MT: In contrast, Bowley, Burt, and Cimino arrived too late to see the killing and the subsequent flight of the shooter. As such, they had nothing probative to add to the record, and were not called to testify.
Where Burt and Cimino are concerned I agree. In Bowley's case you are wrong, because he could pin point the time of the crime. That's probative, at least in a honest investigation, and if you feel that it is not, then please explain why the FBI went through all sorts of trouble to get time estimates for the time of DOA from the hospital, to such an extend that they were calling several times daily and a nurse described it as boardering on harassment. Also please explain why they did call people like James Thomas Aycox, Anne Boudreaux and George Bouhe who did not witness anything at all?
Well, they certainly didn't witness anything involving either Tippit's murder or it's aftermath, so I'd have to say they were deposed with the deliberate intent to give future conspiracy theorists red herrings to toss around when all else failed. I hope you sent a nice note thanking them for that thoughtful touch. Proper etiquette aside, why you think Bowley could be used to "pin point" anything is a mystery. You've presented no evidence whatsoever that his watch was any more accurate than any other clock that day.
MT: Bowley's call from the radio in Car 10 is immortalized on the channel one dictabelt recording, nestled with any number time stamps useful to place when that radio call was made. With the dictabelt, there's no need to know what time Bowley thought it was.
BS. First of all, the dictabelt was a voice activated machine that did not run all the time, and thus can not give an accurate sequence of events as far as actual time is concerned and, secondly, the times being called by the dispatcher can not be relied upon, as J.C. Bowles, the man in charge of the DPD dispatchers, explained to the HSCA that the clocks used by the dispatchers did not reflect real time.
A quote from Bowles' HSCA testimony;
A master clock on the telephone room wall was connected to the City Hall system. This clock reported "official" time. Within the dispatcher's office there were numerous other time giving and time recording devices, both in the telephone room and in the radio room. Telephone operators and radio operators were furnished "Simplex" clocks. Because the hands often worked loose, they indicated the incorrect time. However, their purpose was to stamp the time, day and date on incoming calls. While they were reliable at this, they were not synchronized as stated in the Committee report. Therefore, it was not uncommon for the time stamped on calls to be a minute to two ahead or behind the "official" time shown on the master clock. Accordingly, at "exactly" 10:10, various clocks could be stamping from 10:08 to 10:12, for example. When clocks were as much as a minute or so out of synchronization it was normal procedure to make the needed adjustments. During busy periods this was not readily done.
In addition to the times stamped on calls by telephone operators, the radio operators stamped the "time" as calls were dispatched, and the "time" that officers completed an assignment and returned to service. Radio operators were also furnished with 12-hour digital clocks to facilitate their time references when they were not using call sheets containing stamped time. These digital clocks were not synchronized with any time standard. Therefore, the time "actual" and time "broadcast" could easily be a minute or so apart.
So, in short; the master clock was connected to a clock at town hall that showed "official time". It's not even sure that was the same as real time. All other clocks used by the DPD were not automatically synchronized with the master clock and required adjustments, which in busy periods did not always take place.
As it was not uncommon for the time stamps, which is "broadcast" time to differ by minutes from "actual" time on a DPD dispatcher clock, which in turn could differ from the "official" time on the master clock connected to the City Hall System, which in turn could differ from "real" time, there is no way you can rely on the DPD recordings and/or transcripts to get an accurate time.
Again, this is what I've been saying from the beginning: in 1963, clocks in common use could only be reasonably expected to be within 5 minutes of standard time. You keep proving my points for me! However, you haven't shown that Bowley's watch, or Davenport's, or Methodist Hospital's clocks, or Markham's *estimate* were any more accurate than the DPD's. And you can't. I should probably still address what Bowles wrote. And I should start by saying clarifying that the test you've quoted is from his "The Kennedy Assassination Tapes," Bowles' rebuttal to the BBN/WA echo correlation analyses. As far as I can find, he never testified in front of the HSCA, nor presented the this work to them. Not sure why you think that would be the case. That being set straight, lets get onto the meat of the problem. When Bowles says that "There is no way to connect 'police time' with 'real time.'" He is specifically referring to this statement by BBN:
"Channels 1 and 2 were in close synchronization, with Channel 2 announced time running approximately 15 seconds ahead of Channel 1. Accordingly, where a determination was necessary, a 15-second adjustment is used. Therefore, Channel 1 plus 15 seconds equals Channel 2 time: Channel 2 less 15 seconds equals Channel 1 time."
