Golitsyn. They dismissed the question by claiming Golitsyn learned a
few facts from his brief orientation period in Nosenko’s directorate, all of which
Nosenko naturally knew better. This was a subterfuge: in reality, the Golitsyn tips
that Nosenko diverted had nothing to do with Golitsyn’s “orientation period” but
were from his service in Finland and his handling of reports from spies within
NATO governments.
The mythmakers reached out even further to misrepresent why Nosenko fell
under suspicion.
• Drunkenness: One, under oath, testified that CIA came to suspect Nosenko
because he had made some drunken misstatements. Yet the only time in all
those years that Nosenko might have been drunk while reporting anything
whatsoever to CIA was during one meeting in 1962, and even then he
showed no sign of being under the influence.
• Language problems : In sworn testimony the representative of CIA’s director
asserted that language difficulties in Geneva caused "crucial misunder-
standings.” Yet he knew that a native Russian speaker had been present at
all but the first meeting and even during that meeting the only misunder-
standings involved one school Nosenko claimed to have attended and one
262 APPENDIX B
detail about his father. The FBI had no problem debriefing Nosenko in
English. 24
• Faulty transcripts: CIA’s representative testified that "discrepancies” in the
transcriptions of the recordings of the 1962 meetings were “very important
in the history of this case because [they] gave rise to charges within the
Agency that Nosenko was not what he purported to be." 25 But the witness,
who had studied the case, must have known that no discrepancies ever
gave rise to any such charge. Moreover, any errors in the transcripts were
early detected and corrected by Peter Deriabin.
4. Vilifying those who suspected Nosenko:
Why, asked a congressman in 1978, would CIA director Stansfield Turner let
his representative "create smashing anti-CIA headlines” by publicly attacking his
own former colleagues?
The answer was that, lacking substantive arguments, CIA’s spokesmen fell
back on ad hominem attacks on Nosenko’s detractors.
In sworn testimony the director’s personal envoy publicly accused his for-
mer colleagues of fabricating a case, torturing, misusing Agency techniques, and
contemplating murder. He rated their performance as “zero,” “miserable,” and
“abominable." They were “naive,” "utterly insensitive,” “extremist,” prone to “fa-
natic theories,” blindly biased, “paranoid,” and of “muddled mind.” 26 Lumped
into a never-defined category of “fundamentalists,” they were derided as “zealots”
and “true believers." A CIA director ticked off Nosenko’s early handlers— whom he
had never met— as “a group of Agency paranoids." 27
So far gone in paranoia was this "group" that they thought “CIA could not
have a bona fide Soviet operation" and turned away honest people who were
offering to become spies for CIA. Nosenko’s defenders never cited a single exam-
ple because in fact CIA had never turned down any volunteer from a Soviet bloc
government who met normal security criteria. It even accepted ones it knew to be
provocateurs, like the Soviet lieutenant of the “Sasha and Olga” case I mention in
Chapter 4, simply to get their stories.
John Hart, a former division chief in CIA, was under oath when he told
Congress that the two top officers of the Soviet Division (David Murphy, its chief,
and me, its deputy chief) “had been discredited" for their work on the Nosenko
case and that this had “caused them to be transferred out ... to foreign assign-
ments." 28 But as the Headquarters supervisor of both these posts abroad, Hart
knew that we had both opted for those challenging and prestigious assignments
long before any “discrediting" began.
Never did Nosenko’s defenders mention any positive results of the hostile in-
terrogation. Indeed, the CIA director’s spokesman testified that it had "failed
miserably.” In fact, it was by confronting Nosenko under circumstances he could
not evade and where he could get no outside coaching that CIA established firmly
that Nosenko was a KGB plant and documented some of the KGB’s purposes in
planting him.
5. Diverting attention from the underlying issue:
Nosenko’s defenders presented his case as essentially "a human phenome-
non” and that the "human factors involved have a direct bearing on some of the
contradictions which have appeared in the case.” As one put it, any questions
of Nosenko’s truthfulness are “poignantly overshadowed by Nosenko’s personal
APPENDIX B 263
tragedy, arising from CIA’s handling of his defection.” "We may not allow our-
selves to forget," he wrote, “that this story deals with a living person.” 29
The central issue of the case, they were implying, was CIA’s mistreatment of
Nosenko. They expressed outrage that “duplicity” had been practiced against
Nosenko and that the polygraph machine had been used more as an instrument
of interrogation than as a fair test of Nosenko ’s truth. They misrepresented the
reason Nosenko was incarcerated. They raised a horrifying vision of his being
thrown into a “torture vault," as one put it, or a “dungeon,” in another’s words. By
1989 the former CIA senior officer John Hart had so lost touch with the truth that
he asserted in writing that the interrogators had deprived Nosenko of sensory
stimuli for more than three years, and another told an investigative reporter that
Nosenko had been starving and close to death. 30 They must have been aware that
Nosenko had regular (as I remember, weekly) visits by a doctor to ascertain his
health and the adequacy of his diet. He was never ill, much less "close to death.”
They were contradicting the documented record. CIA director Richard Helms
and Nosenko’s former handlers testified under oath that Nosenko had been in-
carcerated only to prevent him from evading questions about contradictions
and anomalies in his stories. (These were the ones that touched upon Oswald,
the possible breaking of American ciphers, and penetration of American Intelli-
gence.) We were preventing what happened in 1985, when the later defector
Vitaly Yurchenko walked out and back to the KGB.
Whereas this case had damning interconnections with other cases like that
of Kulak/“Fedora,” Nosenko’s defenders avoided this subject. One mentioned the
cases of Cherepanov and Loginov only to imply that they, like Nosenko, were
innocent individuals whom CIA had stupidly misunderstood. 31
6. Ridiculing the “theory” of Soviet deception:
CIA spokesmen conveyed the idea that Soviet deception was a figment of
paranoia. Golitsyn, said one, “was given to building up big, fantastic plots, and he
eventually built up a plot . . . which was centered around the idea that the KGB
had vast resources which it was using to deceive . . . Western governments. This
plot was able to deceive the West . . . because [the KGB] had penetrations at high
levels . . . within the intelligence services of these countries, including our own.”
They displayed contempt for those who believed in such a crazy idea as “a plot
against the West," an idea that stemmed only from “historical research.” “I don’t
happen to be able to share this kind of thing,” said one. “The so-called plot was
sheer nonsense.” 32 Thus did CIA’s official spokesman dismiss as mad fantasy the
documented history of sixty years of such KGB "plots" of the sort described in
Chapters 10, 11, and 12 of this book.
A top CIA counterintelligence officer attacked this “historical research” from
a different angle. He admitted that Soviet deception operations had indeed taken
place— but by Nosenko’s time they were irrelevant. The classic prewar deception
operation “Trust,” he wrote, had existed “in a ‘totally different KGB and a totally
different world." He pointed out that in those distant days [the KGB] had had to
deal with large-scale resistance from elements of the population who got support
from emigration groups abroad. But both the resistance and the groups had since
dwindled away— and with them, the need for this sort of operation. 33
This denial became CIA doctrine— but not the KGB’s. As set out explicitly in
the KGB’s in-house secret history of 1977, there was an unbroken continuum
264 APPENDIX B
from “Trust" to the present day. The KGB was teaching today’s officers that this
“aggressive counterintelligence” was the best way to succeed in counterintel-
ligence work.
The myth thus created was accepted not only by investigative reporters
who could not know the truth but also by reputable historians— and even CIA
personnel.
A writer in the 1990s, after talking to Agency insiders, could say with no fear
of being contradicted, "Although [Nosenko] was in fact a genuine defector, Angle-
ton became convinced that he was a fake.” 34 A BBC interviewer asked a reputable
British historian about the doubts that had circulated concerning Nosenko’s
bona fides. The historian answered confidently that there had never been genuine
doubts but only paranoid views that had been fully discredited. Later this same
historian wrote that CIA’s suspicions of Nosenko were a “horrendous misjudg-
ment" and its investigation “appallingly mishandled.” 35
Another prestigious historian in 1994 described “Lieutenant Colonel” No-
senko as “the highest-ranking officer of the KGB to fall into CIA hands." Though
CIA had kept Nosenko “in sub-human conditions for five years, his evidence is
now regarded as far more reliable than all that Angleton’s protege Golitsyn ever
provided.” 36
The myth became doctrine within CIA itself. So deeply rooted did this fiction
become that even later chiefs of the Soviet operations division adopted it and
passed it on with their special authority. Two successive chiefs had so little knowl-
edge of the Nosenko case that they propagated the myth that “Angleton . . .
persuaded others at the CIA that [Nosenko] had been sent by Moscow to tie them in
knots about Oswald and dozens of other sensitive cases. He was encouraged in his
paranoia by an earlier KGB defector, Anatoly Golitsyn, who had told Angleton that
every defector after him would be a double agent. . . . Angleton had managed to co-
opt key officials in the Soviet Division, convincing them that virtually all of the spies
they were running were double agents sent against them by the KGB. . . . Those
who . . . challenged the prevailing paranoia were in danger of coming under suspi-
cion of being Soviet agents themselves. . . . The end result of these mind games was
virtual paralysis in the CIA’s operations against the Soviet Union. . . . CIA officers
largely stopped trying to target Soviets [and] the Soviet Division had been turning
away dozens of ‘volunteers, ’ Soviets and Eastern Europeans [. . . offering] to work
for the United States .” 37 As stated in Chapter 20, this was unfounded nonsense,
and not a single Soviet volunteer was turned away.
Other CIA officers, without access to the files, typically knew only what they
had been taught. One wrote, "The KGB defector Yuri Nosenko was badly and
illegally mistreated . . . because James Angleton and the CIA were mesmerized by
the paranoid ravings of a previous defector, Anatoly Golitsyn." 38
Wrote another CIA veteran a generation afterward, “When Nosenko offered a
version of Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination that didn't fit the
agency’s corporate view, he was sent to solitary confinement . . . for three years.” 39
With historians accepting it and CIA insiders reciting it, and with its high-
level sponsorship, the myth has prevailed. Wishful thinking triumphed.
APPENDIX C
Self-deception— Bane of
Counterintelligence
The most amazing part of the story of Arthur Or-
ton, the imposter better known as “the Tichborne claimant,” is that he nearly
prevailed.
The butcher’s apprentice Orton (if this was really who he was— he never
admitted it) sailed from Australia to pose as the long-missing heir to the fortune
and title of the Tichborne family in Victorian England. He was undeterred by his
ignorance; he later proved unable to name a single one of the real heir's boyhood
friends or schoolteachers. Also, he could not say what was written in a letter that
the heir had left behind with his best friend and could not speak French although
the heir had spent his boyhood in Paris. Whereas the heir was well educated, the
claimant could not spell or write grammatically; worse, he was older, fatter, and
looked quite different.
To compensate for all that, Orton had going for him the con man’s equip-
ment: a confident and persuasive air, quick thinking, skill in playing back infor-
mation given to him, and— most important of all— the natural gullibility of others.
He managed to persuade the heir's own mother that he was her son and got
more than eighty witnesses from the heir’s army service, school, and other circles
to certify that they recognized him. His claim caught the public’s imagination,
won organized support, and proved so difficult to judge that Orton’s trial— which
finally condemned him— spanned a total of 827 days and stands in the Guinness
Book of Records as the longest in British history. 1
Is this really so amazing? Frauds have succeeded with even less foundation.
A late-eighteenth-century forger managed to convince renowned scholars that
his hastily turned out letters and manuscripts were really written by Shakespeare
despite errors and anachronisms that to one expert revealed "forgery palpable to
the meanest capacity.” Inspired by a drawing of the ancient British King Vorti-
gern that hung prominently in his father’s study, William Henry Ireland pro-
ceeded to write "Shakespeare’s” manuscript of a play by that name. When his
father told visitors the stunning and quite unbelievable news that this play had
been unearthed, they simply considered it an "enchanting coincidence [that]
Ireland should so long have owned a drawing on the same subject." 2
“How willingly,” the forger recognized, “people will blind themselves on
266 APPENDIX C
any point interesting to their feelings. Once a false idea becomes fixed in a per-
son’s mind, he will twist facts or probability to accommodate it rather than ques-
tion it.” 3
Among such con men and imposters feeding at the trough of human cred-
ulity are more dangerous predators: traitors and provocateurs, stealing not just
money but the safety of nations. Not surprisingly, governments maintain orga-
nizations of specialists to detect and thwart them. What is surprising is that
gullibility and self-deception flourish among these professional skeptics almost
as extravagantly as along the patent medicine trail.
Looking back at the long string of successful Soviet bloc provocations from
the "Trust” operation of the 1920s, we might suppose that naive Westerners are
the natural dupes of ruthless Eastern guile. Nothing of the sort: wily Russian
conspirators too (as we shall see) have been undone by almost transparent dup-
ery. Gullibility respects no frontiers or organizational fences; while the British in
World War Two were cunningly manipulating Nazi agents in England in the
famous “Double Cross” operations, other British were at the same time being
duped on the continent by the Nazi counterespionage services.
The colorful and never-ending history of fraud continues to unfold in our
daily newspapers with stories of innocent oldsters being gulled— and profes-
sional intelligence services as well. A defecting Cuban intelligence officer startled
CIA in the late 1980s by revealing that every CIA spy in Cuba was working under
the control of the Soviet-trained Cuban counterintelligence service. Defectors
during the Prague Spring of 1968 gave CIA the unwelcome news that Czecho-
slovak officials the CIA thought had been successfully recruited by one of its fast-
rising operatives in Asia had actually been pushed into CIA’s overeager and under-
skeptical nets by Czech-Soviet controllers.
Clearly, this tendency to deceive ourselves deserves the attention of any stu-
dent of counterintelligence.
We cannot and need not try to cover the whole subject of dupes and duplicity.
That would lead us far back in history, far out in geography, and deep down into
abstruse realms of psychology and epistemology. But we can usefully recall to
mind some famous disasters and the human foibles that made them possible. We
cannot help wondering whether the CIA handlers of those Cuban and Czech
double agents— and others we will meet here— might have averted trouble for
themselves and their organizations had they remembered their adversaries’ pen-
chant for deception and their own penchant for self-deception.
Among the plotters trying to overthrow the tsarist regime in Russia, none were
more active than the Socialist Revolutionaries, and among these SRs none were
more dangerously exposed than the members of their terrorist wing, the so-called
combat organization. They lived with nerves stretched and sensitive to any un-
usual occurrence because they knew that the Okhrana, the Tsarist political po-
lice, was trying to insert agents provocateurs into their ranks.
How strange it seems, then, that they blinded themselves to the most threat-
ening evidence. When their plans went astray and their members fell into police
traps, they failed again and again to draw the seemingly inescapable conclu-
sion. They even rejected precise warning that came to them from within the
Okhrana itself.
In early 1903 a friendly Okhrana agent slipped the word to Khristianinov, a
member of the combat organization, that the Okhrana would refrain from raid-
APPENDIX C 267
ing the organization’s secret weapons assembly shop “because it has an agent
there already.” Now, only a handful of the members even knew of the existence of
that shop, so the finger pointed at the man who had set it up— their leader, Yevno
Azev. But after Khristianinov had ineptly presented the facts and Azev, on the
contrary, had defended himself lucidly and convincingly, an investigating group
concluded that all was well and that Azev (who had, after all, organized the
assassination of the tsarist Interior Minister Plehve) stood above suspicion.
Three years later came an anonymous letter from within the Okhrana, giving
the names of two members of the combat organization who were police spies: "T.,
an ex-convict, and the engineer Azev who recently arrived from abroad.” The SRs
took this warning seriously enough; they immediately recognized "T” as Tatarov
and checked, interrogated, and verified the accusation, and killed him. But with
half the Okhrana message proven correct— excluding the ever-present menace of
false denunciations— the SRs still could not bring themselves to accept the other
half. Not even when, after another year, they got more news from inside the
Okhrana. Their friend, the journalist and historian Vladimir Burtsev, confirmed
that there was a traitor high in the SR leadership and even gave his police pseu-
donym, “Raskin." Despite the earlier warning, and despite the growing signs of
betrayal from within, the SRs chose to treat Burtsev as “a ridiculous and harmful
maniac.” They accused him of trying to disrupt the revolutionary movement by
discrediting Azev, its most formidable terrorist, and they warned him to desist.
Lacking legal proof, Burtsev stood alone and helpless.
Again and again the SR combat organization’s missions failed, and its mem-
bers were arrested, but still the leaders rejected Burtsev’s pleading as “idle chat-
ter," the more so because the accused Azev was at that moment planning an
assassination attempt against the tsar himself.
Finally Burtsev got the proof he needed. In Germany he met the retired, dis-
credited Okhrana chief Lopukhin and, while telling him something that Lopuk-
hin had not known, that Azev had masterminded Plehve ’s assassination— tried
out on him the pseudonym "Raskin.” In that dramatic moment in a train com-
partment Lopukhin answered, “I know nobody by the name of Raskin but I have
met the engineer Yevno Azev several times.”
Now Burtsev forced the SR party leadership to react by printing an open
letter to it, accusing Azev. So how did they react? They sought to silence Burtsev
by putting him on trial for libeling Azev. The judges were cold and hostile until he
finally revealed Lopukhin’s words, and even then one of them called it “slander.”
Finally they began the investigation of Azev that confirmed his guilt and in Janu-
ary 1909 precipitated his flight from the country. But this happened six years
after the necessary evidence had been at hand, too late to restore the will and
cohesion of the shattered combat organization. 4
Lenin could also be deceived, despite the rosy view expressed by his wife and
closest associate Krupskaya: "Of our entire group Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin] was the
best prepared in the field of conspiracy; he knew his way about and was able to
dupe spies superbly.”
In 1912 this paragon of wariness promoted Roman Malinovsky to member-
ship in the Bolsheviks' first Central Committee and made him his deputy inside
Russia and the leading Bolshevik of the Social Democrat (SD) representation in
the tsarist parliament (Fourth Duma). When Lenin’s close collaborators Bukha-
rin and Troyanovsky gave him solid reasons to suspect that Malinovsky was a
268 APPENDIX C
tsarist police provocateur, Lenin angrily rejected the charges and threatened that
if Bukharin joined this “dark campaign of slander” Lenin would publicly brand
him a traitor. (Bukharin desisted.)
At the Duma Malinovsky gave the SDs’ first major speech of the parliamen-
tary session. Though its main purpose was to present two major platform items,
Malinovsky (on Okhrana instructions) omitted precisely those two items. He
explained afterward that he had been nervous in his maiden speech and had lost
his place. When the SD newspapers then printed the passage that Malinovsky had
omitted, the police confiscated the whole issue. Sill Malinovsky was able to brush
suspicions aside. He even survived a later, more blatant episode: in February
1914a new Okhrana chief, appalled at the potential scandal of running an op-
position parliamentary deputy as a spy, forced Malinovsky to resign his Duma
post without any logical excuse. To many this meant that Malinovsky must be a
traitor. But not to Lenin.
By June of that year the Menshevik leaders Martov and Dan were “convinced
beyond any doubt" that Malinovsky was a traitor and that the Okhrana controlled
the internal Bolshevik organization around the newspaper Pravda, which Mali-
novsky had helped set up (with capital provided by another tsarist provocateur).
But Martov recognized that "whether we shall succeed in proving it is another
question, because we are handcuffed by our own people.” How right he was;
Lenin again refused to investigate these "dark rumors" and again turned on the
accusers: “We do not regard them as honest citizens.” As late as 1916 he was still
speaking of the “dirty fabrications" against Malinovsky. He said that the “party
leadership" had reached “the unqualified and unshakable conviction that . . . the
legend of his being an agent provocateur was invented by conscious calumnia-
tors." Still later he called the charges “absolutely absurd.” 5
When the Okhrana files were opened after the tsar’s fall in February 1917,
Malinovsky was revealed, of course, to have been a provocateur from the outset.
After the Bolshevik coup d’etat, Lenin had him shot.
Leon Trotsky, old conspirator and co-founder of the Bolshevik state, was no more
astute than Lenin in this way.
Outmaneuvered by Stalin, exiled and driven from one country to another,
some of his helpers killed, Trotsky could not fail to be wary— but he proved unable
to read the warnings he was getting. His faithful Dutch follower Sneevliet gave
him good reason to believe that Mark Zborowski, the closest associate of Trots-
ky’s son Leon Sedov in the Paris-based International Secretariat of the move-
ment, was an NKVD (early designation of the KGB) provocateur. Trotsky, instead
of ridding himself of Zborowski, called for a tribunal to condemn Sneevliet for
sowing discord. It must have jolted him two years later, when his son died myste-
riously in a Paris hospital; few beside Zborowski had even known Sedov’s where-
abouts. (Indeed, as was later learned, the KGB, with Zborowski’s help, had found
and murdered Sedov.)
Two years later, an anonymous source from inside the NKVD (identifying
himself after his defection as Aleksandr Orlov, a senior official) sent a message
telling Trotsky that Zborowski was an NKVD agent. Trotsky derisively rejected
the warning as an NKVD effort to spread suspicion in his organization.
Orlov’s message also told Trotsky that Stalin was trying to have him killed.
Confirmation, if any was needed, came in the spring of 1940 when a team of
assassins raided Trotsky's house in Mexico and sprayed seventy-five bullets into
APPENDIX C 269
his bedroom, miraculously missing him and his wife. As a result, every morning
thereafter Trotsky is said to have exulted, “Another lucky day; we are still alive.”
All this was still not enough to alert him to the suspicious signs that his
future assassin was scattering about. Ramon Mercader had insinuated himself
from nowhere, introduced by his Trotskyite girlfriend, into Trotsky’s guarded
household. He was known to be using a false passport and the life story he gave,
even his identity documents, could not withstand the most superficial check. And
his character changed, too; once inside Trotsky’s circle this formerly apolitical
and ignorant drifter became so sharp and involved that Trotsky thought he might
become a useful member of the movement.
Two days before the killing, in an almost blatant rehearsal, Mercader oddly
kept his hat on while in Trotsky’s study and, despite the warm weather, kept his
coat (which would later hide the murder weapon) under his arm while he sat
impolitely close by Trotsky’s side rather than apart in a chair. This irritated rather
than alarmed Trotsky, who complained to his wife that night, “I don’t like the
man." She remarked, moreover, that “he never wears a hat.” When Mercader
appeared at the house two days later, he appeared to Mrs. Trotsky strangely pale
and troubled. But he was allowed in, again with his hat and coat, this time hiding
the fatal ice axe . 6
The success of the much-publicized Soviet deception operation called the “Trust”
has been attributed to the cunning of its perpetrators in the KGB (then called
OGPU), but it depended as much upon the gullibility of its victims.
These were people who, more than others, should have been wary. Military
exiles driven from Russia after long civil war and terror, they knew the ruthless
hand of the OGPU and knew it would reach out and try to neutralize them in their
places of refuge abroad. Their clubs in Paris and Germany and their paramilitary
units in Yugoslavia should be bastions of disenchantment, sprouting antennas
sensitive to the slightest hostile move or beguilement from Soviet Russia, and
ready to react with skepticism and outrage.
Nothing of the sort. They responded with simple joy when, hardly a year
after their military defeat, a messenger brought news of a resistance to Bolshevik
rule growing secretly in the form of a “Monarchist Organization of Central Rus-
sia” (MOCR), with secret sympathizers inside the OGPU and other Soviet agen-
cies. They admired the uncanny ability of these new “friends” to move into and
out of the tightly policed country, to procure false identities backed by authentic
Soviet documentation, and even to spring co-conspirators from jail. When the
MOCR set up “windows” for couriers to pass through the borders of Poland,
Finland, or Estonia, the emigres spent less time asking how were the wires cut or
the guards bribed than in exulting over these openings to the homeland. Even in
Paris their “secret” plots were the talk of the cafes, but they deluded themselves
that unbeknownst to the OGPU whole roomfuls of conspirators could safely meet
in Moscow and Petrograd.
Western intelligence services were sucked in, too. Neglecting Machiavelli’s
warning about emigres, they saw this “resistance organization” not as a trap but
as an opportunity to get information from the forbidden land . 7 After a while some
recognized Trust’s intelligence as spurious, and others drew back after experi-
enced operatives Sidney Reilly and pre-Revolutionary SR terrorist Boris Savin-
kov (Azev’s onetime deputy) had gone to their doom in Soviet Russia through
MOCR “windows." But even these deceived themselves long enough to permit the
270 APPENDIX C
OGPU to close out the hoax at a time of its own choosing and to use this closure to
open yet another trap— into which the outsiders again leaped.
This and similar KGB provocations neutralized resistance to Bolshevik rule
in its early years. But even after they were exposed, their victims’ embarrassment
was still not intense enough to cure gullibility. The Poles, for example, had been
among the first to recognize that the Trust’s information was useless and decep-
tive, but hardly twenty years later some of these same individuals, by then in
emigration themselves, allowed themselves to be duped by a carbon copy of the
Trust. The same Soviet manipulators organized a new “resistance” to Soviet rule,
this time in Poland with Polish communist helpers, in an organization called
“WiN” (Polish initials for “Freedom and Independence"). It accomplished its So-
viet aims for five years but then the Soviets chose to close it down at the end of
1 952 in order to use its closure, as they had that of Trust, as part of another Soviet
operation. 8
The British in World War Two used captured spies as double agents to mislead
the Germans concerning the time and place of the Allies’ 1944 invasion of
Europe— and were playing a risky game. A single mistake might be enough to
alert the German handlers and expose what the British were hiding: the real
invasion plans.
In fact, the British controllers of the double agents did make some slips, and
mishaps did occur. But they were protected by the adversaries’ gullibility. If the
German handlers noticed (wrote one of the British officers involved), they man-
aged to find “far more credible explanations of what had occurred than the true
explanation that the agent was a double cross. ... It was far more reasonable to
suppose that he had been misled by the British than that he had over a period of
years tricked and deceived his German paymaster. ... It was extremely, almost
fantastically difficult to ‘blow’ a well-established agent." 9
Not only the Germans were gullible. While the British were deceiving them, they
were deceiving the British. Whole networks of Allied agents dedicated to sabo-
tage in occupied Europe were taken under German control. The German han-
dling of these double agents was flawed— more than one managed to radio to
London the prearranged signal that he had fallen under German control— but like
the Germans, the British “found more credible explanation for what had oc-
curred than the true explanation that the agent was a double cross." So at the end,
as Allied armies advanced through Europe, the last German-controlled message
from the ostensibly British “North Pole” agent network in Holland, addressed by
name to the British handlers in London, shed crocodile tears of “regret” that “we
[Germans] have acted for so long as your sole representatives in this country."
In 1 94 1 the German battleship Bismarck, having intercepted and sunk the British
battle cruiser Hood, and having fought off other warships, escaped into the vast
Atlantic. In a surprisingly short time a huge force assembled and then intercepted
and sank the Bismarck. The German naval command asked itself, might the
British have broken the Germans’ ciphers? (Indeed they had, in the now famous
"Ultra" affair.)
No, decided the German board of inquiry. “It is not necessary to put the
blame on a breach of security as regards the code and cipher tables.” There is the
APPENDIX C 271
defensive reaction of almost any organization: “not necessary,” meaning in effect
not easy, not pleasant.
The question kept popping up. Some convoys supplying Rommel’s corps in
the North African desert from across the Mediterranean were spotted with sus-
picious speed (one as it emerged from dense fog) and were attacked and sunk
from sea and air. The Germans were forced again to ask themselves about the
security of their ciphers. Then U-boat losses to Allied aircraft rose startlingly. In
mid- 1943 they were being spotted suspiciously often in many different areas (in
fact, thanks to Ultra). Again a German board reviewed communications security.
Each of these reviews concluded smugly that the ciphers were safe. As late as
1959 Grand- Admiral Doenitz still refused to believe they were not, and ascribed
his navy’s losses to the excellence of British radar.
This kind of self-deception joined with a lack of courtroom-quality proof to grant
to Kim Philby many extra years to do the work that has since caused him to be
labeled (perhaps prematurely) as “the spy of the century.”
Philby's career was jolted on 25 May 1953 when British diplomats Guy Bur-
gess and Donald Maclean fled England to the USSR just after Burgess had re-
turned to London from Washington, where he had lived for a year with Philby,
and just three days before Maclean was to have been interviewed by British
counterintelligence. As MI6 chief in Washington, Philby had been one of the few
people to know of the impending move against Maclean (exposed by a break of
KGB ciphers code-named "Venona”). Now the CIA and FBI refused to deal fur-
ther with Philby, so he was recalled to London and questioned about “indiscre-
tions" and “misconduct.”
His interrogators, Milmo and Skardon, considered Philby a traitor and they
had better reasons than the “third man” warning to Burgess and Maclean. One
was Philby’s communist first wife, another was “the nasty little sentence in Krivit-
sky’s evidence” (as Philby later called it). NKVD operative Walter Krivitsky, after
defecting in 1937, had told the British that the NKVD had sent a young English
journalist to Spain during the civil war there. This had caused Philby no problem
at the time because many fit this description. But the lead hung there waiting for
a cross-bearing.
Pointing more directly toward Philby were four fingers left behind by the
ghost of Konstantin Volkov. This British-desk NKVD officer had contacted the
British Consulate in Istanbul in August 1945 offering information about Soviet
spies in the British government. His information could have uncovered Philby,
Maclean, and Burgess (and doubtless others) but fate— and Soviet manipulation
—had placed Philby across his path. Philby had become head of counterintelli-
gence work against the USSR and was the logical choice, as he pointed out, to
handle the case. He quickly alerted the NKVD, which removed Volkov before he
could make his next contact. But these pointers remained:
• Volkov had told the British Consul that a “head of a British counteres-
pionage organization” was an NKVD agent. Philby was now head of a
recently formed MI6 organization to counter Soviet espionage.
• Within MI6 Philby had handled the Volkov matter almost single-handedly.
Any suspicion that a leak might have caused Volkov’s untimely disappear-
ance would necessarily point toward him.
272 APPENDIX C
• Philby had so dragged his fee and delayed the British response to Volkov’s
appeal that the British Consul correctly concluded that unless Philby was
criminally incompetent, he must be a Soviet agent.
• "Two days after the Volkov information reached London," as Philby learned
from his British interrogator Milmo, "there had been a spectacular rise in
the volume of NKVD wireless traffic between London and Moscow, fol-
lowed by a similar rise in the traffic between Moscow and Istanbul.”
But this had not been enough. It took the Burgess-Maclean flight, eight years
later, to halt Philby’s rise toward the top of MI6. And even that was not enough to
make him confess. MI6 dropped him for errors of judgment, not for treason, and
a few years later, in what may have been an accident of parliamentary procedure,
he was publicly cleared by Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan. So those ice-
bergs of suspicion gradually melted in the warm waters of organizational self-
deception and forgetfulness— and Philby sailed on. Incredibly, MI6 rehired him.
Its chiefs, like many MI6 officers, had scoffed at the very thought that Philby
might be a traitor, and at the paranoid idea that the Soviets might have pene-
trated their ranks. Now they set him up as a journalist in Beirut where they
thought his contacts would prove useful.
Useful they were, but mainly for the KGB. Though removed from MI6’s
central files, Philby kept in touch with former colleagues and other Westerners of
interest to KGB recruiters. These Westerners still trusted Philby; even those who
thought he might have warned Burgess and Maclean did not suspect he had done
it on the KGB’s behalf. A former CIA official in the area wrote, “When I went to
Beirut in 1957 to set up a consulting firm I was told by both CIA officers and SIS
officers that Philby was still suspect, although he had been formally cleared of
any connection with Burgess and Maclean, and that I would be doing a great
service to my country were I to keep an eye on him. I did, as did other British and
American laymen who were friends of his. Like all the others, I didn’t have the
slightest suspicion that he was a Soviet agent and, in fact, wouldn’t believe it until
he surfaced in Moscow. . . . Believe me, it was a terrible shock.” 10
Finally, in 1962 new information pointed unmistakably at Philby, and MI6
had to act. A longtime colleague, Nicholas Elliott, got a partial confession from
him, but then he fled to the Soviet Union and until his death in 1988 kept on
helping the KGB damage the West.
Alger Hiss was another beneficiary of willful neglect of the obvious. His secret
collaboration with Soviet Intelligence was known to Western authorities long
before he moved up to play a substantive role in conferences where America’s
posture toward the Soviet regime was being worked out, and more than a decade
before he was finally brought before a court. Here is how:
• In 1937 the Soviet defector Walter Krivitsky, when he met the former So-
viet diplomat Alexander Barmine in Paris, named Hiss as an agent.
• In September 1939 French Intelligence passed to American Ambassador
Bullitt information (presumably from Krivitsky) that Alger and his brother
Donald Hiss were Soviet agents. Bullitt told President Roosevelt soon
thereafter.
• On 2 September 1939 the journalist Isaac Don Levine, Krivitsky s friend,
escorted Whittaker Chambers to the home of Assistant Secretary of State
Adolph Berle, where Chambers gave details of his Soviet and Communist
APPENDIX C 273
Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) intelligence activity and
clandestine contacts with Alger and Donald Hiss. Berle took notes and
reported to President Roosevelt— who laughed it off. Others also told Roo-
sevelt about the suspicions, but neither he nor Berle passed the informa-
tion to the FBI.
• In 1941 the FBI got its first news of Hiss directly from Chambers. Despite
their initial interest, they neglected to follow up.
• In April 1945 at the San Francisco Conference, which founded the United
Nations, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko indiscreetly told American
Secretary of State Stettinius that he would be “very happy to see Alger Hiss
appointed temporary secretary general, as he had a very high regard for
Hiss, particularly for his fairness and impartiality.”
• In August 1945 the GRU code clerk Igor Gouzenko defected and reported
that an assistant to Secretary Stettinius was a Soviet spy.
• In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley, a communist underground courier,
named to the FBI Soviet spies in government, including some who had
been previously named by Chambers. She had been told about Hiss. FBI
director J. Edgar Hoover asked President Truman for permission to take
action against Hiss, but Truman remained "stubbornly antagonistic” to the
allegations.
Hiss’s career path to the top was blocked only when Congress took an interest
in him after a 1946 grand jury in New York had begun looking into Soviet es-
pionage. This finally forced the State Department to remove him from access to
secrets. In mid- 1948— more than ten years after he had first been exposed— the
spotlight finally shone on him. The House Un-American Activities Committee
called Chambers to testify and arranged his dramatic confrontation with Hiss.
Chambers then revealed the famous “pumpkin papers” that documented Hiss’s
treason. He denied under oath having ever known Chambers, but when con-
fronted with contrary facts began to back off and equivocate. The committee
“kept Hiss on the stand, leading him point by point over his past testimony,
leading him to dodge, bend and weave— a spectacle of agile and dogged indignity
—through his discrepancies and contradictions, but never bringing him com-
pletely to lose his footing or to yield an inch in his denials.” To one committee
member Hiss’s testimony appeared “clouded by a strangely deficient memory."
Nevertheless the press echoed public sympathy for Hiss (“tall, handsome,
well-educated, a brilliant law student”) and skepticism and contempt for Cham-
bers: “Not only was he untidy,” commented a biographer of President Truman,
“but he had had an erratic career and was clearly far gone into paranoia.”
In 1977 the writer Allen Weinstein, helped by Hiss and intending to prove his
innocence, set out to review all the data. But he was an honest man and the facts
he found convinced him (as they do any reader of his book) that Hiss was guilty.
Still some journalists kept suggesting that Hiss had been diabolically framed. 1 1
Why do we fall prey to hoaxes, deceptive tricks, impostures, lies, and misrepre-
sentations that seem obvious to others less emotional or less involved? Why, once
duped, do we then hang on to our misconception, sometimes against the evi-
dence of our senses? Why, when supplied with that evidence, are we more likely
to attack its suppliers— a Burtsev, Bukharin, Martov, Sneevliet, or Chambers—
instead of the deceiver?
274 APPENDIX C
And why do professional intelligence officers, trained to expect such hoaxes
and paying fulsome lip service to alertness, fall again and again into traps? Why
does the harsh light of skepticism so often diffuse into a rosy glow of wishful
thinking?
You might blame a training that fails to instill skepticism, or you could
criticize bureaucratic structures that let responsibility fall between stools, but
that would be too easy. The reason lies deeper— far down in the recesses of the
human mind. It is not our eyes and ears that shape our reality but our brain,
which biters and translates their perceptions, a brain produced by a unique set of
needs and desires so that different people may make different interpretations and
draw different conclusions from the same evidence.
Here we touch upon the classic conbict between mind and heart, reason and
emotion, sun and moon, a conbict which, as we are reminded by ancient poems
and aphorisms, is as old as humanity. Scientibc enlightenment has not resolved
that conbict. Our brains still biter in the perceptions they desire and biter out
those they do not. They still lead us unconsciously toward “reasonable” choices
that favor our self-interest or our ease and— in debance of warning, instruction,
or experience— lead us away from those that bother or threaten. Hence we suffer
from that “universal inability to distinguish true from false, right from wrong,
when the false is cast in the image of the world's desire and the true is nothing
that the world can fathom, or wants to." 12
Alger Hiss knew this and cynically built it into his defense. In essence, he
asked the committee to disregard the evidence and follow its emotions. “It is
inconceivable that there could have been on my part, during hfteen years or more
in public office . . . any departure from the highest rectitude without its becoming
known. It is inconceivable that the men with whom I was intimately associated
during those hfteen years should not know my true character better than this
accuser. It is inconceivable that . . . [etc.]" How right he was: we have seen two
presidents bnding it inconceivable, Roosevelt "laughing it off” and Truman “stub-
bornly antagonistic.”
Trained and experienced intelligence officers are only human. As a KGB
(then OGPU) officer said to calm the nerves of a Trust provocateur he was dis-
patching to contact Western Intelligence, “You’ll have no problem. They want to
believe and trust you." 13 Indeed “they” do— as they showed through the decades
by falling for hoax after Soviet hoax, false defectors, double agents, and opera-
tional traps, and by failing to recognize penetration agents in their midst.
Perhaps those German case officers noticed oddities in their agents’ reports
from England, but their own careers and prestige depended on these agents and
obscured their concern for winning the war. Those SR conspirators genuinely
could not imagine that Azev would betray them. Those MI6 leaders could not
believe Philby to be a traitor, because that would annul all their hard work and
devoted careers.
If Americans are not alone in suffering this form of blindness, they are par-
ticularly predisposed to it. Whittaker Chambers wrote of that "invincible igno-
rance, rooted in what was most generous in the American character, which be-
cause it was incapable of such conspiracy itself, could not believe that others
practiced it. It was rooted, too, in what was most singular in the American experi-
ence, which because it had prospered so much apart from the rest of the world,
could not really grasp . . . why [Communists] acted as they did." Regarding the
sincere belief of Hiss’s lawyer, Marbury, in Hiss’s innocence, Chambers concluded
APPENDIX C 275
that Marbury “knew that my charges could not be true because . . . Communists
simply could not occur in [his] social and professional world. . . . Marbury ’s mind
was closed to certain possibilities and a part of its natural acuteness blunted— a
condition that would seem to be almost as dangerous to a lawyer as to a general
in the field .” 14
This, perhaps, helps explain why many American intelligence officers refuse
to accept the idea of Soviet deception operations. After a lifetime in intelligence
work, former director of Central Intelligence William Colby seemed proud to
admit that he “could just not figure out at all” what [his own counterintelligence
staff] were doing .” 15 A veteran supervisor of CIA operations abroad dismissed
sixty years of KGB deception operations as a sort of paranoid fantasy and ad-
mitted with candor, “I don’t happen to be able to share this kind of thing ." 16
Having committed himself to an erroneous position— having been duped— a
person is likely to react to contrary evidence in the same way as those German
handlers of the "double cross” agents: by refusing to admit it. “Faith, fanatic
Faith," a poet wrote, “once wedded fast/To some dear falsehood, hugs it to the
last.” Samuel Ireland, father of that faker of Shakespeare, was a renowned expert
and collector of Elizabethan manuscripts. Ridiculed for (unwittingly) lending his
prestige to his son’s forgery by publishing it, he never to his death allowed himself
to believe they were false, despite expert evidence and even his son’s repeated
confession.......
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/34C953DA-31F0-4FBA-A09F-45224ABCC1CB.jpeg?ver=1566443280966)
-
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/AC544087-A506-40F4-8156-ACE44A74164A.jpeg?ver=1566444032064)
-
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/D18DFCF0-EF6E-4514-85A5-8E9EFE23E7BA.jpeg?ver=1566442720511)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/34C953DA-31F0-4FBA-A09F-45224ABCC1CB.jpeg?ver=1566443280966)
Michael,
Why did you post it before I'd reformatted it and deleted some of it to make it shorter? (Now you'll have to actually read it, and twice at that, just to see if I'm telling the truth about the "deleted" bit.)
Do you realize how immature, desperate and troll-ish you look?
-- MWT ;)
PS You don't wear red lipstick, do you? (That's what it looks like, my friend.)
PPS Thanks for the "bump," btw. (Un-formatted though it is.)
PPPS Why did you make it so large? Were you afraid it wouldn't get noticed?
-
From Richards Heuer’s: Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
Nosenko provided identification of, or leads to, some 238 Americans and about 200 foreign nationals in whom the KGB had displayed varying degrees of interest, and against whom they had enjoyed varying degrees of success. He provided information on about 2,000 KGB staff officers and 300 Soviet national agents or contacts of the KGB. His information on the methods and scope of Second Chief Directorate operations against foreign diplomats and journalists in Moscow and visitors to the Soviet Union filled a large gap in our knowledge and had an enormous impact on the raising of CIA's consciousness of these operations; the result was important improvements in the physical security of U.S. installations and the personal security of U.S. officials and advisors to the USSR. The Soviet Union suffered additional costs through the adverse publicity and deterrent effect of Nosenko's defection and the arrest of several agents he identified.
