I know one of the things that has some liberals upset is Cheevers' documentation of the fact that it was not JFK’s idea to announce a 1,000-man troop withdrawal, and that he didn’t like the idea but was talked into it by McNamara:
McNamara and Taylor also encouraged Kennedy to publicly state that he’d pull a thousand U.S. advisers out of South Vietnam by the end of the year, and that “the bulk of U.S. personnel” could probably be withdrawn by 1965. Other White House counselors thought such a declaration was imprudent. What if the war went badly, especially in light of South Vietnam’s political troubles, and the advisers had to stay longer? What if more were needed to help battle the VC?
Kennedy himself was reluctant, saying the proposed statement was “overly optimistic” and didn’t have much value. McNamara, however, insisted it would show congressional critics that the administration had a plan for reducing American combat casualties. Kennedy ultimately agreed to issue a press release along the lines his defense secretary wanted.
But the president’s instincts were right; he was quickly attacked in the press. The Washington Post, for example, lambasted the prediction of a 1965 pullout as “groundless prophecy” and an affront to the “maturity and intelligence” of the American public. (pp. 373-374)
The statement said that "the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965" and that "by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn." Kennedy thought this was "overly optimistic." However, he eventually succumbed to McNamara's pressure and agreed to the press release.
