In my recent reading, including rereading
In the Eye of History, I’ve been reminded of the quality of some of the “kooks” who don’t accept the LN narrative. FBI agents Sibert and O’Neill both flatly rejected the SBT, and O’Neill became a full-tilt CTer.
Another “kook,” apparently, was Admiral George G. Burkley. There is nothing original in this post; it’s all been covered elsewhere. It’s entirely possible that someone here knows more than I do and can show I’m all wet. Nevertheless, I am astonished that Burkley doesn’t receive more attention.
Who would be more qualified than Burkley to speak about the medical aspects of the JFKA? He was a highly respected physician who served multiple Presidents; in the case of JFK, to whom he was the personal physician, he was in the Dallas motorcade, at Parkland and at Bethesda; and by his account he was “in charge of” the autopsy and entrusted with custody of the brain. By all accounts, he was capable and extremely discreet. At the time of the JFKA, he was only 61, not some doddering figurehead.
And yet, he was not called to testify by either the WC or the HSCA. Does this not seem “just a bit” odd in light of some of the obscure characters and dubious experts who
did testify? He seemed to be extremely miffed that he wasn’t called by the WC. After his death, his children emphasized to the HSCA (Doug Horne) that the only thing he ever talked about in connection with the JFKA was his mystification and disappointment at not being called by the WC (more about this below). His 9-page written statement to the WC, dated November 27, 1963, is buried in Volume XXII as CE 1126 and is completely devoid of any details about the autopsy:
https://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wcvols/wh22/html/WH_Vol22_0062a.htm.
There are clear indications that Burkley’s views differed from the orthodox LN narrative in a big way.
As early as October 17, 1967, he was interviewed by William McHugh for the John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program. This exchange stopped McHugh cold:
McHUGH: Do you agree with the Warren Report on the number of bullets that entered the President’s body?
BURKLEY: I would not care to be quoted on that.Really – why not? Burkley was apparently a sufficiently imposing figure that McHugh just moved on.
On March 18, 1977, then HSCA chief counsel Richard F. Sprague wrote a startling memo to the file:
https://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/numbered_files/box_23/180-10086-10295/html/180-10086-10295_0002a.htm.
Sprague had been contacted by telephone by Burkley’s attorney, William F. Illig. Illig was no lightweight either. He was a name partner in a large and long-established Erie, PA, law firm and was 72 years old when he contacted Sprague. In consultation with Burkley on a tax matter, Burkley had indicated that “he has information in the Kennedy assassination indicating that others besides Oswald may have participated.” Illig said that Burkley “wanted no publicity whatsoever” but had consented to the contact and would meet with Sprague in Washington.
Bombshell, right? We’ll never know. Less than two weeks later, Sprague was gone. Apparently –
unbelievably – there was no follow-up.
Note the phrasing: Burkley “has information.” Burkley was most definitely not the type to be spreading rumors or contacting the HSCA because he’d been wowed by reading
Rush to Judgment. He had something he believed was substantive and significant.
Burkley was one of several people subsequently interviewed by the HSCA in connection with a “Search for missing autopsy materials,” the title of a memo to file that Andy Purdy wrote on August 17, 1977:
https://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/arrb/master_med_set/pdf/md19.pdf. No bombshells, but “DR. BURKLEY said the doctors didn't section the brain and that if it had been done, it might be possible to prove whether or not there were two bullets. DR. BURKLEY thinks there was one but concedes the possibility of there having been two.” Hmmm.
Burkley was interviewed by Purdy in January of 1978. Purdy followed up with a letter and a short, bland draft affidavit. See
https://www.kenrahn.com/Marsh/Autopsy/BURKLEY.TXT. Paragraph 7 of the draft affidavit contained the slightly odd statement, “I supervised the autopsy and directed the fixation and retention of the brain for future study of the course of the bullet or bullets.”
“Or bullets?” It’s a safe bet that Purdy didn’t come up with this language. When Burkley returned the signed affidavit, dated 11/28/78, he included a handwritten note stating, “Had the Warren Commission deemed to call me, I would have stated why I retained the brain and the possibility of two bullets having wounded President John F. Kennedy's brain would have been eliminated.”
“The possibility of two bullets?” Was Burkley perhaps trying to telegraph something? “Deemed to call me?” This sounds like a guy miffed that he wasn’t called.
Next we have the curious episode of Burkley speaking with author Henry Hurt in 1982 in connection with the preparation of
Reasonable Doubt. According to the book, “In 1982 Dr. Burkley told the author in a telephone conversation that he believed that President Kennedy's assassination was the result of a conspiracy. This startling statement, after so long a silence, amplified an obscure exchange Dr. Burkley had in an oral-history interview on file at the Kennedy Library in Boston.”
At Burkley’s request, Hurt sent him a list of the areas that Hurt wanted to explore. Burkley expressed a willingness to cooperate. Two months later, Hurt proposed a meeting. “The doctor responded with an abrupt refusal to discuss any aspect of the case.” Since Burkley was very much alive when the book came out in 1986, it’s unlikely the respected Hurt was fabricating.
Lastly, we have the ARRB. Burkley died in 1991. Doug Horne of the HSCA contacted all four of Burkley’s adult children, including the daughter (Nancy Denlea) who was the executor of his estate. The children said he was extremely discreet and never spoke about any aspect of his work with any President (which makes Sprague’s memo and Hurt’s book all the more remarkable). The only thing he said about the JFKA was to express his disappointment at not being called by the WC. The children had no relevant documents.
Here are Horne’s contact reports:
https://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/arrb/master_med_set/md253/html/md253_0003a.htm; https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/arrb/master_med_set/pdf/md250.pdf; https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/arrb/master_med_set/md251/html/md251_0002a.htm; https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/arrb/master_med_set/md252/html/md252_0001a.htm.
The only one of interest is the first – Nancy Denlea. On January 13, 1997, she told Horne that she would sign an ARRB waiver allowing access to Burkley’s files with Illig. She would have “no objection” and this would be “no problem.” The
quid pro quo was that Horne must provide her with anything the HSCA had about her father’s contacts with the WC and HSCA, to which Horne agreed. Horne’s handwritten noted dated July 16, 1998 (18 months later?) stated that she “changed her mind and decided not to sign the waiver” – and that was that.
The ARRB report does not indicate the change of mind:
The Review Board contacted the children of deceased Vice Admiral George G. Burkley, former military White House physician to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, to find out if their father had deposited his papers at any institution, or if they possessed any assassination records. The staff came up empty-handed.
According to House Select Committee on Assassinations records, Burkley’s personal attorney apparently told the HSCA that his client believed there was a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. Mr. Illig, Burkley’s attorney, however, is now deceased. The Review Board staff asked Burkley’s daughter, the executor of his estate, to sign a waiver allowing the Review Board access to papers at Illig’s law firm, but she declined to sign and return the waiver.I don’t know about you, but I find all this intriguing. Burkley either knew or thought he knew something pretty seriously wrong with the LN narrative. As utterly discreet and close-mouthed as he was, what Illig communicated to Sprague seems astonishing.
Was Burkley a “kook?” Hardly. Was he so miffed at not being called by the WC that he was willing to invent tales and blow the JFKA wide open?
Highly unlikely. It’s stuff like this – and there is lots of it – that fuels my nagging doubts that the LN narrative is the full story.