Full Transcription: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/25943-richards-heuer-nosenko-five-paths-to-judgement/?tab=comments#comment-405084.
Michael,
If you'd read Spy Wars, you'd realize Nosenko didn't provide leads to anyone who: 1) wasn't already suspected, 2) still had access to confidential information, or 3) was still working for the KGB/GRU.
In other words, the few people he "betrayed" to the CIA and/or the FBI were "throwaways", and the only reason he "uncovered" them was to build up his so-called bona fides in those agencies' eyes and thereby more effectively detract from and contradict what true-defector Golitsyn was telling them.
Didn't you read the excerpt I posted the other day? (I'll post an encapsulation, here, in a few minutes, plus the rest of the chapter for background, so you won't miss it, and you'll be able to refer to Dayle W. Smith (aka "Andrey"), and Robert Lee Johnson, and Boris Belitsky, and William Vassall, in your own words, next time, and try to convince me, in your own words, how they really were unsuspected, active spies for the KGB when Nosenko "uncovered" them for the CIA and the FBI!) Oh yeah, and about the and the 52 microphones in the American Embassy that nobody even suspected, and the 100 or so microphones in the new wing, the wing your boy Nosenko assured CIA didn't have any because Khrushchev was hoping and praying for better relations with the U.S.
(LOL)
-- MWT ;)
Here it is.
PART FOUR -- Confrontation
CHAPTER 17 -- Crunch Time
The expression on (Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, aka the Soviet Block Division) Dave Murphy’s face reflected that he knew I had come in to present him a problem— one he had hoped would simply go away.
I confirmed his apprehension. “We have to do something about Nosenko,'’ I said. “The debriefing is winding down. There’s not much water left in the well. Almost every day it looks more like we have a bad one on our hands. The time has come, Dave. We’ve got to decide what to do next.”
Dave took no pleasure from this. He was aware of the mounting mass of anomalies in Nosenko’s reporting and of the contradictions we were finding on the side. We had both hoped that with time we could find some innocent explanation, but none had materialized.
“Of course,” I added, “we might just walk away from this.” Only a few people were aware of our suspicions. We could resettle Nosenko some- where, get him a job, try to keep an eye on him, and remain alert for any new data we might uncover. “Maybe that’s our only course, but it would cost us our chance to clarify what’s behind all this— and that will come back to haunt us.”
“Yes,” Dave said. "Certainly his story about Lee Harvey Oswald will.”
Dave was right. As we re-questioned Nosenko about President Kennedy’s assassin, it was becoming ever more likely that his story was a message from the Kremlin to reassure the American government that the KGB had not commanded the deed. That message might well be true, but Nosenko was wildly exaggerating the KGB’s indifference to Oswald. He was saying and repeating (with claimed but unlikely authority) that neither KGB nor GRU had paid the slightest attention to this, their first Marine defector who moreover had been a radar operator at a U-2 spy plane base in Japan and was eager to help the Soviets any way he could. This tale was so hard to believe that it might cause someone to jump to the conclusion that Nosenko was covering up a contrary truth— that the KGB did form some relationship with Oswald and that the Soviet Politburo really did order JFK’s assassination.
We paused, thinking no doubt along the same lines.
“The Oswald story is one big question,” I added, “but there are others— the code clerks.” Nosenko had certified, with an authority that we now saw was spurious, that the KGB had failed to recruit any American code clerks. Golitsyn’s information had given us reason to think the KGB may have nailed two of them— and Nosenko seemed to be diverting us from precisely those two. "If the Sovs are deciphering U.S. military communications, we’d better find out about it.”
Dave nodded. “Yes, and about CIA security, too.” He remembered how Nosenko’s phony story of Kovshuk’s trip to Washington had hidden the betrayer of Popov. He remembered, too, Nosenko’s screwy account of Penkovsky’s dead drop that could be hiding a KGB penetration agent inside CIA who betrayed Penkovsky.
We lapsed into silence. Dave sighed. "No other explanation? Maybe he was just boasting? Pretending he did things he didn’t? Claiming personal involvement in operations he’d only heard about in corridor gossip? That he’s a congenital liar, a con man?”
"Hell, Dave, we’ve been through this before. You know we’ve tested every one of these propositions over and over again. I’ve had Joe and Sally argue them as persuasively as they can. They all collapse.”
"How about all the KGB spies he’s uncovered? Would the KGB sacrifice them?”
"Try to name one who was previously unknown and had access to secrets at the time Nosenko uncovered him. There aren’t any.”
Dave knew that we had looked into each of Nosenko’s ostensibly important leads and they had all come up dry. Nevertheless, I ran through them again.
• The most important suspect, "Andrey” the sergeant-mechanic of cipher machines, left service six months before Nosenko fingered him —and had never had access to cipher secrets even while active.
• The spy in the (Paris airport) Orly courier center, Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, had been very important indeed— when active. But by the time Nosenko told us about him, Johnson had lost his access to the courier center, and his mentally unhinged wife was broadcasting her knowledge that he was a Soviet spy. The case was stone-cold dead, and the KGB knew it before Nosenko handed it to us.
• Microphones in the American Embassy? Everyone from the ambassador to the janitor knew they existed— as they do in every embassy
the Politburo might be interested in. Golitsyn had confirmed that well-known fact.
• Nosenko had heard that a U.S. army captain had been recruited but knew nothing that could single him out from the thousand or more fellow captains in Germany.
• The Belitsky double agent case had already been exposed by Golitsyn— and the KGB knew it.
• By the time Nosenko walked into CIA in Geneva and pinpointed the British naval source William Vassall, the KGB already knew Vassall to be compromised by Golitsyns defection. They even played a game to build up Nosenko in Western eyes: after Golitsyn’s defection, against all logic, they restored their contact with Vassall, which they had suspended while the British investigated an Admiralty lead from an earlier source. 1
"Okay,” Dave said, “So Nosenko didn’t expose any active or valuable spies. But all the same, a lot of people around here believe the KGB would never send out one of their own staff officers as a defector.”
"That may or may not be true,” I answered, and reminded him that Nosenko was not deputy chief of the American Embassy Section in 1960- 1961, where he ostensibly got all his more important information. "He can only tell us what he’s been briefed to pass along. That’s a far cry from ‘sending out a KGB officer as a defector.’ ” When asked about the general run of stuff any KGB officer would have to know, Nosenko had proved unbelievably ignorant— or was pretending to be. He either could not or would not give sensible answers to our questions on internal KGB procedures. "When he can’t dodge these questions,” I added, "he says stupid, impossible things.” Moreover, it was no part of the original KGB plan to put Nosenko into our hands as a “defector” who would have to undergo detailed questioning. In 1962 he insisted that he would never defect and told why. He would meet us only when he happened to travel abroad. That way the KGB could limit the frequency and duration of face-to-face meetings and prevent our getting too deeply into any subject.
Obviously something unexpected had caused the KGB to change its plan and have Nosenko defect. It was not hard to guess what that was. The assassination of the American president by a recent resident of the USSR would have panicked the Politburo. If the U.S. government became persuaded that the Kremlin had ordered the assassination it might even cause war. This panic was confirmed after the Cold War. KGB General Oleg Kalugin recalled the Kremlin’s reaction when they learned that the assassin Oswald had enjoyed their hospitality and had a Soviet wife. They turned to the KGB. In the Soviet Embassy in Washington, “We began receiving nearly frantic cables from KGB headquarters in Moscow, ordering us to do every- thing possible to dispel the notion that the Soviet Union was somehow behind the assassination. . . . The Kremlin leadership was clearly rattled by Oswald’s Soviet connection, and in cable after cable the message we were to convey was clear: ‘Inform the American public through every possible channel that we never trusted Oswald and were never in any way connected with him.’” 2
The Soviet leaders were known to turn to the KGB when they wanted to slip an “inside” message to the American government. For years they had been establishing back channels during international conferences. One tactic was to have KGB diplomats “confide” in journalists as they did during the Cuban Missile Crisis. To put American minds to rest about Lee Harvey Oswald, the Kremlin’s message— that they had nothing to do with the killing— needed to be more authoritative and convincing than diplomatic chitchat.
That would require defection, even if only temporary, of someone with convincing authority. The Warren Commission could not be satisfied with a written report from some (necessarily unnamed) CIA agent-in-place whom they could not question or from whom they could not ascertain how he had obtained the information.
Dave nodded. "I can see it. Just when they needed a channel like this they found it, ready-made: a KGB officer already established as a trusted CIA agent.”
“Yes, but he would have to ‘defect.’ ”
Dave chuckled at the thought. “Wouldn’t the KGB guys who set this up hate to see their long-range operation go up in smoke just to pass Khrushchev’s message to the Yanks. I can feel their pain. But they sure couldn’t say no.”
"Moreover,” I added, “I don’t think Nosenko intends to stay long as a defector.” I reminded Dave of the lack of interest that Nosenko had shown toward the country he had ostensibly chosen as his new home. “After he’s done his gig with the Warren Commission, he’ll probably find some excuse to get mad at us and return to the USSR .” 3
"At least we’d be rid of him,” Dave observed with a smile.
"And of any chance to get behind his stories,” I said. “That’s what it’s all about. We should confront him and at least try to get a better idea of what’s behind all this. Then maybe we can persuade the FBI to dig into the code clerk cases we think Nosenko’s stories are covering up.”
"Okay,” Dave said, “go ahead— confront him.”
Again he was joking but I still reminded him, "We’ve been tiptoeing all over the place just to keep Nosenko from getting wind of our suspicions,” I said. “Once he does, he’ll split— fly the coop. He steps out the door and sells his story to a newspaper, and there goes the ball game. Even with all we know, we’re having a hell of a time evaluating his stuff. Can you imagine a journalist even trying?”
Dave groaned. "Okay, so how can we confront him? What’s ever to stop him walking out the door?”
"The only possibility I see is to put him under guard while we put the tough questions to him. Depending on his answers we should learn enough to either clear him or decide beyond question that he is a plant.”
"And in that case?”
There was the problem. We had no realistic options.
There was no way even to expel him. The U.S. government would not turn Nosenko back to the Soviets unless he himself asked for that, in writing. The Swiss would have no reason whatsoever to allow him back into their alpine republic— he wasn’t their problem. The West Germans would not be interested. Neither would any other Western democracy. One by one, we reviewed and eliminated the possibilities. We would have to admit that CIA could not establish the bona fides of this defector whom we had
brought from Europe— and resettle him as an immigrant in the United States. "Far from Washington, I would hope.”
After a moment’s reflection Dave remarked, “But that still leaves the problem of his legal status in the country. He’s on parole to CIA and the law says we have to certify that he is who he said he is, that he had real access to the information he gave, and that we believe the reasons he gave for defecting. I couldn’t certify a single one of those points.”
"Nor that ‘we have no information that any foreign intelligence service influenced his defection.’ Hell, we’re up to our ass in just such info.”
Any discussion of resettling Nosenko outside the United States was probably pointless— because of Nosenko’s claimed knowledge of Oswald. We could not send away the only source allegedly able to throw light, even if false light, on the Soviet role in the assassination.
"We will have to tell the Warren Commission how we evaluate Nosenko’s information,” I said. "That alone would be cause to detain and confront him— to assess whether his Oswald info is invention or a KGB message.”
Dave summarized. "It boils down to this: either we hold and confront him, or we drop the whole thing and pretend to take Nosenko at face value.” Helms to see whether there’s even a possibility of the first alternative.”
To put the question and, if the answer were yes, to get the necessary authority, Helms, Murphy, and the CIA’s legal counsel went to Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach on 2 April 1964. Although they did not ask for any specific length of time, they presumably delivered the impression we had given them, that by holding Nosenko for two or three weeks of interrogation we should be able to throw more light on the validity and probable background of his information.
The attorney general considered the terms of Nosenko’s parole that made CIA responsible for ensuring that Nosenko’s presence would not harm U. S . interests . In the light of our current opinion that his presence was in fact specifically designed to harm those interests, the Attorney General gave the go-ahead.
Now we prepared for the confrontation that, we hoped, would throw light on this extraordinary affair.
.....
Footnotes
1 . John Vassall, Vassal l. The Autobiography of a Spy (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1975), 132-34.
2. Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 57-58.
3. We foresaw— and forestalled— what was to happen twenty years later. After a few weeks in the West the ostensible KGB defector Vitaly Yurchenko, having betrayed “secrets,” walked out on CIA in Washington and returned to Moscow, not to be punished as a traitor but to resume his KGB employment and to be given a medal.
.....
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
-
On page 7 of this thread, Michael Clark posted a grossly over-enlarged (and unpaginated, of course) page from John L. Hart's virtually treasonous propaganda piece, The Monster Plot Report.
That page (pg. 81) and the ones surrounding it in The Monster Plot Report extol all of the wonderful help false-defector Yuri Nosenko gave the CIA and FBI, specifically all of the KGB and GRU agents he'd helped them to "uncover".
On page 8 of this thread, I posted a detailed rebuttal (see below) to those assertions, but Clark has made no effort to challenge said rebuttal in his own words, choosing instead to "appeal to authority" by continuing to post the same garbage from his favorite gullible (or worse) discredited* sources: Howard J. Osborn, Richards J. Heuer and, of course, the HSCA perjurer and author of The Monster Plot Report, John L. Hart, himself.
In my humble opinion, it's almost as though Clark is secretly working for KGB-boy Vladimir Putin in trying to convince gullible members and guests here (and at the so-called Education Forum) that Yuri Nosenko was a true defector (and Anatoliy Golitsyn a crazy or false one), despite the fact that world-class "The CIA Killed JFK" CTer and former Army Intelligence analyst John Newman was so convinced by what Tennent H. Bagley wrote in his 2007 Spy Wars and his 2013 Spy Master that he now believes that Nosenko was a false defector (interestingly, Newman convinced none other than Peter Dale Scott of same in March 2018), and that true-defector Golitsyn was a valuable source of information for CIA (and could have been for J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, which organization, having been so thoroughly hoodwinked by "Fedora" and others, wouldn't give Golitsyn "the time of day"). *read Bagley's 2007 Spy Wars, 2014 Ghosts of the Spy Wars, and 2013 Spymaster, and Mark Riebling's 1994 Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA.
Does Michael Clark realize how foolish (or worse) and troll-ish he looks here?
Here's a list from my page-7 reply summarizing the specific allegations Hart made in that (pg. 81) piece of garbage Michael had posted there a little earlier :
KGB Souces Yuri Nosenko Allegedly Uncovered For CIA and FBI:
1) U.S. Army sergeant Robert L. Johnson
2) -- a buncha technical military stuff
3) U.S. Sergeant Dayle W. Smith
4) James A. Mintkenbaugh
5) Some microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow
6) William John Cristopher Vassall !
7) and ... gasp ... about 200 unnamed spies in unnamed European countries, as attested to by three unnamed CIA officers who had the wherewithal to know!
.....
Now for the really good stuff from my Reply #73 on: August 18, 2019, 06:29:31 AM on page 8 of this thread):
Michael,
Well, not hearing from you as to whether or not that list of spies allegedly uncovered by Nosenko that I drew up is comprehensive, and seein' as how you replied to my post with some difficult-to-read stuff about two of my heroes (Anatoliy Golitsyn and Pyotr Popov) in a discolored and grossly over-enlarged page from Hart's "Monster Plot," instead, I guess I'll just go ahead and start with Number 1 on the list -- U.S. Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson, okay?
Let's see what another of my heroes, Tennent H. Bagley, has to say about him, whaddaya say?
Robert L. Johnson
From page 179 of Bagley's 2007 book Spy Wars:
The spy in the Orly (Paris airport) courier center, Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, had been very important indeed -- when active. But by the time Nosenko told us about him, Johnson had lost his access to the courier center, and his mentally unhinged wife was broadcasting her knowledge that he was a Soviet spy. The case was stone-cold dead, and the KGB knew it before Nosenko handed it to us.
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP -- Sergeant Dayle W. Smith !
Dayle W. Smith
From Bagley's book Spy Master (with-and-about former KGB General Sergei Kondrashev):
Sergeant Dayle W. Smith (KGB's "Andrey") confessed to having been recruited while in Moscow during 1953-1955. But the American authorities saw no reason to prosecute him because he had had no access to sensitive information and never passed any to the Soviets. For the KGB, he was a free “give-away.”
And this from page 179 of Spy Wars:
The most important (according to Nosenko) suspect, (KGB's) "Andrey” the sergeant-mechanic of cipher machines, left service six months before Nosenko fingered him and had never had access to cipher secrets even while active.
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP: James A. Mintenbaugh ! (... Who??)
James A. Mintkenbaugh
From the Wikipedia article on Robert Lee Johnson (see above):
(Johnson) also recruited a former Army friend, James Mintkenbaugh. Johnson worked for the KGB between 1953 and 1964, and passed on information while stationed at various sites in Europe and the U.S. ... In 1964, Johnson was turned in by his wife and, like Mintkenbaugh, received a 25-year prison sentence in 1965.
Note: Bagley doesn't seem to talk about Mintkenbaugh in his books or in his PDF Ghosts of the Spy Wars, but I think it's reasonable to assume that since Robert Lee Johnson was already "toast" when Nosenko "uncovered" him, that Mintkenbaugh was "throw away" material, as well.
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP: Some Microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow!
Microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
From page 179 of Bagley's Spy Wars:
Microphones in the American Embassy? Everyone from the ambassador to the janitor knew they existed -- as they do in every embassy the Politburo might be interested in. Golitsyn had confirmed that well-known fact.
Note: Bagley goes into this in some detail in his HSCA testimony. He starts talking about them at the bottom of this page:
https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol12/html/HSCA_Vol12_0299b.htm
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP: William John Cristopher Vassall !!!
William John Cristopher Vassall
For background on this dude, here's the Wikipedia article on him. I don't know how accurate the article is because I haven't read it yet. (I'll read it later today and let you know if there's anything egregiously wrong in it ...)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Vassall
And here's something on him in Bagley's Spy Wars, page 179:
By the time Nosenko walked into CIA in Geneva (in May 1962) and pinpointed the British naval source William Vassall, the KGB already knew Vassall to be compromised by Golitsyns defection (in December of 1961). They even played a game to build up Nosenko in Western eyes: after Golitsyn’s defection, against all logic, they restored their contact with Vassall, which they had suspended while the British investigated an Admiralty lead from an earlier source.(fn 1)
And this, also from Spy Wars, page 260:
Nosenko’s defenders cite his uncovering of John Vassall, the British Admiralty employee, as a great contribution although they knew that Golitsyn had previously exposed Vassall. To explain that away, they went further in inventiveness: the British weren’t really on Vassall's track at all, they said. Had it not been for Nosenko’s information the British might have mistaken Golitsyn’s lead to Vassall for a totally different Admiralty source, the Houghton-Gee-Lonsdale network earlier un- covered by Goleniewski.(fn 18) In fact, no such confusion was even remotely possible.
(There's more, but it's getting late, even here in Paradise-on-Earth known as La Jolla, California ...)
-- MWT ;)
.....
-- MWT Walk:
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On page 7 of this thread, Michael Clark posted a grossly over-enlarged (and unpaginated, of course) page from John L. Hart's virtually treasonous propaganda piece, The Monster Plot Report.
That page (pg. 81) and the ones surrounding it in The Monster Plot Report extol all of the wonderful help false-defector Yuri Nosenko gave the CIA and FBI, specifically all of the KGB and GRU agents he'd helped them to "uncover".
On page 8 of this thread, I posted a detailed rebuttal (see below) to those assertions, but Clark has made no effort to challenge said rebuttal in his own words, choosing instead to "appeal to authority" by continuing to post the same garbage from his favorite gullible (or worse) sources: Howard J. Osborn, Richards J. Heuer and, of course, the HSCA perjurer and author of The Monster Plot Report, John L. Hart, himself.
In my humble opinion, it's almost as though Clark is secretly working for KGB-boy Vladimir Putin in trying to convince gullible members and guests here (and at the so-called Education Forum) that Yuri Nosenko was a true defector (and Anatoliy Golitsyn a crazy or false one), despite the fact that world-class "The CIA Killed JFK" CTer and former Army Intelligence analyst John Newman was so convinced by what Tennent H. Bagley wrote in his 2007 Spy Wars and his 2013 Spy Master that he now believes that Nosenko was a false defector (interestingly, Newman convinced none other than Peter Dale Scott of same in March 2018), and that true-defector Golitsyn was a valuable source of information for CIA (and could have been to J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, which organization, having been so thoroughly hoodwinked by "Fedora" and others, wouldn't give Golitsyn "the time of day").
Does Michael Clark realize how foolish (or worse) and troll-ish he looks here?
Here's a list from my page-7 reply summarizing the specific allegations Hart made in that (pg. 81) piece of garbage Michael had posted there a little earlier :
KGB Souces Yuri Nosenko Allegedly Uncovered For CIA and FBI:
1) U.S. Army sergeant Robert L. Johnson
2) -- a buncha technical military stuff
3) U.S. Sergeant Dayle W. Smith
4) James A. Mintkenbaugh
5) Some microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow
6) William John Cristopher Vassall !
7) and ... gasp ... about 200 unnamed spies in unnamed European countries, as attested to by three unnamed CIA officers who had the wherewithal to know!
.....
Now for the really good stuff from my Reply #73 on: August 18, 2019, 06:29:31 AM on page 8 of this thread):
Michael,
Well, not hearing from you as to whether or not that list of spies allegedly uncovered by Nosenko that I drew up is comprehensive, and seein' as how you replied to my post with some difficult-to-read stuff about two of my heroes (Anatoliy Golitsyn and Pyotr Popov) in a discolored and grossly over-enlarged page from Hart's "Monster Plot," instead, I guess I'll just go ahead and start with Number 1 on the list -- U.S. Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson, okay?
Let's see what another of my heroes, Tennent H. Bagley, has to say about him, whaddaya say?
Robert L. Johnson
From page 179 of Bagley's 2007 book Spy Wars:
The spy in the Orly (Paris airport) courier center, Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, had been very important indeed -- when active. But by the time Nosenko told us about him, Johnson had lost his access to the courier center, and his mentally unhinged wife was broadcasting her knowledge that he was a Soviet spy. The case was stone-cold dead, and the KGB knew it before Nosenko handed it to us.
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP -- Sergeant Dayle W. Smith !
Dayle W. Smith
From Bagley's book Spy Master (with-and-about former KGB General Sergei Kondrashev):
Sergeant Dayle W. Smith (KGB's "Andrey") confessed to having been recruited while in Moscow during 1953-1955. But the American authorities saw no reason to prosecute him because he had had no access to sensitive information and never passed any to the Soviets. For the KGB, he was a free “give-away.”
And this from page 179 of Spy Wars:
The most important (according to Nosenko) suspect, (KGB's) "Andrey” the sergeant-mechanic of cipher machines, left service six months before Nosenko fingered him and had never had access to cipher secrets even while active.
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP: James A. Mintenbaugh ! (... Who??)
James A. Mintkenbaugh
From the Wikipedia article on Robert Lee Johnson (see above):
(Johnson) also recruited a former Army friend, James Mintkenbaugh. Johnson worked for the KGB between 1953 and 1964, and passed on information while stationed at various sites in Europe and the U.S. ... In 1964, Johnson was turned in by his wife and, like Mintkenbaugh, received a 25-year prison sentence in 1965.
Note: Bagley doesn't seem to talk about Mintkenbaugh in his books or in his PDF Ghosts of the Spy Wars, but I think it's reasonable to assume that since Robert Lee Johnson was already "toast" when Nosenko "uncovered" him, that Mintkenbaugh was "throw away" material, as well.
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP: Some Microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow!
Microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
From page 179 of Bagley's Spy Wars:
Microphones in the American Embassy? Everyone from the ambassador to the janitor knew they existed -- as they do in every embassy the Politburo might be interested in. Golitsyn had confirmed that well-known fact.
Note: Bagley goes into this in some detail in his HSCA testimony. He starts talking about them at the bottom of this page:
https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol12/html/HSCA_Vol12_0299b.htm
-- MWT ;)
NEXT UP: William John Cristopher Vassall !!!
William John Cristopher Vassall
For background on this dude, here's the Wikipedia article on him. I don't know how accurate the article is because I haven't read it yet. (I'll read it later today and let you know if there's anything egregiously wrong in it ...)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Vassall
And here's something on him in Bagley's Spy Wars, page 179:
By the time Nosenko walked into CIA in Geneva (in May 1962) and pinpointed the British naval source William Vassall, the KGB already knew Vassall to be compromised by Golitsyns defection (in December of 1961). They even played a game to build up Nosenko in Western eyes: after Golitsyn’s defection, against all logic, they restored their contact with Vassall, which they had suspended while the British investigated an Admiralty lead from an earlier source.(fn 1)
And this, also from Spy Wars, page 260:
Nosenko’s defenders cite his uncovering of John Vassall, the British Admiralty employee, as a great contribution although they knew that Golitsyn had previously exposed Vassall. To explain that away, they went further in inventiveness: the British weren’t really on Vassall's track at all, they said. Had it not been for Nosenko’s information the British might have mistaken Golitsyn’s lead to Vassall for a totally different Admiralty source, the Houghton-Gee-Lonsdale network earlier un- covered by Goleniewski.(fn 18) In fact, no such confusion was even remotely possible.
(There's more, but it's getting late, even here in Paradise-on-Earth known as La Jolla, California ...)
-- MWT ;)
.......
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/27D47312-3F97-4E74-8CD5-16C094054B20.jpeg?ver=1566517571567)
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(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/3BD12325-E0F8-4F36-B301-41E8D3306676.jpeg?ver=1566515571899)
Edit: In my previous post I forgot to mention yet another source open-minded members and guests can read to help them understand how thoroughly gullible jerks, liars and/or virtual traitors (or worse) McCoy, Hart, Solie, Heuer and George Kisevalter have been thoroughly discredited (one could say "outed"), to wit: Tennent H. Bagley's 1978 HSCA Testimony (in Hearings, volume XII), where he's referred to as "Mr. D. C.", as in (former) Deputy Chief of CIA's Soviet Russia/Soviet Block Division.
-- MWT ;)
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(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/CE33C91E-FC22-4703-B65C-D75AD161C920.jpeg?ver=1566521166976)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/2B315883-15A1-4B75-B0E0-58145FB04FC4.jpeg?ver=1566521166976)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/0B071A4B-B87F-4FA7-9CF8-27DBC3B0FF6F.jpeg?ver=1566521166976)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/A360E668-3F09-4307-B806-BC47DAFF4970.jpeg?ver=1566521166976)
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Michael,
I'll be making about ten corrections to that piece by John Le Carre's Half-brother.
Piecemeal, maybe even one-by-one, so as to "cover" as many of your propagandistic posts as possible.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS When are you going to send that letter to John Newman and Peter Dale Scott, telling them how wrong they are about Nosenko?
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Michael,
I'll be making about ten corrections to that piece by John Le Carre's Half-brother.
Piecemeal, maybe even one-by-one, so as to "cover" as many of your propagandistic posts as possible.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS When are you going to send that letter to John Newman and Peter Dale Scott, telling them how wrong they are about Nosenko?
That’s pretty funny. I didn’t know if you would thank me or go all-out freak, like you did. I thought it was pretty neutral. It is so topical that I am really shocked, nee, amused at your reaction. Does it even say ten things?
Anyroads, it’s nice to know that I keep you busy...
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That’s pretty funny. I didn’t know if you would thank me or go all-out freak, like you did. I thought it was pretty neutral. It is so topical that I am really shocked, nee, amused at your reaction. Does it even say ten things?
Michael,
I'll be dealing with at least some of the things I've highlighted in the obituary.
One day in June 1962, Tennent "Pete" Bagley, the Soviet specialist at the CIA station in Berne, was instructed to take the train to Geneva to handle the case of a KGB officer attached to the Soviet delegation to a disarmament conference, who was offering his services to the Americans. That short journey turned Bagley into a central figure in perhaps the most controversial and baffling spy story of the entire Cold War.The KGB officer's name was Yuri Nosenko. At that first meeting he agreed to return to Moscow as a CIA agent-in-place. But in January 1964 he was back in Geneva with the Soviet arms delegates, insisting his cover was about to be blown and that he had to come over to
the West. But was he the real thing, or a fake defector sent by the KGB to confuse? If he was a plant, the strategy succeeded brilliantly. For the next dozen years the Nosenko case tied the CIA in knots, paralysing the Agency's vital espionage efforts against its Cold War adversary and destroying careers in the process. Bagley's background was typical in the Agency's early days. He came from an old US Navy family, studded with admirals; his uncle had been the first American killed in the 1898 Spanish-American war. Bagley himself had served in the Marines and studied at Princeton and the University of Geneva before joining the CIA in 1950. He seemed to have it all. He was tall and all-American handsome, talented and ambitious. Some senior figures in the Agency saw him as a future CIA director. He was also a friend of James Angleton, the Agency's formidable counter-intelligence chief. And then Yuri Nosenko came on the scene. Initially Bagley had no doubts. Nosenko was the first senior defector from the KGB's Second Directorate, responsible for internal security and monitoring – and if possible recruiting – personnel in the US Embassy as well as visiting American tourists, businessmen and academics. The information he provided at the 1962 debriefings at a CIA safe house in Geneva was top-class, including details of KGB surveillance methods and leads that hastened the unmasking of several Soviet spies in the West (among them the UK Admiralty clerk, John Vassall). "Jim, I'm involved in the greatest defector case ever," Bagley enthused to Angleton when he returned to Washington. But the older man was visibly unimpressed, and handed Bagley a file to read. "When you finish this, you'll see what I'm saying," he told him. The file essentially consisted of the theorising of a previous KGB defector, Anatoly Golitsyn, who had come across in 1961.
Golitsyn had managed to convince the paranoid Angleton that not only did the KGB have high-level moles in US and British intelligence, but was running a gigantic disinformation campaign against the West. Nothing was what it seemed, and every defector, according to Golitsyn, was in fact a plant – among them, naturally, Yuri Nosenko. The file planted doubts in Bagley's mind too, and his suspicions were further aroused by discrepancies in Nosenko's initial story. In 1964 those doubts exploded. The defector claimed to have information that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the murder of President Kennedy just two months earlier and, astonishingly, that the KGB didn't even have contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, Kennedy's assassin, during the three mysterious years that the one-time US Marine lived in the Soviet Union, between 1959 and 1962. Nosenko's tale seemed too good to be true, exonerating Moscow just as the Warren Commission was starting work amid widespread suspicion that Oswald was indeed a real-life Manchurian Candidate controlled by the KGB. Soon after landing on US soil, Nosenko found himself a prisoner, held incommunicado in a safe house in Virginia and subjected to harsh interrogation, hunger and sleep deprivation. But he never broke, passing lie detector tests and resisting every effort of Bagley and his fellow sceptics to extract a confession. Gradually the upper echelons of the CIA split into warring camps, of "Fundamentalists" like Angleton and Bagley, and those who believed Nosenko was the real thing, and who were increasingly appalled by the way he was being treated. Ultimately the latter group prevailed. By 1967 Nosenko's ordeal was over, and in 1969 he was formally cleared, placed on the CIA payroll as a consultant and given a new identity. By then Bagley was long since off the case, posted to Brussels, where he would spend five years as station chief before retiring from the Agency in 1972. Amazingly Nosenko never held his harsh treatment against the US, nor regretted his original decision to defect. Bagley, though, remained obsessed by the case, convinced until the end that Nosenko was a plant: "this KGB provocateur and deceiver," as he put it in his 2007 memoir Spy Wars, a powerful argument of the anti-Nosenko case. The book led the CIA to cancel a planned lecture that Bagley was to give: four decades on, old wounds were still bleeding. Nosenko himself died in 2008. A few years earlier, someone asked Bagley what he'd say to Yuri Nosenko if he ever ran into him. His answer was, "Don't shoot."
-- MWT ;)
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Michael,
I'll be dealing with at least some of the things I've highlighted in the obituary.
One day in June 1962, Tennent "Pete" Bagley, the Soviet specialist at the CIA station in Berne, was instructed to take the train to Geneva to handle the case of a KGB officer attached to the Soviet delegation to a disarmament conference, who was offering his services to the Americans. That short journey turned Bagley into a central figure in perhaps the most controversial and baffling spy story of the entire Cold War.The KGB officer's name was Yuri Nosenko. At that first meeting he agreed to return to Moscow as a CIA agent-in-place. But in January 1964 he was back in Geneva with the Soviet arms delegates, insisting his cover was about to be blown and that he had to come over to
the West. But was he the real thing, or a fake defector sent by the KGB to confuse? If he was a plant, the strategy succeeded brilliantly. For the next dozen years the Nosenko case tied the CIA in knots, paralysing the Agency's vital espionage efforts against its Cold War adversary and destroying careers in the process. Bagley's background was typical in the Agency's early days. He came from an old US Navy family, studded with admirals; his uncle had been the first American killed in the 1898 Spanish-American war. Bagley himself had served in the Marines and studied at Princeton and the University of Geneva before joining the CIA in 1950. He seemed to have it all. He was tall and all-American handsome, talented and ambitious. Some senior figures in the Agency saw him as a future CIA director. He was also a friend of James Angleton, the Agency's formidable counter-intelligence chief. And then Yuri Nosenko came on the scene. Initially Bagley had no doubts. Nosenko was the first senior defector from the KGB's Second Directorate, responsible for internal security and monitoring – and if possible recruiting – personnel in the US Embassy as well as visiting American tourists, businessmen and academics. The information he provided at the 1962 debriefings at a CIA safe house in Geneva was top-class, including details of KGB surveillance methods and leads that hastened the unmasking of several Soviet spies in the West (among them the UK Admiralty clerk, John Vassall). "Jim, I'm involved in the greatest defector case ever," Bagley enthused to Angleton when he returned to Washington. But the older man was visibly unimpressed, and handed Bagley a file to read. "When you finish this, you'll see what I'm saying," he told him. The file essentially consisted of the theorising of a previous KGB defector, Anatoly Golitsyn, who had come across in 1961.
Golitsyn had managed to convince the paranoid Angleton that not only did the KGB have high-level moles in US and British intelligence, but was running a gigantic disinformation campaign against the West. Nothing was what it seemed, and every defector, according to Golitsyn, was in fact a plant – among them, naturally, Yuri Nosenko. The file planted doubts in Bagley's mind too, and his suspicions were further aroused by discrepancies in Nosenko's initial story. In 1964 those doubts exploded. The defector claimed to have information that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the murder of President Kennedy just two months earlier and, astonishingly, that the KGB didn't even have contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, Kennedy's assassin, during the three mysterious years that the one-time US Marine lived in the Soviet Union, between 1959 and 1962. Nosenko's tale seemed too good to be true, exonerating Moscow just as the Warren Commission was starting work amid widespread suspicion that Oswald was indeed a real-life Manchurian Candidate controlled by the KGB. Soon after landing on US soil, Nosenko found himself a prisoner, held incommunicado in a safe house in Virginia and subjected to harsh interrogation, hunger and sleep deprivation. But he never broke, passing lie detector tests and resisting every effort of Bagley and his fellow sceptics to extract a confession. Gradually the upper echelons of the CIA split into warring camps, of "Fundamentalists" like Angleton and Bagley, and those who believed Nosenko was the real thing, and who were increasingly appalled by the way he was being treated. Ultimately the latter group prevailed. By 1967 Nosenko's ordeal was over, and in 1969 he was formally cleared, placed on the CIA payroll as a consultant and given a new identity. By then Bagley was long since off the case, posted to Brussels, where he would spend five years as station chief before retiring from the Agency in 1972. Amazingly Nosenko never held his harsh treatment against the US, nor regretted his original decision to defect. Bagley, though, remained obsessed by the case, convinced until the end that Nosenko was a plant: "this KGB provocateur and deceiver," as he put it in his 2007 memoir Spy Wars, a powerful argument of the anti-Nosenko case. The book led the CIA to cancel a planned lecture that Bagley was to give: four decades on, old wounds were still bleeding. Nosenko himself died in 2008. A few years earlier, someone asked Bagley what he'd say to Yuri Nosenko if he ever ran into him. His answer was, "Don't shoot."
-- MWT ;)
Why don’t you Just “deal with them”, instead of posting...... Twice...... that you are going to deal with them?
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BTW: What the hell did you do there? Did you type that out? Couldn’t you find I nice clean copy, or, did you have trouble with the Copy/Paste function?
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Why don’t you Just “deal with them”, instead of posting...... Twice...... that you are going to deal with them?
For several reasons, Michael:
1) To give you something to complain about so you can continue to avoid the questions I've already asked you and the points I've already made
2) To prepare you for the coming shocks
3) To put that obituary from the British newspaper The Independent in a format more pleasing to the eyes than the way you posted it
4) Because, at nearly 70 years of age, I'm tired now, and I'm going to take a nap. Is that okay with you?
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS I plan to resume my diatribes against you and that HSCA perjurer and virtual traitor (or worse) John L. Hart, et al., around 12 midnight Cali time (3 AM Albany, New York time).
Think you'll be up?
PPS In fact, I can see myself doing that on a fairly regular basis from here on out ...
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For several reasons, Michael:
1) To give you something to complain about so you can continue to avoid the questions I've already asked you and the points I've already made
2) To prepare you for the coming shocks
3) To put that obituary from the British newspaper The Independent in a format more pleasing to the eyes than the way you posted it
4) Because, at nearly 70 years of age, I'm tired now, and I'm going to take a nap. Is that okay with you?
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
My format is quite nice. I’d say it is better. Did you type it? It’s only 8:00 in lovely La Jolla, Go out and get some air, ( try to stay away from the hot stuff, okay?). And thanks for the heads-up that you’ll be taking a nappy-poo. That means it’s time for me to get busy.
Cheers
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My format is quite nice. I’d say it is better. Did you type it? It’s only 8:00 in lovely La Jolla, Go out and get some air, ( try to stay away from the hot stuff, okay?). And thanks for the heads-up that you’ll be taking a nappy-poo. That means it’s time for me to get busy.
Cheers
PPPS A side benefit for me for doing it that way is that my posts will be visible to our open-minded guests for a couple of hours before you have an opportunity to "cover them" with grossly over-enlarged, un-paginated cut-and-paste jobs.
-- MWT ;)
PS When are you going to send that letter to Newman and Scott, Michael?
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Have at it, Big Guy....
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/BA13C31D-4CEE-4BAE-8EC2-0843773B3DB5.jpeg?ver=1566531209664)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/57FA16A9-A3D8-46B6-A525-A23CB7CDF764.jpeg?ver=1566531209664)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/B1962DC6-381E-4E0F-8168-417E67B553C4.jpeg?ver=1566531209664)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/B4FAA284-E51F-4A46-8C0A-C230E7C0B1FC.jpeg?ver=1566531209664)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/4ED9E2C3-61AD-4FE2-98A8-B406313795BF.jpeg?ver=1566531209664)
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Michael,
Point being?
That Bagley's lawyer had also represented evil James Angleton?
That Bagley lost his clearance when he retired (with a medal and a citation)?
What?
Bagley's HSCA Testimony is much more important than the fact that he was not permitted to have access to certain classified CIA documents beforehand. Have you read his testimony yet. Michael? It runs pages seventy-five pages and begins on page 571 of HSCA's Volume XII:
https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol12/html/HSCA_Vol12_0288a.htm
Regardless, taking Bagley's obituary's mistakes, mis-characterizations (and things that could have been worded in a less biased manner) in order and in batches of three (and therefore in no particular order of importance), I'll be making about five posts, timed in such a way, of course, as to best "cover" your most recent post at any given time.
Here's the first one:
1) Bagley wasn't just "the Russia Specialist" at CIA's station in Bern, Switzerland, when Nosenko walked in in Geneva in 1962. He was a Soviet Russia Division Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence at the time
2) In Geneva in 1962, Nosenko was adamant that he didn't want to be contacted by or to communicate with CIA after he returned to Moscow. Therefore I wouldn't call him a CIA "agent in place" in the USSR.
3) Bagley claims CIA operations and counterintelligence efforts against the KGB were not negatively affected while he and others in said agency were trying to "break" Nosenko.
