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Author Topic: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)  (Read 5927 times)

Offline Gary Craig

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Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #40 on: April 18, 2021, 04:34:16 PM »
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  Senator John F. Kennedy, US Senate, April 6, 1954:
 
 
'Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be
  told the blunt truth about Indochina.
 
  I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted
  as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu
  and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State
  just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in
  Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of
  the Congress which have been briefed--if not consulted--on this
  matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or alarmist in my evaluation
  of the situation.
 
  But to pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina without
  at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile
  and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes
  the inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike
  similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people
  for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper
  basis for determining the extent of American participation.
 
  Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory,
  every member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears
  to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous
  amounts of economic and materiel aid from the United States, and
  despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call
  for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations
  underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless
  of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons
  that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without
  greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time
  and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area
  is not to disparage their valor. If "united action" can achieve the
  necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the
  security and freedom of all Southeast Asia, then such united action is
  clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in
  our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in
  further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over
  aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions
  under which that pledge is made.
 
  I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military
  assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
  and at the same time nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has
  the sympathy and covert support of the people.
 
  Moreover, without political independence for the Associated States, the
  other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this
  as a war of colonialism; and the "united action" which is said
  to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely
  to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention,
  without participation by the armed forces of the other nations
  of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the people
  of the Associated States, with increasing reluctance and discouragement
  on the part of the French--and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese
  Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation
  of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground--such
  intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in
  the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.
 
  This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon
  my return from the Far East as follows:
 
      In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort
      of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There
      is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam government among
      the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism
      makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms.
      The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment
      within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather
      than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from
      and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed
      failure.
 
  In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act
  which would have provided for the distribution of American aid,
  to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom
  and independence desired by the people of the Associated States
  My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should
  not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation;
  and that the new French government could be expected to make "a
  decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment
  or resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland]
  assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our great
  ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states."
 
  Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that
  the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second,
  that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed
  under steps "now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory
  for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just
  around the corner, or lies two years off. But the stringent limitations
  upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain;
  and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is
  largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these
  prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of
  their reiteration, and they have caused this nation to delay definitive
  action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may
  well be past.
 
  It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the
  difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions
  of military victory and assurances of complete independence have
  given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first,
  that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated
  States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable
  officer corps, a military victory, even with American support,
  in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and,
  second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be
  obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which
  presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.
 
  If the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate
  independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated
  States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain
  aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is
  my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance
  at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men
  and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.
 
  The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But
  in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest
  appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be
  effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic
  retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once
  such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review,
  and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and
  security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence
  of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people,
  then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: "If we think them not enlightened
  enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
  remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion
  by education."

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #40 on: April 18, 2021, 04:34:16 PM »


Offline Jon Banks

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Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #41 on: April 18, 2021, 07:09:29 PM »
  Senator John F. Kennedy, US Senate, April 6, 1954:
 
 
'Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be
  told the blunt truth about Indochina.
 
  I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted
  as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu
  and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State
  just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in
  Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of
  the Congress which have been briefed--if not consulted--on this
  matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or alarmist in my evaluation
  of the situation.
 
  But to pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina without
  at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile
  and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes
  the inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike
  similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people
  for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper
  basis for determining the extent of American participation.
 
  Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory,
  every member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears
  to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous
  amounts of economic and materiel aid from the United States, and
  despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call
  for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations
  underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless
  of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons
  that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without
  greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time
  and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area
  is not to disparage their valor. If "united action" can achieve the
  necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the
  security and freedom of all Southeast Asia, then such united action is
  clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in
  our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in
  further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over
  aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions
  under which that pledge is made.
 
  I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military
  assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
  and at the same time nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has
  the sympathy and covert support of the people.
 
  Moreover, without political independence for the Associated States, the
  other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this
  as a war of colonialism; and the "united action" which is said
  to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely
  to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention,
  without participation by the armed forces of the other nations
  of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the people
  of the Associated States, with increasing reluctance and discouragement
  on the part of the French--and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese
  Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation
  of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground--such
  intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in
  the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.
 
