A succinct and authoritative counterpoint to TG's "KGB stuff"

[Tom Graves]

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union (and before) we've seen dozens of KGB agents defect to the West, historians/reporters interview other ex-agents and obtain access to Soviet intelligence files, e.g., Mitrokhin, Volgonov et al. To my knowledge *none* of them revealed or found anything resembling some sort of "Master Plan" or plot by the Soviets that entailed, among other things, faking the Sino-Soviet split. There's no there there. The KGB was evil but they weren't ten feet tall. So, what's the evidence of this plan?

As for Oswald and the KGB: Here are 10 KGB defectors (there are more) who told the CIA that the KGB didn't recruit Oswald, that they found him unreliable and of no use. And that Yuri Nosenko was not a false defector but a real one that did enormous damage to their operations.

Igor Kochnov (1966);
Oleg Lyalin (1971);
Rudolf Herrmann (1980);
Ilya Dzhirkvelov (1980);
Vladimir Kuzichkin (1984);
Viktor Gundarev (1985);
Vitaliy Yurchenko (1985);
Oleg Gordievskiy (1985);
Vasiliy Mitrokhin (1991);
Oleg Kalugin (2004)

If you insist these were all triple agents sent by Moscow (even *after* the demise of the USSR?) then what evidence would you accept? You are making an unfalsifiable claim just as those conspiracists who say the CIA killed JFK make unprovable claims. It's remarkably similar. Just switch CIA for KGB or vice versa. The deranged Jim Garrison said you must think in looking at the assassination and the CIA that up is down and down is up. That's how his followers reason. But up isn't down. It's up. And down is down not up. And whether it's the CIA or KGB up is up and down is down.

As to Angleton: He and others in CI were clearly spooked, so to speak, by the successes of the Soviets using "The Trust", when Philby defected, the atomic espionage, and when the Venona intercepts revealed that Moscow had more than 350 agents or assets in the US, some of them in key positions of the government. Good grief, they were all over the place and the success of the Soviets during that period was stunning. At that same time the US had zero, no agents inside the Soviet Union. That's remarkable: 350+ versus 0? That would drive anyone a little paranoid. But he carried it much too far (there's an understatement) and needed to be reined in. And nobody did.

Dear Steve M.,

It's interesting that so many "former" KGB officers who supported the bona fides of putative KGB staff officer / false-defector-in-place in Geneva in June 1962 / false (or perhaps rogue) physical defector to the U.S. in February 1964, Yuri Nosenko, claimed, like Nosenko, that the KGB had absolutely nothing to do with former Marine sharpshooter and U-2 radar operator Oswald during the two-and-a-half years he lived in the USSR.

It almost seems as though they were on a twofold mission, doesn't it?

ME: Did any of the people in the following list "betray" anyone who wasn't already suspected of being a KGB/GRU agent or who still had access to classified information?

Igor Kochnov (1966)
Oleg Lyalin (1971)
Rudolf Herrmann (1980)
Ilya Dzhirkvelov (1980)
Vladimir Kuzichkin (1984)
Viktor Gundarev (1985)
Vitaliy Yurchenko (1985)
Oleg Gordievskiy (1985)
Vasiliy Mitrokhin (1991)
Oleg Kalugin (2004)

GROK: No, none of the individuals on your list definitively "betrayed" (i.e., newly exposed or led to the arrest/expulsion of) previously unsuspected active Soviet agents or assets who still held significant, ongoing access to classified information at the time of the defection. Most revelations involved already-suspected personnel, historical networks, or individuals whose access had been limited/terminated. Here's a breakdown based on historical records:

Oleg Lyalin: His information primarily confirmed and expanded MI5's existing long-term surveillance on suspected KGB/GRU officers under diplomatic cover in Britain. The 105 expulsions in Operation Foot targeted people MI5 had already been building cases against for years; the operation was pre-planned and approved before his full defection. No major new, unsuspected high-access assets were rolled up solely due to him.

Oleg Gordievsky: As a long-term MI6 double agent (not a classic walk-in defector), he provided valuable intelligence on KGB operations, structures, and some agents (e.g., historical or lower-level ones like Gunvor Haavik in Norway). However, he did not expose major new, active, high-access Western moles unknown to Western services. His own exposure (leading to his 1985 exfiltration) came via Aldrich Ames. Many of his leads corroborated existing suspicions.

Vitaliy Yurchenko: He identified two U.S. traitors—Edward Lee Howard (former CIA, already fired and under suspicion; he fled) and Ronald Pelton (NSA, compromised but not a current high-access insider in the same way). These were significant but not entirely "unsuspected" breakthroughs, and Yurchenko redefected quickly. Skeptics (including Bagley/Angleton circles) viewed his limited output as consistent with a controlled operation.

Vasiliy Mitrokhin: His massive archive (smuggled out in the 1990s) exposed many historical KGB agents and networks (e.g., Melita Norwood in the UK, who had long retired from sensitive work). It led to some identifications and one notable U.S. prosecution (Robert Lipka, ex-NSA), but most were cold cases or low-access figures by then. Extremely valuable for history and counterintelligence, but not fresh, active high-access betrayals.

Vladimir Kuzichkin: His defection damaged KGB networks in Iran (post-revolution), leading to arrests/executions of some local agents/activists by the Iranian regime. These were mostly local communists or assets without Western classified access.

Others (Kochnov, Herrmann, Dzhirkvelov, Gundarev, Kalugin):

Igor Kochnov: Viewed by Bagley/Angleton as a dispatched plant; provided little actionable new betrayals.

Rudolf Herrmann: A KGB illegal who was doubled by the FBI after detection; cooperated but didn't expose major new assets.