For example, please read about that non-issue in this excerpt (starting on page 213) from Spy Wars:
Richard Helms never considered the doubts (about Nosenko) truly resolved and viewed the Agency’s formal acceptance as a matter of convenience. Nosenko had to be released, and one way to do it was to clear him, at least officially. 11 These doubts faded in the second half of the 1960s with the advent of Kochnov and the departure from Headquarters of myself and Dave Murphy. The man who replaced Murphy as Soviet Bloc Division (SB) chief, Rolf Kingsley, had not previously focused on Soviet matters and had little patience with counterintelligence. He called for a fresh review of the case by “more neutral” officers, who concluded that Nosenko was probably genuine. 12 Finally, when William E. Colby became director of Central Intelligence in September 1973, the Agency’s approach to counterintelligence changed and the shadows over Nosenko were cleaned away. (At this time I had already retired, so I learned of these events only later from those who lived through them.) Colby gave a strong push to the growing myth surrounding the No- senko affair (see Appendix B). In his memoirs he asserted that some former CIA people believed in an all-knowing KGB that was well on the way to dominating the world. “The [SB] Division produced operations and intelligence,” Colby wrote, "but the [counterintelligence] staff believed that those operations and intelligence were controlled by the KGB ... to mislead the United States in a massive deception program.’’ 13 Colby also derided a "paralysis” that he claimed had overtaken Soviet operations. “I sensed a major difficulty,” he wrote. “Our concern over possible KGB penetration, it seemed to me, had so preoccupied us that we were devoting most of our time to protecting ourselves from the KGB and not enough to developing the new sources and operations that we needed to learn secret information. ... I wanted to consider the KGB as something to be evaded by CIA, not as the object of our operations nor as our mesmerizing nemesis.” 14 If one were to believe one of its later chiefs, the Soviet Division in that dark earlier time “had been turning away dozens of volunteers, Soviets and Eastern Europeans who had contacted American officials with offers to work for the United States.” 15 In reality the caution that Murphy— not Angleton— introduced into CIA’s efforts to recruit Soviets was never allowed to hinder the acceptance of a single Soviet volunteer, nor did it preclude any well-considered recruitment approach. None of these assertions of “paralysis” has cited a single rejection of a volunteer, defector, or proposal for action. Ironically, it was these latter-day critics who themselves started turning away Soviet defectors— on the grounds that CIA had all it needed or could handle. Among those whom CIA turned away— on specific orders from Headquarters— was Vasily Mitrokhin, who had stolen and stashed a large hunk of KGB operational archives. 16 While paying lip service to the need for vigilance, Colby saw counterintelligence mainly as an impediment to intelligence collection. His impatience and disinterest came out in the form of simplification and sarcasm. “I spent several long sessions doing my best to follow [Counterintelligence Staff chief Angleton’s] tortuous theories about the long arm of a powerful and wily KGB at work, over decades, placing its agents in the heart of allied and neutral nations and sending its false defectors to influence and under- mine American policy. I confess that I couldn’t absorb it, possibly because I did not have the requisite grasp of this labyrinthine subject, possibly because Angleton's explanations were impossible to follow, or possibly because the evidence just didn’t add up to his conclusions. ... I did not suspect Angleton and his staff of engaging in improper activities. I just could not figure out what they were doing at all.” 17 Colby soon got to work reorganizing the Counterintelligence Staff and divesting it of some of its components. Then in 1974 the New York Times exposed the fact that in apparent violation of the Agency’s charter, Angleton's staff had been checking international mail to and from some left-wing Americans. This gave Colby the ammunition he needed to rid himself of this nuisance. At the end of that year he demanded Angleton’s resignation and was glad to see Angleton’s chief lieutenants Raymond Rocca, William Hood, and Newton Miler follow him into retirement. To steer a less troubling course, Colby appointed to head the Counter- intelligence Staff George Kalaris, a man without experience in either counter- intelligence or Soviet bloc operations, and, as his deputy, Leonard McCoy, a handler of reports, not an operations officer, who had already himself as a fierce advocate for Nosenko. Now began an extraordinary cleanup inside the Counterintelligence Staff— and the disappearance of evidence against Nosenko. "Scotty" Miler’s carefully accumulated notes on this and related cases were removed from the files and disappeared, along with a unique card file of discrepancies in Nosenko’s statements. 18 Shortly afterward Colby appointed an officer to review the files anew. John L. Hart was assisted by four officers. They worked for six months, from June to December 1976. I caught a glimpse of their aims and work methods when Hart came to Europe to interview me. He had not bothered to read what I had written (though he said nothing new had come to light on the question of Nosenko’s bona hdes) and seemed interested only in why, eight years earlier, I had warned that bad consequences might flow from Nosenko’s release. I saw that his aim was not to get at the truth but to find a way to clear Nosenko, so I refused to talk further with him. As I later learned, Hart’s team did not even interview the Counter- intelligence Staff officers who had analyzed the case and maintained hies on it for nine years. Among them were two veteran analysts who, having come “cold” to the case, had concluded on their own that Nosenko was a plant— and had written their reasons. Hart then wrote a report ("The Monster Plot Report") that affirmed total trust in Nosenko.19 Having decreed their faith and gotten rid of disbelievers, the CIA leadership banned further debate. One experienced officer in the Soviet Bloc Division— my old colleague Joe Westin, who knew so much about this case— took a late stand against Nosenko’s bona hdes. He was told by higher-ups, “If you continue on this course, there will be no room for you in this Division”— and his future promotion was blocked. Peter Deriabin, who kept trying to warn Agency officials about Nosenko, was told to desist or his relations with CIA would be threatened (see Appendix A). Nosenko’s rescuers then set out to discredit those who had distrusted him. They hrst labeled them as paranoid (a charge always difficult to refute) and then moved on to distort the record.
-- MWT ;)
PS Why are you enlarging all of the documents you post here to this size text?
To try to make your postings look more "substantial"? LOL
Don't you realize how childish and troll-ish you look by doing so?
Are you really so desperate for attention?
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Note: The original of this document, linked just below here, is riddled with typos, making it a painful, slow read. I have cleaned it up extensively. It still needs work and I will continue to edit it as my time, patience and interest persist.
Nosenko: Five paths to judgement
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/H_folder/Heuer_on_NosenkoV1.pdf
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment," Studies in Intelligence, vol. 31, no. 3 (Fall 1987), pp. 71-101. Originally classified "Secret."
CIA's internecine struggle in the 1960s about counterespionage left a cloud over counterintelligence disciplines there. At the core was the chief, James Angleton, and his trusted Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn; the trigger was the distrusted defection of another Soviet intelligence officer, Yury Nosenko. The saga was Homeric. It has been told many times-but never, I think, so well as in this meticulous logical and empirical exercise. The author has been one of CIA's finest intellects. He has published trenchantly in the open literature on theories of deception and counter-deception. Yet one must now acknowledge that cogent exoneration of Nosenko contributed to permanent rejection of Angleton, and eventually to years of reluctance to suspect even Aldrich Ames. So standards for vigilance remain disputable.
Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment
RICHARDS J. HEUER, JR.
Yuri Nosenko, a middle-level KGB officer, volunteered his services to the Central Intelligence Agency in Geneva in 1962 and defected to the United States in 1964. His defection initiated a bitter and divisive controversy over his bona fides that lasted at least 10 years, seriously impaired CIA operations against the Soviet Union, and today still simmers beneath the surface of debates about Soviet deception.
This study tells much of this important and fascinating case, but that is not its only purpose. It also explores some of the fundamental yet often unrecognized assumptions that channel our thinking as we analyze the possibility of deception. The Nosenko controversy is used to illustrate five fundamentally different criteria for making judgments about deception. Examination of the controversy shows that the analytical criterion one uses determines what evidence one looks at and possibly the conclusion one reaches. It also shows that one's preferred criterion may be strongly influenced by professional experience and organizational affiliation. It is important for anyone analyzing the possibility of deception to recognize the existence of alternative criteria for making judgments and to understand the strengths and limitations of each.
This report has three parts. Part I is an overview of the Nosenko case and the controversy surrounding it. It provides background information needed to understand the more conceptual and analytical parts that follow. Part II presents the five criteria for making judgments about deception and describes how each was applied by different parties to the Nosenko controversy. Part III draws conclusions from the previous discussion.
The report is based on two types of sources. One source is my own memory from the years 1965 to 1969. Although not personally involved in the handling or the analysis of the case, my job at that time did require that I be well informed about it and related counterintelligence cases. More recently, I re- viewed files on the case, including the six major studies of Nosenko's bona fides and many lesser reports and memorandums dealing with this issue. This is an extraordinarily rich data base for studying how counterintelligence analysis should and should not be conducted'!
I: Overview
Yuri Nosenko came from a prominent family. His father was the Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding in the 1950s, member of the Communist Party central Committee, deputy to the Supreme Soviet, and close personal friend of senior Politburo members. He had towns named after him, and his death was commemorated by a plaque on the Kremlin wall.
Son Yuri joined naval intelligence in 1949 at age 22, then transferred to the KGB in 1953. His initial KGB assignment was in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate (Internal Counterintelligence) with responsibility’s for work against American journalists and military attaches assigned to Moscow. In 1955, Nosenko was transferred to the Tourist Department, and in 1958 became deputy chief of the section responsible for work against American and British tourists in the USSR. After spending 1961 and 1962 back in the American Department working against the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, Nosenko returned to the Tourist Department, where he became deputy chief.
In June 1962, Nosenko contacted the CIA Station in Geneva, Switzerland, where he was on temporary assignment as security officer with a Soviet disarmament delegation. In a series of debriefings, he provided information on KGB operations against the United States and Great Britain. Nosenko noted that, with a wife and child in the USSR, he had no desire or intention to defect, but he did agree to work as an agent in place and to meet with CIA officers on subsequent trips to the West. He rejected contact in Moscow, and, in any event, this seemed unnecessary as he anticipated future travel to the West.
Subsequent evaluation of information provided by Nosenko during the 1962 meetings led to the conclusion that he was acting under KGB control. It was initially believed that the purpose of the KGB-controlled operation was to divert [CIA investigators from pursuing the leads they were given about KGB agents by] another KGB officer, Anatoliy Golitsyn, who had defected to the CIA Station in Helsinki six months before. This thesis is discussed in greater detail below.
When Nosenko returned to Geneva in January 1964, he confronted his CIA handlers with two surprises: he wanted to defect immediately, and he had been the officer responsible for the KGB file on Lee Harvey Oswald. Oswald, a former U.S. Maline who had defected to the Soviet Union and later returned to the United States with a Soviet wife, had assassinated President Kennedy just two months earlier. Given Oswald's background, possible Soviet or Cuban involvement was one of the most burning issues faced by the Warren Commission investigation of the President's assassination.Nosenko reported that he had personally handled the Oswald case on two occasions-first, when Oswald defected while on a tourist visit to the Soviet Union, and later when he was tasked to review the file on Oswald after the assassination. Nosenko assured the U.S. Government that the KGB had had no involvement whatsoever with Oswald or with the assassination. However, Nosenko's account of the KGB's handling of Oswald differed on several significant points from what were believed to be standard KGB policies and procedures.
These surprises obviously increased suspicion of Nosenko, but they also heightened interest in his full debriefing. If he were bona fide, the value of his information was obvious. If he were operating under Soviet direction, the KGB was clearly trying to conceal some aspect of its relationship with Oswald. A full debriefing ofNosenko in the United States offered an opportunity to break him and learn the true story, or at least to "mirror-read" his account in order to identify Soviet goals on an issue of paramount importance to the Warren Commission and the U.S. Government-possible Soviet involvement in the President's assassination.
Nosenko's defection was accepted, and he was brought to the United States as a parolee under CIA custody in February 1964. The initial debriefing was conducted with care not to reveal to Nosenko any of these suspicions. This debriefing reinforced doubts about his bona fides, so in April 1964, with the approval of the Attorney General, Nosenko was placed in confinement and hostile interrogation began. (Because Nosenko was a parolee rather than a legal immigrant, CIA bore legal responsibility for his actions. Nosenko's own legal rights were ambiguous.) At the end of 1964 Nosenko was transferred to a specially constructed confinement unit at Camp Peary. During hostile inter-rogation, he was subjected to psychological intimidation and physical hardship, but never to physical abuse.
The hostile interrogation seemed to identify many more gaps and anomalies in Nosenko's story, but it did little to clarify key questions. It was to be argued later that, to the contrary, the way Nosenko was handled during this interrogation simply muddied the waters. Nosenko's handlers were so convinced that he was under KGB control that the interrogation was designed to document guilt, rather than to obtain information or make an objective assessment . The information Nosenko provided was generally ignored, as the objective of the interrogations to force Nosenko to admit that he did not know what he should have known (according to the assumptions of the interrogators) and, therefore, he had not held the positions in the KGB he claimed. The polygraph examination was manipulated as a means of putting additional pressure on Nosenko, which invalidated its use as a test of veracity. The conviction that Nosenko was under Soviet control led to this case becoming the touchstone for evaluating other sources on Soviet intelligence. Sources who provided information supporting Nosenko's story were them- selves deemed suspect.
The theory of a "master plot" developed, subsequently called the "monster plot" by those who rejected this theory, which encompassed about a dozen counterintelligence sources. According to the master plot theory, the KGB had a very high-level penetration of CIA, comparable to the recently exposed penetrations of Kim Philby in the British Secret Intelligence Service (MIG) and Heinz Felfe in the West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). Therefore, all CIA Soviet operations were at least known to, if not controlled by, the KGB. Nosenko and other defectors and sources in place in Soviet intelligence were being run by the KGB to tie up CIA and FBI counterintelligence assets in unimportant activities, divert the investigation of leads to significant Soviet agents, and protect the security and/or enhance the careers and manipulate the access of Soviet agents within CIA and the FBI- in short, to keep CIA and the FBI fat and happy and unsuspecting of the true state of affairs. The evidence and rationale for this theory are discussed at length below.
This theory led to an extensive search for the KGB penetration. CIA officers with Slavic backgrounds and the most experience in dealing with the Soviets were among the initial suspects; the careers of several innocent officers were permanently damaged. As the magnitude of the information the Soviets were alleged to be sacrificing for this operation became more apparent, the search for the penetration focused at progressively higher levels. At one time or another, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Soviet Bloc (SB) Division, the Chief of the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence all came under suspicion in the minds of some of the principal players. This atmosphere of suspicion, and the concern that any successful recruitment of a Soviet official might be compromised by the penetration, had a serious, debilitating effect on operations against Soviet targets. It also had a serious adverse impact on morale within SB Division.
As time passed, most division operations officers became generally aware of the theory, but were carefully compartmented from any detailed knowledge. A strong resentment and increasingly vocal opposition developed among those who saw or felt the impact of this theory but were not privy to the evidence on which it was based. As more time passed with no progress toward resolving the case, the "temporary " detention of Nosenko without due process of law became increasingly unacceptable. In August 1966, CIA Director Richard Helms gave SB Division 60 days to conclude its case against Nosenko. In February 1967, Tennant "Pete" Bagley, then Deputy Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, submitted a report whose bulk caused it to become known as the "Thousand Pager," although it was "only" 835 pages long. The report presented reasons for believing Nosenko to be under [KGB] control and described hundreds of unexplained gaps or discrepancies in his story. The Soviet Bloc Division had been given three years to prove its case. It developed substantial circumstantial evidence but no hard proof in the form of a confession from Nosenko or identification of a KGB penetration of CIA. Operations against Soviet targets had been adversely affected, dissension and morale problems were growing, and the continued detention of Nosenko was untenable.
Now it was the critics' turn, and the pendulum began its swing. Helms assigned his newly appointed deputy, Rufus Taylor, to oversee the case and to develop a plan for the final disposition of Nosenko's case. DDCI Taylor asked Gordon Stewart, who was shortly to become Inspector General, to review the case and develop a recommendation for future action. Stewart was critical of Bagley's Thousand Pager. He said it read like a prosecutor's brief, assuming guilt and interpreting every discrepancy as evidence of this guilt. Stewart granted that SB Division had shown many of Nosenko's assertions to be blatantly false. However, the gaps and contradictions could possibly be explained by personal motives, faulty memory, and coincidence, and did not necessarily compel a conclusion of KGB control. Stewart concluded that SB Division had not proved its case against Nosenko, that certain proof might never be available, and that the time had come for CIA to start to "distance" itself from the matter. Whether Nosenko was a Soviet agent or not, he had to be removed from solitary confinement, gradually rehabilitated, and eventually given his freedom to settle in the United States.
Meanwhile, CI staff had also objected to the Bagley report. The staff strongly supported the Master Plot Theory, but took exception to one major element of the SB Division analysis. With the help of CI staff comments, Bagley's Thousand Pager was edited down to 407 pages. This report was known as the "Green Book" and became the official SB Division position on Nosenko. By the time of its completion in February 1968, however, the case had already been taken out of SB Division and CI Staff hands, and the report was a dead letter before it even went to press.
In September 1967, DCI Helms had transferred responsibility for the Nosenko case from the SB Division to the Office of Security. In October 1967 a security officer, Bruce Solie, began a nine-month, friendly re-interrogation of Nosenko. Rather than trying to trap Nosenko into inconsistencies, the goal of this debriefing was to obtain as much information as possible and to give Nosenko an opportunity to develop a single coherent story. Nosenko "passed" a polygraph examination in August 1968. In October 1968, Solie submitted his report, the third of an eventual total of six major studies of this case. It concluded that Nosenko was a bona fide defector, not under Soviet control. Solie based this judgment primarily on the value of information provided by Nosenko, plus benign explanations for many of the anomalies and inconsistencies identified by SB Division interrogation.
By this time, the SB Division leadership that had propounded the master plot theory had been reassigned and replaced by officers who would take a fresh look at the issue. The new leadership gave three experienced SB Division officers carte blanche to examine the original debriefing reports, reassess the evidence, and recommend whether or not SB Division should change its position on Nosenko's bona fides. The three-man SB Division team, which represented different backgrounds and points of view, agreed to focus on the anomalies in Nosenko's story. The ground rule was that if any member of the team stipulated an anomaly as important, it had to be addressed by the other two members. Each officer could prepare his own analysis, but they would all address the same issues. Their report, which was finished in January 1969, became known as the three "Wise Men" report.There was easy agreement that most of the inconsistencies listed in Bagley's original Thousand Pager were really insignificant. Attention eventually narrowed to the 14 "stipulated anomalies" that anyone of the three officers had designated as important. When these were examined from the perspective of searching for the truth, rather than proving guilt, the case against Nosenko began to unravel. By this time, it was not difficult to develop non-sinister explanations. Some of the anomalies and how they were resolved are discussed later.
The SB Division team split 2 to 1 in favor of Nosenko's bona fides. The analysis moved the thinking of all three officers significantly in the direction of accepting Nosenko. One officer who had always felt that Nosenko might be bona fide felt he could now prove the case. One who started out believing Nosenko was dispatched by the KGB changed his mind as a result of the new information that was developed. The officer who continued to vote for KGB control had been one of the principal analysts and advocates of the master plot theory; he became substantially less confident of this conclusion than he had been.
In a meeting convened by Inspector Gordon Stewart, the Solie report was accepted by DCI Helms, DDCI Taylor, and the new SB Division leadership, over the strong objection of the CI Staff. Nosenko was subsequently released from confinement and, in March 1969, put on the payroll as a CIA consultant. Although Helms still had doubts about Nosenko, he awarded Solie an intelligence medal for his work in rehabilitating him. (About four years earlier, Helms had awarded Tennant Bagley an intelligence medal for his work in unmasking Nosenko as a KGB plant.) James Angleton, longtime chief of the CI Staff, remained convinced of the master plot theory and considered himself the last remaining obstacle to KGB manipulation of CIA. In December 1974, DCI William Colby's offer of another assignment preCipitated the resignation of Angleton and three other senior CI Staff officers. CI staff -which was reorganized under new management-was now convinced that the master plot was actually a monster plot that existed only in the minds of its believers.
Dismissal of the top CI Staff leadership encouraged those pushing for Nosenko's total exoneration and his recognition as an important and valuable source. In 1976, John Hart was recalled from retirement to spend six months investigating the Nosenko case and its effects on CIA. Hart became incensed by what he perceived as an inhuman approach to handling Nosenko and the prosecutorial approach to assessing his bona fides. At DCI Stansfield Turner's request, Hart gave CIA senior officers a series of lectures on lessons learned from the case, and he testified on the subject before Congress.
Hart's study, entitled "The Monster Plot," concluded that doubts about Nosenko's bona fides were of our own making. Much of his study was devoted to demonstrating that those who handled the case were "not objective, dispassionate seekers of truth," and that the case was mishandled because the goal from its inception was to obtain proof that Nosenko was guilty, not to determine whether he was or not. Hart effectively documented much of what went wrong-errors in the transcripts of the initial meetings with Nosenko, faulty assumptions about the KGB, and the preconceptions that made it virtually impossible at that time for any source on Soviet intelligence to establish his bona fides in the eyes of SB Division or the CI Staff. But Hart did not really answer the arguments of those who claimed Nosenko was dispatched by the KGB. Hart believed that those initially responsible for the Nosenko case were so thoroughly discredited by the way they handled it that it was unnecessary to answer their arguments in any detail.
The election of President Reagan and the subsequent appointment of William Casey as DCI led to the sixth full-scale study of the Nosenko case- 17 years after his defection. Tennant Bagley, who had retired nine years earlier, sought to use the opportunity of a new administration with a harder line on the Soviet Union to reopen the case. In March 1981 he sent the new DCI a lengthy study entitled "Why Nosenko Is a Plant-and Why It Matters." He argued that acceptance of Nosenko indicated continued high-level penetration and manipulation of CIA by the KGB. Director Casey named Jack Fieldhouse to investigate Bagley'S allegations.
In August 1981, Fieldhouse produced a study entitled "An Examination of the Bagley Case Against Yuriy Nosenko." Whereas previous analysts had focused exclusively on Nosenko's statements and his handling, Fieldhouse recognized the importance of the historical context in which the case transpired. He noted at the outset, for example, that the foundation of the problem was laid before Nosenko ever arrived, as this was at a time when fear of the power of the KGB was perhaps at an all-time high. This historical context, and the reasons for the fear, are discussed in detail below. Fieldhouse's report refutes Bagley's arguments point by point; identifies what went wrong and how it was possible for so many capable CIA officers to be so wrong for so long; and describes the serious adverse impact the master plot theory had on the handling of many
other Soviet cases.
Until now, we have paid little attention to the reasons why various analysts concluded Nosenko was or was not under Soviet control. We have limited the presentation to background information for those not previously initiated into the mysteries of the secret war between the CIA and the KGB, or the secret war within the CIA itself on this subject. We turn now to the purpose of this study, an analysis of how the analysis was done.
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II: Strategies
The intelligence or counterintelligence analyst seeks to determine the truth. But let's go back a step and ask, how do we know the truth? What criterion, or measuring rod, do we use for determining that something is or is not true, that something probably is or is not deception? In this section, we identify five criteria that might be used for making this judgment, and we examine which ones were employed by different analysts, at different times, to judge that Nosenko was or was not a Soviet agent.
For convenience, we have labeled the five criteria according to some salient characteristic-the motive approach, anomalies and inconsistencies approach, litmus test approach, cost accounting approach, and predictive test approach. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; any concrete case of deception analysis usually contains elements of several approaches, but one or at most two will generally be dominant and serve as the main basis for judgment. A principal point is that different criteria have different strengths and wealmesses, lead one to focus on different sorts of evidence, and may lead to quite different conclusions about the presence of deception. A second important point is that these criteria are complementary, and that a complete analysis requires all five approaches.
In this section, we take arguments used in the Nosenko case and group them under the five strategies for analyzing deception. The purpose is to gain a better understanding of the different approaches, to document conclusions about their strengths and weaknesses, and to seek a better understanding of how intelligence officers looking at the same case could arrive at opposite judgments. By comparing and contrasting each approach, we see what each magnifies and reveals, as well as what it blurs or ignores. Discussion of each approach begins by describing its basic characteristics.
Motive Approach.
Some attention to motive must be part of any deception analysis. What distinguishes this approach is a matter of emphasis. The identification of a motive for deception, and of the opportunity and the means to engage in it, becomes a driving force behind a judgment that deception is in fact present. This is similar to the approach taken by a prosecuting attorney; if the prosecutor establishes motive, opportunity, and means, then circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty. The deception analyst taking this approach starts with a motive, then tries to view the situation as it appears to the adversary. Given the motive, how would the adversary view the opportunities, costs, risks, and means available to accomplish the task? The analyst seeks to reconstruct details of the deception plan through inference from fragmentary evidence.
The weakness of this approach is that motive, opportunity, and means alone are not sufficient for a valid inference of deception. They show only what could have happened, not what actually did happen. Most people have motive, opportunity, and means to commit many crimes-for example, cheating the government on taxes-yet they don't do it. To develop a stronger inference of deception, it is also necessary to evaluate past deception practices to show not only that the adversary could have done it, but also that the adversary makes a habit of that type of activity.
We first present, uncritically, arguments used pursuant to the motive approach to demonstrate that Nosenko was a KGB plant. This is followed by counterarguments subsequently used in refuting this view.
The origins of the master plot theory cannot be understood without an appreciation of the historical circumstances at the time. This was the era of the construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis. More important, it was a period of extreme and justifiable concern about Soviet penetration of Western intelligence services, as well as a time when CIA was just beginning to receive reports on increased KGB emphasis on disinformation. In January 1963, Kim Philby had finally been confronted with evidence of his KGB service, and had responded by fleeing to Moscow. He had been a KGB agent since 1933, and during those years had seen lengthy service in the British Intelligence Service (MI6). At one time, while a KGB agent, he had been chief of MI6's counterintelligence operations against the Soviet Union. As chief of MI6's Washington liaison with CIA during postwar years, he had served as a mentor to CIA in developing organization and policy during its formative years. Philby's stature was such that his colleagues had anticipated he would eventually become Chief of MI6.
Another British Intelligence officer, George Blake, had been arrested in the spring of1961. As part of his MI6 duties, he had taken the minutes of joint CIA-MI6 meetings to plan the Berlin tunnel operation to tap Soviet military phone lines. Before Blake's arrest, the Berlin tunnel had been regarded as one of the most successful operations against the Soviet target during the decade of the 1950s. Blake's arrest suggested strongly that the KGB had known about the tunnel from its inception, but had let the operation. run for 11 months to protect the penetration source who had reported it. This fueled suspicions about when and how other major operations of that era had been compromised.
Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB officer who defected in 1961, reported high-level Soviet penetration of the French intelligence and security services. The agents had not yet been identified, quite possibly because the agents were themselves in a position to block effective investigation. In [West] Germany, Heinz Felfe had been arrested in November 1961. With KGB assistance, he had maneuvered himself into the ideal position of chief of counterintelligence operations against the Soviet Union for the West German BND. It seemed unlikely that CIA could have been fortunate enough to avoid completely the disasters that other services had suffered as a result of high- level KGB penetration. Indeed, there were specific indications that CIA had not been spared. Golitsyn reported that the KGB had placed an agent within the highest echelons of American intelligence, but he could provide no details. Three years earlier Colonel Michal Goleniewski, a CIA penetration of Polish intelligence, who defected in December 1960, had reported a KGB penetration of CIA Soviet operations. Goleniewski knew the codename for this penetration but had little identifying data. Although a Pole, Goleniewski was knowledgeable of KGB operations because he had served as a KGB agent within the Polish service and had close personal contact with KGB officers. He confirmed his credibility by providing accurate information leading to the arrest of George Blake as a KGB penetration of British MI6 and Heinz Felfe as a KGB penetration of West German intelligence.
Another major source of concern about penetration was the arrest of two important CIA penetrations of Soviet Military Intelligence, the GRU. Pyotr Popov had been arrested in 1959 and Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy in 1962. CIA counterintelligence analysts were still trying to determine if the two men had been compromised through Soviet penetration or by operational accident or error. Given the remarkable record of successful KGB penetration of Allied services, to say nothing of specific reports of penetration of CIA from our most recent defectors, Golitsyn and Goleniewski, Soviet penetration of CIA seemed a likely explanation.
Concern about KGB penetration of CIA was one pillar of the master plot theory. If the KGB had such a penetration, this would provide both motive and opportunity for deception. Moreover, if the KGB had a penetration in a position to compromise Popov and Penkovsldy, that same penetration probably would have been in position to report to the KGB on the 1962 meetings with Nosenko; by this reasoning, Nosenko's reappearance in the West in 1964 was itself evidence of KGB control.
The second pillar of the master plot theory was concern about KGB disinformation. Department D, the KGB's disinformation department, had been formed in 1959. Goleniewski was the first CIA source to report in detail on its anticipated functions and significance. He stated that one of the many objectives of KGB disinformation was the protection of Soviet agents by means of actions designed to mislead Western security services. He listed among specific objectives and types of disinformation operations those designed to discredit accurate information of significance received by the opposition through sources not under Soviet control, such as defectors, thus casting doubt on the veracity of the source of this true information: Goleniewski stated further that, in extreme cases, the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some of its own agent assets to enhance the reputation of an agent penetration of a Western intelligence service. Golitsyn confirmed Goleniewski's reporting on Department D and added that a KGB or GRU defector's file would be sent to this new unit. Department D would review the areas of information compromised to the opposition by the defector and search for opportunities to exploit the situation. Golitsyn elaborated on this report with his own speculation, which played a major role in development of the master plot theory. (It should be noted at this point that Golitsyn was a highly egocentric individual with an extremely conspiratorial turn of mind; after his defection, he became certifiably paranoid.) Golitsyn felt that his information was so important and damaging to the KGB that the Soviets would feel compelled to send out another source to discredit him or his information.
In short, Golitsyn predicted the appearance of someone like Nosenko as a KGB plant. Golitsyn also predicted that a KGB penetration of American intelligence would be assisted by other KGB agents, false - defectors and double agents-who would provide information designed to bolster the penetration's position and access in the service. The penetration, in turn, would be in a position to help authenticate the other agents. Golitsyn's speculation became the core of the master plot theory. Circumstantial confirmation of this speculation came from an analysis of how the KGB had exploited Heinz Felfe in the West German service. They had exploited Felfe in exactly the manner Golitsyn had predicted they would exploit a penetration of CIA-with assistance from a series of double agents and false defectors. Felfe himself had been running an East German journalist, codename LENA, as a double agent against the KGB. The KGB was ostensibly running LENA as a principal agent for operations against West Germany, but was actually running him to support its operation with Felfe.
The LENA case, among others, established Felfe as a Soviet specialist and successful operations officer. It provided Felfe with cover for monthly trips from Munich to Berlin, where he met with his Soviet handlers as well as with LENA. More important, the case provided cover for Felfe to investigate any person or subject of interest to the Soviets. When LENA reported the KGB had targeted him against a West German official, for example, Felfe organized the resources of the West German Government to investigate that official to uncover the reason for Soviet interest and determine if that person might actually be susceptible to Soviet recruitment. When the KGB asked LENA to obtain specific political or technical information, Felfe would investigate the subject himself to determine what could be released to the Soviets and what was so sensitive that it had to be protected. In short, the KGB used LENA to provide cover for Felfe to make inquiries on virtually any subject of interest to the KGB. Was the KGB using the Nosenko case in some similar manner to support a penetration of CIA, as predicted by Golitsyn?
All these details of recent counterintelligence history were deeply etched in the minds of senior counterintelligence officers in the SB Division and the CI Staff. Much of this information was unknown to other Agency personnel. The differences in available information created fundamentally different view- points concerning Soviet operations and the security of CIA. Were the counterintelligence officers paranoid, or were the others simply uninformed, and perhaps somewhat naive, about the true nature of the secret war between CIA and the KGB?
Into this atmosphere of concern and suspicion came KGB officer Yuriy Nosenko. At the initial series of meetings in 1962, Nosenko provided information on about 10 of the same KGB operations on which Golitsyn had reported six months earlier. The overlapping information was especially noteworthy because Golitsyn and Nosenko had served in different Chief Directorates of the KGB, Golitsyn in Foreign Intelligence and Nosenko in Internal Counterintelligence. Was it pure coincidence that they should both have information on the same KGB operations? It appeared that Golitsyn's prediction might have come true, that Nosenko was prOviding information intended to divert the investigation of agents partially identified by Golitsyn.
From the KGB's point of view in planning such a deception, the overlap of information between Golitsyn and Nosenko would confirm Nosenko's bona fides, reduce the amount of new information the KGB would have to sacrifice, and provide an opportunity to deflect American investigation of those agents the KGB considered most important.
At the 1962 meetings, Nosenko also reported that Colonel Popov, CIA's first important penetration of the GRU, who had been arrested in 1959, had been compromised by postal surveillance. A maid, working for an American Embassy officer in Moscow who had been co-opted to assist CIA, treated his clothes with a so-called “thief powder” to facilitate postal surveillance. The KGB picked up three operational letters mailed by this officer [on behalf of] CIA when the powder activated a sensor in the Soviet postal system. This "innocent" explanation for Popov's compromise indicated that CIA Soviet operations were not penetrated after all. To those who already believed in the existence of penetration, this was clear evidence of deception. The KGB's motive was to protect the penetration who had actually compromised Popov, and to do this it had to prOvide CIA with an alternative explanation for Popov's arrest. Another Golitsyn prediction appeared to have come true-that the KGB would support its penetration of CIA by use of false defectors and double agents.
Thus was born the initial conviction that Nosenko was under KGB control. This conclusion, in turn, seemed to confirm that CIA must be penetrated. KGB control of Nosenko made little sense except as part of a high-stakes game involving penetration of CIA. If the KGB had a well-placed penetration of CIA Soviet operations, it followed that all of CIA's Soviet sources were at least known to, if not controlled by, the KGB, as had been the case in British and West German intelligence. With this reasoning, the Nosenko case grew into the master plot -or monster plot- that eventually encompassed about a dozen sources on Soviet intelligence. Any source who claimed ability to report on Soviet intelligence matters, but could not reveal either the assumed KGB deception program or the penetration of American intelligence on which it was based, was automatically assumed to be part of the deception effort. Nosenko was but the first of many to suffer the consequences of this thinking.
As critics have accurately noted, deception was taken as a premise; it was not a finding arrived at after careful investigation of Nosenko's story. Field- house concluded ". . . there was never an honest effort to establish Nosenko's bona fides. There was only a determined effort to prove Nosenko was male-fide and part of a KGB deception meant to mislead CIA into believing it was not penetrated-thereby covering up the 'real' reason for the compromise of Popov and Penkovskiy." Hart observed that "... at no time from June 1962 to October 1967 was Nosenko afforded the land of systematic, objective, non- hostile interrogation . . . which otherwise had been standard operating procedure in dealing with similar sources."
It is noteworthy that none of the background on assumed penetration of CIA or the Soviet disinformation program is included in the formal SB Division assessments of Nosenko's bona fides. It is documented in limited distribution memorandums of that period, but those who doubted Nosenko believed they could and should prove their case only on the basis of anomalies and inconsistencies in Nosenko's own statements, without reference to penetration of CIA or to all the other Soviet operations that were considered part of the master plot. Except for Jack Fieldhouse, those who subsequently defended Nosenko adopted these same ground rules, so systematic refutation of many master plot arguments is lacking in their analysis.
The principal counterargument was the simple assertion that the KGB would never mount such a deception because of the cost to its self in information given away (to be discussed later) and the risk that a KGB defector, penetration, or disaffected provocateur might compromise the entire enterprise at any time. It was also noted that, to obtain Politburo approval to place one of it’s own staff personnel in contact with the enemy as a false defector, the KGB would have to be able to demonstrate that this was the best and least costly, perhaps the only, way to achieve its objectives. This too seemed quite implausible. No objectives were ever suggested that could not be achieved by less costly or less risky means.
This counterargument has passed the test of time. It seems impossible that the KGB could have concealed such an extensive and all-inclusive deception for so many years, given the steady flow of new KGB defectors and sources in a position to reveal such a conspiracy had it actually existed. One may, of course, argue that many of these subsequent sources up to the present day are also part of the plot. This would imply, however, that the entire KGB as we have known it for 25 years is, unbeknownst to most of its officers, little more than a cover organization for deception, with the truly secret work being done elsewhere. Concern about high-level penetration of CIA Soviet operations has been alleviated with time. Although the exact basis for the Golitsyn and Goleniewski reports has not been clarified, several non staff (contract agent) penetrations have been identified. In any case, it appears that whatever source the KGB may have had was not in a position to compromise CIA penetrations of Soviet intelligence. Subsequent KGB defectors and penetration sources have reported no indications of the type of high-level penetration of CIA that had been suspected. The argument that compartmentation would prevent all but a very few KGB officers from being aware of such an important case is weakened by our experience with the Philby, Blake, and Felfe cases. Knowledge of the existence of these penetrations, although not the specific identity of the agents, was more widespread in the KGB than one might expect. The more important and productive the sources, the more difficult it is to prevent the gradual expansion of knowledge about [them].
One initial basis for suspicion of Nosenko in 1962, the overlap between his reporting on KGB agents and information previously received from Golitsyn, was clearly resolved in Nosenko's favor. One suspected duplication turned out to be a separate case, more important than the one Golitsyn had reported on. In three of the most important cases of overlapping information , it was the more detailed and better sourced information from Nosenko that served as a basis for effective counterintelligence action to terminate the KGB operations. Rather than prOviding disinformation to discredit Golitsyn or divert investigation of his leads, as had been hypothesized as the KGB goal, Nosenko's reporting con- firmed and supplemented Golitsyn's information and permitted effective action to be taken. Nosenko never said a bad word about Golitsyn. Golitsyn's prediction that the KGB would try to discredit him never materialized.
Golitsyn's claim that a penetration of CIA would be assisted by false defectors and double agents is also open to question. The basis for his speculation is not clear; it could have developed from seeds planted by [James Angleton as] Chief, CI staff, in discussions with Golitsyn. There is no evidence that the KGB exploited Philby or Blake in this manner. They did manipulate Felfe this way, but Felfe was an imaginative and aggressive officer who very likely master- minded his own case. The LENA operation, and the way it was used to enhance Felfe's reputation and expand his access, may well have been Felfe's own idea rather than a typical element of KGB modus operandi. Moreover, the double agents used to support the Felfe operation had little access to sensitive information, so there was little cost to the KGB; this was no precedent for KGB use of it’s own staff officers as double agents or false defectors. To the contrary, the
Felfe case clearly indicated that the KGB could support and manipulate an important penetration of an opposition service without having to sacrifice valid information about itself. In any event, there does not appear to have been a penetration of CIA to be manipulated in this manner, so there was neither motive nor opportunity for the hypothetical deception.
Anomalies and Inconsistencies Approach.
The most common approach to counterintelligence analysis is to focus on anomalies and inconsistencies, then infer a motive or other explanation for these unusual circumstances. Counterintelligence analysis often bases judgements on "deviation from an assumed standard of what is normal," for example, security practices would normally prevent the source from obtaining access to the reported information, or, conversely, the source disclaims access to information he is expected to have.
This approach underrates the frequency of accident, coincidence, inaccurate translation, inadequate debriefing, and misunderstanding. It overrates an analyst's ability to judge what is normal or abnormal in the adversary's organization or society. Events that accompany the accidental exposure of sensitive information or the defection of a trusted official are, by definition, never normal and, therefore, invariably provide a basis for suspicion. This approach to analysis , which is characteristic of the counterintelligence officer, is very difficult to implement correctly; conclusions are frequently wrong.
The three Soviet Bloc Division studies of Nosenko's bona fides-the Thousand Pager and the Green Book that judged him a plant, and the Wise Men report that later saw him as bona fide-all used the same explicit criteria for testing bona fides. The criteria are cited here, as they are a clear statement of the anomalies and inconsistencies approach as it applies to human sources. To be judged bona fide, the information Nosenko provides about his life and related persons and events must be coherent and his accounts of important events must be consistent. Allowing for personal vagaries, such as lapses of memory and so forth, as well as for factors of accident and coincidence, the information he relates must conform within reasonable limits with that which is known from independent and reliable sources to the United States Government about Soviet realities and about the events, topics, and individuals Nosenko describes.
In short, the appropriate test of bona fides was seen as plausibility, coherence, consistency, and compatibility with known facts. Note the absence of any mention of value of information supplied to the U.S. Government or damage to Soviet interests. Also note the absence of any mention of putting oneself in Soviet shoes to evaluate motives, opportunities, and problems that might be encountered in mounting a deception operation. We have already seen that this was done in practice by the SB Division analysts, but that this discussion was largely excluded from the bona fides assessments. Following the established criteria, Nosenko's handlers concentrated on identifying inconsistencies and implausibilities in Nosenko's story, gaps in his knowledge, conflicts with known information, and suspicious coincidences. In fact, identification of such anomalies became the principal goal of interrogation, at the cost of failure to learn all the information Nosenko had to offer on KGB operations. So many anomalies were found that Bagley required 835 pages to document them all.
The interrogators had ample grist for their mill, as Nosenko did lie, exaggerated , err, and change his story, and he admitted this under interrogation. His motive was to conceal embarrassing elements of his personal background and to exaggerate his importance. Rather than accepting Nosenko's admissions as resolving some of the anomalies, however, the interrogators interpreted the admissions as further "proof" of the conclusion that he was dispatched by the KGB. The admissions were viewed as an attempt to cover up the holes the interrogators had found in his story.
We shall cite here only a few of the more significant anomalies in the Nosenko case. Again, we first present, uncritically, some of the arguments used to build the case against Nosenko, then show how these anomalies were subsequently resolved by more objective analysis and investigation.
Two months after the assassination of President John Kennedy by Lee Harvey Oswald, Nosenko arrived in Geneva and advised CIA that he, person- ally, was the KGB officer responsible for Oswald's file at the time Oswald defected to the Soviet Union. The KGB had never heard of Oswald, he said, until Oswald told his Intourest guide that he wanted to renounce his American citizenship and stay in the USSR. Without ever talking to Oswald or having anyone else talk with him, Nosenko, as the responsible KGB officer, judged that Oswald was of no interest. The KGB did not even want to accept Oswald's request for asylum, and relented only after he tried to commit suicide after being advised of his rejection. The KGB never debriefed Oswald on his experience as a U.S. marine radar operator as he was of “little importance," and never conducted an investigation to ascertain he was not an American agent before allowing him to stay in the Soviet Union. The KGB did not object to Oswald marrying a Soviet woman, Marina, or to Marina's subsequent departure with him to the United States, as Marina was "stupid, uneducated, and possessed anti-Soviet characteristics." In brief, the KGB had never had any contact whatsoever with either Oswald or his wife and was happy to be rid bf them both. Within hours of Oswald's identification as the presidential assassin, Nosenko personally was ordered to review the KGB's Oswald file to assess Soviet liability. At this time, Nosenko was already an American agent with incentive to collect and remember as much information as possible on this vitally important subject. Nosenko expressed absolute certainty that he had the complete and accurate story of KGB contact with Oswald.