  This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon
  my return from the Far East as follows:
 
      In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort
      of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There
      is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam government among
      the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism
      makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms.
      The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment
      within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather
      than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from
      and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed
      failure.
 
  In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act
  which would have provided for the distribution of American aid,
  to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom
  and independence desired by the people of the Associated States
  My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should
  not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation;
  and that the new French government could be expected to make "a
  decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment
  or resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland]
  assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our great
  ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states."
 
  Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that
  the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second,
  that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed
  under steps "now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory
  for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just
  around the corner, or lies two years off. But the stringent limitations
  upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain;
  and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is
  largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these
  prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of
  their reiteration, and they have caused this nation to delay definitive
  action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may
  well be past.
 
  It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the
  difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions
  of military victory and assurances of complete independence have
  given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first,
  that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated
  States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable
  officer corps, a military victory, even with American support,
  in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and,
  second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be
  obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which
  presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.
 
  If the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate
  independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated
  States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain
  aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is
  my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance
  at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men
  and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.
 
  The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But
  in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest
  appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be
  effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic
  retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once
  such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review,
  and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and
  security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence
  of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people,
  then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: "If we think them not enlightened
  enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
  remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion
  by education."

Doesn't sound like a guy who bought into the "Domino Theory" stuff...

Offline Steve M. Galbraith

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Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #42 on: April 19, 2021, 03:47:20 PM »
Doesn't sound like a guy who bought into the "Domino Theory" stuff...
Then you're again saying that all of those statements by him - and RFK - were lies? And you think a speech on the Senate floor in 1954 - in '54? - is evidence of his later views in 1963? When he later said - to Cronkite in September of '63 - that he believed in the theory he was, well, openly lying? And when RFK said similar things in 1964 he too was lying?

We have the statements by McNamara, the statements by Rusk, by Bundy, by RFK and all sorts of documents indicating that the theory was believed by the Administration. And on the other hand we have a floor speech in 1954. So which to believe?

Here is RFK on JFK's reason for winning: "Just the loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite clear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fall."

You seem to believe, again, that all of these statements could be later simply made to disappear. That he could explicitly and repeatedly say that a loss in Vietnam would lead to the loss of SE Asia and would harm American security and then just say he didn't mean it?

Look, clearly JFK wanted to try and normalize and "calm" down US-Soviet relations, to reduce the chances of war between the two sides. He recognized something that many of his top advisers - particularly in the Pentagon - didn't: that a nuclear war was simply not winnable, that, as he said, after such a war the living would envy the dead, and that the use of such horrible weapons had to be a very last resort. Very last. But that doesn't mean he was some sort of dove, someone who didn't believe that Moscow and communism (read his views on Mao) weren't were existential threats to the West. He wanted peace but he wasn't going to surrender.

FWIW, I think the situation in Vietnam in 1954, which was well before Moscow and Beijing started supporting Hanoi, was completely different than in 1963 when they were clearly supporting the North. In '54 it looked to be a quite different situation in terms of the Cold War then in 1963.
« Last Edit: April 20, 2021, 04:48:19 PM by Steve M. Galbraith »

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #42 on: April 19, 2021, 03:47:20 PM »


Offline Colin Crow

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Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #43 on: April 19, 2021, 03:57:02 PM »

At least LN theory fared better.

Offline Jon Banks

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Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #44 on: April 19, 2021, 08:20:47 PM »
Then you're again saying that all of those statements by him - and RFK - were lies? And you think a speech on the Senate floor in 1954 - in '54? - is evidence of his later views in 1963? When he later said - to Cronkite in September of '63 - that he believed in the theory he was, well, openly lying? And when RFK said similar things in 1964 he too was lying?

We have the statements by McNamara, the statements by Rusk, by Bundy, by RFK and all sorts of documents indicating that the theory was believed by the Administration. And on the other hand we have a floor speech in 1954. So which to believe?

Both men were politicians. In those times, Democrats had to take a tough line on Communism publicly in order to defend against the "soft on Communism" label.