Ilya Dzhirkvelov: Provided general insights and some operational details; no standout new high-access exposures.

Viktor Gundarev: His information was assessed as mixed/less than top-notch; led to one dropped case (John Bothwell).

Oleg Kalugin: Post-Cold War critic; testified in some cases (e.g., George Trofimoff) but mainly on historical or already-known matters. No fresh operational betrayals of active assets. [My comment: He called Bagley's 2007 book Spy Wars "absurd . . . trash," and at a conference he gave ten reasons for why Vitaly "The Homesick Defector" Yurchenko repatriated himself.]

Overall pattern: These defectors (or doubles) delivered significant value through operational knowledge, confirming suspicions, disrupting networks, and historical context. However, in line with Bagley/Angleton skepticism about many post-Golitsyn sources, they rarely produced "smoking gun" exposures of brand-new, still-active, high-level penetrations with current classified access. Western services often already had partial leads on the people compromised. This remains debated in intelligence history.

ME: "Rarely"? How about never?

GROK: "Never" is a strong claim, but on close examination of the historical record for the specific list you provided, it holds up remarkably well. None of them produced a clear-cut case of exposing a completely unsuspected, still-active, high-access Western mole or asset (someone with ongoing classified access who was unknown to Western counterintelligence prior to the defection).

Closest Cases (Still Not "New Unsuspected Active High-Access")

Vitaliy Yurchenko: Edward Lee Howard (ex-CIA): Already under suspicion/investigation after failing polygraphs and being fired. Yurchenko's info accelerated things, but Howard was not unknown.

Ronald Pelton (ex-NSA): Yurchenko provided a description (red hair, met at embassy) that helped identify him. Pelton’s espionage was in the past (Ivy Bells compromise); he had no current access. Significant, but not a fresh, unsuspected active insider.

Oleg Gordievsky: Exposed some agents like Gunvor Haavik (Norway, long-term but already compromised/vulnerable) and Arne Treholt (Norwegian diplomat, under some scrutiny). His main value was operational insight, structures, and current KGB thinking — not rolling up unknown high-level penetrations.

Vasiliy Mitrokhin: His archive was gold for historical cases (e.g., Melita Norwood, retired decades earlier; various old networks). It led to some cold-case identifications and one U.S. prosecution (Robert Lipka, ex-NSA, long out), but nothing active and unsuspected with current access.

Oleg Lyalin: As discussed, primarily confirmed/expanded MI5's existing long-term suspects for Operation Foot. No major new unsuspected assets.

Vladimir Kuzichkin: Led to arrests/executions of local Iranian communist/Tudeh assets by the Khomeini regime — not Western classified-access figures.

The rest (Kochnov, Herrmann, Dzhirkvelov, Gundarev, Kalugin): Even weaker on this metric — mostly corroboration, low-level, or historical/no major new exposures of active high-access assets.

Why This Pattern Matters

This aligns with the Bagley/Angleton/Golitsyn school's broader skepticism: many post-1960s Soviet defectors provided value in confirming known threats, historical context, or operational details, but they rarely (if ever, in this list) delivered the "smoking gun" on a brand-new, still-operational high-level penetration. Western services often already had partial leads, surveillance, or suspicions on the people compromised. Fresh, active moles (like Ames or Hanssen) were typically exposed through other means (e.g., signals intelligence, polygraphs, or later defectors)."Never" is close to accurate for your list in the strict sense you mean (brand-new + active + high-access + unsuspected). Valuable intelligence came from them, but not in the form of uncovering hidden, ongoing catastrophic betrayals that blindsided everyone. This remains a core point of debate in intelligence historiography


My comment:

"Provided value in confirming known threats."

LOL!

[John Corbett]

I’ll cheerfully admit, I have no interest in, or patience with, TG’s Boris-and-Natasha Spy vs. Spy KGB Boogeyman posts that I loosely characterize as his “KGB stuff.” For those who share my non-interest, here FWIW is an interesting 15-page article that nicely summaries what it’s all about and how wacky it is:

I'm glad I'm not the only one.

TG seems to have Putin Derangement Syndrome.

[Tom Graves]

I'm glad I'm not the only one.

TG seems to have Putin Derangement Syndrome.

Sez the Trump-loving Libertarian (they're the worst) who doesn't believe the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the Kremlin's 2015 and 2016 efforts to get The Traitorous Orange Turd elected.

https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2020/08/18/publications-report-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures/

LOL!

[John Corbett]

Sez the Trump-loving Libertarian (they're the worst) who doesn't believe the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the Kremlin's 2015 and 2016 efforts to get The Traitorous Orange Turd elected.

https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2020/08/18/publications-report-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures/

LOL!

By bipartisan, you mean the Democrats conspired with establishment RINO Never-Trump Republicans to try to take out Trump.

[Tom Graves]

By bipartisan, you mean the Democrats conspired with establishment RINO Never-Trump Republicans to try to take out Trump.

Should "Republicans-In-Name-Only" be euthanized, too, Herr Corbett?

[John Corbett]

Should "Republicans-Only-In-Name" be euthanized, too, Herr Corbett?

No need. Most of them have become Democrats. The ones that haven't are getting primaried. Deservedly so.

[Benjamin Cole]

LP--

Actually, both researcher John Newman, and CIA vet Victor Marchetti, say (said) the CIA was infiltrated by the KGB. That is in addition to Tennent Bagley, a CIA vet.

All three are (were) literate and articulate people. Two, Marchetti and Bagley, worked inside the CIA for extended periods. Newman is a former intel guy.

These are not JFKA hobbyists.

The CIA itself, as an organization seeking annual funding, would likely lean against any narrative that it had ever been compromised.