At a time when the Warren Commission was just opening its investigation, the fact that CIA found itself in clandestine contact with the one KGB officer who on two occasions had been personally responsible for Oswald's file seemed to be an unbelievable stroke of good fortune. Nosenko's account of the Oswald case appeared equally incredible. The following elements of Nosenko's story seemed contrary to Soviet practice: that the KGB would turn down an American defector before even talking with him to assess his knowledgeability; that after accepting him for residence in the USSR, he was not debriefed on his prior military service, that he would be granted residence in the USSR with no KGB investigation of his bona fides to determine he was not an American agent; and that no obstacles were placed in the path of his wife Marina's emigration when Oswald decided to leave the Soviet Union.
Another group of anomalies identified by the interrogators related to Nosonko’s personal background and KGB career. At different times, he gave three different dates for his entry into the KGB and two different stories concerning how he came to be hired. He could not describe the normal personnel procedures a new KGB employee would go through. He admitted lying about his KGB rank. The pattern of transfers from one department to another and back again and lengthy overseas TDYs appeared unusual. He could not describe any operational activity for which he had been personally responsible that would justifY his claimed promotions and awards. He admitted that, at one time, he was probably the only officer in the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a party member. In short, his description of his KGB career simply did not ring true.
There were also gaps in Nosenko's knowledge of KGB operations. The positions a source has held imply he should be knowledgeable of certain events. That Nosenko was uninformed on things he should have known was viewed as evidence he did not really hold the claimed positions. The most serious gaps in Nosenko's knowledge concerned the 1960-61 period, when he claimed to be deputy chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate's section responsible for all operations against the American Embassy in Moscow. He claimed specific responsibility for supervising the case officers working against American code clerks in Moscow during this period. This is a subject about which CIA had a great deal of collateral information against which to check Nosenko's reporting. Nosenko did provide credible detail to establish his knowledge of significant aspects of at least six cases, but he was unaware of significant developments or events he should have known if he were really the supervisor of the case officers handling these cases. And he lacked any information at all on some Operations he should have known about if he were really the deputy chief of the section.
One item concerning Nosenko's work against the American Embassy in 1961 was of particular interest, as it related to how Penkovsldy was compromised. Nosenko consistently maintained that he was the case officer responsible for covering the activities of an American Embassy officer who was ob- served in December 1961 visiting the location of what The KGB believed to be a dead-drop site in Pushldn Street. He also claimed to have received surveillance reports on this site for three months thereafter. The site is significant, as it is the place where a CIA officer was subsequently arrested while picking up a dead- drop from Penkovsldy. The problem with Nosenko's account is that at the time the American Embassy officer visited this site, Nosenko had already been transferred from the American Embassy Department to the Tourist Department. His story was interpreted as showing he did not really serve in the American Department during the dates he claimed, and that the purpose of his false account was to make CIA think Penkovsldy was discovered by surveillance rather than by penetration.
A series of gaps and conflicts of this type led interrogators to conclude that Nosenko had not actually served in the positions he claimed. In fact, Bagley's original Thousand Pager concluded that Nosenko had probably not been a KGB officer at all, that he was just an empty receptacle into which the KGB had poured a very detailed legend. This despite the fact that Golitsyn, whose bona fides were not in question, had confirmed knowing of Nosenko as a KGB officer. Any single conflict, gap, or coincidence might be explainable, but the massive compendium of anomalies compiled by SB Division seemed difficult to reconcile with any hypothesis other than KGB control. In fact, however, this analysis of Nosenko's bona fides was a prime example of Murphy's law-that everything that can go wrong will go wrong. Most of the problems with Nosenko’s story have been resolved. In many cases, the explanation amounted to a clear refutation of the basis for suspicion. In many others, it was simply a plausible alternative hypothesis.
The sources of analytical error may be grouped into six main categories: biased analysis, inaccurate record of Nosenko's reporting, misunderstanding of Nosenko as a person, invalid assumptions about the KGB, honest mistakes by Nosenko, and genuine coincidences.
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Biased Analysis
There was no effort to seek out alternative explanations for seemingly suspicious events. For example, one case officer who met with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964 wrote that he suspected him from the very first meeting on the basis of Nosenko's emotionless and mechanical delivery of his statement announcing his intention to defect. The statement appeared to have been rehearsed . At the time, Chief, SB Division, attributed considerable weight to this further indication of opposition control. But there are many reasons why Nosenko might have delivered the statement in this manner. Rather than being emotionless, his emotions may have been so strong that he forced himself, consciously or subconsciously, to repress them to avoid an emotional scene. Most intelligence officer defectors, under similar circumstances, probably pre- pare with great care what they want to tell us about their reasons for defection. In other words, the evidence used against Nosenko was also quite consistent with the alternative hypothesis- that he was bona fide.
Similarly, after hostile questioning began, it was noted that Nosenko "became quite erratic, contradicted himself many times, and became upset physically. . . . As a result of this session, we know that Subject can be thrown off balance by aggressive questioning in those areas which we know to be important parts of the entire KGB operation." No consideration was given to the fact that a bona fide defector whose entire future depends upon acceptance in his new homeland might react the same way when falsely accused of being a KGB plant. Some of the most important inconsistencies and gaps in knowledge that were held against Nosenko can also be interpreted as actually supporting his bona fides. The three different dates for the start of his KGB service are a case in point; surely, if it were all a KGB legend, this would have been one of the most important dates and one could expect him to remember it accurately. That he was far from consistent on this date certainly appears at least as explainable in terms of some personal idiosyncrasies as in terms of the deception theory.
Another example was Nosenko's inability to report on some KGB opera against American Embassy personnel during 1960-61. This did invalidate his claim to be knowledgeable of all such operations, but it did not necessarily support the deception theory. If the KGB wanted us to believe that Nosenko had the complete knowledge he claimed to have during this period, surely it would have researched how much CIA already knew or could be presumed to know, and it would have had Nosenko tell us about all of these operations. His failure to report on any single operation CIA knew about would discredit his claim to total knowledge. Thus, his false claim does not fit the deception hypothesis. More credible is the thesis that he was exaggerating, that he didn't have an accurate picture of the limitations of his own knowledge, or that we made false assumptions about how much a person in his position should know or remember.
A great many of the anomalies and inconsistencies cited in Bagley's Thousand pager and in the subsequent Green Book were of this type. That is, they were consistent with the deception hypotheSiS, but they were also consistent with the hypotheSis that Nosenko was not under control. Therefore, they had little analytical value.
Inaccurate Record of Nosenko's Reporting
During four of the five clandestine meetings with Nosenko in Geneva in 1962, two CIA case officers were present. The more senior officer, who took notes and wrote reports to Headquarters, spoke mediocre Russian and made many errors in his written record of the meetings. The second officer, who handled much of the discussion with Nosenko, was a native Russian speaker. After the series of meetings was completed, the tape recordings of the meetings were "transcribed" by the native speaker. The tapes were of poor quality and were difficult to follow. Therefore, the native speaker, who had little patience for detailed work, dictated from the Russian language tapes directly into English, generally following the faulty notes that the other officer had prepared. Thus, the many errors of translation and understanding were carried over from the meeting notes to the "transcripts." For example, an Army Sargent at the American Embassy who Nosenko reported was recruited by the KGB was described by Nosenko as a code machine repairman. This was trans-lated as a mechanic and generally assumed to refer to garage mechanic. When Nosenko corrected this misunderstanding in 1964, he was criticized for "changing his story."
These reports and transcripts formed the basis for the original judgment that Nosenko was a dispatched agent, but they were so flawed as to make any analysis subject to considerable error. These inadequacies were not discovered until 1965, when a faithful RUSSian-language transcript was finally prepared. The full impact of the inaccuracies was not realized until 1968-69, when the Russian was translated into English and a 35-page report was prepared on the major errors and the effects these errors had had in supporting the charge that Nosenko was a false defector.
Misunderstanding of Nosenko as a Person
CIA initially failed to understand Nosenko's background and how it affected his life and career. This failure was caused, in part, by questioning that was designed from the beginning to trap Nosenko rather than to understand him and by errors in the tape transcripts. It was, however, largely due to the fact that Nosenko himself was an anomaly within the KGB, so it is no wonder that his career seemed anomalous. Nosenko was the spoiled-brat son of a top leader and, in the mid-1960s, CIA had no experience with that type of Soviet official.
A story that came to light much later, from an independent source, is illustrative of Nosenko's background. In Naval Preparatory School m 1943, Nosenko was caught stealing and was beaten up by a number of his classmates. Nosenko's mother complained to Stalin, and the whole school was subjected to strict disciplinary punishment, with some of the students being sent to the front.Nosenko lied to CIA about his date of entry into the KGB to conceal the fact that his graduation from the Institute of International Relations had been delayed a year because he flunked the exam in Marxism-Leninism. He entered the KGB through the influence of a high-ranking family friend, bypassing the normal personnel procedures. The first few years he received a poor performance evaluation and was recommended for dismissal, his job being saved only by parental intervention. He contracted a venereal disease, concealed this by using false KGB documents to receive treatment under an alias, was caught, served 15 days in prison, and was dismissed from his position as Komsomol secretary. Nosenko's father refused to intercede yet again for his wayward son, but his mother intervened with high-level friends and saved hIs KGB Job.
After several years in the KGB, Nosenko seems to have matured and settled down to an adequate performance. His frequent transfers and lengthy trips abroad may have been because his superiors considered him a hot potato-a mediocre officer and a troublemaker with political connections that could destroy his boss's career; it is understandable that his supervisors were happy to transfer him, send him abroad, or award him undeserved honors. Nosenko lied to conceal his personal weaknesses, his professional limitations, and the fact that his entire career depended upon his parents' influence and intervention. A need to enhance his own self-esteem and to ensure acceptance by CIA led Nosenko to exaggerate his responsibilities and knowledge of KGB operations.
Interrogators under instructions to obtain evidence against Nosenko, rather than to evaluate him, persisted in judging his story by malapropiate standards. They failed to recognize, or to accept, that because of his family's status and privilege, Nosenko's life and to some extent his career had developed outside many of the rules, regulations, and restrictions imposed on the average KGB officer. They also failed to recognize that a person with Nosenko’s famIly background and poor performance record is certainly not the type KGB would select for the extremely important and difficult mission of going over to the enemy as a false defector.
Invalid Assumptions About the KGB
Before Nosenko's defection, CIA had very little information on the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (Internal Counterintelligence), where Nosenko served. To evaluate the plausibility of Nosenko's reporting, his interrogators formed a stereotype of the Second Chief Directorate against which to compare Nosenko's information. That stereotype contained assumptions regarding the Second Chief Directorate against which to compare Nosenko's information. That stereotype contained assumptions regarding the Second Chief Directorate's authority in the USSR, its relations with the KGB First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence), the relative weight the Second Chief Directorate placed on the recruitment of foreign embassy officials as compared with controlling or monitoring their activities, how much the Second Chief Directorate ought to know about certain events, and how much a specific officer, such as Nosenko, should have known and recalled.
Some of these assumptions were erroneous-based on an exaggerated view of overall KGB capabilities. This made possible a series of discoveries of "duplicity" by Nosenko and other counterintelligence sources who could rarely measure up to CIA's expectations of what they ought to have known, accomplished, or said. An important example concerns the gaps in Nosenko's knowledge of operations against the American Embassy in 1960 and 1961, while he was deputy chief of the responsible section. The interrogators developed their own job description for a deputy chief of a section, then used this as a criterion for judging what Nosenko should have known. The job description was faulty, as it was based on the American concept of a deputy who is fully informed, has authority paralleling the chief, and who automatically fills in for the chief when he is absent.
The Russian word that Nosenko applied to himself was zamestitel. When the meaning of this term was researched in 1968, it was found to be broader than the American concept of deputy. It is perhaps most accurately rendered in English as assistant. This different concept of Nosenko's position, his, at-best, mediocre performance as an officer and supervisor, a tendency to exaggerate his importance, and a perhaps unconscious self-delusion as to the extent of his own knowledge all combine to explain the gaps in Nosenko's knowledge during the 1960-61 period.
Honest Mistakes by Nosenko
There are other possible explanations for the previously noted anomaly in Nosenko's reporting on surveillance of the Penkovskiy dead-drop site on Pushkin Street. One is that Nosenko confused the Embassy officer's visit to the Pushkin Street drop with an earlier visit by this same officer to a different dead-drop site on Gorldy Street, which did occur about the time Nosenko described, and while he was responsible for covering this officer's activity. The subsequent notoriety given to the arrest of a CIA officer at the Pushkin Street site provides ample explanation for how Nosenko may have learned that his former target visited this site as well. After the publicity surrounding the arrest, it is normal that Nosenko would have discussed the background with his former colleagues. Nosenko apparently erred by confusing the two dead-drop sites, and by failing to recall when and how he learned of the Pushkin Street site. In any bona fides assessment, allowance must be made for this sort of faulty memory.
Legitimate Coincidence
The amount of overlap between Nosenko's and Golitsyn's reporting on KGB operations was, indeed, unusual. So was our good fortune in learning that the one Second Chief Directorate officer, with whom CIA was in contact, just happened to have been the KGB case officer for Lee Harvey Oswald and to report this to CIA just as the Warren Commission was beginning its investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. There were quite a few other equally fortuitous and, therefore, suspicious coincidences in other cases associated with the master plot. Coincidence is a normal part of life, but to a counter- intelligence officer it is like waving a red flag in front of a bull. Nosenko's interrogators made no allowance whatsoever for the fact that coincidences are not always sinister.
Although most of the discrepancies that generated suspicion have been resolved, there are still some unexplained anomalies. This is probably inevitable, given the complexity of Nosenko’s personality, the limits of our understanding of the Soviet system, and the confusion generated by the hostIle manner in which Nosenko was initially questioned.
Nosenko's reporting on Lee Harvey Oswald is the most significant remaining mystery. As late as 1978, long after Nosenko's bona fides had been established, John Hart, in testimony to Congress, defended Nosenko as a reliable source but described his reporting on Oswald as "incredible" and suggested that it be ignored. Hart attributed the problem to compartmentation within the KGB and that Nosenko was uninformed even though he genuinely thought otherwise. Such a possibility is understandable in principle, but is hard to accept in this case because Nosenko plausibly claimed to have been inside the relevant "compartment" that would give him full knowledge. Nosenko's demonstrated tendency to exaggerate his importance and access may have played a role, but It may also be that we greatly exaggerate out own understanding of how the KGB might react to a low-level defector like Oswald.
At the start of this section, we noted that the anomalies and inconsistencIes approach is difficult to implement well. It underrates the frequency of coincidence, inaccurate translation, inadequate debriefing, and misunderstanding. It overrates an analyst's ability to judge what is normal or abnormal in an adversary’s organization or society. That assessment is certainly borne out in the Nosenko case.
Many of the problems were of our own making. Because of the a priori assumption of guilt, no attempt was made to resolve the many discrepancies; instead, the discrepancies were cherished as proof that Nosenko was dis- patched by the KGB. Even under more normal circumstances, this case would have presented difficulties for the anomalies and inconsistencies approach because of Nosenko's personality and unusual background, our limited knowledge of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, some noteworthy coincidences, and the historical time period in which it occurred.
Litmus Test Approach.
The information or source to be evaluated is compared with other information or another source of known reliability and accuracy. The known information or source serves as a litmus test for evaluating the new or suspect information or source. This approach is similar to that of the finished intelligence analyst who asks: Is the information consistent with the facts as we know them from other sources? For example, a statement by a Soviet leader or an article in a military journal may be compared with information from a classified source of certain reliability. If the open source differs from the reliable classified information, it may be judged deceptive.
Use of this approach presupposes that one can be certain of the reliability and accuracy of the information or source used for comparison. Unfortunately, such certainly is seldom available. When this degree of certainty is present, and is justified, the approach yields strong inferences about deception.
This litmus test strategy played an important role in extending the master plot theory. The conviction that Nosenko was under KGB control led to his case being used as a touchstone for evaluating other sources of information on Soviet intelligence. If another source supplied information supporting questionable elements of Nosenko's story, or supporting the line that Popov and Penkovsldy were detected by surveillance rather than penetration, or support- ing any other aspect of the theme that CIA was not penetrated, then that source automatically became suspect as part of the master plot. (Recall that belief in a well-placed penetration of CIA led to the further assumption that all CIA Soviet sources were probably known to, if not controlled by, the KGB. Knowledge of which additional sources were being actively manipulated by the KGB would, it was believed, lead to better understanding of Soviet goals and possibly offer clues to identification of the penetration.)
Nosenko was only one of about a dozen sources on Soviet intelligence who eventually came to be considered part of the master-or monster-plot. To illustrate the application of the litmus test approach in this case, we discuss only two of these other sources; both of whom may have lost their lives as a result of U.S. preoccupation with Soviet deception, one through no fault of CIA, the other as a direct consequence of the master plot theory.
Cherepanov was a former officer of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, the same department in which Nosenko had served for a time. He was known to CIA from an abortive attempt to contact the American Embassy in Yugoslavia. After his return to Moscow, he was assigned to the Second Chief Directorate. He was subsequently dismissed from the KGB and went to work for Mezhlmiga, the book distribution enterprise. In October 1963, Cherepanov gave a packet of documents to an American couple visiting Moscow to purchase books and asked that it be delivered to the American Embassy. The package, which contained KGB reports dealing mainly with surveillance techniques and operations against the American Embassy, was opened by the political counselor of the Embassy. He concluded this was a Soviet provocation and, after copying the documents for CIA, insisted they be returned to the Soviets. Nosenko reported that when the documents were returned, the KGB immediately identified Cherepanov as their source. A quick check revealed that Cherepanov had disappeared. Nosenko himself then became part of a team of KGB officers hastily organized to find and arrest him.
The legitimacy of the Cherepanov documents was questioned at the time they were first received and analyzed at CIA Headquarters, but no firm conclusion was reached. In 1962, Nosenko had reported that CIA's first penetration of the GRU, Colonel Popov, had been arrested in 1959 as a result of surveillance of an American diplomat in Moscow. This comfortable explanation deflected suspicion of a KGB penetration of CIA as the cause of Popov's demise. One of the Cherepanov documents, plus a note from Cherepanov that accompanied the documents, confirmed Nosenko's earlier report and provided additional plausible details.
A different Cherepanov document concerned another area of concern relating to Popov's compromise. It was a detailed KGB analysis of movements by FBI surveillance teams in New York City. It showed KGB awareness of a special FBI surveillance at precisely the time an illegal agent dispatched by Popov had arrived in New York City. CIA had given the FBI information on the illegal's arrival. A compromised FBI surveillance would have drawn suspicion to Popov, and there was speculation that it was a possible cause of Popov's compromise. The Cherepanov document could have been planted to exacerbate the already difficult relationship between CIA and the FBI.
The information from Nosenko and Cherepanovwas mutually reinforcing. The documents Cherepanov delivered in 1963 confirmed Nosenko's earlier report that Popov had not been compromised through penetration of CIA. Then, when the Cherepanov documents were questioned at CIA Headquarters, Nosenko came out in 1964 to confirm their authenticity. If a KGB team had been sent out to apprehend Cherepanov, then obviously the documents he provided were genuine rather than a KGB provocation. When Nosenko was judged to be under KGB control, it seemed clear that Cherepanov must have been under control as well, and that both were confirming each other's bona fides while pushing the view that Colonel Popov had not been compromised through penetration of CIA.
Yuriy Loginov was a KGB illegal who volunteered his services to CIA in May 1961 while abroad on an illegal's training mission. He came to the West again in 1962 and for a third time in 1964, shortly after Nosenko's defection. The purpose of his 1964 trip was to cultivate and prepare for recruitment an American military communicator stationed in Cairo. Loginov brought with him several items if interest, including a copy of a top secret KGB training manual, presenting KGB doctrine on the recruitment of Americans. After 15 months in the West, Loginov returned to Moscow to report that he had developed a good personal relationship with an American, but that the target did not appear recruitable and was being reassigned to the United States.
The Loginov case baffled SB Division from the start. Although the information he provided, particularly in the counterintelligence field, appeared to check out, this very fact gave rise to consternation, as Loginov did not conform to SB Division's conception of the type of man the KGB would select to train and dispatch as an illegal. Nor did the instructions Loginov received from the KGB while in the West conform to SB Division ideas of how the KGB would handle such an agent (anomalies and inconsistencies approach).
The decisive evidence that condemned Loginov, however, was his reporting that supported the bona fides of both Cherepanov and Nosenko. Loginov's father had a dacha next door to Cherepanov, and Loginov reported that, in the fall of 963, he witnessed the KGB search of Cherepanov’s dacha. Nosenko had reported participating in this search. Loginov's story seemed to confirm the reality of Cherepanov’s flight and capture, but the coincidence of the neighboring dacha that justified his knowledge seemed extraordinary. Loginov also reported on KGB reactions to Nosenko's defection, and said that, because of the defection, his own dispatch to Canada on a new mission had been canceled. (Unbeknownst to Loginov, Nosenko knew about another illegal also being readied for dispatch to Canada, which undoubtedly persuaded the KGB that it’s would be prudent to delay sending Loginov.)
As a result of these two reports, Loginov was immediately labeled part of the master deception plot, with the role of supporting the bona fides of Cherepanov’s and Nosenko. The document on KGB operational doctrine for recruitment of Americans was judged authentic and was exploited extensively to improve the security of American installations and businesses abroad. This was considered the price the KGB was prepared to pay to support Loginov's bona fides and, thus, make him more effective in his role as a deception agent. When Loginov traveled West again, on a Canadian passport with a mission to legalize himself in South Africa before moving permanently to Canada, CIA arranged for him to be arrested in South Africa. Under questioning by the South Africans, he admitted to being a KGB illegal doubled by the Americans. After Loginov spent six months in solitary confinement, two CIA officers interrogated him for over three months in an effort to force an admission that he had been directed by the KGB to contact CIA and pass disinformation. Despite optimal interrogation conditions, Loginov refused to change his story, so the South Africans were left with the same problem that CIA originally had with Nosenko-what to do with a Soviet who was not trusted but against whom one had no juridical evidence.
A fortuitous solution to this problem appeared when East Germany claimed Loginov as an East German citizen (a common ploy in such cases) and suggested he be included in an East-West German prisoner exchange. CIA encouraged the idea despite Loginov's pleas not to be exchanged. At the exchange point, in July 1969, Loginov resisted repatriation for four hours until he was forcibly turned over to the waiting KGB officers. Subsequent reporting indicates he may have been executed.
There is every reason to believe that both Cherepanov and Loginov were bona fide sources, not under KGB control. They produced valuable intelligence consistent with their access, but they failed the master plot litmus test. Consideration of other anomalies in the cases or the value of information supplied were all subordinated to the overwhelming importance attributed to the fact that both sources supported themes considered to be part of the master deception plot.
These clear examples of the litmus test strategy illustrate the major weakness of this strategy for analyzing deception. The strategy presupposes certainty about the information or source used as a basis for the test. In this instance, the analysts were certain about Nosenko being under control, but their certainty was unjustified and led to wrong conclusions in about a dozen cases, with immense consequences for CIA in lost operational opportunities, and often with adverse personal consequences for the Soviets involved.
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Cost Accounting Approach.
An analyst employing this strategy focuses on the cost incurred by the adversary to conduct a deception. If the cost is higher than any potential gain, the deception hypothesis is rejected. Most frequently considered is the cost of providing valid and valuable information to establish and maintain the credibility of a deception channel. This approach judges a source on the basis of it’s production. This is the strategy generally used by the Directorate of Operations (DO) reports officer, as distinct from the DO operations officer, who is more likely to focus on anomalies or inconsistencies in the circumstances under which the source obtained the information or passed it on to us.
The cost accounting approach assumes an accurate understanding of how much an adversary is willing to sacrifice to achieve his goals. This is difficult because, in principle, there always can be a goal that is important enough to justify any cost. Such analysis, therefore, may be correct in routine cases that follow the established pattern, but wrong in the rare, exceptionally high-stakes situation when it counts the most. Traditional theory holds that deception is most likely when the stakes are highest; for example, when an adversary would be willing to pay the greatest price to achieve his goals.
The three previous approaches, motive, anomalies and inconsistencies, and litmus test, are best used to show the presence of deception. One cannot do that with the cost accounting strategy. This strategy can be used only to prove the absence of deception, not its presence. This is because high cost may (or may not) imply the absence of deception, but low cost does not necessarily imply its presence. Cost accounting was the primary strategy employed by those who believed Nosenko was a bona fide defector. Briefly, it was argued that information provided by Nosenko was so valuable to CIA and so damaging to the USSR that it was inconceivable the KGB would willingly give it away. The KGB would never deliberately place one of its own officers into the hands of its principal adversary.
Bruce Solie, the Office of Security officer who handled Nosenko's rehabilitation, believed a source should be judged on the quality of information received. He felt that too much attention had been paid to challenging Nosenko’s story, and not enough to finding out everything he could tell us about KGB operations. Accordingly, Solie's debriefing concentrated on obtaining more information. Since the value of Nosenko's information created a presumption of bona fides, Solie's approach to anomalies and inconsistencies was to seek some plausible explanation and to recognize that, given the nature of the case, some anomalies may never be explained. Subsequently, the FBI reported that a minimum of nine new counterintelligence cases were developed as a result of Solie's reexamination, and that new information of considerable importance was developed on old cases; additional detailed information was also obtained on KGB operations in other countries, and on KGB organization, modus operandi, and personnel. Altogether, the information pointed to a valuable, bona fide source.
Nosenko provided identification of, or leads to, some 238 Americans and about 200 foreign nationals in whom the KGB had displayed varying degrees of interest, and against whom they had enjoyed varying degrees of success. He provided information on about 2,000 KGB staff officers and 300 Soviet national agents or contacts of the KGB. His information on the methods and scope of Second Chief Directorate operations against foreign diplomats and journalists in Moscow and visitors to the Soviet Union filled a large gap in our knowledge and had an enormous impact on the raising of CIA's consciousness of these operations; the result was important improvements in the physical security of U.S. installations and the personal security of U.S. officials and advisors to the USSR. The Soviet Union suffered additional costs through the adverse publicity and deterrent effect of Nosenko's defection and the arrest of several agents he identified.
The master plot theorists also assessed the value of Nosenko's information, not as the overriding criterion for evaluating his bona fides, but certainly as a relevant consideration. They came to the opposite conclusion. They argued that KGB operations reported by Nosenko had been previously reported by Golitsyn or other sources, involved agents who had lost their access, who the KGB had reason to believe had been compromised, who were unimportant, or where the information could not be confirmed. At times, this argument was made with a stacked deck, and Nosenko always came out the loser. If Nosenko reported on a KGB operation previously reported by an- other defector, this was not counted as a plus for Nosenko, because the KGB already knew the operation had been compromised. If he reported an operation not previously known, the information was judged doubtful because it could not be confirmed.The argument that Nosenko's information was unimportant was always difficult to sustain, as it kept being contradicted by reality. For a time, various rationalizations were possible, but eventually Solie's supplemental debriefing of Nosenko, a more objective interpretation of his information, and successful investigation of the leads developed a clear record to Nosenko's credit. For example, Bagley argued that Nosenko's information on microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow was a KGB giveaway, as Golitsyn had already reported on this subject. Golitsyn's report, however, was only a general statement that the Embassy was bugged. Nosenko identified which offices, where in these offices the mikes were located, and what conversations had been monitored. It was only Nosenko's more detailed, first-hand information that persuaded the State Department to incur the significant cost and disruption involved in tearing out walls to find and neutralize the installation. They found 52 mikes, 47 of them still active, covering many of the most interesting offices in the Embassy.
Nosenko's supporters and detractors largely ignored each other's arguments, as they approached the analysis of Nosenko's bona fides from entirely different paths and used different criteria for judging the truth. In the context of the master plot, the value of information provided by Nosenko measured only the magnitude of the deception to come. To believers in Nosenko, on the other hand, the list of espionage cases the FBI had developed from his information and the many leads to KGB agents in other countries were ample proof of his bona fides. As the KGB would not willingly sacrifice this information, there must be some other explanation for the conflicts in his story. Ironically, one of the strongest points in favor of Nosenko was not made in any of the studies of his bona fides. This is because of the tacit agreement by Nosenko's detractors and supporters alike that he should be considered on his own merits, without reference to the master plot as a whole. This was an artificial limitation, as almost everyone on both sides of the issue recognized that, if Nosenko were bona fide, the master plot theory would collapse. Conversely, if the master plot theory could be disproved, the case against Nosenko would be difficult to sustain.
The point is that Nosenko's information was only a small part of the total information on Soviet intelligence being received at that time from multiple sources believed to be part of the master plot. If all the valuable information from all the supposedly controlled sources had been collected in one massive compendium to show the incredible magnitude of what was allegedly being sacrificed, it would have made a most powerful argument against the master plot theory and, therefore, against the argument that Nosenko was under control.
To the few who were informed of all these other cases and saw events from the master plot perspective, it began to appear as though the entire KGB might have become a sacrificial lamb on the altar of deception and diversion. The diehards (some would call them paranoids) rationalized this by concluding that the deception must be even bigger and more important than previously believed; as the KGB sacrifices mounted, the level and importance of the assumed penetration went higher and higher. Others, however, who initially had accepted the inherent plausibility of the master plot, began to have doubts. There had to be some limit on how much the KGB would give away.
A former Chief of the CI Group in SB Division told me, for example, that he first began to doubt the master plot theory when he learned about a senior East European military officer who had been supplying CIA with very important Warsaw Pact documents for many years. Giving away counterintelligence leads to divert opposition security services was one thing, but the wholesale sacrifice of military secrets was quite another. Continuation of this operation seemed to belie the existence of a well-placed KGB penetration of CIA, which was an essential part of the master plot theory.
In 1976, John Hart visited Tennant Bagley, who had retired four years earlier, to inquire whether, after so much time, he still rejected Nosenko's bona fides. Bagley asked if there had been any new evidence confirming Nosenko's story, to which Hart replied there had not. I believe that Hart was wrong; there was much additional evidence to refute the master plot theory. During the intervening years, old sources continued and new counterintelligence sources were developed that produced a continuous flow of very valuable information, thereby greatly increasing the total cost to the Soviets if the master plan theory were valid. The most knowledgeable new sources would have failed the master plot litmus test, for they confirmed genuine KGB distress at Nosenko's defection, reported that the KGB would be unwilling to use a KGB staff officer as a double agent or false defector, and failed to report any massive counterintelligence deception program or penetration of CIA at the level that had been feared.
In summary, this cost accounting strategy led to an accurate judgment of Nosenko's bona fides. Our discussion does, however, illustrate the principal weakness of this approach, namely, how to determine what the adversary might regard as an acceptable cost. Analysts on both sides of the issue recognized that a source's production is a useful criterion for judging bona fides, but they had radically different views on how much information and the kinds of information the KGB would be willing to sacrifice in the interest of deception.
Predictive Test Approach.
This approach is not normally used in intelligence analysis, but it could and should be used under select circumstances. It might also be called the scientific approach, for it addresses a problem the way a scientist does. The scientist develops a tentative hypothesis to explain the phenomenon under study, then devises tests to prove or disprove the hypothesis. The same approach can be used in deception analysis. A tentative hypothesis about deception can often be tested by using the presumption of deception to make a series of predictions. If the deception theory generates predictions that are borne out by subsequent experience, this suggests that the hypothesis is true. If expectations are contradicted by experience, this suggests that the hypothesis may be wrong.
The principal value of testing views in this manner is that it makes it more difficult to rationalize contradictory evidence. There is a human tendency to interpret new information in ways that do not require us to change our minds. By using a hypothesis about deception to make explicit predictions, one specifies the circumstances under which one could be proved wrong. The predictions are either confirmed or they are not. The latter outcome points to possible flaws in one's understanding of the subject and provokes thought as to where reasoning went astray. If one has not made explicit predictions, one may not concede or even recognize that the reasoning was ill founded.
The weakness of this strategy is that it presupposes some form of ongoing activity, so that one can make short-term predictions and see if they come true. Another weakness is that it requires more self-conscious introspection and willingness to question one's own assumptions than most intelligence analysts are comfortable with, and therefore is seldom used.
This strategy was not used explicitly in any of the analyses of the Nosenko case. This form of reasoning did, however, implicitly affect the thinking of some persons involved in the case. The master plot theory did lead to certain expectations, or implied predictions, and when they were not borne out in practice this did engender doubts about the theory. The most obvious expectation was that it might be possible to break Nosenko. Of course, one could never be certain Nosenko would break even if he were under KGB control, but the interrogators had important psychological advantages. They had total control over Nosenko, were "certain" he was a KGB-dispatched agent, and even "knew" the purpose of the KGB operations.Yet Nosenko did not confess to anything more than a few self-serving lies. Similar advantages existed in the CIA interrogation of Loginov in South Africa; again, the interrogation was unsuccessful.
The master plot theory assumed the existence of a well-placed KGB penetration of CIA. It predicted that KGB agents, such as Nosenko, were either being directed with guidance from the penetration, or were being used to build up or protect the penetration. This limited the suspects to a finite number of CIA officers. It was estimated that astute counterintelligence analysis and security investigation would identify the penetration, but no such penetration was discovered despite extensive investigation. Again, the theory was contradicted by events. This might logically have led the proponents of the theory to question their assumptions, but it did not. Additional expectations concerned the KGB operations on which Nosenko reported. One would expect the KGB to try to achieve its deception goals with the minimum necessary cost to itself. This led to the view that Nosenko's revelations about KGB operations were probably less important than they appeared to be. Specifically, if was anticipated that investigation of Nosenko's leads to seemingly well-placed KGB agents would show that these agents had recently lost their access or were, for some other reason, expendable to the KGB. Further, it was expected that investigation of tantalizing leads to agents who could not be fully identified by Nosenko would lead to dead ends, so the KGB would really have sacrificed nothing at all. In some cases, these expectations were accurate, but in a significant number of cases investigations did identify valuable KGB agents.
These beliefs and expectations were, in effect, logical deductions or predictions based on the master plot hypothesis.If they had been set forth explicitly as predictions, and recognized as valid if partial and imperfect tests of the hypothesis, it would have been far more difficult to ignore the implications of their being contradicted by events. Unfortunately, the advocates of the master plot theory were seeking to prove it, not to test it. They regarded the master plot as a fact, not as a hypothesis to be subjected to critical examination, so developments that seemed to contradict this view were ignored, rationalized, or misinterpreted.
III: Conclusions
Heretofore, I have tried to present an objective account of the diverse arguments used, or in some cases not used, by those on both sides of the Nosenko issue. What follows is personal opinion. The reader is cautioned that opinions on this case are as numerous and varied as the many CIA and FBI officers who were personally involved in one or another phase of it. The opinions expressed here are certainly not the final word.
I will start by making my personal bias clear. I became a believer in the master plot theory in 1965 when first exposed to the reasoning described above under the motive approach. Although initially a believer, I never put much stock in Bagley's Thousand Pager, as I had learned from experience to be skeptical of conclusions based on the anomalies and inconsistencies approach to counterintelligence analysis. My first doubts arose when, one by one, various expectations failed to materialize, which is the reasoning described above under the predictive test approach. Subsequently, for reasons discussed under the cost accounting approach-the high volume of significant intelligence being received through multiple sources-I rejected the master plot theory and concluded that Nosenko was not acting under KGB control. This conclusion was recently reinforced when, in doing research for this study, I learned how the many anomalies and contradictions were eventually explained.
I remain firmly opposed to the view that the master plot was an irresponsible, paranoid fantasy. Given the information available at the time, as described under the motive approach, it would have been irresponsible not to have seriously considered this possibility. The mistake was not in pursuing the master plot theory, but in getting so locked into a position that one was unable to question basic assumptions or to note the gradual accumulation of contrary evidence. This type of analytical error is not uncommon, and all of us are susceptible to it. It can lead one to overlook deception as well as to perceive deception when it isn't there, as happened in the Nosenko case.
Gordon Stewart was correct in criticizing Bagley's analysis for assuming guilt and then interpreting every discrepancy as evidence of this guilt. After serious doubts began to be raised about this analysis, the Soviet Bloc Division should have assigned an officer in a devil's advocate role to do an analysis that assumed innocence, then examined how the evidence could be interpreted as being consistent with this view. By failing to give a fair shake to the opposing view, SB Division lost control of the case to another component that approached the analysis from a totally different perspective. This lesson should be taken to heart by any component involved in a serious controversy over deception .
Most important for this study is not what we learn about the Nosenko case, but what can be learned about deception analysis in general. There seem to be five quite separate and distinct paths to reaching judgments about deception. Which path one chooses is strongly influenced by one's past experience and the patterns of thought associated with one's functional responsibilities or organizational affiliation. The path one take determines, in turn, the evidence one seeks and, in large measure, the conclusion one reaches"
Generally, analysts in the Nosenko case gave greatest weight to the islands of evidence they were most familiar and most comfortable with, and this in turn determined which approach they took. Some counterintelligence personnel were very familiar with and influenced by the concern about penetration of CIA. Speaking for myself, for example, I had been the Headquarters desk officer on the Goleniewsld case at the time we received both of his reports, the one on the penetration of CIA and the one that led to identification of Felfe as a KGB penetration of West German intelligence. I had also seen first hand how much damage a well-placed penetration, such as Goleniewsld, could do to an opposition service. This personal experience made the master plot seem very real and very plausible. Other counterintelligence specialists, more directly involved in the Nosenko case than I, had personal experience with the seeming contradictions and extraordinary coincidences in his story, so this is what most influenced them.
One's professional experience and organizational affiliation play important roles in determining the strategy one employs to analyze deception. Counterintelligence officers, DO reports officers, and DI intelligence analysts look at deception through different conceptual lenses. The strategy employed, in turn, largely determines what evidence one seeks and the conclusion one reaches. Examination of Soviet motives led Bagley to review the entire history of CIA and KGB counterintelligence operations. Anomalies and inconsistencies perceived by counterintelligence personnel in the initial debriefing of Nosenko led to hostile interrogation to develop still more anomalies and inconsistencies. Solie's cost accounting approach led to friendly interrogation designed to produce as much information as possible, while playing down the anomalies. The litmus test approach focused attention on how other sources' information related to the Nosenko case, while overlooking the total value of these sources' information.
The Nosenko case vividly illustrates the weakness inherent in each of the five strategies for analyzing deception. Bagley identified a plausible motive for Soviet deception and supported it with voluminous circumstantial evidence, yet Nosenko was not under Soviet control. There was an enormous number of anomalies and inconsistencies in Nosenko's story, yet they were all produced by sloppy translation and inadequate debriefing, the unique aspects of Nosenko’s background and personality, genuine accident and coincidence, and the circumstances of his handling; they were not truly indicative of hostile control.
Comparing the value of information received from a source against some criterion of the cost the adversary would be willing to incur also leads to strong inferences about deception, but only if the putative threshold of acceptable cost is correct; in the Nosenko analysis, that threshold was itself a major point of disagreement. Comparing suspect information against some objective criterion of truth can lead to strong inferences about deception, but only If the criterion does indeed represent the truth; in the Nosenko case, it did not. Making test predictions can prompt reconsideration of one's views if they fail the test of experience, but, typically, this was not done in the Nosenko case; analysts were too busy trying to prove they were right, rather than testing their assumptions.
If there is a single lesson to be learned from this, it is that all five approaches are useful for complete analysis. Exclusive reliance on anyone strategy is dangerous. The cost accounting approach led to a correct conclusion in the Nosenko case, but it, too, has inherent vulnerabilities, and there is no guarantee it will be correct in all future cases. This places a heavy burden on the deception analyst. To do a thorough analysis of all the possibilities, one must examine the diverse bodies of evidence relevant to each of these strategies. This will often require investment of substantial time to gain understanding of previously unfamiliar fields.
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.....
Michael,
Wow, that was a regular "tour de force" by you! You must be very proud of yourself!
However, there are several problems in Heuer's propaganda piece.
One of the main ones is that on page 391 Heuer talks about "thief powder" (what the Ruskies called "Metka" according to Bagley) and how it was allegedly used by the KGB to uncover Pyotr Popov in Moscow. Heuer, regardless of the fact that he's apparently mixing up here two false narratives that were told by Nosenko, makes no mention whatsoever of KGB's Vladislav Kovshuk, Yuri Guk, and "Alexander Kislov" (aka "The Three Musketeers") who were sent to Washington D.C. in early 1957 to reactivate Edward Ellis Smith (aka "Popov's Mole"), the first CIA officer recruited by the KGB (in Moscow in late 1956) .
What's up with that?
It's a major clue as to how terribly right Golitsyn was, and how terribly deceptive your false-defector-hero, Yuri Nosenko, was. Tennent H. Bagley writes about it in great detail in his book Spy Wars and in his 35-page follow-up PDF Ghosts of the Spy Wars.
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS Why doesn't Heuer have any footnotes, any "sources"? Bagley has lots of them in his writings ...
