Confusion and misinformation abound regarding the HSCA's acoustical evidence. The HSCA's six acoustical experts determined that the Dallas police dictabelt contains at least four impulses caused by gunfire in Dealey Plaza, and that one of the shots came from the grassy knoll. Most researchers know this much, but many don't know the events that led up to this historic finding.
On May 12, 1978, the HSCA asked the scientific firm BBN to analyze the Dallas police dictabelt and determine if it contained gunshots. The Committee chose BBN because the firm specialized in acoustical analysis and performed such work as locating submarines by analyzing underwater sound impulses. BBN also pioneered the technique of using sound recordings to determine the timing and direction of gunfire from a tape that was recorded during the 1970 shootings at Kent State University.
Dr. James E. Barger, the lead scientist at BBN, doubted that the tape contained gunfire based on a preliminary examination of the Channel One recording thought by researcher Gary Mack to contain gunshots. Barger determined that the recording, to the human ear, contained no audible sounds of gunfire, contrary to Mack’s claim that seven shots could be heard.
Barger told the HSCA that he was “not hopeful about the prospects of recovering anything from the tape.”Indeed,
Barger agreed to clean up the recording and run a series of tests on it in order to prove there were no gunshots on the tape. He reasoned that if preliminary tests showed that no gunshots were on the tape, there would be no need to conduct additional acoustical tests in Dallas, saving the HSCA time and money.
This is important to keep in mind:
Far from going into their analysis with a bias toward finding gunfire on the tape, the BBN acoustical scientists believed their preliminary tests would prove the dictabelt contained no gunfire. They thought they were doing the tests in order to spare the HSCA from wasting time and money on acoustical testing in Dealey Plaza.Two months later, on July 13, 1978, Dr. Barger called the HSCA and dropped a bombshell: he reported that the preliminary tests found evidence of three to five gunshots on the dictabelt.
Barger told the Committee that a more sophisticated test was required to determine if any of the impulse sounds were actually gunfire. He suggested that BBN be allowed to conduct an acoustical reconstruction in Dealey Plaza during which test shots would be fired from locations suggested by eyewitness accounts and compared with the impulse sounds on the police dictabelt. If any of these acoustical fingerprints matched the impulse sounds on the recording, BBN would be able to determine the timing of the shots, the location of the gunman, and the target for each shot fired.
The major points of the acoustical evidence are as follows:
* At least four sets of gunshot impulse patterns with echo patterns unique to Dealey Plaza occur on the dictabelt recording. In other words, their acoustical fingerprints match those of some of the test shots fired in Dealey Plaza.
* Those echo patterns occur in the correct topographic order, which is an amazing correlation all by itself.
* Remarkable locational-movement correlations were found between the dictabelt gunshots and the test-firing gunshots. The BBN scientists determined that the probability that chance caused these correlations was “less than 1%.”
Even the NRC/NAS/Ramsey panel admitted that their own calculations showed there was a 93% probability that the correlations were not the result of chance--a fact that is always ignored by critics who cite the panel's findings.
* The dictabelt contains N-waves from supersonic rifle fire, and those N-waves occur only among the identified gunshot impulse patterns, and only in the two impulse patterns that were recorded when the motorcycle’s microphone was in position to record them--yet another impressive correlation.
* Remarkably, the dictabelt not only contains N-waves but it also contains muzzle blasts and muzzle-blast echoes, and those N-waves, muzzle blasts, and muzzle-blast echoes occur in the correct order and interval, proving beyond any rational doubt that the dictabelt contains gunshot impulses.
* Windshield distortions occur in the dictabelt's gunshot impulse patterns when they should occur and do not occur when they should not, another stunning correlation. The HSCA arranged for a separate test to confirm the science and effects of windshield distortion.
* Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, acoustical scientists from Queens College who specialized in processing acoustical signals for military applications, determined that gunshot impulse 144.9 (initially timed at 145.1) came from the grassy knoll. Weiss and Aschkenasy calculated there was no more than a 5.3% probability (P=0.053) that the 144.9 impulse pattern was not caused by gunfire, and they argued that the probability was likely lower than that. This is why they reported there was a 95% probability or higher that this shot came from the grassy knoll.
In another oblique admission, the NRC/NAS/Ramsey panel reported that their analysis found that the probability that the 144.9 impulse pattern was not gunfire from the knoll was 22.3% (P=0.223), which means their analysis found that the probability that the impulse pattern
was caused by gunfire from the knoll was 77.7%, another fact that is always ignored by critics who cite the panel's findings.
Moreover, former USDA research scientist Dr. Donald Thomas has proved that the NRC/NAS/Ramsey panel committed crucial errors in reaching their P=0.223 calculation, and that the probability that the 144.9 impulse pattern was caused by grassy knoll gunfire is virtually 100 percent (
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Essay_-_Acoustics_Overview_and_History_-_part_2.html).
Incidentally, a major reason that Weiss and Aschkenasy were selected to do a refined analysis of the BBN findings was that they were recommended by the Acoustical Society of America.
However, some conspiracy theorists reject, minimize, or ignore the HSCA acoustical evidence only because they believe it does not support their shooting scenario, even though it refutes the lone-gunman theory. They think the acoustical evidence requires them to believe that only four shots were fired, that three of those shots came from the TSBD's sixth-floor window, and that only one shot came from the grassy knoll (and that it missed).
However, the acoustical evidence does not require us to accept these positions. It is crucial to understand that the four impulse patterns that the HSCA acoustical experts identified as shots on the police tape were identified as gunfire because they matched the impulse patterns of four shots fired during the field test in Dealey Plaza, and that during that test, shots were fired from only two locations: the sixth-floor window and the grassy knoll.
During the HSCA test firing, no shots were fired from any window in the Dal-Tex Building or the County Records Building, or from any other alternative point in the plaza, but only from the sixth-floor window and from a spot behind the picket fence on the grassy knoll.
In addition, a fifth impulse pattern on the dictabelt was arguably wrongly rejected as gunfire. Due to pressure from the HSCA, the BBN experts identified the impulse pattern at 140.3 as a false alarm, even though it passed the echo-delay matching test, and even though 8 of its 10 impulses matched the impulses of one of the test shots.
The BBN experts said they rejected the 140.3 impulse pattern as a shot because it occurs just 1.07 seconds after the second shot from the sixth-floor window, and because it "only" had one microphone match and "only" had a coefficient score of 0.6. A coefficient score of 0.6 means that 8 of the 10 impulses in the impulse pattern matched the impulses of a pattern of one of the field-test shots. The rejection of the 140.3 impulse pattern as gunfire seems to have been based on something other than science.
Furthermore, if there was a third gunman and he used a silencer or fired from a point five or six feet behind a window, even if the HSCA field test had fired shots from his location or from a nearby location, either his shots would have created no impulse patterns on the tape or they would have created patterns that were too weak to be matched to test-shot patterns.
For more information on the HSCA acoustical evidence, see the following:
"The HSCA's Acoustical Evidence: Proof of a Second Gunman"
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KvdvH8gTqFgMn-2vTI5ppg_egWxRKg9U/view"Overview and History of the Acoustical Evidence in the Kennedy Assassination Case" (a three-part article)
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Essay_-_Acoustics_Overview_and_History.htmlhttps://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Essay_-_Acoustics_Overview_and_History_-_part_2.htmlhttps://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Essay_-_Acoustics_Overview_and_History_-_part_3.html"The Bike with the Mike"
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=99545"Debugging Bugliosi"
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=58061