Given JFK's somewhat sympathetic view of anti-Colonial movements in his time combined with his well documented resistance to the Pentagon's efforts to escalate US involvement in Vietnam during his first term, it remains plausible that he wouldn't have made the same mistakes as LBJ. I don't think we can assume that he would've taken the same exact path.

But I'm also aware of the fact that it was politically risky for him to be viewed as "losing Vietnam to the Commies" and in the end, politics might have won.

It's very similar to the logic that has kept the US in Afghanistan for almost 20 years.

« Last Edit: April 19, 2021, 11:13:46 PM by Jon Banks »

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #44 on: April 19, 2021, 08:20:47 PM »


Offline Tom Scully

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Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #45 on: April 19, 2021, 10:38:55 PM »
Well we know now that JFK lied about the Missile Gap stuff during the 1960 campaign. So why not extend that to other contradictory things that he said?

We also know that RFK basically endorsed the Warren Report publicly while privately investigating his brother's murder because he suspected a conspiracy from day 1.

So RFK's public statements can't be taken at face value either. 

Both men were politicians. In those times, Democrats had to take a tough line on Communism publicly in order to defend against the "soft on Communism" label.

Given JFK's somewhat sympathetic view of anti-Colonial movements in his time combined with his well documented resistance to the Pentagon's efforts to escalate US involvement in Vietnam during his first term, it remains plausible that he wouldn't have made the same mistakes as LBJ. I don't think we can assume that he would've taken the same exact path.

But I'm also aware of the fact that it was politically risky for him to be viewed as "losing Vietnam to the Commies" and in the end, politics might have won.

It's very similar to the logic that has kept the US in Afghanistan for almost 20 years.

Jon, for someone as sensitive as you seem to be about accuracy, please explain to readers how any of what is presented in the academic research and analysis below was JFK's fault. He was a politician in 1960 running for the office of POTUS against Nixon, of all people. What are you actually accusing JFK of doing in that 1960 campaign that you've had no similar negative reaction to a republican or Trump party candidate doing, 1960 to 2020?

https://www.academia.edu/4849570/Who_Ever_Believed_in_the_Missile_Gap_John_F_Kennedy_and_the_Politics_of_National_Security
« Last Edit: April 20, 2021, 12:48:36 AM by Tom Scully »

Offline Jon Banks

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Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #46 on: April 19, 2021, 11:11:32 PM »
Jon, for someone as sensitive as you seem to be about accuracy, please explain to readers how any of what is presented in the academic research and analysis beow was JFK's fault. He was a politician in 1960 running for the office of POTUS against Nixon, of all people. What are you actually accusing JFK of doing in that 1960 campaign that you've had no similar negative reaction to a republican or Trump party candidate doing, 1960 to 2020?

https://www.academia.edu/4849570/Who_Ever_Believed_in_the_Missile_Gap_John_F_Kennedy_and_the_Politics_of_National_Security


You're correct. It's not accurate to say JFK lied about the Missile Gap. He wasn't brought into the loop about the issue until he became President.

My broader point still stands. We shouldn't take everything politicians say at face value. In JFK's case, what he said and did privately sometimes contradicted his public stances on the Soviets and Southeast Asia.

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #46 on: April 19, 2021, 11:11:32 PM »


Offline Gary Craig

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Re: JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)
« Reply #47 on: April 20, 2021, 06:39:33 PM »
http://www.jfk-info.com/files.htm

THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON TRANSITION:
THE CASE FOR POLICY REVERSAL

 by DR. JOHN M. NEWMAN.

~snip~

Combat Troops:   Just Another Notch or a Fork in the Road?

   "What was American policy in Vietnam in the early 1960s?  From early in his administration,

President Kennedy accepted that the primary American objective was to prevent the communist

domination of South Vietnam.  There was never any argument over the ends of American Vietnam policy

under Kennedy, but there was an argument over the means to be employed to achieve those ends.  More

specifically, President Kennedy's policy was to assist the South Vietnamese to prevent the communist

domination of their country.  The prohibition against engaging in another American land war in

Asia was a fundamental policy of the Kennedy Administration, and one which President Johnson actually

endorsed in 1964.