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From: http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/78E28C08-3765-46D6-B456-11594481D4A8.jpeg?ver=1566596617429)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/DAF67E54-19A9-41C5-B6B0-D785D368A9BB.jpeg?ver=1566596617429)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/2DB6D38F-E099-4A73-8C21-DB7CDA679695.jpeg?ver=1566596617429)
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From: http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/78E28C08-3765-46D6-B456-11594481D4A8.jpeg?ver=1566596617429)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/DAF67E54-19A9-41C5-B6B0-D785D368A9BB.jpeg?ver=1566596617429)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/2DB6D38F-E099-4A73-8C21-DB7CDA679695.jpeg?ver=1566596617429)
Michael,
Why such large text and such huge gaps? Are you afraid your posts won't get noticed otherwise? Do you have any idea how troll-ish you look?
How's that letter you're going to send Newman and Scott coming along?
-- MWT ;)
PS Never heard of Vladislav Kovshuk, Yuri Guk, and "Alexander Kislov" (aka "The Three Musketeers")?
Pity that.
PPS I'm starting to get emails from people from around the country (who've evidently gotten my address from my EF "bio") saying what a "jerk" you are ...
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Michael, Why such large text? Are you afraid your posts won't get noticed otherwise? Do you have any idea how troll-ish you look?
How's that letter you're going to send Newman and Scott coming along?-- MWT ;) PS Never heard of Vladislav Kovshuk, Yuri Guk, and "Alexander Kislov" (aka "The Three Musketeers")? Pity that.
Thomas, do you have anything relevant to post? If so, when will you get to it?
Also, you promised, 4 times, last night, to shower this thread wilth at least ten rebuttles to one of my posts, we are still waiting.
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Michael,
PPS I'm starting to get emails from people from around the country (who've evidently gotten my address from my EF "bio") saying what a "jerk" you are ...
If that were true, I certainly would like to know about it. I don’t want to come-off as a jerk. To be sure, I received no PM’s from within the community saying as much.
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Thomas, do you have anything relevant to post? If so, when will you get to it?
Also, you promised, 4 times, last night, to shower this thread wilth (sic) at least ten rebulttles (sic) to one of my posts, we are still waiting.
Michael,
Patience is a virtue. I'll get to it, don't you worry. Like around 3 AM, maybe 4 AM, your time tomorrow ...
In the meantime, what's your "take" on what Vladislav Kovshuk, Yuri Guk and "Alesandr Kislov" (aka "The Three Musketeers") were doinf in Washington D.C. in early 1957?
Never heard of them? Pity that.
You can read about them (and traitor Edward Ellis Smith) in these two works by Tennent H. Bagley:
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames/page/n77
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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Michael,
Patience is a virtue. I'll get to it, don't you worry. Like around 3 AM, maybe 4 AM, your time tomorrow ...
In the meantime, what's your "take" on what Vladislav Kovshuk, Yuri Guk and "Alesandr Kislov" (aka "The Three Musketeers") were doinf (sic) in Washington D.C. in early 1957?
-- MWT ;)
Good, something relevant, someday.
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Good, something relevant, someday.
How's that highly informed and ... gulp ... admonishing letter to professors John Newman and Peter Dale Scott coming along, Mike?
LOL
Scott's heartrending and twelve-years-late admission that Yuri Nosenko was a false defector, after all, EDIT: comes at 34:48 ....
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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........
(Scott's heartrending and severely belated admission that Yuri Nosenko was a false defector, after all, come (sic) at 34:48 .)
........
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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Hav u watcht it yett Mikey?
Or is you two afeard, as per usjul?
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Hav u watcht it yett Mikey?
Or is you two afeard, as per usjul?
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Michael,
When are you going to send Newman and Scott that letter?
Better yet, why don't you print out Five Paths to Judgement and The Monster Plot Report on some nice soft paper and send 'em to them in a big bundle?
(They could probably use the extra toilet paper. )
-- MWT ;)
PS Or save it for yourself, seein' as how you've so full of "it."
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http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/273845B8-9F01-4A65-9A3C-581297F46CD9.jpeg?ver=1566609502997)
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Michael,
I'll be dealing with at least some of the things I've highlighted in the obituary.
One day in June 1962, Tennent "Pete" Bagley, the Soviet specialist at the CIA station in Berne, was instructed to take the train to Geneva to handle the case of a KGB officer attached to the Soviet delegation to a disarmament conference, who was offering his services to the Americans. That short journey turned Bagley into a central figure in perhaps the most controversial and baffling spy story of the entire Cold War.The KGB officer's name was Yuri Nosenko. At that first meeting he agreed to return to Moscow as a CIA agent-in-place. But in January 1964 he was back in Geneva with the Soviet arms delegates, insisting his cover was about to be blown and that he had to come over to
the West. But was he the real thing, or a fake defector sent by the KGB to confuse? If he was a plant, the strategy succeeded brilliantly. For the next dozen years the Nosenko case tied the CIA in knots, paralysing the Agency's vital espionage efforts against its Cold War adversary and destroying careers in the process. Bagley's background was typical in the Agency's early days. He came from an old US Navy family, studded with admirals; his uncle had been the first American killed in the 1898 Spanish-American war. Bagley himself had served in the Marines and studied at Princeton and the University of Geneva before joining the CIA in 1950. He seemed to have it all. He was tall and all-American handsome, talented and ambitious. Some senior figures in the Agency saw him as a future CIA director. He was also a friend of James Angleton, the Agency's formidable counter-intelligence chief. And then Yuri Nosenko came on the scene. Initially Bagley had no doubts. Nosenko was the first senior defector from the KGB's Second Directorate, responsible for internal security and monitoring – and if possible recruiting – personnel in the US Embassy as well as visiting American tourists, businessmen and academics. The information he provided at the 1962 debriefings at a CIA safe house in Geneva was top-class, including details of KGB surveillance methods and leads that hastened the unmasking of several Soviet spies in the West (among them the UK Admiralty clerk, John Vassall). "Jim, I'm involved in the greatest defector case ever," Bagley enthused to Angleton when he returned to Washington. But the older man was visibly unimpressed, and handed Bagley a file to read. "When you finish this, you'll see what I'm saying," he told him. The file essentially consisted of the theorizing of a previous KGB defector, Anatoly Golitsyn, who had come across in 1961.
Golitsyn had managed to convince the paranoid Angleton that not only did the KGB have high-level moles in US and British intelligence, but was running a gigantic disinformation campaign against the West. Nothing was what it seemed, and every defector, according to Golitsyn, was in fact a plant – among them, naturally, Yuri Nosenko. The file planted doubts in Bagley's mind too, and his suspicions were further aroused by discrepancies in Nosenko's initial story. In 1964 those doubts exploded. The defector claimed to have information that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the murder of President Kennedy just two months earlier and, astonishingly, that the KGB didn't even have contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, Kennedy's assassin, during the three mysterious years that the one-time US Marine lived in the Soviet Union, between 1959 and 1962. Nosenko's tale seemed too good to be true, exonerating Moscow just as the Warren Commission was starting work amid widespread suspicion that Oswald was indeed a real-life Manchurian Candidate controlled by the KGB. Soon after landing on US soil, Nosenko found himself a prisoner, held incommunicado in a safe house in Virginia and subjected to harsh interrogation, hunger and sleep deprivation. But he never broke, passing lie detector tests and resisting every effort of Bagley and his fellow sceptics to extract a confession. Gradually the upper echelons of the CIA split into warring camps, of "Fundamentalists" like Angleton and Bagley, and those who believed Nosenko was the real thing, and who were increasingly appalled by the way he was being treated. Ultimately the latter group prevailed. By 1967 Nosenko's ordeal was over, and in 1969 he was formally cleared, placed on the CIA payroll as a consultant and given a new identity. By then Bagley was long since off the case, posted to Brussels, where he would spend five years as station chief before retiring from the Agency in 1972. Amazingly Nosenko never held his harsh treatment against the US, nor regretted his original decision to defect. Bagley, though, remained obsessed by the case, convinced until the end that Nosenko was a plant: "this KGB provocateur and deceiver," as he put it in his 2007 memoir Spy Wars, a powerful argument of the anti-Nosenko case. The book led the CIA to cancel a planned lecture that Bagley was to give: four decades on, old wounds were still bleeding. Nosenko himself died in 2008. A few years earlier, someone asked Bagley what he'd say to Yuri Nosenko if he ever ran into him. His answer was, "Don't shoot."
-- MWT ;)
To all of my faithful followers --
In an earlier post, this thread, I challenged the veracity of the first three highlighted items in the above obituary of Tennent H. Bagley.
Now for the next three:
4) In Geneva in May, 1962, Nosenko was (ostensibly) the first senior defector from the KGB's Second Directorate, responsible for internal security and monitoring -- and if possible recruiting -- personnel in the U.S. embassy (in Moscow) (emphasis added)
From Spy Wars, page 93 --
Me: During Nosenko's first two months in the U.S., i.e., during the period of time that CIA, upon request, took him to Hawaii for a much-needed vacation, and therefore during the period of time before he was so brutally incarcerated (sarcasm), ...
Bagley: Like every defector Nosenko was asked to sit down and take as many hours or days as he needed to write about his personal life— family, schooling, military service, and professional career. These leisurely considered reflections, we hoped, would correct things he might have said carelessly in the haste of safe house meetings in Geneva. He might have led himself into contradictions by boasting to impress us but now, firmly accepted in the West, he would have little reason for self-puffery.
What he now wrote did indeed contradict things he had said before but instead of clarifying old discrepancies it created new ones. His stories of his marriages and divorces rang false, his military service made no sense, and his manner of leaving military service and entering the KGB clashed with the administrative requirements known to us from other sources. When we called him on such anomalies he readily shifted details, but this produced further contradictions and questions.
Even his accounts of his career varied, beginning with the date he entered the KGB. In Geneva he had written in an autobiographical note that he had entered in the spring of 1952, and told us he had received a ten-year certificate. Now he placed his entry in the spring of 1953, but could not remember whether before or after the death of Stalin. This was as easy for a Soviet citizen to remember as for an American asked when he learned of President Kennedy’s assassination, especially given the near-chaos that reigned in the service when Beria rose and fell at that time.
Nosenko said he had come, without training or preparation, directly into the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate. His first job was to spy on (and recruit as spies) American press correspondents in Russia. A year afterward he was shifted within the same section to work against the personnel of the military attache offices of the American Embassy.
Preparing to debrief him on this critical subject, we checked the American Embassy security records to see what American personnel had said about KGB attempts to recruit them. We turned up incidents that had occurred in Nosenko’s time and sector, but, strangely, he did not know about them. The KGB had staged two provocations against Nosenko’s own military attache targets and expelled them in a loud press campaign of outrage— scandals that were the talk of the whole service (one veteran later referred to them as “famous” affairs) and not just among the officers working directly against those attaches. But Nosenko had never heard of either of them. Moreover, we could find no mention of anyone resembling Nosenko in American Embassy reports of contacts with Russians.
Charles Bohlen, the American ambassador in Moscow from April 1953 to April 1957, remembered that during this period “there were about twelve cases, mostly of [our] clerical personnel but in one instance of a security officer, getting into trouble, usually with women. The secret police [KGB] took incriminating infrared pictures, then tried to recruit the Americans for espionage. All of these people were out of the country in twenty-four hours.’’1 Nosenko knew of none of these cases except (he said in 1962) that of the security officer Edward Ellis Smith.
The KGB was well aware that the Americans were collecting intelligence from their Embassy premises via long-range photography, radio intercept, and other techniques. To thwart these efforts the KGB was using sophisticated countermeasures which the Embassy people could perceive.
“What measures do your people take against American intercept work from inside the Moscow Embassy?” I asked Nosenko.
"I don’t know anything about that,” he answered.
"Well, anyone who looks at the Embassy can see the antennas. In your coverage of the Embassy, did you never look into this?”
"No, never.”
"The antennas were on the roof,” I said. As you’ve said, the top floors held the substantive sections where only the Americans were allowed. How many such classified floors were there?”
Nosenko answered confidently. “Two. As I’ve told you, we had mikes in there.”
How could a supervisor of the section working against the Embassy not know that there were in fact three classified floors?
Nosenko was queried about KGB officers and their work against Embassy personnel. Whenever our interviewer would ask which colleague was responsible for work against a targeted American, Nosenko had a ready answer. But it became apparent that he was relying not on personal memory but on some sort of memorized table of organization. When his answers were collated they presented an absurd imbalance in the workloads of his section mates and sometimes contradicted what he had said earlier.
We asked Nosenko about his previous travel abroad but were unable to get a coherent or believable explanation for trips that made no sense in his career. While overseeing in Moscow some of the KGB’s highest priority counterintelligence work, he was off at least eight times on the unrelated task of security-watchdogging various types of Soviet groups traveling abroad. He escorted boxing teams to London in August 1957 and October 1958 and to the Caribbean in 1959, and during the period 1960-1961 did things impossible for someone actually supervising work against the American Embassy as he claimed to be doing (see Chapter 15). Only a month after moving back to the Tourist Department with a promotion to section chief, his name was submitted for a Swiss visa to watchdog a months-long conference in Geneva. On his return to Moscow, having
spent hardly three months on the job, he was promoted again. A year later— having had no apparent professional success— he was upped to a still higher post as first deputy department chief. But mere days afterward, off he went again on an extended delegation-watchdog assignment to Geneva. Such a career had no relation to the real KGB, or indeed to any functioning organization.
As we probed into KGB internal procedures, Nosenko proved to be ignorant of routine practices that he supposedly practiced daily, like sending telegrams or checking files. (ETC, ETC, ETC)
Also this, from page 169:
The shadows over Nosenko’s code-clerk stories turned blacker a few days
later. Murphy called me to his office.
"Jim Angleton has been talking to Golitsyn,” he said, as I passed up the leather couch and took a seat beside his desk. “Now that Nosenko’s defection is public, Jim passed Golitsyn the facts of Nosenko’s personal history and KGB career— nothing more— and Golitsyn hit the roof.”
“Just because of the personal history?”
“Especially the KGB career— Nosenko’s claim to have been deputy chief of the SCD’s [Second Chief Directorate’s] American Embassy section in 1960-61. Golitsyn visited the section in Moscow during that time and talked with the chief. He knows Nosenko was not a member then.”
“He’s sure?”
"Absolutely,” Dave said. “He had heard of Nosenko, says he met him once, but knew him only as a minor figure, certainly not as any kind of supervisor.” Dave hunched toward me over his desk. “In fact, Golitsyn doubts that anyone below the section chief would have been supervising Gryaznov and Kosolapov. He isn’t even sure the section had a deputy chief at that time.”
"Damn it to hell,” I said. "That explains it. You remember, we’ve been having trouble with that story, too. We couldn’t see how Nosenko could possibly have held that job. Looks like Golitsyn was right about this.”
Our debriefings of Nosenko were producing strange results. Nosenko did not know some things that he should have, if he had held the American Embassy section job. Even stranger, he had been describing things he himself was doing in 1960 and 1961 that made no sense whatever for some- one supervising operations against the Embassy in Moscow— entrapping homosexual tourists, for example, and escorting delegations.
"Moscow isn’t that much different from here,” Dave said. “People in key jobs don’t run around on dumb errands. Remind me.”
“I’ve forgotten some of it, Dave. Wait a minute while I go get my notes on this.” Five minutes later I was back, and started to run through the things we had noticed.
"When Tom was debriefing him the other day on his operations against tourists, Nosenko boasted that he had recruited an American tourist in Sofia by homosexual compromise, and even named the guy [call him "L”] and gave the date: May 1961. Tom was surprised and asked what the hell he was doing in Sofia when he was supposed to be working against the American Embassy in Moscow. Nosenko was taken aback. He came up with an explanation— he just happened to be in Sofia instructing Bulgarian
State Security how to operate against the American Embassy in Sofia. Tom was sure he was improvising but just nodded and went on. I had told him not to pin Nosenko down on his contradictions.”
If Nosenko was in Sofia on embassy-operations business, how could he get diverted there to the homosexual compromise of an American tourist? We knew that KGB pitches to foreigners need a plan and advance approval. In Sofia, moreover, the Bulgarians could handle that sort of thing without any help from Moscow.
Dave interjected, “Some homosexual provocateur would have had to set up L. Where the hell did he pop up from at just that moment? I can’t swallow this story.”
“I can’t either, Dave. And that’s just one. Here are some others.”
I read out for Dave some (but not all) of the other activities in 1 960 and 1961 that Nosenko had described, any one of which would be hardly imaginable for a person in his claimed position:
• In mid- 1960 Nosenko was to be security watchdog for a group of Soviet automobile manufacturers visiting the American industry in Detroit. The only reason he did not go was that the trip was cancelled at the last minute.
• Later in 1960 he accompanied some Soviet metallurgists to Cuba, acting as their security watchdog. 1
• Nosenko told us he had handled two homosexual provocateurs code-named ‘Shmelev’ and ‘Grigory’ from the time he recruited them in the 1950s until his defection. Dave stopped me here.
“We’re being asked to believe that a supervisor of KGB operations against its top-priority American Embassy target is handling the tourist department’s street-level homosexual provocateurs?” I could only shrug, and went on with my list.
• He traveled to the port of Odessa with V. D. Chelnokov, chief (he said) of the Tourist Department, to meet Chelnokov’s agent, an American travel organizer (“F”) coming in on a cruise ship. The FBI had interviewed F, who confirmed Nosenko’s presence— as a junior, almost menial, assistant to Chelnokov. But this was late 1960.
• Nosenko’s mistake about the date of Abidian’s visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop (see Chapter 14) revealed that he could not have held the job he claimed.
• Nosenko remembered clearly that he was in the Tourist Department when Anatoly Golitsyn defected in Finland. That was in mid-December 1961 (though Nosenko insisted it was mid-January 1962).
• The final item on my list was Nosenko’s proud account of compromising and recruiting two homosexual American tourists— he had even jotted notes of the date and names. But the date was 2 January 1962 and he had left the American Embassy section on the last day of 1961. In those forty-eight hours in the middle of the holiday season he could hardly have got into a new supervisory job, spotted and planned and got approval for provocative sexual compromise of two Americans, and then carried out both jobs. “He must have been in the Tourist Department for a lot longer than one working day,” I pointed out, "if he did it at all.”
We both saw that no member of the American Embassy section, least of all a supervisor, would or could do the things Nosenko claimed. He wasn’t there— and Golitsyn was right.
Dave grasped at a straw. “You don’t suppose he was just embellishing his own career to look better in our eyes, do you?”
"No. This Embassy-section job is at the very heart of his story.” I didn’t need to repeat what Dave knew all too well: that Nosenko had stressed his two personal responsibilities in that job, directly supervising work against the security officer and the code clerks. The two code clerks who did not report to the Embassy any KGB contact were precisely the two— "Will” and "Mott” (Note: Man On The Train) — implicated in the events Golitsyn learned about in Helsinki.
"Moreover,” I added, “That’s the job that gave Nosenko authority to tell about the Pushkin Street dead drop and about ‘Zepp’— and those things relate to when and how the KGB really uncovered Penkovsky.”
We sat in silence for a moment.
"So many mistakes,” Dave mused, shaking his head. "It looks to me like this job was tacked onto a career legend— maybe at the last minute. That could explain why he’s fouling it up so badly, mixing up work against tourists with work against the Embassy and getting his dates all askew.”
“I agree. Let’s face it, we’ve got a problem. This job claim is what gives him the authority to cover up successful KGB recruitments of code clerks. If the KGB has gained the ability to read enciphered American military communications, they sure would want to hide the fact. Maybe that’s what
this is all about.”
Murphy sighed tiredly. “Fine. But enough for today. There’s a lot to think about.”
5) The information Nosenko provided at the 1962 debriefings at a CIA safe house in Geneva was top-class
It seemed so at the time, but when the (at least) fourteen instances of overlapping between Nosenko's narrative and Golitsyn's top-secret file were noticed by Bagley a short time later at CIA Headquarters, Nosenko started looking fishy indeed, especially since Golitsyn had worked in the KGB's First Chief Directorate (i.e., foreign) and Nosenko had (allegedly) worked in the Second Chief Directorate (domestic)
6) Nosenko hastened the unmasking of several Soviet spies in the West (among them the UK Admiralty clerk, John Vassall)
At the time of Nosenko's defection, Vassall was already suspected of being a traitor by British Intelligence, one source claiming he was on a "short list" of four suspects, another source says a "short list" of twenty.
Regardless, it's still true that Nosenko did not "uncover" any KGB/GRU agents who were 1) not already suspected, 2) still working for the KGB or GRU, or 3) still had access to confidential information.
Period. Full stop. For now.
-- MWT ;)
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http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
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http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
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Michael,
Did you get that from Jefferson "Intellectually Dishonest" Morley, by any chance?
Have you read my one-star review of his "The Ghost" at Amazon (under my username "dumptrumpputin")?
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS You do realize that what you've posted is probably incorrect, don't you?
PPS Regardless, you do realize, don't you, that even your bugbear Tennent H. Bagley, admitted that true-defector Golitsyn had made a few mistakes. Maybe this was one of them, IDK ...
News at eleven, so stay tuned, y'all.
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http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
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http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
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(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/D293F860-EB2E-4728-8461-F82782099541.jpeg?ver=1566640696059)
Funny.
Golitsyn brought Bagley's and Angleton's (et al.) attention to the true identities of KGB's "Three Musketeers" and the possible significance of what they were up to, hanging out suspiciously around movie theaters in D.C. in early 1957 (meeting up with traitor Edward Ellis Smith aka "Popov's Mole"), and etc, etc, etc ...
And that Mark Riebling, in Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA, says that (approx) 94 per cent of the verifiable things Golitsyn predicted in his 1984 book New Lies For Old, had already been proved correct by 1994 (when Riebling's book was published).
https://archive.org/details/WedgeFromPearlHarborTo911HowTheSecretWarBetweenTheFBIAndCIAHasEndangeredNationalSecurity
https://archive.org/stream/GolitsynAnatoleTheNewLiesForOldOnes/Golitsyn-NewLiesForOld-TheCommunistStrategyOfDeceptionAndDisinformation1984_djvu.txt
Cheers!
-- MWT :)
PS From Spy Wars, page 281:
Golitsyn, Anatoly: KGB officer who was stationed in Austria in 1953-1955 and defected to CIA in Helsinki on 15 December 1961 after years of memorizing cases and documents that had come to his attention. His pointers exposed active KGB spies in several Western governments, including three intelligence services.
PPS It's "Golitsyn," not "Golytsin," by golly.
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http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
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Cleveland C. Cram?
LOL
You really know how to pick 'em, Michael!
-- MWT ;)
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http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
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Recent posts, by me, are from:
http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
For reference; from Wikipedia:
Cleveland C. Cram (December 21, 1917, Waterville, Minnesota – January 9, 1999) was a station chief and historian for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Cram studied at Saint John's University and Harvard and served as a naval officer in the South Pacific during World War II. He was recruited by the CIA in 1949, and began working in London in 1953. As deputy station chief in London, he was responsible for the CIA's liaison with British intelligence services MI5 and MI6, and he later moved on to become station chief in the Netherlands and Canada.
After Cram's retirement in 1975, he was called back to do historical research on the record of Counterintelligence Chief James J. Angleton. After six years of work he completed the twelve-volume "History of the Counterintelligence Staff 1954–1974" (1981), which remains classified. In 1993 he completed the monograph "Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature, 1977–92", which was declassified in 2003.
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http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
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From the same mostly inaccurate piece by Cram, but a little earlier:
The Storm Birds: Soyiet Post-War Defectors by Gordon Brook-Shepherd; Weidenfeld and Nicolson (London), 1988--303 pages
Gordon Brook-Shepherd, a British foreign correspondent turned historian, has with publication of this book done the best work of his long career. As intelligence history dealing with Soviet post-war defectors, it is not only an exciting read but is factually accurate in almost every respect. Compressed within its 303 pages is the story of how the Western intelligence services, largely denied the possibility of obtaining information from within the Soviet Union, came to realize the enormous intelligence value of those soviets who risked their lives to make the leap to freedom. More importantly, the author has immersed himself thoroughly in the voluminous detail about the defectors so that he comprehends the events which influenced the secret world of intelligence, with the result his judgments are objective and fair. The author likely achieved this kind of professional knowledge partly from work on his earlier book, The Storm Petrels, which recounted the story of pre-war defectors from the Soviet Union. With this experience plus generous help from CIA and the British intelligence services, Brook-Shepherd has written a fascinating account of how and why so many senior Soviet intelligence officials defected and their impact on the West. The author deals with his complex subject in chronological fashion starting with the first post-war defector, Igor Gouzenko, in Canada. It is difficult today to comprehend how little knowledge the West, governments as well as people, possessed about Soviet espionage and subversive activity prior to Gouzenko's defection in September 1945. This event and the revelations that flowed from it stunned both statesmen and the public. It had an enormous effect in America where it was coupled with defections of Americans such as Elizabeth Bentley, Louis Budenz, Whittaker Chambers, etc. from communism, all of whom made a contribution to the growing mass of evidence about Soviet illegal activities. In Canada where Prime Minister Mackenzie King seemed almost unable to grasp the enormity of Soviet transgressions, it had the salutary effect of establishing the groundwork for a security service in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In Britain the Gouzenko information also had an electric affect, but agents such as Philby were often able behind the scenes to blunt its force. (For example, it is known that Philby managed single handedly, without drawing attention to himself, to prevent amajor position paper urging stronger action against the Soviets from reaching the Prime Minister.) Although Gouzenko was the first Soviet intelligence officer to defect post-war and the impact of his disclosures are almost beyond measure, the author does not include him amongst the post-war defectors he describes as "giants." He
defines a giant as one who dominated the scene in the sense that his contribution went far beyond his normal professional assets to play a certain strategic role in post-war history. The three he places in this category are Penkovsky, "Farewell," and Gordievsky.
.....
Penkovsky, "Farewell," and Gordievsky, were "Giants," huh?
Well, at least he got one of them right: Penkovsky; betrayed by Sir Roger Hollis and maybe one other person about two weeks after he'd volunteered to work for MI-6 and CIA.
That is if Brook-Shepherd meant contributions to Western intelligence services. (LOL)
Gordievsky, Oleg: KGB colonel who agreed in 1974 to collaborate with British Intelligence in Copenhagen. While he was serving in London in the 1980s the KGB learned of his collaboration and recalled him to Moscow, where he was interrogated but did not confess (LOL). He managed to flee the USSR and subsequently made his life in England.
Chapter 16. Connections
1 . The KGB was spreading stories of its plans to assassinate Nosenko. (LOL) The KGB counterintelligence chief in New York told his colleague Oleg Gordievsky in the late 1960s that his prime murder targets in the United States were Nosenko and Anatoly Golitsyn (C. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story [New York: HarperCoIlins, 1990], 585).
Chapter 20. Lingering Debate
1 . Of the fifteen, thirteen are named: “Kitty Hawk” [Igor Kochnov], Ilya Dzhirkvelov, Yuri Loginov, Aleksandr Cherepanov, Vitaly Yurchenko, and apparently Yuri Krotkov, as well as Vladimir Kuzichkin, Viktor Gundarev, Ivan Bogatyy, the Illegal “Rudolf Herrmann,” Vladimir Vetrov (alias "Farewell”), Oleg Gordievsky, and Oleg Lyalin. Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior. Janies Jesus Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter (New York and London: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 365 n53.
2. House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, Hearings (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979) (hereafter HSCA Hearings), Vol. 4, 60.
3. Those five were Cherepanov, Loginov, Krotkov, Lyalin, and Vetrov.
The text (from Spy Wars, pg 209) for the above footnotes:
After they had decided once and for all that Nosenko genuinely defected and was telling the truth, CIA insiders spread the happy word that they had received “convincing” confirmation from later KGB sources.
“All of the KGB defectors since 1964— who were in a position to know about the Nosenko case and whose bona fides have been absolutely verified by the CIA— have strongly supported Nosenko,” they told an investigative journalist in the 1980s. They numbered “more than fifteen in all” and were “uniformly incredulous to learn from the Americans that Nosenko was ever doubted.”1 An official CIA spokesman (John L. Hart) was later to tell Congress the same story.2
Fifteen confirmations might make a convincing case— but not these fifteen. In actuality these sources had not been “in a position to know,” nor were their "bona fides absolutely verified.” Five of them had never mentioned Nosenko at all, and others were not even in the KGB when Nosenko defected.3 Not one of the fifteen had firsthand knowledge, much less had any of them been in a position to learn of the KGB’s tightly compartmentalized deception operations. Those who were not lying or fabricating were presumably repeating what they had been told either officially or by corridor gossip— and in fact false accounts were being circulated. Another KGB officer was told that no fewer than “forty colonels” had been bred as a result of Nosenko’s defection— but after reflection and discussion with other officers recognized the story to be false and an intentional plant within the KGB. 4 Three KGB veterans who talked with me after the Cold War seemed to believe these planted tales or rumors because they assumed (wrongly, as later events would show) that the KGB would never use one of its staff officers as a defector. One Illegal, alias “Rudy Herrmann,’’ reported that he had been told to try to find Nosenko in the United States— but he could not know why. (The KGB must have been wondering why Nosenko had dropped off their radar screen.)
To label all these sources "absolutely verified bona fide” was grotesque. Suspicions hung over six of the fifteen. 5 If even one of those six was a KGB plant, a skeptic
might wonder why the KGB, through that plant, had vouched for Nosenko.
There were, outside this list, more authoritative KGB sources, with more direct knowledge. What did they say about Nosenko— especially in more relaxed conditions after the end of the Cold War? Some said flatly that Nosenko was lying, others inadvertently revealed it by contradicting Nosenko’s stories, and the best-informed felt sure the KGB had planted him on CIA. For example:
• In his 1995 memoirs, Filipp BoBary Kampov, deputy chief of KGB counter- intelligence (Second Chief Directorate, or SCD) and Nosenko’s boss at the time, twisted the facts and ignored Nosenko’s 1962 meetings with CIA, by then well known even to the public. He wrote that Nosenko went to Geneva for “serious operational tasks”— not the way the KGB describes delegation watchdogging. The KGB chairman at the time, Vladimir Semichastniy, said Nosenko had been sent to Geneva to work on “some woman” with an aim to recruit her. (Nosenko apparently did not know this.) Semichastniy said Nosenko had been “expelled from every school he attended” and had got into the KGB only with the help of (then deputy) chairman Ivan Serov. (Nosenko did not know this, either; he named a different high-level sponsor, equally unlikely.) 6
• A later KGB chairman, Vadim Bakatin, along with former KGB foreign-counterintelligence chief Oleg Kalugin, told the chief counsel of the House Select Committee on Assassinations that Nosenko had “exaggerated and lied about his knowledge of Oswald.” 7
• Oleg Kalugin reported that Nosenko did not serve in the American Department of the SCD in 1960-1961.
• A veteran of the SCD’s American Department at the time said Nosenko had served only one year, from 1952 to 1953, in the American Department. He had performed badly and was shunted off to the nonoperational department that handled routine liaison with other Soviet institutions.
• A KGB veteran told me after the Cold War that Nosenko did not hold the KGB jobs he listed for CIA and that the circumstances suggested to him that the SCD (specifically, its 14th Department, for operational deception) had dispatched Nosenko to deceive CIA.
Quite a different story came from a clumsy KGB effort to support and enhance Nosenko’s image in American eyes. In the early 1990s they put an official hie on Nosenko into the hands of KGB veteran Colonel Oleg Nechiporenko. It was ostensibly to help him write a memoir of his encounter with Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City a few weeks before Oswald assassinated President Kennedy— never mind that Nosenko was entirely irrelevant to this subject. Nechiporenko thereupon devoted fifty pages— under the title “Paranoia vs. Common Sense’’— to make the point that CIA (and specifically me, Pete Bagley) had been stupid not to recognize the great good luck that had fallen into CIA’s lap with Nosenko’s defection. Like others, he stressed the “colossal damage” that this defection had done to the KGB and the near-panic it caused to high-level KGB chiefs and to Khrushchev himself. But the attempt backfired. That KGB file contradicted a lot of what Nosenko had told us about his early life and entry into the KGB, and Nechiporenko’s book told things about Oswald that Nosenko must have known if he had really had access to Oswald’s hie— but did not know. 8
Nechiporenko revealed that books like his own were actually parts of ongoing KGB operations. A West German editor complained to him, at about the time Nechiporenko’s own book was appearing, that another author, Oleg Tumanov, was refusing to fill in the details in his manuscriptrecounting his twenty years as a KGB penetration agent inside Radio Liberty. You are naive, Nechiporenko replied, to expect details. Tumanov, he explained, “was a link, a part of an operation. . . . And this operation isn’t completed.” If the author were to tell all, "CIA would know what the KGB was doing today and tomorrow. The KGB is not dead.” 9
Even if this still-living KGB was carrying on an unfinished operation, its use of Nechiporenko to attack me was like using a battering ram against an open door. CIA itself had disowned my position, had used some of the same words as Nechiporenko to denigrate me (and others who had distrusted Nosenko), and had been happily employing Nosenko for a quarter century. Why then this late, gratuitous assault? Could they still fear that CIA might reverse its position on Nosenko and finally look into the implications underlying his case? As far as I know, the KGB need have no fear on that front.
Nechiporenko’s position in this ongoing KGB game contrasts oddly with the new line on Nosenko that was emerging in Moscow. After years of vilifying Nosenko for the damage he did the KGB and condemning him to death, KGB spokesmen were beginning to suggest that Nosenko did not defect at all. Their new line was that he fell into a trap and was kidnapped by CIA. After the assassination of President Kennedy, so this story goes, CIA learned (through what a KGB-sponsored article fantasized as a far-flung agent network in Russia) that a KGB officer named Nosenko had inside knowledge about Lee Harvey Oswald. So when that target came to Geneva (to recruit a woman connected with French Intelligence) a CIA “action group” under Pete Bagley, working on direct orders from CIA director Richard Helms and Soviet Division chief David Murphy, drugged and kidnapped him, in order to pump him for information about Oswald’s sojourn in Russia. 10
One can only speculate on the KGB’s purpose in creating such a fantasy. Might they be preparing Nosenko ’s return to Russia without punishment like the later "CIA kidnap victim” Yurchenko? Whatever the reason, this change of posture reflected Moscow’s growing readiness to admit that Nosenko’s defection was not as previously presented. Finally, CIA will be left alone in believing in Nosenko.
For a few years after the Agency in 1968 made its official finding in Nosenko’s favor, CIA did not speak with a single voice. The leadership of its Counterintelligence Staff under James Angleton judged Nosenko to be a KGB plant, and its operations chief Newton S. (“Scotty”) Miler continued to probe into what lay behind the KGB’s operation.
Two former KGB officers, Peter Deriabin and Anatoly Golitsyn, after learning about Nosenko’s case in detail (Deriabin had even questioned him personally— see Appendix A) were certain that Nosenko had been dispatched by the KGB and was lying about his KGB activities and career. As Deriabin put it, any KGB officer knowing the facts would be equally convinced. He was right. After the Cold War a KGB officer, after reading some of CIA’s questions and Nosenko’s answers, laughed out loud and asked me an unanswerable question, “How could your service ever have trusted such a person?”
-- MWT ;)
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https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no4/pdf/JIH-Angleton-Robarge-2003.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/F14F633C-88BD-43B3-98B4-8E11292DC548.jpeg?ver=1566662197515)
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Michael,
....
.... when I addressed "My Faithful Followers," I did so on my "Monster Plot" thread, and that's the thread I was, by definition, referring to.
......
-- MWT
Thomas,
Don’t your “Faithful Followers” follow you wherever you go? Don’t they follow you wherever you are posting?
No? ... That is strange. It’s like they are, maybe, following the thread, and, maybe, not following you?, at all?
You know, there are only two of us posting on this thread. It just might be that they aren’t following you, or the thread.
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Thomas,
Don’t your “Faithful Followers” follow you wherever you go? Don’t they follow you wherever you are posting?
No? ... That is strange. It’s like they are, maybe, following the thread, and, maybe, not following you?, at all?
You know, there are only two of us posting on this thread. It just might be that they aren’t following you, or the thread.
Michael,
In my humble opinion, your envy (regarding my popularity among our open-minded, willing-to-learn "guests") and your childishness, stubborness and trollish-ness (as exibited in nearly all of my "Off Topic Threads") are ... palpable.
-- MWT ;)
PS When are you going to send that letter to John Newman and Peter Dale Scott?
IIRC, Professor Scott belatedly (i.e., eleven years after Bagley's Spy Wars was published) realized during Newman's two-part presentation (Part II, below) that Nosenko was a false defector, after all, and confesses to same at 34:48 ...
Cheers!
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Michael,
In my humble opinion, your envy (regarding my popularity among our open-minded, willing-to-learn "guests") and your childishness, stubborness and trollish-ness (as exibited on all five of these "Off Topic Threads") are ... palpable.
-- MWT ;)
.......
Yeah, sure.
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http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/80D5656F-2E72-4905-9065-05C36E47AC02.jpeg?ver=1566672234066)
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Yeah, sure.
Oops, I forgot to include "ignorance".
Edit: Regarding Kulak, "Kislov," Kochnov, Polyakov, Guk, Kovshuk, et al..
Oh yeah, and Yuri Nosenko, too.
-- MWT ;)
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Oops, I forgot to include "ignorance".
-- MWT ;)
Of course.
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(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/C02229BE-B073-4446-A41A-7AF356B0885B.jpeg?ver=1566673085673)
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Oops, I forgot to include "ignorance".
Edit: Regarding Kulak, "Kislov," Kochnov, Polyakov, Guk, Kovshuk, et al..
Oh yeah, and Yuri Nosenko, too.
-- MWT ;)
But I figure you're pretty dang good with computers and IT and stuff like that.
-- MWT ;)
PS Don't you have a word-processing program you can use to write that letter you're going to send to John Newman and Peter Dale Scott?
If you can't afford Office, I hear Apache Open Office is pretty darn good ... and it's free!
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https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000301860003-4.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/F9B64F6C-383C-45F6-860B-068A36AF4DA8.jpeg?ver=1566676829239)
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Something to keep in mind while reading this thread: (Copied from the (References & links to websites which contain pornographic images and/or abusive content directed at members of this Forum is strictly prohibited ) forum, not sure who to credit)
This Post Includes:
I. Rules for (email threads and other) Forum Spies: COINTELPRO Techniques for Dilution, Misdirection, and Control of an Internet Forum
II. 25 Rules of Disinformation by Michael Sweeney
III. Eight Traits of Disinformationalist
IV. How to Spot a Spy (COINTELPRO Agent)
V. Seventeen Methods For Truth Suppression
I. COINTELPRO Techniques for dilution, misdirection and control of a internet forum..
There are several techniques for the control and manipulation of a internet forum no matter what, or who is on it. We will go over each technique and demonstrate that only a minimal number of operatives can be used to eventually and effectively gain a control of a ‘uncontrolled forum.’
Technique #1 – ‘FORUM SLIDING’
If a very sensitive posting of a critical nature has been posted on a forum – it can be quickly removed from public view by ‘forum sliding.’ In this technique a number of unrelated posts are quietly prepositioned on the forum and allowed to ‘age.’ Each of these misdirectional forum postings can then be called upon at will to trigger a ‘forum slide.’ The second requirement is that several fake accounts exist, which can be called upon, to ensure that this technique is not exposed to the public. To trigger a ‘forum slide’ and ‘flush’ the critical post out of public view it is simply a matter of logging into each account both real and fake and then ‘replying’ to prepositined postings with a simple 1 or 2 line comment. This brings the unrelated postings to the top of the forum list, and the critical posting ‘slides’ down the front page, and quickly out of public view. Although it is difficult or impossible to censor the posting it is now lost in a sea of unrelated and unuseful postings. By this means it becomes effective to keep the readers of the forum reading unrelated and non-issue items.
Technique #2 – ‘CONSENSUS CRACKING’
A second highly effective technique is ‘consensus cracking.’ To develop a consensus crack, the following technique is used.
Under the guise of a fake account a posting is made which looks legitimate and is towards the truth is made – but the critical point is that it has a VERY WEAK PREMISE without substantive proof to back the posting. Once this is done then under alternative fake accounts a very strong position in your favour is slowly introduced over the life of the posting. It is IMPERATIVE that both sides are initially presented, so the uninformed reader cannot determine which side is the truth. As postings and replies are made the stronger ‘evidence’ or disinformation in your favour is slowly ‘seeded in.’ Thus the uninformed reader will most like develop the same position as you, and if their position is against you their opposition to your posting will be most likely dropped. However in some cases where the forum members are highly educated and can counter your disinformation with real facts and linked postings, you can then ‘abort’ the consensus cracking by initiating a ‘forum slide.’
Technique #3 – ‘TOPIC DILUTION’
Topic dilution is not only effective in forum sliding it is also very useful in keeping the forum readers on unrelated and non-productive issues. This is a critical and useful technique to cause a ‘RESOURCE BURN.’ By implementing continual and non-related postings that distract and disrupt (trolling ) the forum readers they are more effectively stopped from anything of any real productivity. If the intensity of gradual dilution is intense enough, the readers will effectively stop researching and simply slip into a ‘gossip mode.’ In this state they can be more easily misdirected away from facts towards uninformed conjecture and opinion. The less informed they are the more effective and easy it becomes to control the entire group in the direction that you would desire the group to go in. It must be stressed that a proper assessment of the psychological capabilities and levels of education is first determined of the group to determine at what level to ‘drive in the wedge.’ By being too far off topic too quickly it may trigger censorship by a forum moderator.
