Yes, Kamala Harris, Hillary Clinton, Gavin Newsom. The obsession with Putin is bizarre. He is a paper tiger. He is in over his head in Ukraine due to the staunch support of Trump who has supplied them with weapons instead of blankets like Obama. Was Obama KGB in your opinion because he refused to support Ukraine?
Dear "Dick,"
1) ME: I personally think Obama's big mistake was not providing Ukraine with lethal defensive weapons. Question: How much non-lethal aid did he give Ukraine?Perplexity AI: Obama’s administration provided Ukraine with hundreds of millions of dollars in non‑lethal/security assistance, plus over $1.3 billion in broader foreign assistance and $2–3 billion in U.S. loan guarantees, but no U.S.-supplied lethal weapons.
Security (non-lethal) military aid
From the outbreak of the crisis in 2014 through early 2015, the Obama administration committed more than $120 million in security assistance to Ukraine’s military and pledged an additional $75 million in non‑lethal equipment. This security aid included items such as body armor, night‑vision goggles, communications gear, medical supplies, explosive‑ordnance disposal equipment, handheld radios, and around 230 armored Humvees.
Specific packages noted in contemporaneous reporting and official releases include:
$23+ million in “defensive security assistance” approved by Obama by June 2014 (body armor, NVGs, comms gear, MREs, medical supplies, tactical gear for border guards).
$46 million in new security assistance announced in September 2014, again explicitly non‑lethal.
A $53 million aid package in 2014 for Ukraine, still excluding weapons or lethal military gear.
A $75 million non‑lethal package in March 2015, including Humvees, counter‑mortar radars, radios, night‑vision devices, UAVs, and ambulances.
Defense and fact‑check sources summarize this as “more than $100–120 million” in security aid by March 2015, rising toward roughly $200 million as later non‑lethal tranches were added.
Broader non-military assistance and guarantees
Beyond military-type security aid, Obama’s administration committed over $1.3 billion in foreign assistance to Ukraine after 2014, aimed at economic and governance reforms, civil society, energy security, and border/defense institution building. This included $220 million in new assistance announced in 2016, plus humanitarian aid for conflict‑affected civilians and programs to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law.
In addition, the U.S. government under Obama provided $2 billion in loan guarantees and set up a third guarantee of up to $1 billion, conditional on reforms—effectively macro‑financial non‑lethal support backing Ukraine’s access to capital markets.
What this means in aggregate
Putting those strands together:
Non‑lethal/security military aid: on the order of $150–200+ million in body armor, NVGs, communications, Humvees, radars, UAVs, medical gear, and related equipment.
Non‑military foreign assistance: more than $1.3 billion for economic, governance, and institutional support, plus over $112 million in humanitarian aid.
Loan guarantees: $2–3 billion in U.S. guarantees, a financial backstop rather than direct cash or materiel.[/i]
2) ME: What do experts say will be the earliest that Russia could realistically invade Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and/or Latvia?Perplexity AI: There is no single consensus date, but expert estimates generally cluster around the later 2020s: some intelligence officials warn Russia could be able to attempt aggression against NATO’s eastern flank as early as 2027, while others point to a 2029–2030 window—always with major caveats about politics, readiness, and deterrence.
Early “worst‑case” dates (around 2027)
Ukrainian and some European officials have raised the earliest alarms.
Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov has said Russia originally planned to prepare for direct aggression against NATO by 2030, but has since shortened that timeline to 2027, with the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) cited as primary potential targets.
In Budanov’s reported assessment, Poland is viewed more as a target for air and missile strikes rather than full occupation, at least in the current planning horizon.
These statements are intentionally stark, aimed at galvanizing Western planning, and assume Russia continues rebuilding forces and industry despite its losses in Ukraine.
Later timelines (around 2029–2030)
Many Western defense officials and analysts put the earliest plausible window a bit later.
Germany’s defense minister Boris Pistorius has warned that Russia could be in a position to start a war with NATO “as early as 2029”, stressing that this is a worst‑case planning date and could be brought forward or pushed back.
Independent analysts cited alongside this warning note that some experts see even sooner possibilities, but the general planning assumption in several European capitals is a second half of the decade window.
Strategic scenario work on Russian threats to NATO’s eastern flank—from think‑tanks like Harvard’s Belfer Center—frames crises in the Baltics as becoming more acute over “the next decade,” not imminently, and emphasizes that Russia would likely combine hybrid measures and localized force buildups, rather than a sudden full‑scale invasion.
So, 2029–2030 appears as the more commonly cited horizon in mainstream Western planning documents, with 2027 as an aggressive, cautionary early marker.
Current intelligence and “no concrete plan” assessments
Baltic security services and officials also caution against treating these dates as firm plans.
A July 2026 report quoting Baltic intelligence sources states there is “no concrete plan” and “no known date” for Russian military provocation against the Baltic states or Poland, and that they see no changes in Russian military presence or preparations specifically aimed at those countries at present.
Officials emphasize that while Russia is hostile and capable of provocations, there is no evidence of a political decision for direct attack on NATO territory.
This reflects the distinction between capability timelines (when Russia could, in theory, have rebuilt enough force) and intent (whether the Kremlin actually chooses to risk war with NATO).
How experts use these dates
In practice, these early‑warning dates are used as planning benchmarks, not predictions.
Defense planners in Germany, the Baltics, and at EU level use 2027 and 2029 as target dates by which European forces, air defenses, and logistics must be ready to withstand high‑intensity conflict without depending entirely on U.S. support.
Scenario work stresses that Russia would likely need several years of force regeneration after Ukraine, including rebuilding armor, artillery, and munitions stocks, before attempting anything beyond coercive moves or limited probes against NATO.
So, when experts say “as early as 2027” or “by 2029,” they are essentially saying: if Europe fails to prepare, Russia might have regained enough capability by then that an attack becomes militarily thinkable, not that such an attack is already scheduled.
3) Regarding The Traitorous Orange Turd, remember when, on 25 July 2019, he tried to extort bogus political support from Zelensky in exchange for his mandated-by-Congress releasing of $400 million in funds to Ukraine?-- Tom