   To deny that the decision to send in ground combat units did not reverse this long-standing feature

of American Vietnam policy simply ignores the most basic facts.  A popular proposition used by observers

who dispute that the use of combat troops reversed US policy is the "gradual slide" argument, which holds

that, on a so-called "policy continuum", ground combat units simply represent the next rung on the ladder

of escalation.  In other words, when the marines waded ashore it was as if the mercury in the

thermometer went from 72 to 73 degrees.  Under Kennedy the temperature increased so

many degrees and under Johnson it increased so many degrees and, since both were in the same

direction, Johnson simply continued the policy.

   Such arguments blur the crucial distinction between a policy of advising the South Vietnamese army

how to fight the war and a policy using the American army to fight the war.  From any perspective, not the

least of which was the Viet Cong's, the difference between the South Vietnamese army and the American

army was not subtle, and neither was the difference between the Special Forces, on the one hand, and the

Marines or 82D  Airborne Division, on the other.  These differences are fundamental, and to construe a

large increase in advisors as something only slightly less or a little different than brigades and divisions of

ground forces is just nonsense.   

   Presidents Kennedy and Johnson could have further deepened American commitments and ratcheted

up American participation in the war effort without crossing the Rubicon of conventional forces in Vietnam.

Sending in the American army was nothing less than taking a different turn at the main fork in the

road to Vietnam.  There are those who argue that the Kennedy Administration never faced this fork in

the road, and that the dire situation faced by Johnson only developed after Kennedy's unfortunate demise.

This argument is misinformed, as the record of Kennedy's first year in office makes unequivocally

clear."
 
        1961:  NSAM-111 and the Limits to American Involvement

   "What does the record of the Kennedy Administration's first year reveal about Vietnam policy?

What was the situation?  What was the President told and how were the policy choices framed?  What

policy did Kennedy choose?

   The political and military situation in Vietnam was already critical and deteriorating further by the

time Kennedy was inaugurated in January 1961. For the first three months the worsening situation in

Vietnam was overshadowed by the crisis in Laos, but over the summer and fall of 1961 Vietnam became

the focus of American attention in Indochina.  As the military situation became increasingly critical, calls

within the Administration for the use of American combat forces in Vietnam prompted a major debate over

Vietnam policy in October-November 1961, a debate Kennedy finally resolved with one of his most

important decisions on Vietnam: National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)-111, promulgated on

November 22, 1961.

   The President sent his top experts to Vietnam for a look while the concerned departments and

intelligence agencies in Washington studied the situation anew.  All of this activity produced a veritable

slew of proposals about what to do, and although there were differences between many of them, most all

advocated sending American combat troops to Vietnam.  The argument that Kennedy was never

confronted with the situation that Johnson was, that Kennedy did not face the sort of difficult choices that

Johnson later did, is an argument which ignores the heart of the Kennedy record on this matter.

   Kennedy was told in no uncertain terms that the military situation in Vietnam was critical and that

the fate of South Vietnam hung in the balance.  Moreover, Kennedy's advisors framed the issue this way:

that the loss of South Vietnam to the communists would affect vital US interests regionally and globally,

and that the only way to prevent such an outcome was to send in American ground forces.4   The

President was told that nothing short of several American combat divisions could save South Vietnam.  It

was in that dire context and against those forceful arguments that Kennedy said no to American combat

forces in Vietnam.  The record on this permits no argument and no wiggle room.  Kennedy was

irreconcilably opposed to an American ground war in Vietnam.

   Instead of combat troops, Kennedy agreed to a substantial increase in American advisors.  This

decision was implemented under the provisions of NSAM-111.  Those observers who cite this decision as

evidence that Kennedy pushed a reluctant military into Vietnam obviously haven't a clue about the context

in which this decision was made.  When the situation, the recommendations and Kennedy's decision are

looked at as a whole, they boil down to this:  even when Kennedy was told the only workable solution

was conventional American forces, he would only agree to assisting the South Vietnamese army fight their

war."


~snip~