Technique #4 – ‘INFORMATION COLLECTION’
Information collection is also a very effective method to determine the psychological level of the forum members, and to gather intelligence that can be used against them. In this technique in a light and positive environment a ‘show you mine so me yours’ posting is initiated. From the number of replies and the answers that are provided much statistical information can be gathered. An example is to post your ‘favourite weapon’ and then encourage other members of the forum to showcase what they have. In this matter it can be determined by reverse proration what percentage of the forum community owns a firearm, and or a illegal weapon. This same method can be used by posing as one of the form members and posting your favourite ‘technique of operation.’ From the replies various methods that the group utilizes can be studied and effective methods developed to stop them from their activities.
Technique #5 – ‘ANGER TROLLING’
Statistically, there is always a percentage of the forum posters who are more inclined to violence. In order to determine who these individuals are, it is a requirement to present a image to the forum to deliberately incite a strong psychological reaction. From this the most violent in the group can be effectively singled out for reverse IP location and possibly local enforcement tracking. To accomplish this only requires posting a link to a video depicting a local police officer massively abusing his power against a very innocent individual. Statistically of the million or so police officers in America there is always one or two being caught abusing there powers and the taping of the activity can be then used for intelligence gathering purposes – without the requirement to ‘stage’ a fake abuse video. This method is extremely effective, and the more so the more abusive the video can be made to look. Sometimes it is useful to ‘lead’ the forum by replying to your own posting with your own statement of violent intent, and that you ‘do not care what the authorities think!!’ inflammation. By doing this and showing no fear it may be more effective in getting the more silent and self-disciplined violent intent members of the forum to slip and post their real intentions. This can be used later in a court of law during prosecution.
Technique #6 – ‘GAINING FULL CONTROL’
It is important to also be harvesting and continually maneuvering for a forum moderator position. Once this position is obtained, the forum can then be effectively and quietly controlled by deleting unfavourable postings – and one can eventually steer the forum into complete failure and lack of interest by the general public. This is the ‘ultimate victory’ as the forum is no longer participated with by the general public and no longer useful in maintaining their freedoms. Depending on the level of control you can obtain, you can deliberately steer a forum into defeat by censoring postings, deleting memberships, flooding, and or accidentally taking the forum offline. By this method the forum can be quickly killed. However it is not always in the interest to kill a forum as it can be converted into a ‘honey pot’ gathering center to collect and misdirect newcomers and from this point be completely used for your control for your agenda purposes.
CONCLUSION
Remember these techniques are only effective if the forum participants DO NOT KNOW ABOUT THEM. Once they are aware of these techniques the operation can completely fail, and the forum can become uncontrolled. At this point other avenues must be considered such as initiating a false legal precidence to simply have the forum shut down and taken offline. This is not desirable as it then leaves the enforcement agencies unable to track the percentage of those in the population who always resist attempts for control against them. Many other techniques can be utilized and developed by the individual and as you develop further techniques of infiltration and control it is imperative to share then with HQ.
II. Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation
Note: The first rule and last five (or six, depending on situation) rules are generally not directly within the ability of the traditional disinfo artist to apply. These rules are generally used more directly by those at the leadership, key players, or planning level of the criminal conspiracy or conspiracy to cover up.
1. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil. Regardless of what you know, don’t discuss it — especially if you are a public figure, news anchor, etc. If it’s not reported, it didn’t happen, and you never have to deal with the issues.
2. Become incredulous and indignant. Avoid discussing key issues and instead focus on side issues which can be used show the topic as being critical of some otherwise sacrosanct group or theme. This is also known as the ‘How dare you!’ gambit.
3. Create rumor mongers. Avoid discussing issues by describing all charges, regardless of venue or evidence, as mere rumors and wild accusations. Other derogatory terms mutually exclusive of truth may work as well. This method which works especially well with a silent press, because the only way the public can learn of the facts are through such ‘arguable rumors’. If you can associate the material with the Internet, use this fact to certify it a ‘wild rumor’ from a ‘bunch of kids on the Internet’ which can have no basis in fact.
4. Use a straw man. Find or create a seeming element of your opponent’s argument which you can easily knock down to make yourself look good and the opponent to look bad. Either make up an issue you may safely imply exists based on your interpretation of the opponent/opponent arguments/situation, or select the weakest aspect of the weakest charges. Amplify their significance and destroy them in a way which appears to debunk all the charges, real and fabricated alike, while actually avoiding discussion of the real issues.
5. Sidetrack opponents with name calling and ridicule. This is also known as the primary ‘attack the messenger’ ploy, though other methods qualify as variants of that approach. Associate opponents with unpopular titles such as ‘kooks’, ‘right-wing’, ‘liberal’, ‘left-wing’, ‘terrorists’, ‘conspiracy buffs’, ‘radicals’, ‘militia’, ‘racists’, ‘religious fanatics’, ‘sexual deviates’, and so forth. This makes others shrink from support out of fear of gaining the same label, and you avoid dealing with issues.
6. Hit and Run. In any public forum, make a brief attack of your opponent or the opponent position and then scamper off before an answer can be fielded, or simply ignore any answer. This works extremely well in Internet and letters-to-the-editor environments where a steady stream of new identities can be called upon without having to explain criticism, reasoning — simply make an accusation or other attack, never discussing issues, and never answering any subsequent response, for that would dignify the opponent’s viewpoint.
7. Question motives. Twist or amplify any fact which could be taken to imply that the opponent operates out of a hidden personal agenda or other bias. This avoids discussing issues and forces the accuser on the defensive.
8. Invoke authority. Claim for yourself or associate yourself with authority and present your argument with enough ‘jargon’ and ‘minutia’ to illustrate you are ‘one who knows’, and simply say it isn’t so without discussing issues or demonstrating concretely why or citing sources.
9. Play Dumb. No matter what evidence or logical argument is offered, avoid discussing issues except with denials they have any credibility, make any sense, provide any proof, contain or make a point, have logic, or support a conclusion. Mix well for maximum effect.
10. Associate opponent charges with old news. A derivative of the straw man — usually, in any large-scale matter of high visibility, someone will make charges early on which can be or were already easily dealt with – a kind of investment for the future should the matter not be so easily contained.) Where it can be foreseen, have your own side raise a straw man issue and have it dealt with early on as part of the initial contingency plans. Subsequent charges, regardless of validity or new ground uncovered, can usually then be associated with the original charge and dismissed as simply being a rehash without need to address current issues — so much the better where the opponent is or was involved with the original source.
11. Establish and rely upon fall-back positions. Using a minor matter or element of the facts, take the ‘high road’ and ‘confess’ with candor that some innocent mistake, in hindsight, was made — but that opponents have seized on the opportunity to blow it all out of proportion and imply greater criminalities which, ‘just isn’t so.’ Others can reinforce this on your behalf, later, and even publicly ‘call for an end to the nonsense’ because you have already ‘done the right thing.’ Done properly, this can garner sympathy and respect for ‘coming clean’ and ‘owning up’ to your mistakes without addressing more serious issues.
12. Enigmas have no solution. Drawing upon the overall umbrella of events surrounding the crime and the multitude of players and events, paint the entire affair as too complex to solve. This causes those otherwise following the matter to begin to lose interest more quickly without having to address the actual issues.
13. Alice in Wonderland Logic. Avoid discussion of the issues by reasoning backwards or with an apparent deductive logic which forbears any actual material fact.
14. Demand complete solutions. Avoid the issues by requiring opponents to solve the crime at hand completely, a ploy which works best with issues qualifying for rule 10.
15. Fit the facts to alternate conclusions. This requires creative thinking unless the crime was planned with contingency conclusions in place.
16. Vanish evidence and witnesses. If it does not exist, it is not fact, and you won’t have to address the issue.
17. Change the subject. Usually in connection with one of the other ploys listed here, find a way to side-track the discussion with abrasive or controversial comments in hopes of turning attention to a new, more manageable topic. This works especially well with companions who can ‘argue’ with you over the new topic and polarize the discussion arena in order to avoid discussing more key issues.
18. Emotionalize, Antagonize, and Goad Opponents. If you can’t do anything else, chide and taunt your opponents and draw them into emotional responses which will tend to make them look foolish and overly motivated, and generally render their material somewhat less coherent. Not only will you avoid discussing the issues in the first instance, but even if their emotional response addresses the issue, you can further avoid the issues by then focusing on how ‘sensitive they are to criticism.’
19. Ignore proof presented, demand impossible proofs. This is perhaps a variant of the ‘play dumb’ rule. Regardless of what material may be presented by an opponent in public forums, claim the material irrelevant and demand proof that is impossible for the opponent to come by (it may exist, but not be at his disposal, or it may be something which is known to be safely destroyed or withheld, such as a murder weapon.) In order to completely avoid discussing issues, it may be required that you to categorically deny and be critical of media or books as valid sources, deny that witnesses are acceptable, or even deny that statements made by government or other authorities have any meaning or relevance.
20. False evidence. Whenever possible, introduce new facts or clues designed and manufactured to conflict with opponent presentations — as useful tools to neutralize sensitive issues or impede resolution. This works best when the crime was designed with contingencies for the purpose, and the facts cannot be easily separated from the fabrications.
21. Call a Grand Jury, Special Prosecutor, or other empowered investigative body. Subvert the (process) to your benefit and effectively neutralize all sensitive issues without open discussion. Once convened, the evidence and testimony are required to be secret when properly handled. For instance, if you own the prosecuting attorney, it can insure a Grand Jury hears no useful evidence and that the evidence is sealed and unavailable to subsequent investigators. Once a favorable verdict is achieved, the matter can be considered officially closed. Usually, this technique is applied to find the guilty innocent, but it can also be used to obtain charges when seeking to frame a victim.
22. Manufacture a new truth. Create your own expert(s), group(s), author(s), leader(s) or influence existing ones willing to forge new ground via scientific, investigative, or social research or testimony which concludes favorably. In this way, if you must actually address issues, you can do so authoritatively.
23. Create bigger distractions. If the above does not seem to be working to distract from sensitive issues, or to prevent unwanted media coverage of unstoppable events such as trials, create bigger news stories (or treat them as such) to distract the multitudes.
24. Silence critics. If the above methods do not prevail, consider removing opponents from circulation by some definitive solution so that the need to address issues is removed entirely. This can be by their death, arrest and detention, blackmail or destruction of their character by release of blackmail information, or merely by destroying them financially, emotionally, or severely damaging their health.
25. Vanish. If you are a key holder of secrets or otherwise overly illuminated and you think the heat is getting too hot, to avoid the issues, vacate the kitchen.
III. Eight Traits of the Disinformationalist
1) Avoidance. They never actually discuss issues head-on or provide constructive input, generally avoiding citation of references or credentials. Rather, they merely imply this, that, and the other. Virtually everything about their presentation implies their authority and expert knowledge in the matter without any further justification for credibility.
2) Selectivity. They tend to pick and choose opponents carefully, either applying the hit-and-run approach against mere commentators supportive of opponents, or focusing heavier attacks on key opponents who are known to directly address issues. Should a commentator become argumentative with any success, the focus will shift to include the commentator as well.
3) Coincidental. They tend to surface suddenly and somewhat coincidentally with a new controversial topic with no clear prior record of participation in general discussions in the particular public arena involved. They likewise tend to vanish once the topic is no longer of general concern. They were likely directed or elected to be there for a reason, and vanish with the reason.
4) Teamwork. They tend to operate in self-congratulatory and complementary packs or teams. Of course, this can happen naturally in any public forum, but there will likely be an ongoing pattern of frequent exchanges of this sort where professionals are involved. Sometimes one of the players will infiltrate the opponent camp to become a source for straw man or other tactics designed to dilute opponent presentation strength.
5) Anti-conspiratorial. They almost always have disdain for ‘conspiracy theorists’ and, usually, for those who in any way believe JFK was not killed by LHO. Ask yourself why, if they hold such disdain for conspiracy theorists, do they focus on defending a single topic discussed in a NG focusing on conspiracies? One might think they would either be trying to make fools of everyone on every topic, or simply ignore the group they hold in such disdain.Or, one might more rightly conclude they have an ulterior motive for their actions in going out of their way to focus as they do.
6) Artificial Emotions. An odd kind of ‘artificial’ emotionalism and an unusually thick skin — an ability to persevere and persist even in the face of overwhelming criticism and unacceptance. This likely stems from intelligence community training that, no matter how condemning the evidence, deny everything, and never become emotionally involved or reactive. The net result for a disinfo artist is that emotions can seem artificial.
Most people, if responding in anger, for instance, will express their animosity throughout their rebuttal. But disinfo types usually have trouble maintaining the ‘image’ and are hot and cold with respect to pretended emotions and their usually more calm or unemotional communications style. It’s just a job, and they often seem unable to ‘act their role in character’ as well in a communications medium as they might be able in a real face-to-face conversation/confrontation. You might have outright rage and indignation one moment, ho-hum the next, and more anger later — an emotional yo-yo.
With respect to being thick-skinned, no amount of criticism will deter them from doing their job, and they will generally continue their old disinfo patterns without any adjustments to criticisms of how obvious it is that they play that game — where a more rational individual who truly cares what others think might seek to improve their communications style, substance, and so forth, or simply give up.
7) Inconsistent. There is also a tendency to make mistakes which betray their true self/motives. This may stem from not really knowing their topic, or it may be somewhat ‘freudian’, so to speak, in that perhaps they really root for the side of truth deep within.
I have noted that often, they will simply cite contradictory information which neutralizes itself and the author. For instance, one such player claimed to be a Navy pilot, but blamed his poor communicating skills (spelling, grammar, incoherent style) on having only a grade-school education. I’m not aware of too many Navy pilots who don’t have a college degree. Another claimed no knowledge of a particular topic/situation but later claimed first-hand knowledge of it.
Cool Time Constant. Recently discovered, with respect to News Groups, is the response time factor. There are three ways this can be seen to work, especially when the government or other empowered player is involved in a cover up operation:
a) ANY NG posting by a targeted proponent for truth can result in an IMMEDIATE response. The government and other empowered players can afford to pay people to sit there and watch for an opportunity to do some damage. SINCE DISINFO IN A NG ONLY WORKS IF THE READER SEES IT – FAST RESPONSE IS CALLED FOR, or the visitor may be swayed towards truth.
b) When dealing in more direct ways with a disinformationalist, such as email, DELAY IS CALLED FOR – there will usually be a minimum of a 48-72 hour delay. This allows a sit-down team discussion on response strategy for best effect, and even enough time to ‘get permission’ or instruction from a formal chain of command.
c) In the NG example 1) above, it will often ALSO be seen that bigger guns are drawn and fired after the same 48-72 hours delay – the team approach in play. This is especially true when the targeted truth seeker or their comments are considered more important with respect to potential to reveal truth. Thus, a serious truth sayer will be attacked twice for the same sin.
IV. How to Spot a Spy (Cointelpro Agent)
One way to neutralize a potential activist is to get them to be in a group that does all the wrong things. Why?
1) The message doesn’t get out.
2) A lot of time is wasted
3) The activist is frustrated and discouraged
4) Nothing good is accomplished.
FBI and Police Informers and Infiltrators will infest any group and they have phoney activist organizations established.
Their purpose is to prevent any real movement for justice or eco-peace from developing in this country.
Agents come in small, medium or large. They can be of any ethnic background. They can be male or female.
The actual size of the group or movement being infiltrated is irrelevant. It is the potential the movement has for becoming large which brings on the spies and saboteurs.
This booklet lists tactics agents use to slow things down, foul things up, destroy the movement and keep tabs on activists.
It is the agent’s job to keep the activist from quitting such a group, thus keeping him/her under control.
In some situations, to get control, the agent will tell the activist:
“You’re dividing the movement.”
[Here, I have added the psychological reasons as to WHY this maneuver works to control people]
This invites guilty feelings. Many people can be controlled by guilt. The agents begin relationships with activists behind a well-developed mask of “dedication to the cause.” Because of their often declared dedication, (and actions designed to prove this), when they criticize the activist, he or she – being truly dedicated to the movement – becomes convinced that somehow, any issues are THEIR fault. This is because a truly dedicated person tends to believe that everyone has a conscience and that nobody would dissimulate and lie like that “on purpose.” It’s amazing how far agents can go in manipulating an activist because the activist will constantly make excuses for the agent who regularly declares their dedication to the cause. Even if they do, occasionally, suspect the agent, they will pull the wool over their own eyes by rationalizing: “they did that unconsciously… they didn’t really mean it… I can help them by being forgiving and accepting ” and so on and so forth.
The agent will tell the activist:
“You’re a leader!”
This is designed to enhance the activist’s self-esteem. His or her narcissistic admiration of his/her own activist/altruistic intentions increase as he or she identifies with and consciously admires the altruistic declarations of the agent which are deliberately set up to mirror those of the activist.
This is “malignant pseudoidentification.” It is the process by which the agent consciously imitates or simulates a certain behavior to foster the activist’s identification with him/her, thus increasing the activist’s vulnerability to exploitation. The agent will simulate the more subtle self-concepts of the activist.
Activists and those who have altruistic self-concepts are most vulnerable to malignant pseudoidentification especially during work with the agent when the interaction includes matter relating to their competency, autonomy, or knowledge.
The goal of the agent is to increase the activist’s general empathy for the agent through pseudo-identification with the activist’s self-concepts.
The most common example of this is the agent who will compliment the activist for his competency or knowledge or value to the movement. On a more subtle level, the agent will simulate affects and mannerisms of the activist which promotes identification via mirroring and feelings of “twinship”. It is not unheard of for activists, enamored by the perceived helpfulness and competence of a good agent, to find themselves considering ethical violations and perhaps, even illegal behavior, in the service of their agent/handler.
The activist’s “felt quality of perfection” [self-concept] is enhanced, and a strong empathic bond is developed with the agent through his/her imitation and simulation of the victim’s own narcissistic investments. [self-concepts] That is, if the activist knows, deep inside, their own dedication to the cause, they will project that onto the agent who is “mirroring” them.
The activist will be deluded into thinking that the agent shares this feeling of identification and bonding. In an activist/social movement setting, the adversarial roles that activists naturally play vis a vis the establishment/government, fosters ongoing processes of intrapsychic splitting so that “twinship alliances” between activist and agent may render whole sectors or reality testing unavailable to the activist. They literally “lose touch with reality.”
Activists who deny their own narcissistic investments [do not have a good idea of their own self-concepts and that they ARE concepts] and consciously perceive themselves (accurately, as it were) to be “helpers” endowed with a special amount of altruism are exceedingly vulnerable to the affective (emotional) simulation of the accomplished agent.
Empathy is fostered in the activist through the expression of quite visible affects. The presentation of tearfulness, sadness, longing, fear, remorse, and guilt, may induce in the helper-oriented activist a strong sense of compassion, while unconsciously enhancing the activist’s narcissistic investment in self as the embodiment of goodness.
The agent’s expresssion of such simulated affects may be quite compelling to the observer and difficult to distinguish from deep emotion.
It can usually be identified by two events, however:
First, the activist who has analyzed his/her own narcissistic roots and is aware of his/her own potential for being “emotionally hooked,” will be able to remain cool and unaffected by such emotional outpourings by the agent.
As a result of this unaffected, cool, attitude, the Second event will occur: The agent will recompensate much too quickly following such an affective expression leaving the activist with the impression that “the play has ended, the curtain has fallen,” and the imposture, for the moment, has finished. The agent will then move quickly to another activist/victim.
The fact is, the movement doesn’t need leaders, it needs MOVERS. “Follow the leader” is a waste of time.
A good agent will want to meet as often as possible. He or she will talk a lot and say little. One can expect an onslaught of long, unresolved discussions.
Some agents take on a pushy, arrogant, or defensive manner:
1) To disrupt the agenda
2) To side-track the discussion
3) To interrupt repeatedly
4) To feign ignorance
5) To make an unfounded accusation against a person.
Calling someone a racist, for example. This tactic is used to discredit a person in the eyes of all other group members.
Saboteurs
Some saboteurs pretend to be activists. She or he will ….
1) Write encyclopedic flyers (in the present day, websites)
2) Print flyers in English only.
3) Have demonstrations in places where no one cares.
4) Solicit funding from rich people instead of grass roots support
5) Display banners with too many words that are confusing.
6) Confuse issues.
7) Make the wrong demands.
Cool Compromise the goal.
9) Have endless discussions that waste everyone’s time. The agent may accompany the endless discussions with drinking, pot smoking or other amusement to slow down the activist’s work.
Provocateurs
1) Want to establish “leaders” to set them up for a fall in order to stop the movement.
2) Suggest doing foolish, illegal things to get the activists in trouble.
3) Encourage militancy.
4) Want to taunt the authorities.
5) Attempt to make the activist compromise their values.
6) Attempt to instigate violence. Activisim ought to always be non-violent.
7) Attempt to provoke revolt among people who are ill-prepared to deal with the reaction of the authorities to such violence.
Informants
1) Want everyone to sign up and sing in and sign everything.
2) Ask a lot of questions (gathering data).
3) Want to know what events the activist is planning to attend.
4) Attempt to make the activist defend him or herself to identify his or her beliefs, goals, and level of commitment.
Recruiting
Legitimate activists do not subject people to hours of persuasive dialog. Their actions, beliefs, and goals speak for themselves.
Groups that DO recruit are missionaries, military, and fake political parties or movements set up by agents.
Surveillance
ALWAYS assume that you are under surveillance.
At this point, if you are NOT under surveillance, you are not a very good activist!
Scare Tactics
They use them.
Such tactics include slander, defamation, threats, getting close to disaffected or minimally committed fellow activists to persuade them (via psychological tactics described above) to turn against the movement and give false testimony against their former compatriots. They will plant illegal substances on the activist and set up an arrest; they will plant false information and set up “exposure,” they will send incriminating letters [emails] in the name of the activist; and more; they will do whatever society will allow.
This booklet in no way covers all the ways agents use to sabotage the lives of sincere an dedicated activists.
If an agent is “exposed,” he or she will be transferred or replaced.
COINTELPRO is still in operation today under a different code name. It is no longer placed on paper where it can be discovered through the freedom of information act.
The FBI counterintelligence program’s stated purpose: To expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, and otherwise neutralize individuals who the FBI categorize as opposed to the National Interests. “National Security” means the FBI’s security from the people ever finding out the vicious things it does in violation of people’s civil liberties.
V. Seventeen Techniques for Truth Suppression
Strong, credible allegations of high-level criminal activity can bring down a government. When the government lacks an effective, fact-based defense, other techniques must be employed. The success of these techniques depends heavily upon a cooperative, compliant press and a mere token opposition party.
1. Dummy up. If it’s not reported, if it’s not news, it didn’t happen.
2. Wax indignant. This is also known as the “How dare you?” gambit.
3. Characterize the charges as “rumors” or, better yet, “wild rumors.” If, in spite of the news blackout, the public is still able to learn about the suspicious facts, it can only be through “rumors.” (If they tend to believe the “rumors” it must be because they are simply “paranoid” or “hysterical.”)
4. Knock down straw men. Deal only with the weakest aspects of the weakest charges. Even better, create your own straw men. Make up wild rumors (or plant false stories) and give them lead play when you appear to debunk all the charges, real and fanciful alike.
5. Call the skeptics names like “conspiracy theorist,” “nutcase,” “ranter,” “kook,” “crackpot,” and, of course, “rumor monger.” Be sure, too, to use heavily loaded verbs and adjectives when characterizing their charges and defending the “more reasonable” government and its defenders. You must then carefully avoid fair and open debate with any of the people you have thus maligned. For insurance, set up your own “skeptics” to shoot down.
6. Impugn motives. Attempt to marginalize the critics by suggesting strongly that they are not really interested in the truth but are simply pursuing a partisan political agenda or are out to make money (compared to over-compensated adherents to the government line who, presumably, are not).
7. Invoke authority. Here the controlled press and the sham opposition can be very useful.
8. Dismiss the charges as “old news.”
9. Come half-clean. This is also known as “confession and avoidance” or “taking the limited hangout route.” This way, you create the impression of candor and honesty while you admit only to relatively harmless, less-than-criminal “mistakes.” This stratagem often requires the embrace of a fall-back position quite different from the one originally taken. With effective damage control, the fall-back position need only be peddled by stooge skeptics to carefully limited markets.
10. Characterize the crimes as impossibly complex and the truth as ultimately unknowable.
11. Reason backward, using the deductive method with a vengeance. With thoroughly rigorous deduction, troublesome evidence is irrelevant. E.g. We have a completely free press. If evidence exists that the Vince Foster “suicide” note was forged, they would have reported it. They haven’t reported it so there is no such evidence. Another variation on this theme involves the likelihood of a conspiracy leaker and a press who would report the leak.
12. Require the skeptics to solve the crime completely. E.g. If Foster was murdered, who did it and why?
13. Change the subject. This technique includes creating and/or publicizing distractions.
14. Lightly report incriminating facts, and then make nothing of them. This is sometimes referred to as “bump and run” reporting.
15. Baldly and brazenly lie. A favorite way of doing this is to attribute the “facts” furnished the public to a plausible-sounding, but anonymous, source.
16. Expanding further on numbers 4 and 5, have your own stooges “expose” scandals and champion popular causes. Their job is to pre-empt real opponents and to play 99-yard football. A variation is to pay rich people for the job who will pretend to spend their own money.
17. Flood the Internet with agents. This is the answer to the question, “What could possibly motivate a person to spend hour upon hour on Internet news groups defending the government and/or the press and harassing genuine critics?” Don’t the authorities have defenders enough in all the newspapers, magazines, radio, and television? One would think refusing to print critical letters and screening out serious callers or dumping them from radio talk shows would be control enough, but, obviously, it is not.
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Something to keep in ind while reading this thread: (Copied from the (References & links to websites which contain pornographic images and/or abusive content directed at members of this Forum is strictly prohibited ) forum, not sure who to credit)
This Post Includes:
I. Rules for (email threads and other) Forum Spies: COINTELPRO Techniques for Dilution, Misdirection, and Control of an Internet Forum
II. 25 Rules of Disinformation by Michael Sweeney
III. Eight Traits of Disinformationalist
IV. How to Spot a Spy (COINTELPRO Agent)
V. Seventeen Methods For Truth Suppression
I. COINTELPRO Techniques for dilution, misdirection and control of a internet forum..
There are several techniques for the control and manipulation of a internet forum no matter what, or who is on it. We will go over each technique and demonstrate that only a minimal number of operatives can be used to eventually and effectively gain a control of a ‘uncontrolled forum.’
Technique #1 – ‘FORUM SLIDING’
If a very sensitive posting of a critical nature has been posted on a forum – it can be quickly removed from public view by ‘forum sliding.’ In this technique a number of unrelated posts are quietly prepositioned on the forum and allowed to ‘age.’ Each of these misdirectional forum postings can then be called upon at will to trigger a ‘forum slide.’ The second requirement is that several fake accounts exist, which can be called upon, to ensure that this technique is not exposed to the public. To trigger a ‘forum slide’ and ‘flush’ the critical post out of public view it is simply a matter of logging into each account both real and fake and then ‘replying’ to prepositined postings with a simple 1 or 2 line comment. This brings the unrelated postings to the top of the forum list, and the critical posting ‘slides’ down the front page, and quickly out of public view. Although it is difficult or impossible to censor the posting it is now lost in a sea of unrelated and unuseful postings. By this means it becomes effective to keep the readers of the forum reading unrelated and non-issue items.
Technique #2 – ‘CONSENSUS CRACKING’
A second highly effective technique is ‘consensus cracking.’ To develop a consensus crack, the following technique is used.
Under the guise of a fake account a posting is made which looks legitimate and is towards the truth is made – but the critical point is that it has a VERY WEAK PREMISE without substantive proof to back the posting. Once this is done then under alternative fake accounts a very strong position in your favour is slowly introduced over the life of the posting. It is IMPERATIVE that both sides are initially presented, so the uninformed reader cannot determine which side is the truth. As postings and replies are made the stronger ‘evidence’ or disinformation in your favour is slowly ‘seeded in.’ Thus the uninformed reader will most like develop the same position as you, and if their position is against you their opposition to your posting will be most likely dropped. However in some cases where the forum members are highly educated and can counter your disinformation with real facts and linked postings, you can then ‘abort’ the consensus cracking by initiating a ‘forum slide.’
Technique #3 – ‘TOPIC DILUTION’
Topic dilution is not only effective in forum sliding it is also very useful in keeping the forum readers on unrelated and non-productive issues. This is a critical and useful technique to cause a ‘RESOURCE BURN.’ By implementing continual and non-related postings that distract and disrupt (trolling ) the forum readers they are more effectively stopped from anything of any real productivity. If the intensity of gradual dilution is intense enough, the readers will effectively stop researching and simply slip into a ‘gossip mode.’ In this state they can be more easily misdirected away from facts towards uninformed conjecture and opinion. The less informed they are the more effective and easy it becomes to control the entire group in the direction that you would desire the group to go in. It must be stressed that a proper assessment of the psychological capabilities and levels of education is first determined of the group to determine at what level to ‘drive in the wedge.’ By being too far off topic too quickly it may trigger censorship by a forum moderator.
Technique #4 – ‘INFORMATION COLLECTION’
Information collection is also a very effective method to determine the psychological level of the forum members, and to gather intelligence that can be used against them. In this technique in a light and positive environment a ‘show you mine so me yours’ posting is initiated. From the number of replies and the answers that are provided much statistical information can be gathered. An example is to post your ‘favourite weapon’ and then encourage other members of the forum to showcase what they have. In this matter it can be determined by reverse proration what percentage of the forum community owns a firearm, and or a illegal weapon. This same method can be used by posing as one of the form members and posting your favourite ‘technique of operation.’ From the replies various methods that the group utilizes can be studied and effective methods developed to stop them from their activities.
Technique #5 – ‘ANGER TROLLING’
Statistically, there is always a percentage of the forum posters who are more inclined to violence. In order to determine who these individuals are, it is a requirement to present a image to the forum to deliberately incite a strong psychological reaction. From this the most violent in the group can be effectively singled out for reverse IP location and possibly local enforcement tracking. To accomplish this only requires posting a link to a video depicting a local police officer massively abusing his power against a very innocent individual. Statistically of the million or so police officers in America there is always one or two being caught abusing there powers and the taping of the activity can be then used for intelligence gathering purposes – without the requirement to ‘stage’ a fake abuse video. This method is extremely effective, and the more so the more abusive the video can be made to look. Sometimes it is useful to ‘lead’ the forum by replying to your own posting with your own statement of violent intent, and that you ‘do not care what the authorities think!!’ inflammation. By doing this and showing no fear it may be more effective in getting the more silent and self-disciplined violent intent members of the forum to slip and post their real intentions. This can be used later in a court of law during prosecution.
Technique #6 – ‘GAINING FULL CONTROL’
It is important to also be harvesting and continually maneuvering for a forum moderator position. Once this position is obtained, the forum can then be effectively and quietly controlled by deleting unfavourable postings – and one can eventually steer the forum into complete failure and lack of interest by the general public. This is the ‘ultimate victory’ as the forum is no longer participated with by the general public and no longer useful in maintaining their freedoms. Depending on the level of control you can obtain, you can deliberately steer a forum into defeat by censoring postings, deleting memberships, flooding, and or accidentally taking the forum offline. By this method the forum can be quickly killed. However it is not always in the interest to kill a forum as it can be converted into a ‘honey pot’ gathering center to collect and misdirect newcomers and from this point be completely used for your control for your agenda purposes.
CONCLUSION
Remember these techniques are only effective if the forum participants DO NOT KNOW ABOUT THEM. Once they are aware of these techniques the operation can completely fail, and the forum can become uncontrolled. At this point other avenues must be considered such as initiating a false legal precidence to simply have the forum shut down and taken offline. This is not desirable as it then leaves the enforcement agencies unable to track the percentage of those in the population who always resist attempts for control against them. Many other techniques can be utilized and developed by the individual and as you develop further techniques of infiltration and control it is imperative to share then with HQ.
II. Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation
Note: The first rule and last five (or six, depending on situation) rules are generally not directly within the ability of the traditional disinfo artist to apply. These rules are generally used more directly by those at the leadership, key players, or planning level of the criminal conspiracy or conspiracy to cover up.
1. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil. Regardless of what you know, don’t discuss it — especially if you are a public figure, news anchor, etc. If it’s not reported, it didn’t happen, and you never have to deal with the issues.
2. Become incredulous and indignant. Avoid discussing key issues and instead focus on side issues which can be used show the topic as being critical of some otherwise sacrosanct group or theme. This is also known as the ‘How dare you!’ gambit.
3. Create rumor mongers. Avoid discussing issues by describing all charges, regardless of venue or evidence, as mere rumors and wild accusations. Other derogatory terms mutually exclusive of truth may work as well. This method which works especially well with a silent press, because the only way the public can learn of the facts are through such ‘arguable rumors’. If you can associate the material with the Internet, use this fact to certify it a ‘wild rumor’ from a ‘bunch of kids on the Internet’ which can have no basis in fact.
4. Use a straw man. Find or create a seeming element of your opponent’s argument which you can easily knock down to make yourself look good and the opponent to look bad. Either make up an issue you may safely imply exists based on your interpretation of the opponent/opponent arguments/situation, or select the weakest aspect of the weakest charges. Amplify their significance and destroy them in a way which appears to debunk all the charges, real and fabricated alike, while actually avoiding discussion of the real issues.
5. Sidetrack opponents with name calling and ridicule. This is also known as the primary ‘attack the messenger’ ploy, though other methods qualify as variants of that approach. Associate opponents with unpopular titles such as ‘kooks’, ‘right-wing’, ‘liberal’, ‘left-wing’, ‘terrorists’, ‘conspiracy buffs’, ‘radicals’, ‘militia’, ‘racists’, ‘religious fanatics’, ‘sexual deviates’, and so forth. This makes others shrink from support out of fear of gaining the same label, and you avoid dealing with issues.
6. Hit and Run. In any public forum, make a brief attack of your opponent or the opponent position and then scamper off before an answer can be fielded, or simply ignore any answer. This works extremely well in Internet and letters-to-the-editor environments where a steady stream of new identities can be called upon without having to explain criticism, reasoning — simply make an accusation or other attack, never discussing issues, and never answering any subsequent response, for that would dignify the opponent’s viewpoint.
7. Question motives. Twist or amplify any fact which could be taken to imply that the opponent operates out of a hidden personal agenda or other bias. This avoids discussing issues and forces the accuser on the defensive.
8. Invoke authority. Claim for yourself or associate yourself with authority and present your argument with enough ‘jargon’ and ‘minutia’ to illustrate you are ‘one who knows’, and simply say it isn’t so without discussing issues or demonstrating concretely why or citing sources.
9. Play Dumb. No matter what evidence or logical argument is offered, avoid discussing issues except with denials they have any credibility, make any sense, provide any proof, contain or make a point, have logic, or support a conclusion. Mix well for maximum effect.
10. Associate opponent charges with old news. A derivative of the straw man — usually, in any large-scale matter of high visibility, someone will make charges early on which can be or were already easily dealt with – a kind of investment for the future should the matter not be so easily contained.) Where it can be foreseen, have your own side raise a straw man issue and have it dealt with early on as part of the initial contingency plans. Subsequent charges, regardless of validity or new ground uncovered, can usually then be associated with the original charge and dismissed as simply being a rehash without need to address current issues — so much the better where the opponent is or was involved with the original source.
11. Establish and rely upon fall-back positions. Using a minor matter or element of the facts, take the ‘high road’ and ‘confess’ with candor that some innocent mistake, in hindsight, was made — but that opponents have seized on the opportunity to blow it all out of proportion and imply greater criminalities which, ‘just isn’t so.’ Others can reinforce this on your behalf, later, and even publicly ‘call for an end to the nonsense’ because you have already ‘done the right thing.’ Done properly, this can garner sympathy and respect for ‘coming clean’ and ‘owning up’ to your mistakes without addressing more serious issues.
12. Enigmas have no solution. Drawing upon the overall umbrella of events surrounding the crime and the multitude of players and events, paint the entire affair as too complex to solve. This causes those otherwise following the matter to begin to lose interest more quickly without having to address the actual issues.
13. Alice in Wonderland Logic. Avoid discussion of the issues by reasoning backwards or with an apparent deductive logic which forbears any actual material fact.
14. Demand complete solutions. Avoid the issues by requiring opponents to solve the crime at hand completely, a ploy which works best with issues qualifying for rule 10.
15. Fit the facts to alternate conclusions. This requires creative thinking unless the crime was planned with contingency conclusions in place.
16. Vanish evidence and witnesses. If it does not exist, it is not fact, and you won’t have to address the issue.
17. Change the subject. Usually in connection with one of the other ploys listed here, find a way to side-track the discussion with abrasive or controversial comments in hopes of turning attention to a new, more manageable topic. This works especially well with companions who can ‘argue’ with you over the new topic and polarize the discussion arena in order to avoid discussing more key issues.
18. Emotionalize, Antagonize, and Goad Opponents. If you can’t do anything else, chide and taunt your opponents and draw them into emotional responses which will tend to make them look foolish and overly motivated, and generally render their material somewhat less coherent. Not only will you avoid discussing the issues in the first instance, but even if their emotional response addresses the issue, you can further avoid the issues by then focusing on how ‘sensitive they are to criticism.’
19. Ignore proof presented, demand impossible proofs. This is perhaps a variant of the ‘play dumb’ rule. Regardless of what material may be presented by an opponent in public forums, claim the material irrelevant and demand proof that is impossible for the opponent to come by (it may exist, but not be at his disposal, or it may be something which is known to be safely destroyed or withheld, such as a murder weapon.) In order to completely avoid discussing issues, it may be required that you to categorically deny and be critical of media or books as valid sources, deny that witnesses are acceptable, or even deny that statements made by government or other authorities have any meaning or relevance.
20. False evidence. Whenever possible, introduce new facts or clues designed and manufactured to conflict with opponent presentations — as useful tools to neutralize sensitive issues or impede resolution. This works best when the crime was designed with contingencies for the purpose, and the facts cannot be easily separated from the fabrications.
21. Call a Grand Jury, Special Prosecutor, or other empowered investigative body. Subvert the (process) to your benefit and effectively neutralize all sensitive issues without open discussion. Once convened, the evidence and testimony are required to be secret when properly handled. For instance, if you own the prosecuting attorney, it can insure a Grand Jury hears no useful evidence and that the evidence is sealed and unavailable to subsequent investigators. Once a favorable verdict is achieved, the matter can be considered officially closed. Usually, this technique is applied to find the guilty innocent, but it can also be used to obtain charges when seeking to frame a victim.
22. Manufacture a new truth. Create your own expert(s), group(s), author(s), leader(s) or influence existing ones willing to forge new ground via scientific, investigative, or social research or testimony which concludes favorably. In this way, if you must actually address issues, you can do so authoritatively.
23. Create bigger distractions. If the above does not seem to be working to distract from sensitive issues, or to prevent unwanted media coverage of unstoppable events such as trials, create bigger news stories (or treat them as such) to distract the multitudes.
24. Silence critics. If the above methods do not prevail, consider removing opponents from circulation by some definitive solution so that the need to address issues is removed entirely. This can be by their death, arrest and detention, blackmail or destruction of their character by release of blackmail information, or merely by destroying them financially, emotionally, or severely damaging their health.
25. Vanish. If you are a key holder of secrets or otherwise overly illuminated and you think the heat is getting too hot, to avoid the issues, vacate the kitchen.
III. Eight Traits of the Disinformationalist
1) Avoidance. They never actually discuss issues head-on or provide constructive input, generally avoiding citation of references or credentials. Rather, they merely imply this, that, and the other. Virtually everything about their presentation implies their authority and expert knowledge in the matter without any further justification for credibility.
2) Selectivity. They tend to pick and choose opponents carefully, either applying the hit-and-run approach against mere commentators supportive of opponents, or focusing heavier attacks on key opponents who are known to directly address issues. Should a commentator become argumentative with any success, the focus will shift to include the commentator as well.
3) Coincidental. They tend to surface suddenly and somewhat coincidentally with a new controversial topic with no clear prior record of participation in general discussions in the particular public arena involved. They likewise tend to vanish once the topic is no longer of general concern. They were likely directed or elected to be there for a reason, and vanish with the reason.
4) Teamwork. They tend to operate in self-congratulatory and complementary packs or teams. Of course, this can happen naturally in any public forum, but there will likely be an ongoing pattern of frequent exchanges of this sort where professionals are involved. Sometimes one of the players will infiltrate the opponent camp to become a source for straw man or other tactics designed to dilute opponent presentation strength.
5) Anti-conspiratorial. They almost always have disdain for ‘conspiracy theorists’ and, usually, for those who in any way believe JFK was not killed by LHO. Ask yourself why, if they hold such disdain for conspiracy theorists, do they focus on defending a single topic discussed in a NG focusing on conspiracies? One might think they would either be trying to make fools of everyone on every topic, or simply ignore the group they hold in such disdain.Or, one might more rightly conclude they have an ulterior motive for their actions in going out of their way to focus as they do.
6) Artificial Emotions. An odd kind of ‘artificial’ emotionalism and an unusually thick skin — an ability to persevere and persist even in the face of overwhelming criticism and unacceptance. This likely stems from intelligence community training that, no matter how condemning the evidence, deny everything, and never become emotionally involved or reactive. The net result for a disinfo artist is that emotions can seem artificial.
Most people, if responding in anger, for instance, will express their animosity throughout their rebuttal. But disinfo types usually have trouble maintaining the ‘image’ and are hot and cold with respect to pretended emotions and their usually more calm or unemotional communications style. It’s just a job, and they often seem unable to ‘act their role in character’ as well in a communications medium as they might be able in a real face-to-face conversation/confrontation. You might have outright rage and indignation one moment, ho-hum the next, and more anger later — an emotional yo-yo.
With respect to being thick-skinned, no amount of criticism will deter them from doing their job, and they will generally continue their old disinfo patterns without any adjustments to criticisms of how obvious it is that they play that game — where a more rational individual who truly cares what others think might seek to improve their communications style, substance, and so forth, or simply give up.
7) Inconsistent. There is also a tendency to make mistakes which betray their true self/motives. This may stem from not really knowing their topic, or it may be somewhat ‘freudian’, so to speak, in that perhaps they really root for the side of truth deep within.
I have noted that often, they will simply cite contradictory information which neutralizes itself and the author. For instance, one such player claimed to be a Navy pilot, but blamed his poor communicating skills (spelling, grammar, incoherent style) on having only a grade-school education. I’m not aware of too many Navy pilots who don’t have a college degree. Another claimed no knowledge of a particular topic/situation but later claimed first-hand knowledge of it.
Cool Time Constant. Recently discovered, with respect to News Groups, is the response time factor. There are three ways this can be seen to work, especially when the government or other empowered player is involved in a cover up operation:
a) ANY NG posting by a targeted proponent for truth can result in an IMMEDIATE response. The government and other empowered players can afford to pay people to sit there and watch for an opportunity to do some damage. SINCE DISINFO IN A NG ONLY WORKS IF THE READER SEES IT – FAST RESPONSE IS CALLED FOR, or the visitor may be swayed towards truth.
b) When dealing in more direct ways with a disinformationalist, such as email, DELAY IS CALLED FOR – there will usually be a minimum of a 48-72 hour delay. This allows a sit-down team discussion on response strategy for best effect, and even enough time to ‘get permission’ or instruction from a formal chain of command.
c) In the NG example 1) above, it will often ALSO be seen that bigger guns are drawn and fired after the same 48-72 hours delay – the team approach in play. This is especially true when the targeted truth seeker or their comments are considered more important with respect to potential to reveal truth. Thus, a serious truth sayer will be attacked twice for the same sin.
IV. How to Spot a Spy (Cointelpro Agent)
One way to neutralize a potential activist is to get them to be in a group that does all the wrong things. Why?
1) The message doesn’t get out.
2) A lot of time is wasted
3) The activist is frustrated and discouraged
4) Nothing good is accomplished.
FBI and Police Informers and Infiltrators will infest any group and they have phoney activist organizations established.
Their purpose is to prevent any real movement for justice or eco-peace from developing in this country.
Agents come in small, medium or large. They can be of any ethnic background. They can be male or female.
The actual size of the group or movement being infiltrated is irrelevant. It is the potential the movement has for becoming large which brings on the spies and saboteurs.
This booklet lists tactics agents use to slow things down, foul things up, destroy the movement and keep tabs on activists.
It is the agent’s job to keep the activist from quitting such a group, thus keeping him/her under control.
In some situations, to get control, the agent will tell the activist:
“You’re dividing the movement.”
[Here, I have added the psychological reasons as to WHY this maneuver works to control people]
This invites guilty feelings. Many people can be controlled by guilt. The agents begin relationships with activists behind a well-developed mask of “dedication to the cause.” Because of their often declared dedication, (and actions designed to prove this), when they criticize the activist, he or she – being truly dedicated to the movement – becomes convinced that somehow, any issues are THEIR fault. This is because a truly dedicated person tends to believe that everyone has a conscience and that nobody would dissimulate and lie like that “on purpose.” It’s amazing how far agents can go in manipulating an activist because the activist will constantly make excuses for the agent who regularly declares their dedication to the cause. Even if they do, occasionally, suspect the agent, they will pull the wool over their own eyes by rationalizing: “they did that unconsciously… they didn’t really mean it… I can help them by being forgiving and accepting ” and so on and so forth.
The agent will tell the activist:
“You’re a leader!”
This is designed to enhance the activist’s self-esteem. His or her narcissistic admiration of his/her own activist/altruistic intentions increase as he or she identifies with and consciously admires the altruistic declarations of the agent which are deliberately set up to mirror those of the activist.
This is “malignant pseudoidentification.” It is the process by which the agent consciously imitates or simulates a certain behavior to foster the activist’s identification with him/her, thus increasing the activist’s vulnerability to exploitation. The agent will simulate the more subtle self-concepts of the activist.
Activists and those who have altruistic self-concepts are most vulnerable to malignant pseudoidentification especially during work with the agent when the interaction includes matter relating to their competency, autonomy, or knowledge.
The goal of the agent is to increase the activist’s general empathy for the agent through pseudo-identification with the activist’s self-concepts.
The most common example of this is the agent who will compliment the activist for his competency or knowledge or value to the movement. On a more subtle level, the agent will simulate affects and mannerisms of the activist which promotes identification via mirroring and feelings of “twinship”. It is not unheard of for activists, enamored by the perceived helpfulness and competence of a good agent, to find themselves considering ethical violations and perhaps, even illegal behavior, in the service of their agent/handler.
The activist’s “felt quality of perfection” [self-concept] is enhanced, and a strong empathic bond is developed with the agent through his/her imitation and simulation of the victim’s own narcissistic investments. [self-concepts] That is, if the activist knows, deep inside, their own dedication to the cause, they will project that onto the agent who is “mirroring” them.
The activist will be deluded into thinking that the agent shares this feeling of identification and bonding. In an activist/social movement setting, the adversarial roles that activists naturally play vis a vis the establishment/government, fosters ongoing processes of intrapsychic splitting so that “twinship alliances” between activist and agent may render whole sectors or reality testing unavailable to the activist. They literally “lose touch with reality.”
Activists who deny their own narcissistic investments [do not have a good idea of their own self-concepts and that they ARE concepts] and consciously perceive themselves (accurately, as it were) to be “helpers” endowed with a special amount of altruism are exceedingly vulnerable to the affective (emotional) simulation of the accomplished agent.
Empathy is fostered in the activist through the expression of quite visible affects. The presentation of tearfulness, sadness, longing, fear, remorse, and guilt, may induce in the helper-oriented activist a strong sense of compassion, while unconsciously enhancing the activist’s narcissistic investment in self as the embodiment of goodness.
The agent’s expresssion of such simulated affects may be quite compelling to the observer and difficult to distinguish from deep emotion.
It can usually be identified by two events, however:
First, the activist who has analyzed his/her own narcissistic roots and is aware of his/her own potential for being “emotionally hooked,” will be able to remain cool and unaffected by such emotional outpourings by the agent.
As a result of this unaffected, cool, attitude, the Second event will occur: The agent will recompensate much too quickly following such an affective expression leaving the activist with the impression that “the play has ended, the curtain has fallen,” and the imposture, for the moment, has finished. The agent will then move quickly to another activist/victim.
The fact is, the movement doesn’t need leaders, it needs MOVERS. “Follow the leader” is a waste of time.
A good agent will want to meet as often as possible. He or she will talk a lot and say little. One can expect an onslaught of long, unresolved discussions.
Some agents take on a pushy, arrogant, or defensive manner:
1) To disrupt the agenda
2) To side-track the discussion
3) To interrupt repeatedly
4) To feign ignorance
5) To make an unfounded accusation against a person.
Calling someone a racist, for example. This tactic is used to discredit a person in the eyes of all other group members.
Saboteurs
Some saboteurs pretend to be activists. She or he will ….
1) Write encyclopedic flyers (in the present day, websites)
2) Print flyers in English only.
3) Have demonstrations in places where no one cares.
4) Solicit funding from rich people instead of grass roots support
5) Display banners with too many words that are confusing.
6) Confuse issues.
7) Make the wrong demands.
Cool Compromise the goal.
9) Have endless discussions that waste everyone’s time. The agent may accompany the endless discussions with drinking, pot smoking or other amusement to slow down the activist’s work.
Provocateurs
1) Want to establish “leaders” to set them up for a fall in order to stop the movement.
2) Suggest doing foolish, illegal things to get the activists in trouble.
3) Encourage militancy.
4) Want to taunt the authorities.
5) Attempt to make the activist compromise their values.
6) Attempt to instigate violence. Activisim ought to always be non-violent.
7) Attempt to provoke revolt among people who are ill-prepared to deal with the reaction of the authorities to such violence.
Informants
1) Want everyone to sign up and sing in and sign everything.
2) Ask a lot of questions (gathering data).
3) Want to know what events the activist is planning to attend.
4) Attempt to make the activist defend him or herself to identify his or her beliefs, goals, and level of commitment.
Recruiting
Legitimate activists do not subject people to hours of persuasive dialog. Their actions, beliefs, and goals speak for themselves.
Groups that DO recruit are missionaries, military, and fake political parties or movements set up by agents.
Surveillance
ALWAYS assume that you are under surveillance.
At this point, if you are NOT under surveillance, you are not a very good activist!
Scare Tactics
They use them.
Such tactics include slander, defamation, threats, getting close to disaffected or minimally committed fellow activists to persuade them (via psychological tactics described above) to turn against the movement and give false testimony against their former compatriots. They will plant illegal substances on the activist and set up an arrest; they will plant false information and set up “exposure,” they will send incriminating letters [emails] in the name of the activist; and more; they will do whatever society will allow.
This booklet in no way covers all the ways agents use to sabotage the lives of sincere an dedicated activists.
If an agent is “exposed,” he or she will be transferred or replaced.
COINTELPRO is still in operation today under a different code name. It is no longer placed on paper where it can be discovered through the freedom of information act.
The FBI counterintelligence program’s stated purpose: To expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, and otherwise neutralize individuals who the FBI categorize as opposed to the National Interests. “National Security” means the FBI’s security from the people ever finding out the vicious things it does in violation of people’s civil liberties.
V. Seventeen Techniques for Truth Suppression
Strong, credible allegations of high-level criminal activity can bring down a government. When the government lacks an effective, fact-based defense, other techniques must be employed. The success of these techniques depends heavily upon a cooperative, compliant press and a mere token opposition party.
1. Dummy up. If it’s not reported, if it’s not news, it didn’t happen.
2. Wax indignant. This is also known as the “How dare you?” gambit.
3. Characterize the charges as “rumors” or, better yet, “wild rumors.” If, in spite of the news blackout, the public is still able to learn about the suspicious facts, it can only be through “rumors.” (If they tend to believe the “rumors” it must be because they are simply “paranoid” or “hysterical.”)
4. Knock down straw men. Deal only with the weakest aspects of the weakest charges. Even better, create your own straw men. Make up wild rumors (or plant false stories) and give them lead play when you appear to debunk all the charges, real and fanciful alike.
5. Call the skeptics names like “conspiracy theorist,” “nutcase,” “ranter,” “kook,” “crackpot,” and, of course, “rumor monger.” Be sure, too, to use heavily loaded verbs and adjectives when characterizing their charges and defending the “more reasonable” government and its defenders. You must then carefully avoid fair and open debate with any of the people you have thus maligned. For insurance, set up your own “skeptics” to shoot down.
6. Impugn motives. Attempt to marginalize the critics by suggesting strongly that they are not really interested in the truth but are simply pursuing a partisan political agenda or are out to make money (compared to over-compensated adherents to the government line who, presumably, are not).
7. Invoke authority. Here the controlled press and the sham opposition can be very useful.
8. Dismiss the charges as “old news.”
9. Come half-clean. This is also known as “confession and avoidance” or “taking the limited hangout route.” This way, you create the impression of candor and honesty while you admit only to relatively harmless, less-than-criminal “mistakes.” This stratagem often requires the embrace of a fall-back position quite different from the one originally taken. With effective damage control, the fall-back position need only be peddled by stooge skeptics to carefully limited markets.
10. Characterize the crimes as impossibly complex and the truth as ultimately unknowable.
11. Reason backward, using the deductive method with a vengeance. With thoroughly rigorous deduction, troublesome evidence is irrelevant. E.g. We have a completely free press. If evidence exists that the Vince Foster “suicide” note was forged, they would have reported it. They haven’t reported it so there is no such evidence. Another variation on this theme involves the likelihood of a conspiracy leaker and a press who would report the leak.
12. Require the skeptics to solve the crime completely. E.g. If Foster was murdered, who did it and why?
13. Change the subject. This technique includes creating and/or publicizing distractions.
14. Lightly report incriminating facts, and then make nothing of them. This is sometimes referred to as “bump and run” reporting.
15. Baldly and brazenly lie. A favorite way of doing this is to attribute the “facts” furnished the public to a plausible-sounding, but anonymous, source.
16. Expanding further on numbers 4 and 5, have your own stooges “expose” scandals and champion popular causes. Their job is to pre-empt real opponents and to play 99-yard football. A variation is to pay rich people for the job who will pretend to spend their own money.
17. Flood the Internet with agents. This is the answer to the question, “What could possibly motivate a person to spend hour upon hour on Internet news groups defending the government and/or the press and harassing genuine critics?” Don’t the authorities have defenders enough in all the newspapers, magazines, radio, and television? One would think refusing to print critical letters and screening out serious callers or dumping them from radio talk shows would be control enough, but, obviously, it is not.
Michael,
1) Always proofread before you post, e.g., "Something to keep in ind".
2) Point being?
3) "People who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones," i.e., Do you work for Vladimir Putin?
4) (It sure seems that way.)
5) When are you going to send that letter of admonishment to John Newman and Peter Dale Scott?
6) It's at 34:48
7) "When losing a debate, resort to slanderous innuendo"?
8 ) Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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There is a whole series of documents outlining the serious ramifications to the KGB by the Nosenko defection
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/15223C84-E1BC-41AB-AD86-A137276F0C1F.jpeg?ver=1566696909720)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/3F49A015-A7F3-4FE8-9F39-AE4080279D80.jpeg?ver=1566696909720)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/2DC15089-88E2-4F0C-A6DA-E3854E1ECE46.jpeg?ver=1566696909720)
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There is a whole series of documents outlining the serious ramifications to the KGB by the Nosenko defection.
.....
Michael,
Wasn't J. Edgar Hoover still running the FBI in July of 1964?
LOL
'Nuff said.
-- MWT. ;)
PS Rhetorical question: Have you ever heard of Aleksey Kulak, aka "Fedora"? The implausibly bold in broad-daylight May, 1962 KGB "walk-in" whom Hoover shielded from the CIA and gave virtual direct access to POTUS for like ...15 years? The guy who not only set the FBI off on a long-term snipe hunt for UNSUBDICK, but who ... gasp ... vouched for Yuri Nosenko's so-called bona fides?
LOL
Maybe you should google him. (Bearing in mind that, until I get around to editing it, most of the "KGB defector or double-agent" stuff on Wikipedia is John L. Hart, Bruce Solie, Richards J. Heuer and/or Cleveland Cram-influenced garbage.)
You do realize, don't you, that in 1980 (i.e., long after Kulak had returned to Moscow, J. Edgar Hoover had died, and the proverbial "cows had left the barn"), the FBI came to the conclusion Kulak had been a KGB triple-agent all-along?
How about another FBI "source" code-named "Shamrock"? Ever heard of him? He also was a KGB triple-agent, and his claim to fame was convincing JEH in 1967 (and trying to convince the CIA) that the Ruskies had undertaken a six-month investigation of the JFK assassination right after The Big Event and had "concluded" that the evil, evil, evil Military Industrial Complex had conspired to kill JFK.
"Shamrock," whom Bill Simpich seems to have conflated with "Byetkov*?" (Ivan Obyedkov -- the Soviet Embassy security guard who volunteered the radioactive name "Kostikov" over a sure-to-be-tapped-by-CIA phoneline to an Oswald impersonator on 10/0263 in M.C.) in Chapter Five of State Secret? (*see below).
LOL
There are so many more.
Maybe I'll tell you about them later.
Cheers!
*From State Secret, Chapter Five: https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/State_Secret_Chapter5.html
Angleton focuses on KGB officer Nikolai Leonov (Note: "The Blond Oswald In Mexico City" -- MWT) as being at the center of both events. Here is a bio of Leonov: HSCA Segregated CIA Collection, Box 8/NARA Record Number: 1993.07.10.11:07:49:620340.
Castro, Che Guevera and their colleagues were arrested in Mexico City on 6/20/56 (Note: And Leonov's "calling card" was found in Fidel's notebook -- MWT). The arrests were conducted by the same man who later interrogated Sylvia Duran, Fernando Barrios Gutierrez (LITEMPO-4). See the New York Times obituary for Fernando Barrios Gutierrez, 11/1/00.
Castro was facing charges (in Mexico in 1956) that he had Communist ties, and Havana demanded his extradition for more than a month before he and his men were finally freed. Tad Szulc, Fidel, pp. 360-364.
In February 1976, Angleton tells the story one more time for the next seven pages - now the name of the double triple (-- MWT) agent earlier referred to "Byetkov" is reviewed by (Note: (true-defector -- MWT) Peter Deriabin.
In this memo, there is a deletion. Is this the allegation of Oswald being arrested in Mexico City while carrying a picture of Leonov? (Note: No! See above note.)
It seems that Angleton got his information from "Byetkov" in 1967, but not certain. (Note: Here Simpich is conflating "Byetkov*?" -- Soviet Embassy Security Guard Ivan Obyedkov -- with FBI/CIA source "Shamrock" (Boris Orehkov), who in 1967 gave FBI and CIA phony information about an alleged 1964 six-month investigation into the JFK assassination by KGB -- MWT)
.....
FWIW, "Shamrock" is mentioned in this article:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/01/10/jfk-files-kgb-had-trusted-relationship-longtime-warren-commission-critic-mark-lane/1018691001/
FBI memo about "Shamrock". His un-redacted name is highlighted in yellow near the bottom of the first page.
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=12653&search=Shamrock#relPageId=2&tab=page
This shows you just how gullible JEH was -- he trusted triple-agent Kulak ("Fedora"), triple-agent "Shamrock" (Orehkov), and false-defector Nosenko!
LOL
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Michael,
I'll be dealing with at least some of the things I've highlighted in the obituary.
One day in June 1962, Tennent "Pete" Bagley, the Soviet specialist at the CIA station in Berne, was instructed to take the train to Geneva to handle the case of a KGB officer attached to the Soviet delegation to a disarmament conference, who was offering his services to the Americans. That short journey turned Bagley into a central figure in perhaps the most controversial and baffling spy story of the entire Cold War.The KGB officer's name was Yuri Nosenko. At that first meeting he agreed to return to Moscow as a CIA agent-in-place. But in January 1964 he was back in Geneva with the Soviet arms delegates, insisting his cover was about to be blown and that he had to come over to
the West. But was he the real thing, or a fake defector sent by the KGB to confuse? If he was a plant, the strategy succeeded brilliantly. For the next dozen years the Nosenko case tied the CIA in knots, paralysing the Agency's vital espionage efforts against its Cold War adversary and destroying careers in the process. Bagley's background was typical in the Agency's early days. He came from an old US Navy family, studded with admirals; his uncle had been the first American killed in the 1898 Spanish-American war. Bagley himself had served in the Marines and studied at Princeton and the University of Geneva before joining the CIA in 1950. He seemed to have it all. He was tall and all-American handsome, talented and ambitious. Some senior figures in the Agency saw him as a future CIA director. He was also a friend of James Angleton, the Agency's formidable counter-intelligence chief. And then Yuri Nosenko came on the scene. Initially Bagley had no doubts. Nosenko was the first senior defector from the KGB's Second Directorate, responsible for internal security and monitoring – and if possible recruiting – personnel in the US Embassy as well as visiting American tourists, businessmen and academics. The information he provided at the 1962 debriefings at a CIA safe house in Geneva was top-class, including details of KGB surveillance methods and leads that hastened the unmasking of several Soviet spies in the West (among them the UK Admiralty clerk, John Vassall). "Jim, I'm involved in the greatest defector case ever," Bagley enthused to Angleton when he returned to Washington. But the older man was visibly unimpressed, and handed Bagley a file to read. "When you finish this, you'll see what I'm saying," he told him. The file essentially consisted of the theorizing of a previous KGB defector, Anatoly Golitsyn, who had come across in 1961.
Golitsyn had managed to convince the paranoid Angleton that not only did the KGB have high-level moles in US and British intelligence, but was running a gigantic disinformation campaign against the West. Nothing was what it seemed, and every defector, according to Golitsyn, was in fact a plant – among them, naturally, Yuri Nosenko. The file planted doubts in Bagley's mind too, and his suspicions were further aroused by discrepancies in Nosenko's initial story. In 1964 those doubts exploded. The defector claimed to have information that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the murder of President Kennedy just two months earlier and, astonishingly, that the KGB didn't even have contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, Kennedy's assassin, during the three mysterious years that the one-time US Marine lived in the Soviet Union, between 1959 and 1962. Nosenko's tale seemed too good to be true, exonerating Moscow just as the Warren Commission was starting work amid widespread suspicion that Oswald was indeed a real-life Manchurian Candidate controlled by the KGB. Soon after landing on US soil, Nosenko found himself a prisoner, held incommunicado in a safe house in Virginia and subjected to harsh interrogation, hunger and sleep deprivation. But he never broke, passing lie detector tests and resisting every effort of Bagley and his fellow sceptics to extract a confession. Gradually the upper echelons of the CIA split into warring camps, of "Fundamentalists" like Angleton and Bagley, and those who believed Nosenko was the real thing, and who were increasingly appalled by the way he was being treated. Ultimately the latter group prevailed. By 1967 Nosenko's ordeal was over, and in 1969 he was formally cleared, placed on the CIA payroll as a consultant and given a new identity. By then Bagley was long since off the case, posted to Brussels, where he would spend five years as station chief before retiring from the Agency in 1972. Amazingly Nosenko never held his harsh treatment against the US, nor regretted his original decision to defect. Bagley, though, remained obsessed by the case, convinced until the end that Nosenko was a plant: "this KGB provocateur and deceiver," as he put it in his 2007 memoir Spy Wars, a powerful argument of the anti-Nosenko case. The book led the CIA to cancel a planned lecture that Bagley was to give: four decades on, old wounds were still bleeding. Nosenko himself died in 2008. A few years earlier, someone asked Bagley what he'd say to Yuri Nosenko if he ever ran into him. His answer was, "Don't shoot."
-- MWT ;)
To all of my faithful followers (LOL) --
Okay, I've already covered the first six highlighted items in the obituary, so now it's time for me to enlighten you on the next three.
7) The file essentially consisted of the theorizing
The file on Golitsyn that Angleton had Bagley read in 1962 did not contain theorizing by Golitsyn, but specific memories regarding his experiences in the KGB, and KGB personnel he either knew personally, or about whom he'd read in KGB reports from several European countries.
8 ) paranoid Angleton
LOL You'd be a little paranoid, too, if your job was to protect the CIA from being penetrated and it had lost a highly placed Soviet intelligence asset (Popov, in October of 1959), your president had been assassinated by, apparently, a former defector to the USSR, and you had a new defector (Golitsyn) who was warning you about the shennagins of a new, top secret "KGB within the KGB" -- Department 14 (aka Department D) of the Second Chief Directorate.
9) every defector, according to Golitsyn, was a plant
A bit of hyperbole. The CIA already had some true defectors (like Pyotr Deriabin and Yuri Rastvorov, both of whom defected in 1954). Regarding future defectors, although Golitsyn (who defected in December 1961) knew that Department 14 (see above) had already sent out someone (Polyakov in 1959; "activated" in 1961) on a "strategic deception" mission, and that KGB would dispatch false defectors (like Yuri Nosenko in January 1964) and triple agents (like Aleksey Kulak in March 1962) to contradict what he, Golitsyn, was trying to tell CIA and the FBI about KGB penetrations of said agencies, as well as about KGB penetrations of several European intelligence agencies and governments, he didn't claim that every single future defector or volunteer double-agent would necessarily be a "plant," but that they should, obviously, be looked at very closely by CIA and/or FBI while trying to determine their "bona fides" or "mala fides," and that they should rely on him to help them make those judgments.
-- MWT ;)
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To all of my faithful followers (LOL) --
Okay, I've already covered the first six highlighted items in the obituary, so now it's time for me to enlighten you on the next three.
7) The file essentially consisted of the theorizing
The file on Golitsyn that Angleton had Bagley read in 1962 did not contain theorizing by Golitsyn, but specific memories regarding his experiences in the KGB, and KGB personnel he either knew personally, or about whom he'd read in KGB reports from several European countries.
8 ) paranoid Angleton
LOL You'd be a little paranoid, too, if your job was to protect the CIA from being penetrated and it had lost a highly placed Soviet intelligence asset (Popov, in October of 1959), your president had been assassinated by, apparently, a former defector to the USSR, and you had a new defector (Golitsyn) who was warning you about the shennagins of a new, top secret "KGB within the KGB" -- Department 14 (aka Department D) of the Second Chief Directorate.
9) every defector, according to Golitsyn, was a plant
A bit of hyperbole. The CIA already had some true defectors (like Pyotr Deriabin and Yuri Rastvorov, both of whom defected in 1954). Regarding future defectors, although Golitsyn (who defected in December 1961) knew that Department 14 (see above) had already sent out someone (Polyakov in 1959; "activated" in 1961) on a "strategic deception" mission, and that KGB would dispatch false defectors (like Yuri Nosenko in January 1964) and triple agents (like Aleksey Kulak in March 1962) to contradict what he, Golitsyn, was trying to tell CIA and the FBI about KGB penetrations of said agencies, as well as about KGB penetrations of several European intelligence agencies and governments, he didn't claim that every single future defector or volunteer double-agent would necessarily be a "plant," but that they should be looked at very closely by CIA and/or FBI while trying to determine their "bona fides" or "mala fides," and that they should rely on him to help them make those judgments.
-- MWT ;)
The third one is going take a while to sort-out.
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The third one is going take a while to sort-out.
Michael,
I personally can't think of any post-Golitsyn true defectors or true KGB double-agents who worked for CIA and/or FBI, although I think Bagley insinuates that there might have been a few.
In my eyes, Oleg Kalugin (who was not really a defector), Oleg Gordievsky and Vasili Mitrokhin are all suspect (as is, btw, MI-5's official historian, Christopher Andrew), for the simple reason that they all claim that Yuri Nosenko was a true defector.
Andrew even has the gall to deny that Sir Roger Hollis was a traitor, when it's almost certain that he betrayed Oleg Penkovsky about two weeks after he'd been recruited by MI-6 and CIA.
All of which reminds me of what James Angleton said during his Church Committee testimony: "A triple-agent will tell you the truth about basically unimportant things 98 percent of the time, and will lie to you about important things the other 2 percent of the time, and he'll really mess you up, boy" (or words to that effect).
Caveat: As Bagley points points out in Spy Wars, Department 14 was so shut-off from other KGB departments that sometimes KGB intentionally lied to its own officers, knowing that they would unwittingly perpetuate the myth of whatever Department 14 deception was being, or had been, run.
Bottom line: Maybe the guys I mentioned, above, aren't "false defectors" per se, but former KGB officers who were lied to, regarding Nosenko, by their superiors .
But, then again ...
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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To all of my faithful followers (LOL) --
Okay, I've already covered the first six highlighted items in the obituary, so now it's time for me to enlighten you on the next three.
7) The file essentially consisted of the theorizing
The file on Golitsyn that Angleton had Bagley read in 1962 did not contain theorizing by Golitsyn, but specific memories regarding his experiences in the KGB, and KGB personnel he either knew personally, or about whom he'd read in KGB reports from several European countries.
8 ) paranoid Angleton
LOL You'd be a little paranoid, too, if your job was to protect the CIA from being penetrated and it had lost a highly placed Soviet intelligence asset (Popov, in October of 1959), your president had been assassinated by, apparently, a former defector to the USSR, and you had a new defector (Golitsyn) who was warning you about the shennagins of a new, top secret "KGB within the KGB" -- Department 14 (aka Department D) of the Second Chief Directorate.
9) every defector, according to Golitsyn, was a plant
A bit of hyperbole. The CIA already had some true defectors (like Pyotr Deriabin and Yuri Rastvorov, both of whom defected in 1954). Regarding future defectors, although Golitsyn (who defected in December 1961) knew that Department 14 (see above) had already sent out someone (Polyakov in 1959; "activated" in 1961) on a "strategic deception" mission, and that KGB would dispatch false defectors (like Yuri Nosenko in January 1964) and triple agents (like Aleksey Kulak in March 1962) to contradict what he, Golitsyn, was trying to tell CIA and the FBI about KGB penetrations of said agencies, as well as about KGB penetrations of several European intelligence agencies and governments, he didn't claim that every single future defector or volunteer double-agent would necessarily be a "plant," but that they should, obviously, be looked at very closely by CIA and/or FBI while trying to determine their "bona fides" or "mala fides," and that they should rely on him to help them make those judgments.
-- MWT ;)
To all of my dear followers (lol) --
Something I forgot to include in my rebuttal of the obituary's "The top-secret Golitsyn file that Bagley read in 1962 essentially contained only Golytsyn's theories" bit, above, is a very important thing I was reminded of by re-reading, this morning, parts of Mark Riebling's fine 1994 book Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA -- that Golitsyn had brought with him a top-secret 1959 KGB document detailing the decisions taken at the Twentieth Communist World Congress to not only designate the U.S. the "Main Enemy" from then on, but to try a new approach: the establishing of a top-secret "KGB within the KGB" (Department 14 of the Second Chief Directorate), charged with winning the Cold War -- without the USSR's actually going to war -- by waging Sun Tzu-like "strategic deception" counterintelligence operations (akin to Lenin's "Operation Trust," and "Sindikat-2"), and interweaving them with traditional "active measures" counterintelligence operations so as to form devastating "feedback loops" against the CIA and the FBI.
In other words, the Golitsyn file that wise James Angleton had Tennent H. Bagley read, right after having interviewed Nosenko for a week in Geneva, described the new-since-1959 so-called "Monster Plot" that true-and-sane defector Anatoliy Golitsyn was trying to warn those very same agencies about, and of which Yuri Nosenko was a major part at the time.
-- MWT ;)
-
To all of my dear followers (lol) --
........
..... true-and-sane defector Anatoliy Golitsyn was trying to ....
-- MWT ;)
Thomas, who said that Golitsyn wasn’t sane?
-
Thomas, who said that Golitsyn wasn’t sane?
Michael,
Well, didn't your boy John L. Hart say he was a certified "Paranoid," or was that your other hero, Richards J. Heuer?
Leonard "I Destroyed Scotty Miler's Records on Nosenko" McCoy?
It's so hard to keep all of those wishful-thinking, spiteful, under-endowed virtual traitors straight!
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS Cleveland Cram? Bruce "Gumshoe" Solie?
-
Michael,
Well, didn't your boy John L. Hart say he was a certified "Paranoid," or was that your other hero, Richards J. Heuer?
Leonard "I Destroyed Scotty Miler's Records on Nosenko" McCoy?
It's so hard to keep up will all those wishful-thinking, spiteful, under-endowed virtual traitors ...
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
“I find your knowledge of who is, and who is not, “well endowed” disturbing”
-
“I find your knowledge of who is, and who is not, “well endowed” disturbing”
Michael,
As with most things on this forum and at the EF, you got it backwards.
As Tennent H. Bagley said, he and Scotty Miler, and James Angleton, et al., were undermined (and KGB's "Monster Plot" abetted) by a few spiteful and under-endowed CIA officers.
Probable mole Richard Kovich, and virtual traitors Leonard McCoy, John L. Hart, Bruce Solie, Howard Osborne, Richards J. Heuer, Clevelland Cram, and possible mole William Colby come to mind.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
-
Michael,
, et al.,
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
Who is “et al.”? There is no “et al”.
-
Who is “et al.”? There is no “et al”.
Michael,
Vague post.
What's the context?
And .. uhh ... regardless ... how do you know?
Something that Vladimir Putin, or Julian Assange, or Tim Leonard (aka "Adam Carter") told you?
Jefferson "Intellectually Dishonest" Morley?
James "Jumbo Duh" DiEugenio?
Dawn "Tin Foil Hat" Meredith?
Mark "The CPUSA Paid Me" Lane?
Oliver "I Trust Putin and My Son Works for RT" Stone?
Tom "Virtual Traitor Leonard McCoy Was My Main Source" Mangold?
David "Not So" Wise?
LOL
-- MWT ;)
Cheers!
-
Michael,
Vague post.
What's the context?
-- MWT ;)
Cheers!
The context is your post, I quoted you. You are implying with your “et al.” that there is a list of like minded people on your list beyond Bagely, Angleton, and Miller? There isn’t.
-
Michael,
Vague post.
What's the context?
And .. uhh ... regardless ... how do you know?
Something that Vladimir Putin, or Julian Assange, or Tim Leonard (aka "Adam Carter") told you?
Jefferson "Intellectually Dishonest" Morley?
James "Jumbo Duh" DiEugenio?
Dawn "Tin Foil Hat" Meredith?
Mark "The CPUSA Paid Me" Lane?
Oliver "I Trust Putin and My Son Works for RT" Stone?
Tom "Virtual Traitor Leonard McCoy Was My Main Source" Mangold?
David "Not So" Wise?
LOL
-- MWT ;)
Cheers!
Thomas, your list includes the set that is equal to everybody but you, and two other dead men.
-
Thomas, your list includes the set that is equal to everybody but you, and two other dead men.
Yep, it was monstrous wishfull-thinking on their part, all right, and ol' Yuri told 'em just what they wanted to hear!
Set?
Boolean Algebra, or a new hit singularity by that hip-hop group "Alice Mandelbrot and the Strange Attractors"?
Point Match?
-
Michael,
As with most things on this forum and at the EF, you got it backwards.
As Tennent H. Bagley said, he and Scotty Miler, and James Angleton, et al., were undermined (and KGB's "Monster Plot" abetted) by a few spiteful and under-endowed CIA officers.
Probable mole Richard Kovich, and virtual traitors Leonard McCoy, John L. Hart, Bruce Solie, Howard Osborne, Richards J. Heuer, Clevelland Cram, and possible mole William Colby come to mind.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
What about Helms?
-
What about Helms?
Helms?
You didn't know he signed off on ol' Yuri just as a matter of expediency, and that in his HSCA testimony he called 'em a liar?
Nope, Helms distrusted Nosenko until the day he died.
He wasn't perfect, though.
In fact, one of Helms' biggest mistakes was following official procedure and turning the Peter Karlow serial over to JEH on January 9, 1962 -- three weeks after true-defector Golitsyn had defected to the U.S. -- and then, of course, some gumshoe FBI agents messed up the surveillance of the former "Easy Chair" chief.
Who was the FBI genius who thought of sending some agents to his house to ask him if they could use his basement to listen in on some his neighbors who were suspected by the FBI "of being German spies"?
Karlow says "okay," and the next morning, being a tech-guy, himself, easily realizes that they've tapped his phone, instead!
Oh yeah, and who was the genius in the FBI who had a "chimney sweeper" knock on his door and offer to clean his chimney ... for free?
And so he grows suspicious and makes a mysterious trip to Philly with a box, goes into a building with the box and comes out without the box, and later tells his interrogators that it was his "extra prosthetic leg" that he'd taken in for "some repairs," and ... and ... and ... JEH gets frustrated with all this unproductive surveillance xxxx and, instead of "playing him" to see who else he might secretly contact, they haul his xxx in for five days of harsh interrorgation?
LOL
Heck, I wouldn't be surprised if he transported top-secret CIA docs to his KGB handler (in Philly?) inside his prosthetic leg, in a box, or not in a box.
Look it up in Mark Riebling's Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA. (It's free-to-read on the Internet.)
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
-
The context is your post, I quoted you. You are implying with your “et al.” that there is a list of like minded people on your list beyond Bagely, Angleton, and Miller. There isn’t.
Michael,
Bagley's Soviet Russia/Soviet Block Counterintelligence section and James Angleton's CI Staff were both highly secretive and neither of them had a whole lot of people in them, but one name in Bagley's section that comes to mind is "Joe Westin," who, at a late date, tried to "go to bat" for the Nosenko-is-a-false-defector guys, but was told in so many words (by Colby or some other fool) that if he didn't cease and desist, there "wouldn't be room" for him in CIA.
A CIA employee who was convinced that Nosenko was a false defector and who also believed in Golitsyn's Monster Plot "theory" was true defector Pyotr Deriabin. Ever heard of him?
How about William Hood (who was in a different division, altogether)?
There are probably others, but I can't think of them at the moment.
Maybe you should look at Bagley's "acknowledgements page" at the beginning of Spy Wars to get an inkling of some of the people who were on Bagley's, Angleton's and Miler's side in the Golitsyn versus Nosenko controversy, and everything that entailed?
Just an idea.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
-
The context is your post, I quoted you. You are implying with your “et al.” that there is a list of like minded people on your list beyond Bagely, Angleton, and Miller. [sic] There isn’t.
....
Michael,
Bagley's Soviet Russia/Soviet Block Counterintelligence section and James Angleton's CI Staff were both highly secretive and neither of them had a whole lot of people in them, but one name in Bagley's section that comes to mind is "Joe Westin," who, at a late date according to Bagley, tried to "go to bat" for the Nosenko-is-a-false-defector guys, but was told in so many words (by Colby or some other fool) that if he didn't cease and desist, there "wouldn't be room" for him in the CIA.
A CIA employee who was convinced that Nosenko was a false defector and who evidently also believed in Golitsyn's Monster Plot "theory" was true defector Pyotr Deriabin. Ever heard of him?
How about William Hood (although he was in a different division)?
There are probably others, but I can't think of them at the moment.
Maybe you should look at Bagley's "acknowledgements page" at the beginning of Spy Wars to get an inkling of some of the people who were on Bagley's, Angleton's and Miler's side in the Golitsyn-versus-Nosenko controversy, and everything that entailed?
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames
Just an idea.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
Michael,
Eighty-nine Ninety-two Ninety-four people, et al., are waiting for you to say something ...
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
-
The context is your post, I quoted you. You are implying with your “et al.” that there is a list of like minded people on your list beyond Bagely, Angleton, and Miller. [sic] There isn’t.
....
Michael,
Eighty-nine Ninety-two Ninety-four people, et al., are waiting for you to say something ...
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
But let's talk about probable mole George Kisevalter, shall we?
Russia-born chess prodigy George Kisevalter, the CIA "expert handler" who handled Pyotr Popov and Oleg Penkovsky before they were arrested by KGB and executed.
The native Russian speaker who was sent by CIA to Geneva in June 1962 to "help" Bagley interview Nosenko, and who was probably responsible for the 150 mis-transcriptions of the tape recordings that were secretly made during those five days in Switzerland, which mis-transcriptions were later discovered by true-defector Pyotr Deriabin.
The guy who later contradicted Bagley on the critical issue of whether or not Nosenko had mentioned, in June 1962, that U.S. Embassy security officer John Abidian had been spotted by KGB in December 1961 while he was allegedly checking on Penkovsky's "dead drop" on Pushkin Street.
The guy who, because of his great "stature" in CIA, was never interrogated during The Great Mole Hunt.
The guy who said Bagley's Russian was poor, and that Nosenko's English was ... poor.
The guy who, iirc, said Nosenko was virtually snockered on Scotch during every interview in Geneva.
The guy who swore up and down that Golitsyn was nuts, and Nosenko a true defector.
The guy ... (etc, etc)
No, Michael.
I might as well confess right now that (probable mole) George Kisevalter isn't on that "list".
He isn't exactly one of pro-Golitsyn / anti-Nosenko people I'm thinking of -- i.e., he's not and never will be one of the sacred "et al.s".
LOL
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
-
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=121783#relPageId=2&tab=page
Nosenko did far more damage to KGB than Golitsyn
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/2E3919EB-9044-49AC-A32E-B187CFF1F768.jpeg?ver=1567260665686)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/13608514-8B17-4C60-89EA-E291444F8380.jpeg?ver=1567260665686)
-
Michael,
In my humble opinion, it's a pity you're so biased, so gullible, so pro-Nosenko, so anti-Golitsyn, so anti-Bagley, so anti-Angleton, so anti-Miler, so anti-Papich, et al.
In short, that you're such a... gasp ... wegular widdle firebwand!
FBI source NY 3653-S* (in the document you posted) was none other than Aleksey Kulak ("Fedora"), the KGB officer who implausibly walked into the FBI field office in New York City in broad daylight in March 1962 (three months after true defector KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn had defected to the U.S.) and "volunteered" to spy for the FBI, saying, "Don't worry, boys, the KGB didn't tail me here because all of my colleagues are meeting right now a couple of blocks away at the Soviet consulate, talking about a FBI traitor we call "Dick," thereby sending FBI off on a multi-year wild goose chase for "UNSUBDICK" (i.e., an unsubstantiated mole whom the Ruskies had allegedly given the code name "Dick").
Didn't you know that in 1980 the FBI finally realized that NY 3653-S* (Aleksey Kulak, aka "Fedora") had been a triple-agent, loyal to the Kremlin all along (for, like FIFTEEN YEARS)?
LOL
-- MWT :)
PS How's that letter to Newman and Scott coming along? You are going to set them straight, aren't you? (If it makes you feel any better, Tennent H. Bagley did not believe the Russians or Castro's Cubans killed JFK -- he was convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated him all by him widdle self!)
PPS In 1961, GRU Colonel Dimitri Polyakov, already on his second two-year tour of duty at the U.N. in NYC, suddenly "volunteered" to spy for the FBI and the CIA, so when Hoover's boy Aleksey Kulak ("Fedora") walked in, he and Polyakov were really able to do a "job" on the gullible, overly territorial, flat-footed, wishful-thinking FBI. Those two Ruskie triple-agents formed a regular heavyweight tag-team that even ol' Mudd Wrassler Tommy would have had a hard time subduing!
PPPS To prove it to yourself that NY 3653-S* was Kulak/Fedora, just go to the Mary Ferrell website and plug that number into the "FBI Documents" search box.
Cheers!
-
Michael,
In my humble opinion, it's a pity you're so biased, so gullible, so pro-Nosenko, so anti-Golitsyn, so anti-Bagley, so anti-Angleton, so anti-Miler, so anti-Papich, et al.
.....
Cheers!
Nosenko spills the beans on a boatload of KGB operatives:
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=121991#relPageId=2&tab=page
-
Nosenko spills the beans on a boatload of KGB operatives:
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=121991#relPageId=2&tab=page
Oh my God.
We've already been through this, Michael. Don't you remember?
And don't you remember the standing challenge I gave you several months ago? --
Name one person Nosenko "uncovered" for the FBI or the CIA who was:
1) not already suspected,
- OR -
2) was still working for the KGB or the GRU,
- OR -
3) still had access to classified information.
Don't you remember how I so methodically shot down all of Richards J. Heuer's candidates?
(Or were they your boy, HSCA perjurer John L. Hart's?)
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
PS How's that letter coming along, Michael?
I mean, I mean, I mean ... you are going to set them straight, aren't you?
(stifled laugh)
-
Oh my God. We've already been through this, Michael. Don't you remember? And don't you remember the standing challenge I gave you several months ago? -- Name one person Nosenko "uncovered" for the FBI or the CIA who was:1) not already suspected,- OR -2) was still working for the KGB or the GRU,- OR - 3) still had access to classified information.
Don't you remember how I so methodically shot down all of Richards J. Heuer's candidates?
Thomas, do you have recollections of anything that actually occurred, or just made-up stuff?
And Thomas, wasn’t one of your stipulations that the candidate be born on the third Thursday of a 30- day month and whose mother was left handed?
Thomas, Don’t you remember being told that you are full of beans?
-
Thomas, do you have recollections of anything that actually occurred, or just made-up stuff?
Michael,
It's very, very sad to see you so desperate as to have to resort to using Iacoletti's "tactics" when you're ... gasp ... losing yet another debate.
What did I "make up" regarding whether or not your hero, Yuri Nosenko, actually "uncovered" for the FBI or CIA (or any of our allies' intelligence agencies) any active or previously unsuspected KGB/ GRU agents or moles, Michael?
Care to specify?
What, you can't ? ? ? ? ? ?
Tsk, tsk!
(How's that letter to Newman and Scott coming along, btw? You're gonna set 'em straight for-once-and-for-all, right?)
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
EDIT (You're counting them, right?):
HEY, MIKE, WANNA PULL AN ALL-NIGHTER???
-
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=182449&search=Nosenko#relPageId=108&tab=page
The Case against Nosenko is improbable and indeed impossible.
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/FD614A42-CBF2-4855-AC06-844915F66CB4.jpeg?ver=1567845039382)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/35ACA844-5E77-453B-8613-B1D1D5A2D5F3.jpeg?ver=1567845039382)
-
. . .
Michael, Michael, Michael ...
Army Sgt. Dayle W. Smith was referenced in the FBI document you posted a couple of posts ago, in which document he was correctly posited (thanks to oh-so-helpful but oh-so-coy Nosenko) as being "Andrey," ... gasp ... "the most important American Intelligence asset the KGB has ever recruited," according to what fake-defector Nosenko told Bagley in Geneva in 1962, and the ostensible reason "The Three Musketeers" (Kovshuk, Guk and Kislov) had journeyed to Washington D.C. in early 1957 -- to "reestablish contact" with this very, very, very, very important spy!
LOL
In reality, Sgt. Smith, aka "Andrey," was a former cipher machine mechanic who had never had access to secret codes, who wasn't even prosecuted when he was "uncovered," and whom the KGB, given the fact that it had to know that true-defector Anatoliy Golitsyn had already told CIA identifying and "connect-the-dots" clues about the Three Musketeers, conveniently used Poor Dayle to hide the real reason the three mysterious swashbucklers had come to D.C. and hung out around (and inside) movie houses for so many months, i.e., to reestablish contact with (or possibly re-recruit) "Popov's Mole," former CIA officer Edward Ellis Smith, and, very probably, to recruit someone in CIA's Soviet Russia Division he had turned KGB onto.
LOL
You really do need to read Bagley's Spy Wars and Ghosts of the Spy Wars, my fwiend.
Have you seen Bagley's "Twenty Questions About Nosenko" near the end of Ghosts of the Spy Wars?
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
Can you answer any of them?
(I sincerely hope Spy Wars and Ghosts of the Spy Wars aren't too complicated for you, Michael. All those Russian names, and the KGB's artful interweaving, since 1959, of traditional "Active Measures CI Ops" with newfangled Sun Tzu-like "Strategic Deception CI Ops," and everything.)
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
-
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=182449&search=Nosenko#relPageId=109&tab=page
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/6CD1AD99-E71A-4AEB-8428-60978BB8ECA8.jpeg?ver=1567868011525)
-
. . .
Michael,
It's a shame that you seem to be utterly incapable of formulating your own rebuttals to my posts about Nosenko and Golitsyn, et al., but instead must resort to copying and pasting oh-so important-looking but discredited documents and writings that I've already (either preemptively or after-the-fact) demolished by methodically tearing them apart, myself, or by suggesting to you that you swallow your pride and actually read Tennent H. Bagley's Spy Wars and Ghosts of the Spy Wars, and Mark Riebling's book Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA.
It would appear that you don't read my posts, or if you do, that they cause you so much Cognitive Dissonance Pain that you choose to dismiss their import for psychological reasons and/or that "winning" is so important to you (in a Trump-like way) that all you can think of is finding another misleading document or essay to post in hopes that it will encourage our guests to be just as brainwashed(?) as you evidently are.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
By the way, how is your letter to professors John Newman and Peter Dale Scott coming along?
You're going to convince them, by turning them onto Five Paths to Judgement and John L. Hart's Monster Plot Report, that your boy Nosenko was a true defector all along, right?
LOL
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames/page/n3
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
https://archive.org/details/WedgeFromPearlHarborTo911HowTheSecretWarBetweenTheFBIAndCIAHasEndangeredNationalSecurity
-
Michael,
It's a shame that you seem to be incapable of formulating your own rebuttals to my posts about Nosenko and Golitsyn, et al., but instead must resort to copying and pasting oh-so important-looking documents and writings that I've already, i.e., preemptively, demolished by either methodically tearing them apart, myself, or by suggesting that you read Tennent H. Bagley's Spy Wars and Ghosts of the Spy Wars, and Mark Riebling's book Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA.
It would appear that you don't read my posts, or if you do, that they cause you so much Cognitive Dissonance Pain that you choose to dismiss their import for psychological reasons and/or that "winning" is so important to you (in a Trump-like way) that all you can think of is finding another misleading document or essay to post in hopes that it will encourage our guests to be just as brainwashed as you evidently are.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
By the way, how is your letter to professors John Newman and Peter Dale Scott coming along?
You're going to convince them, by turning them onto Five Paths to Judgement and John L. Hart's Monster Plot Report, that your boy Nosenko was a true defector all along, right?
LOL
Same old, same old tired response.
-
Same old, same old tired response.
Michael,
Yes, I would imagine that my responses are very very tiring for you, indeed, seeing as how you don't know how to reply to them in a coherent, convincing manner.
How's that letter coming along, by the way?
LOL
To all of our open-minded guests: Please note that the very last thing Professor Scott says to John Newman is that he "absolutely believes him (Bagley, via Newman) that Nosenko was sent to the U.S. (by the KGB) to discredit (true defector) Golitsyn."
Did you miss that part, Michael?
-- MWT Walk:
-
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10150-10004.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/D1B465CA-640E-47FF-A47D-90175D63BB76.jpeg?ver=1567891843281)
-
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10150-10004.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/D1B465CA-640E-47FF-A47D-90175D63BB76.jpeg?ver=1567891843281)
Bruce Solie?
LOL
Bruce Solie, the gumshoe-like CIA Office of Security guy who was bamboozled by several KGB triple agents/false defectors, who lost true-defector "Shadrin" in Vienna, and who coaxed Nosenko through his final "clearing" polygraph tests with hints and softball questions??
What a joke.
LOL
-- MWT ;)
PS Riebling says some choice things about him in Wedge, as does Bagley in Spy Wars.
-
Bruce Solie? LOL Bruce Solie, the gumshoe-like CIA Office of Security guy who was bamboozled by several KGB triple agents/false defectors, who lost true-defector "Shadrin" in Vienna, and who coaxed Nosenko through his final "clearing" polygraph tests with hints and softball questions?? What a joke. LOL -- MWT ;) PS Riebling says some choice things about him in Wedge, as does Bagley in Spy Wars.
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10150-10004.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/00AF168A-F700-4534-B42F-2191FDA22BFB.jpeg?ver=1567892631768)
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/C27C7F9E-6B09-4448-9568-671418DD402C.jpeg?ver=1567892631768)
-
. . .
Michael,
Why are you posting the same long and highly misleading Bruce Solie-written report in two consecutive posts? (Isn't that ... gasp ... against Forum Rules?)
I mean, I mean, I mean ... are you ... gasp ... at a loss for words and at this point just desperately trying to fool our guests into believing that you aren't losing our little debate about Nosenko and Golitsyn, et al.?
Aren't you capable of responding, in your own words, to the three points I made about that jerk, above?
Are you afraid to read about Solie in Riebling's Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA and in Bagley's Spy Wars?
(I hope you don't think those two books are products of ... gasp ... the evil, evil, evil, evil Deep State.)
They're free-to-read, you know. I posted "links" to them -- and to Bagley's 35 page PDF Ghosts of the Spy War -- above, in an earlier post on this page, this thread.
-- MWT ;)
PS How's that letter to Newman and Scott coming along? You're gonna set 'em straight about your boy, Nosenko, right?
PPS Hey, Mike ... wanna pull an all-nighter?
PPPS Written by Gumshoe and FBI-like Office of Security officer Bruce Solie, huh? The guy who was bamboozled by several KGB triple-agents/false-defectors, lost true-defector "Shadrin" to KGB kidnappers in Vienna, and who coached Nosenko through his final "clearing" polygraphs?
Bruce L. Solie.
What a "piece of work" he was.
-
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10150-10004.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/5D82664C-0096-4F8A-B8A8-837E6E979A47.jpeg?ver=1567986091296)
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https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10150-10004.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/5D82664C-0096-4F8A-B8A8-837E6E979A47.jpeg?ver=1567986091296)
Michael,
Are you mystically inclined, Mike?
Do you really believe "Third time's the charm"? Isn't it against Forum Rules to post the same (long; grossly blown-up) document three times in a row, especially with no meaningful comments of your own?
Relative "newbie" that you are, you're really quite desperate, aren't you? (It shows, my friend, it shows.)
Haven't you read about Gumshoe Solie in Bagley's Spy Wars or Riebling's Wedge, yet? (I gave you the free-to-read "links" to those two books, above. Don't you remember?)
Tsk, tsk. Such a pity
Cheers!
-- MWT
PS How's that letter coming along?
PPS You know what your posts are like, Michael? They're like a stranger who "gets off on" walking into peoples' houses during a dinner party and dumping a hot, stinkin' load in the middle of the living room, getting up, smiling contentedly, ... and then walking out.
Shall I start calling you "Dump Artist Mike"?
EDIT: Or "Mike The Dump Artist", "MTDA" for short?
-
Michael,
Are you mystically inclined, Mike?
Do you really believe "Third time's the charm"?
Relative "newbie" that you are, you're really quite desperate, aren't you? (It shows, my friend, it shows.)
Haven't you read about Gumshoe Solie in Bagley's Spy Wars or Riebling's Wedge, yet? (I gave you the free-to-read "links" to those two books, above. Don't you remember?)
Tsk, tsk. Such a pity
Cheers!
-- MWT
PS How's that letter coming along?
PPS You know what your posts are like, Michael? They're like a stranger who "gets off on" walking into peoples' houses during a dinner party and dumping a hot, stinkin' load in the middle of the living room, getting up, smiling contentedly, ... and then walking out.
Shall I start calling you "Dump Artist"?
Noted
-
Noted
Michael,
How's that letter to Newman and Scott coming along?
You're gonna set 'em straight about your boy, Nosenko, right?
-- MWT ;)
PS Why did you leave out my question, "Isn't it against Forum Rules to post a (long; grossly over-enlarged) document three times in a row, especially with no meaningful comments of your own?"
Edit: Isn't that the same thing as SPAMMING, a form of TROLLING?
PPS Duly noted.
-
Michael,
..........
-- MWT ;)
PS Why did you leave out my question, "Isn't it against Forum Rules to post a (long; grossly over-enlarged) document three times in a row, especially with no meaningful comments of your own?"
Edit: Isn't that the same thing as SPAMMING, a form of TROLLING?
PPS Duly noted.
You edited that in
-
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10150-10004.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/7A5716B0-FED6-408E-9489-B5032F65A588.jpeg?ver=1567990348373)
-
. . .
LOL
You just don't "get it," do you, Michael?
Any of our open-minded guests who have taken the time to not only read my posts, but to also look up Nosenko, Golitsyn, "Fedora," Edward Ellis Smith, John L. Hart, Leonard McCoy, and Bruce L. Solie, et al., in Spy Wars, Ghosts of the Spy Wars, and Wedge can see right through your desperate efforts to hide the fact that you're losing this "debate," big time.
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames/page/n3
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
https://archive.org/details/WedgeFromPearlHarborTo911HowTheSecretWarBetweenTheFBIAndCIAHasEndangeredNationalSecurity
Or, for that matter, to watch John M. Newman's two-part "Spy Wars" presentation from March, 2018.
-- MWT ;)
-
LOL
You just don't "get it," do you, Michael?
Any of our open-minded guests who have taken the time to not only read my posts, .......
(https://media.giphy.com/media/8cdfoJuYuz2u27DAAO/giphy.gif)
(https://giphy.com/gifs/8cdfoJuYuz2u27DAAO/html5)
-
. . .
Yet another enlightening and highly cerebral post by Michael "I Obviously Don't Get It" Clark.
-- MWT ;)
PS How's that letter coming along, Mike?
PPS You forgot to include this part:
" ... but to also look up Nosenko, Golitsyn, "Fedora," Edward Ellis Smith, John L. Hart, Leonard McCoy, and Bruce L. Solie, et al., in Spy Wars, Ghosts of the Spy Wars, and Wedge can see right through your desperate efforts to hide the fact that you're losing this 'debate,' big time."
https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames/page/n3
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362
https://archive.org/details/WedgeFromPearlHarborTo911HowTheSecretWarBetweenTheFBIAndCIAHasEndangeredNationalSecurity
"Or, for that matter, to watch John M. Newman's two-part "Spy Wars" presentation from March, 2018."
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
-
...
PS How's that letter coming along, Mike?
...
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
(https://media.giphy.com/media/ES3kwwGsuroHK/giphy.gif)
-
(https://media.giphy.com/media/nGtOFccLzujug/giphy.gif)
Michael,
It's good to see you so hard at work, trying to overcome your "writer's block".
You're gonna set professors Newman and Scott straight about your boy, Nosenko, right?
I think you're right -- They're probably not aware that HSCA perjurer John L. Hart's "Monster Plot Report" was released to the public in 2017!
-- MWT :D
-
....
-
...
-
....
Hey, Michael!
Wanna pull an "all-nighter"?
-- MWT ;)
PS How's that letter coming along?
You are gonna set 'em straight, right?
-
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10150-10004.pdf
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/392E9123-A927-4395-86CE-7F7EE52B6FF0.jpeg?ver=1567999926368)
-
. . .
Michael,
Do you realize how pathetic you look to our open-minded and inquisitive guests?
-- MWT ;)
PS How's that letter to professors Newman and Scott coming along?
You're gonna set 'em straight about your boy, Nosenko, right?
LOL
-
https://jfkfacts.org/was-yuri-nosenko-a-kgb-mole/#more-29709
Was Yuri Nosenko a KGB mole?
jeffmorley
A readeader asks:
Do you still believe Nosenko was a true defector, Jeff?
Have you read Tennent H. Bagley’s “Spy Wars,” or even his 35-page PDF “Ghosts of the Spy Wars”?
Yes, I did read Bagley’s Spy Wars. I also interviewed him. And yes, I do believe Nosenko was a true defector.
I think Bagley was wrong, for two reasons: lack of a plausible suspect and lack of damage to CIA operations.
Remember Angleton’s theory that Nosenko was a dispatched defector is inextricably bound up in the theory that Nosenko was dispatched to protect a mole already working inside the CIA as of January 1964. So the reader’s question is really two, was Nosenko a mole? And, if so, who was he protecting?
As I asked in THE GHOST
if there was a mole burrowed into the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, as the Angletonians claimed, who the devil was it? And what damage did he do?
James Angleton
James Angleton oversaw the surveillance of Oswald
Those who argue that Nosenko was a controlled defector need to answer these two questions. I was especially convinced by George Kisevalter, the most experienced CIA officer handling Russian defector. Kisevalter always vouched for Nosenko’s bonafides.
From THE GHOST
“Kisevalter’s opinion was not idiosyncratic. In 1997, he received the agency’s Trailblazer Award recognizing him as one of fifty top CIA officers in its first fifty years, an honor Angleton did not receive. There was never any doubt in Kisevalter’s mind about the bona fides of Yuri Nosenko. Three subsequent reviews by senior CIA officers reached the same conclusion. So did Cleveland Cram, the former London station chief who wrote the definitive study of Angleton’s operations.. So did Benjamin Fischer, a career officer who became the agency’s chief historian.
“The Great Mole Hunt or Great Mole Scare of the late 1960s turned the CIA inside out ruining careers and reputations in search for Soviet penetrations that may or may not have existed,” Fischer wrote.
The dissenters from the institutional consensus about the Mole Hunt were mostly officers who had served Angleton on the Counterintelligence Staff. The Angletonians, as they called themselves, were a dogged bunch. Bill Hood and Pete Bagley asserted that the clandestine service was never penetrated during Angleton’s watch–which is true. They also claimed that the CIA’s operations against the Soviet Union were not unduly harmed by the Mole Hunt–which is not.
Yuri Nosenko and wife
Exonerated mole suspect Yuri Nosenko and wife.
Angleton and his acolytes would speak many words in his defense and write more than a few books. They cited scores of statements by Yuri Nosenko that they said were not credible or misleading, and indeed, Nosenko had exaggerated and embellished as defectors often do. But if there was a mole burrowed into the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, as the Angletonians claimed, who the devil was it? And what damage did he do?
The CIA has learned from hard experience what happened when the Soviets succeeded their operations: agents were arrested and executed. But even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the opening of significant portions of KGB archives, the Angletonians could not identify any operations compromised by the putative mole [allegedly protected by Nosenko]. They could not even offer up the name of a single plausible candidate. After the passage of five decades, the likeliest explanation is that there wasn’t a mole.”
-
https://jfkfacts.org/was-yuri-nosenko-a-kgb-mole/#more-29709
Was Yuri Nosenko a KGB mole?
jeffmorley
A readeader asks:
Do you still believe Nosenko was a true defector, Jeff?
Have you read Tennent H. Bagley’s “Spy Wars,” or even his 35-page PDF “Ghosts of the Spy Wars”?
Yes, I did read Bagley’s Spy Wars. I also interviewed him. And yes, I do believe Nosenko was a true defector.
I think Bagley was wrong, for two reasons: lack of a plausible suspect and lack of damage to CIA operations.
Remember Angleton’s theory that Nosenko was a dispatched defector is inextricably bound up in the theory that Nosenko was dispatched to protect a mole already working inside the CIA as of January 1964. So the reader’s question is really two, was Nosenko a mole? And, if so, who was he protecting?
As I asked in THE GHOST
if there was a mole burrowed into the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, as the Angletonians claimed, who the devil was it? And what damage did he do?
James Angleton
James Angleton oversaw the surveillance of Oswald
Those who argue that Nosenko was a controlled defector need to answer these two questions. I was especially convinced by George Kisevalter, the most experienced CIA officer handling Russian defector. Kisevalter always vouched for Nosenko’s bonafides.
From THE GHOST
“Kisevalter’s opinion was not idiosyncratic. In 1997, he received the agency’s Trailblazer Award recognizing him as one of fifty top CIA officers in its first fifty years, an honor Angleton did not receive. There was never any doubt in Kisevalter’s mind about the bona fides of Yuri Nosenko. Three subsequent reviews by senior CIA officers reached the same conclusion. So did Cleveland Cram, the former London station chief who wrote the definitive study of Angleton’s operations.. So did Benjamin Fischer, a career officer who became the agency’s chief historian.
“The Great Mole Hunt or Great Mole Scare of the late 1960s turned the CIA inside out ruining careers and reputations in search for Soviet penetrations that may or may not have existed,” Fischer wrote.
The dissenters from the institutional consensus about the Mole Hunt were mostly officers who had served Angleton on the Counterintelligence Staff. The Angletonians, as they called themselves, were a dogged bunch. Bill Hood and Pete Bagley asserted that the clandestine service was never penetrated during Angleton’s watch–which is true. They also claimed that the CIA’s operations against the Soviet Union were not unduly harmed by the Mole Hunt–which is not.
Yuri Nosenko and wife
Exonerated mole suspect Yuri Nosenko and wife.
Angleton and his acolytes would speak many words in his defense and write more than a few books. They cited scores of statements by Yuri Nosenko that they said were not credible or misleading, and indeed, Nosenko had exaggerated and embellished as defectors often do. But if there was a mole burrowed into the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, as the Angletonians claimed, who the devil was it? And what damage did he do?
The CIA has learned from hard experience what happened when the Soviets succeeded their operations: agents were arrested and executed. But even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the opening of significant portions of KGB archives, the Angletonians could not identify any operations compromised by the putative mole [allegedly protected by Nosenko]. They could not even offer up the name of a single plausible candidate. After the passage of five decades, the likeliest explanation is that there wasn’t a mole.”
Michael
Have you seen my reply to this on my new "Sinister Implications" thread, yet?
Do you think your "saturation dumping" technique impresses our open-minded and inquisitive guests?
Cheers!
-- ;)
-
Michael,
Do you realize how pathetic you look to our open-minded and inquisitive guests?
-- MWT ;)
PS How's that letter to professors Newman and Scott coming along?
You're gonna set 'em straight about your hero, Nosenko, right?
LOL
OMG
I just now realized that Michael Clark probably hasn't been banned after all -- he's just working on that letter he's gonna send to professors Newman and Scott, notifying them that HSCA perjurer John L. Hart's hush-hush 187-page The Monster Plot Report was finally released by the National Archives two years ago!
(They must not have known it, seein' as how they were so badly fooled by that evil, evil, evil-and-incompetent Tennent H. Bagley!)
-- MWT ;)
-
OMG
I just now realized that Michael Clark probably hasn't been banned after all -- he's just working on that letter he's gonna send to professors Newman and Scott, notifying them that HSCA perjurer John L. Hart's hush-hush 187-page The Monster Plot Report was finally released by the National Archives two years ago!
(They must not have known it, seein' as how they were so badly fooled by that evil, evil, evil-and-incompetent Tennent H. Bagley!)
-- MWT ;)
I miss Michael Clark.
Where has he gone?
Gasp -- Is he on a two-week suspension, or is he just worn out?
It's so dead around here without him!
-- MWT :'(
-
Michael,
Do you realize how pathetic you look to our open-minded and inquisitive guests?
-- MWT ;)
PS How's that letter to professors Newman and Scott coming along?
You're gonna set 'em straight about your boy, Nosenko, right?
LOL
I do wish Michael Clark would come back so we could talk about these things.
Except Michael doesn't exactly talk about them, he just posts discredited essays and debunked FBI and CIA documents about them, instead.
Over and over and over again.
-- MWT ;)
-
I do wish Michael Clark would come back so we could talk about these things.
Except Michael doesn't exactly talk about them, he just posts discredited essays and debunked FBI and CIA documents about them, instead.
Over and over and over again.
-- MWT ;)
Michael,
Have you watched John Newman's two-part March 2018 youtube video presentation about Bagley's book Spy Wars yet?
-- MWT ;)
-
Michael,
Have you watched John Newman's two-part March 2018 youtube video presentation about Bagley's book Spy Wars yet?
-- MWT ;)
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32359254.pdf
TOP SECRET
13 October 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: BAGELY, Tennant, Harrington
#386 38
1) On Wednesday, 7 October 1970 I briefed Colonel L. K. White, Executive Director-Controller on certain reservations I have concerning the proposed promotion of subject to a supergrade position.
2) I was very careful to explain to Colonel White at the outset that my reservations had nothing whatsoever to do with Bagely's security status. I explained that it was my conviction that Bagely was almost exclusively responsible for the manner in which the Nosenko case had been handled by our SR division. I said I considered that Bagely lacked objectivity and that he had displayed extremely poor judgment over a two year period in the handling of this case. Specifically as one example of Bagely's extreme prejudice I pointed out that the SR division had neglected to follow up several leads provided by Nosenko which subsequently had been followed up by this office (Bruce Solie) and that this lead us to individuals who have confessed their recruitment and use by the Soviets over an extensive period of time.
3) I explained further that Bagely displayed extremely poor judgment in the actions he took during that time that Nosenko was incarcerated at ISOLATION. On many occasions, as the individual responsible for Nosenko's care, I refuse to condone Bagely's instructions to my people who are guarding him. In one instance Bagely insisted that Nosenko's food ration be reduced to black bread and water three times daily. After I had briefed Colonel White, he indicated that he would refresh the Director's memory on Bagely's role in the Nosenko case at the time he reviews supergrade promotions.
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
-
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32359254.pdf
TOP SECRET
13 October 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: BAGELY, Tennant, Harrington
#386 38
1) On Wednesday, 7 October 1970 I briefed Colonel L. K. White, Executive Director-Controller on certain reservations I have concerning the proposed promotion of subject to a supergrade position.
2) I was very careful to explain to Colonel White at the outset that my reservations had nothing whatsoever to do with Bagely's security status. I explained that it was my conviction that Bagely was almost exclusively responsible for the manner in which the Nosenko case had been handled by our SR division. I said I considered that Bagely lacked objectivity and that he had displayed extremely poor judgment over a two year period in the handling of this case. Specifically as one example of Bagely's extreme prejudice I pointed out that the SR division had neglected to follow up several leads provided by Nosenko which subsequently had been followed up by this office (Bruce Solie) and that this lead us to individuals who have confessed their recruitment and use by the Soviets over an extensive period of time.
3) I explained further that Bagely displayed extremely poor judgment in the actions he took during that time that Nosenko was incarcerated at ISOLATION. On many occasions, as the individual responsible for Nosenko's care, I refuse to condone Bagely's instructions to my people who are guarding him. In one instance Bagely insisted that Nosenko's food ration be reduced to black bread and water three times daily. After I had briefed Colonel White, he indicated that he would refresh the Director's memory on Bagely's role in the Nosenko case at the time he reviews supergrade promotions.
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Resentful Howard J. Osborn, who was Chief of the Soviet Russia Division for only a very short time, and who worked in CIA's Office of Security with Bruce "I Got Duped By "Kitty Hawk," "Fedora" and "Top Hat," Et Al" Solie?
LOL
From an earlier post:
Michael,
In Spy Wars, Bagley says that some "spiteful, under-endowed" CIA officers caused wishful-thinking/"let's move beyond this mess" CIA leadership to conclude, erroneously, that Nosenko was a true defector.
Your Howard J. Osborn had been chief of the Soviet Russia Division for a only a short time when he was replaced by David Murphy, and Osborn's boy, Bruce "Gumshoe" Solie, was not only totally snookered by triple-agent Kochnov into losing a true defector (Artamanov) in the Kittyhawk Affair, but bamboozled by triple-agent Loginov (who, btw, was still alive and doing business in Moscow in 2004, according to Bagley) into believing that Nosenko was ... gasp ... a true defector.
Now, nobody wants to know that they are incompetent or that they've been fooled, and when confronted with facts that tend to indicate that they are incompetent or gullible, many, like Osborn and Solie, become ... well ... spiteful.
It's an unfortunate but natural human reaction.
-- MWT ;)
-
Resentful Howard J. Osborn, who was Chief of the Soviet Russia Division for only a very short time, and who worked in CIA's Office of Security with Bruce "I Got Duped By "Kitty Hawk," "Fedora" and "Top Hat," Et Al" Solie?
LOL
From an earlier post:
Michael,
In Spy Wars, Bagley says that some "spiteful, under-endowed" CIA officers caused wishful-thinking/"let's move beyond this mess" CIA leadership to conclude, erroneously, that Nosenko was a true defector.
Your Howard J. Osborn had been chief of the Soviet Russia Division for a only a short time when he was replaced by David Murphy, and Osborn's boy, Bruce "Gumshoe" Solie, was not only totally snookered by triple-agent Kochnov into losing a true defector (Artamanov) in the Kittyhawk Affair, but bamboozled by triple-agent Loginov (who, btw, was still alive and doing business in Moscow in 2004, according to Bagley) into believing that Nosenko was ... gasp ... a true defector.
Now, nobody wants to know that they are incompetent or that they've been fooled, and when confronted with facts that tend to indicate that they are incompetent or gullible, many, like Osborn and Solie, become ... well ... spiteful.
It's an unfortunate but natural human reaction.
-- MWT ;)
Bagely is the only one who is spiteful, incompetent, and can’t face that he has been bamboozled. Hart, Heuer, Olson and McCoy all are looking after the agency and being as kind as possible to Bagely. Making clear, to the interested parties of the Agency, that Bagely screwed-up, big time, is not being spiteful, pernicious, disloyal or acting out of any personal animosity or jealousy; they are doing their job. Bagely is the one who is acting like the jilted teen-girl, commenting on the endowments of his colleagues as a defense.
But, Thomas, you just go on, and admire your man’s endowments.
-
Bagely is the only one who is spiteful, incompetent, and can’t face that he has been bamboozled. Hart, Heuer, Olson and McCoy all are looking after the agency and being as kind as possible to Bagely. Making clear, to the interested parties of the Agency, that Bagely screwed-up, big time, is not being spiteful, pernicious, disloyal or acting out of any personal animosity or jealousy; they are doing their job. Bagely is the one who is acting like the jilted teen-girl, commenting on the endowments of his colleagues as a defense.
But, Thomas, you just go on, and admire your man’s endowments.
Michael,
A couple of questions for you:
Have you watched the part in John Newman's March 2018 "Spy Wars" presentation where Newman says that many people in CIA expected Bagley to become director of the agency?
Do you really think that, as you told Paul Baranco at the EF, Newman must have had some kind of prior "relationship" with Bagley which enabled Bagley to, in so many words, dupe Newman into believing Golitsyn was a true defector, and Nosenko a false one?
Do you think Newman might be part of "The Deep State"?
Are you going to send Newman and Peter Dale Scott a letter aprising them of how very, very wrong they are about your hero, Nosenko?
-- MWT ;)
-
Michael,
A couple of questions for you:
Have you watched the part in John Newman's March 2018 "Spy Wars" presentation where Newman says that many people in CIA expected Bagley to become director of the agency?
Do you really think that, as you told Paul Baranco at the EF, Newman must have had some kind of prior "relationship" with Bagley which enabled Bagley to, in so many words, dupe Newman into believing Golitsyn was a true defector, and Nosenko a false one?
Do you think Newman might be part of "The Deep State"?
Are you going to send Newman and Peter Dale Scott a letter aprising them of how very, very wrong they are about your hero, Nosenko?
-- MWT ;)
More stupid, inane, questions with false quotes and manipulative paraphrases.
Thomas, you know what people “make-of” people who repeat themselves over and over and over and over again, don’t you?
Now, excuse me whilst I distribute some Osborn memos, will you?
-
And some more on Bagley,
More from CIA Director of Security, Howard Osborne:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/EB79135B-FE9C-43D1-A388-B336E38B0FC2.jpeg?ver=1566053403000)
-
And some more on Bagely,
Mqore from CIA Director of Security, Howard Osborne:
(https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a95b5aff-c8a2-48ae-8436-008ec880290f/downloads/EB79135B-FE9C-43D1-A388-B336E38B0FC2.jpeg?ver=1566053403000)
Michael,
Olson memos? Did you mean Osborn memos?
If you were to honestly answer my questions, maybe I'd go a little easier on you.
But then again ... Nah, probably not.
Regardless, "false quotes"? What false quotes?
That Newman said on videotape during his March 2018 "Spy Wars" presentation that many people in CIA believed Bagley was, in so many words, on the fast track to becoming Director of CIA?
You don't believe Bagley said that?
Or that Peter Dale Scott told Newman on videotape that Newman's March 2018 Bagley-based "Spy Wars" presentation had convinced him that Nosenko was a false defector who had been dispatched to the U.S. to discredit Golitsyn?
Or that you told Paul Baranco at the EF that Newman must have had some kind of prior "relationship" with Bagley which enabled Bagley to, in so many words, dupe Newman into believing Golitsyn was a true defector, and Nosenko a false one?
Please clarify, Mike.
If you can.
-- MWT ;)
-
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10111-10250.pdf
104-10111-10250
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. Date: 18 Feb 1971
SUBJECT: Nosenko Case
1. On 18 Feb Mr. REDACTED chief/EUR/BNL told me that Mr. John Hart, C/EUR, had told him to tell only me the following.
When REDACTED was in Brussels, in late January, 1971, he was with Mr. Russell Hibbs, G5-14 case officer, for a long Wed. evening. REDACTED said that during their conversation, Hibbs spent a lot of time complaining about what Hibbs claimed was Mr. (Pete) Bagley’s, COS, reluctance to pursue and push investigations of AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said he would not attempt to relate what Hibbs said was the specific leads mentioned. The point he wanted to make sure I knew was Hibbs attitude towards Bagley as deliberately not following-up on AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said Hibbs was coming to Hq. in the Summer and he would let me know about the arrival in the event I wanted to talk to Hibbs.
2. My only contact was to thank REDACTED and tell him to let me know when Hibbs arrived.
(Copy to Solie)
SIGNATURE
Scott Miller
Note on p. 2: This information is not to be disseminated.
Any inquiry or interest in this memo should be brought
To the attention of DC/SRS, Bruce Solie
-
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10111-10250.pdf
104-10111-10250
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. Date: 18 Feb 1971
SUBJECT: Nosenko Case
1. On 18 Feb Mr. REDACTED chief/EUR/BNL told me that Mr. John Hart, C/EUR, had told him to tell only me the following.
When REDACTED was in Brussels, in late January, 1971, he was with Mr. Russell Hibbs, G5-14 case officer, for a long Wed. evening. REDACTED said that during their conversation, Hibbs spent a lot of time complaining about what Hibbs claimed was Mr. (Pete) Bagley’s, COS, reluctance to pursue and push investigations of AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said he would not attempt to relate what Hibbs said was the specific leads mentioned. The point he wanted to make sure I knew was Hibbs attitude towards Bagley as deliberately not following-up on AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said Hibbs was coming to Hq. in the Summer and he would let me know about the arrival in the event I wanted to talk to Hibbs.
2. My only contact was to thank REDACTED and tell him to let me know when Hibbs arrived.
(Copy to Solie)
SIGNATURE
Scott Miller
Note on p. 2: This information is not to be disseminated.
Any inquiry or interest in this memo should be brought
To the attention of DC/SRS, Bruce Solie
Michael,
John L. Hart, the guy who perjured himself in front of the HSCA?
What a piece of work he was.
This is what Tennent H. Bagley had to say, on page 215 of Spy Wars, about a 1976 incident between himself and Hart:
While paying lip service to the need for vigilance, Colby saw counterintelligence mainly as an impediment to intelligence collection. His impatience and disinterest came out in the form of simplification and sarcasm. “I spent several long sessions doing my best to follow [Counterintelligence Staff chief Angleton’s] tortuous theories about the long arm of a powerful and wily KGB at work, over decades, placing its agents in the heart of allied and neutral nations and sending its false defectors to influence and under- mine American policy. I confess that I couldn’t absorb it, possibly because I did not have the requisite grasp of this labyrinthine subject, possibly because Angleton's explanations were impossible to follow, or possibly because the evidence just didn’t add up to his conclusions. ... I did not suspect Angleton and his staff of engaging in improper activities. I just could not figure out what they were doing at all.” (fn 17)
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Colby soon got to work reorganizing the (Angleton's) Counterintelligence Staff and divesting it of some of its components. Then in 1974 the New York Times exposed the fact that in apparent violation of the Agency’s charter, Angleton’s staff had been checking international mail to and from some left-wing Americans. This gave Colby the ammunition he needed to rid himself of this nuisance. At the end of that year he demanded Angleton’s resignation and was glad to see Angleton’s chief lieutenants Raymond Rocca, William Hood, and Newton Miler follow him into retirement.
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To steer a less troubling course, Colby appointed to head the Counterintelligence Staff George Kalaris, a man without experience in either counterintelligence or Soviet bloc operations, and, as his deputy, Leonard McCoy, a handler of reports, not an operations officer, who had already distinguished himself as a fierce advocate for Nosenko. Now began an extraordinary cleanup inside the (Angleton's) Counterintelligence Staff— and the disappearance of evidence against Nosenko. Miler’s carefully accumulated notes on this and related cases were removed from the files and disappeared, along with a unique card file of discrepancies in Nosenko’s statements. (fn 18)
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Shortly afterward Colby appointed an officer to review the files anew. John L. Hart was assisted by four officers. They worked for six months, from June to December 1976. I caught a glimpse of their aims and work methods when Hart came to Europe to interview me (in Belgium). He had not bothered to read what I had written (though he said nothing new had come to light on the question of Nosenko’s bona fides) and seemed interested only in why, eight years earlier, I had warned that bad consequences might flow from Nosenko’s release. I saw that his aim was not to get at the truth but to find a way to clear Nosenko, so I refused to talk further with him. As I later learned, Hart’s team did not even interview the Counterintelligence Staff officers who had analyzed the case and maintained files on it for nine years. Among them were two veteran analysts who, having come “cold” to the case, had concluded on their own that Nosenko was a plant— and had written their reasons. Hart then wrote a report that affirmed total trust in Nosenko. (fn 19)
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Having decreed their faith and gotten rid of disbelievers, the CIA leadership banned further debate. One experienced officer in the Soviet Bloc Division— my old colleague Joe Westin, who knew so much about this case— took a late stand against Nosenko’s bona fides. He was told by higher-ups, “If you continue on this course, there will be no room for you in this Division”— and his future promotion was blocked. Peter Deriabin, who kept trying to warn Agency officials about Nosenko, was told to desist or his relations with CIA would be threatened (see Appendix A).
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Nosenko’s rescuers then set out to discredit those who had distrusted him. They first labeled them as paranoid (a charge always difficult to refute) and then moved on to distort the record.
.....
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)
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https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10111-10250.pdf
104-10111-10250
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. Date: 18 Feb 1971
SUBJECT: Nosenko Case
1. On 18 Feb Mr. REDACTED chief/EUR/BNL told me that Mr. John Hart, C/EUR, had told him to tell only me the following.
When REDACTED was in Brussels, in late January, 1971, he was with Mr. Russell Hibbs, G5-14 case officer, for a long Wed. evening. REDACTED said that during their conversation, Hibbs spent a lot of time complaining about what Hibbs claimed was Mr. (Pete) Bagley’s, COS, reluctance to pursue and push investigations of AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said he would not attempt to relate what Hibbs said was the specific leads mentioned. The point he wanted to make sure I knew was Hibbs attitude towards Bagley as deliberately not following-up on AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said Hibbs was coming to Hq. in the Summer and he would let me know about the arrival in the event I wanted to talk to Hibbs.
2. My only contact was to thank REDACTED and tell him to let me know when Hibbs arrived.
(Copy to Solie)
SIGNATURE
Scott Miller
Note on p. 2: This information is not to be disseminated.
Any inquiry or interest in this memo should be brought
To the attention of DC/SRS, Bruce Solie
Note: AEDONOR is the CIA cryptonym for Nosenko.
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https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10111-10250.pdf
104-10111-10250
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. Date: 18 Feb 1971
SUBJECT: Nosenko Case
1. On 18 Feb Mr. REDACTED chief/EUR/BNL told me that Mr. John Hart, C/EUR, had told him to tell only me the following.
When REDACTED was in Brussels, in late January, 1971, he was with Mr. Russell Hibbs, G5-14 case officer, for a long Wed. evening. REDACTED said that during their conversation, Hibbs spent a lot of time complaining about what Hibbs claimed was Mr. (Pete) Bagley’s, COS, reluctance to pursue and push investigations of AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said he would not attempt to relate what Hibbs said was the specific leads mentioned. The point he wanted to make sure I knew was Hibbs attitude towards Bagley as deliberately not following-up on AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said Hibbs was coming to Hq. in the Summer and he would let me know about the arrival in the event I wanted to talk to Hibbs.
2. My only contact was to thank REDACTED and tell him to let me know when Hibbs arrived.
(Copy to Solie)
SIGNATURE
Scott Miller
Note on p. 2: This information is not to be disseminated.
Any inquiry or interest in this memo should be brought
To the attention of DC/SRS, Bruce Solie
Michael,
Something I forgot to say in my earlier post about the 18 February 1971 memo written by my hero, Newton "Scotty" Miler (whose painstakingly collected and cross-referenced files on the Nosenko case were burned by your buddy McCoy after Miler retired), is that there were (and still are) lots of ignorant, wishful-thinking fools (or worse) who believed Nosenko was a true defector.
The "Hibbs" dude mentioned in the memo was obviously one of them.
Cheers!
-- MWT ;)