The difference between what Bowles is referring to as "real time" versus what you'd like us to believe is one of scale. He is saying that the DPD dispatcher time system isn't consistent enough to allow exact synchronization of channel 1 with channel 2, as BBN had asserted possible. He is
not saying that the DPD dispatcher time system isn't consistent enough for general usage. He's also trying to rebut the BBN/WA analyses by creating FUD, and as such might be (actually, probably is) exaggerating the actual status in furtherance of that goal. Reading further in, the only part of the Bowles excerpt that matters in this conversation is the part about the clocks used by the radio dispatch operators. If you start comparing channel one and channel 2, you'll realize that they had to be pretty closely aligned that day. JM Souter broadcasts "captain advises all emergency equipment...have 283 cut the traffic at Hines and Industrial...Have all emergency units on South Industrial" just after the channel 2 dispatch operator calls out "12:35 PM" and before the operator calls out "12:36". On channel one, Souter also chimes in saying, "Advise all emergency traffic to use some other route besides Industrial and have 283 cut traffic at Hines and Industrial" soon after the channel one dispatch operator calls out "12:35" and before the operator calls out "12:36." That is Souter transmitting on one channel, then immediately flipping over the other and transmitting the same information so that everyone is on the same page. They obviously won't be simultaneous, but will be within seconds of each other. Soon after, both the channel 1 and channel 2 dispatchers deliver almost identical urgent broadcast messages at 12:36. On channel one, it's, "attention, all emergency equipment...attention all emergency equipment...do not use Industrial Boulevard...Do not use Industrial Boulevard...12:36". The channel two message is a somewhat more terse "Attention, do not use Industrial Boulevard...12:36 PM." The implication of these synchronicities is clear: on that afternoon, the radio operators' clocks were running within a minute of each other. And everyone seems to agree that Channel 2 was running within a minute or two of "real" time that day. So, the channel one clock appears to be within 3 minutes at most of standard time. No matter what you'd have Bowles have us believe.
You don't have to assume that the channel one recording was continuous to get important temporal information out of it. By the way, people have run regression analyses against the channel one recording. After the assassination, it was running very close to continuously from the open mic all the way to the Tippit killing. Any objection to the timing data from the Dictabelt based on possible gaps caused by stoppage isn't going to amount to much.
MT: The "police time" bit is what exactly the what I was getting at. Your problem is, there is also a "Markham time" problem, a "Bowley time" problem, a "Davenport time" problem, etc, and no expectation that any of them would conform more closely to some standard reference clock than "police time."
No, there isn't a "Markam time" problem etc. On an individual level each item can perhaps be questioned to some extend but not in combination with eachother. When I created the timeline, it was clear to me that no LN would look at the combined facts in an honest manner, and so far I've been right. And that obviously includes you.
The guilty dog barks first, Mr Weidmann. Pointless insults aside, you haven't rebutted anything here. "In combination" is, in your case, a pretty nebulous concoction. In reality, the measurement of time is subject to the same issues with precision, accuracy, and margin of error just as that any other measurement humans can make. In this case, we're talking about people running around with a cheap mechanical clock on their wrist that was last synchronized God knows when with a reference that was God knows haw far off of standard time. Markham is subject to the same issues that everyone else had in those days. But really, her sense of time is particularly suspect: as you've noted, she was trying to catch the "1:15" bus to downtown even though the scheduled times were 1:12 and 1:22. She didn't even know what time her bus was supposed to be there. And she left home at about 1:00 PM in order to catch a bus that would take her the 3.5 miles so she could start her shift at 2:30. That's right: she gave herself an hour and a half to go 3.5 miles. That's someone who's used to missing her bus and knew to give herself more than enough time for the next one. That's not someone who I'd expect to have a good grasp of exactly what time it was.
MT: And there are those pesky accounts that you haven't mentioned, like the FBI interview where Dr Liguori says he declared Tippit DOA at 1:25 (and it's helpful to realize that "time of death" is not necessarily the same as "time declared dead.")
You mean the 302 report in which the time was later changed? That report? Why in the world would I mention that? The authorization for autopsy is an official document, signed by a Justice of the Peace. That carries for more weight than some internal 302 report of the FBI, claiming that somebody said something, that isn't part of the official record. The authorization for autopsy said the D.O.A. time was 1.15 and that was based on information from Dr Liguori. And Detective Davenport, who was there, confirms that time in his report. That's corroboration, whether you like it or not!
You realize that Davenport altered the time of death in his report as well? In good copies, you can easily see that he'd originally put the time of death as "1:00" then overstruck the "00" with "15." This creates a problem for you. The change can't really be explained by a simple typo; on a typewriter keyboard, "0" is on the opposite side of the top row from "1", with "5" in the middle. It's hard to see how Davenport's fingers would confuse "0" for "1" and another "0" for "5." Had Davenport known firsthand that the TOD/DOA was at 1:15, he would have typed it that way the first time. Another interesting detail is the times he chooses to type. The time of death is placed at 1:00 then 1:15 as I've already mentioned. He then notes that a button and bullet was removed from a wound at 1:30, and that at 3:30 Fritz commanded everyone to turn in the evidence gathered in the Tippit investigation. All of these time fall neatly on the quarter hour. The odds of that happening by chance is (4/60)^4, or 1 in 50625, if you're looking at it minute by minute. The odds are still a don't-bet-on-it 1 in 81 if you want to chop the hour into 5 minute increments. If he's quantizing his hours into quarters, nothing he writes is going to be useful to "pinpoint" anything. Especially if his time of death didn't come from his own first-hand knowledge. Just be cause he was there doesn't mean that he was paying attention to everything that you'd like him to.
And then you had to go all Rossley on us and bring up the "official document" defense. Good luck with that. The autopsy authorization states that the time of death was 1:15, but the time of death and time declared dead aren't necessarily the same. Really, in the case of DOA, then they aren't by definition. However, if you like official reports, the DPD homicide report states that the "time of offence" for the murder was 1:18 PM, and the "Pronounced dead by physician" field says "Dr Liguori Methodist Hospital, DOA at 1:30pm," which comports well with the FBI 302 interview with Liguori placing the time declared dead at 1:25.
A few years ago someone posted Tippit's death certificate, as official document as official documents get. It put the time of death at 1:15pm, but curiously stated that the "time of injury" was 1:18. Maybe Tippit got hit by one of those bullets from the movie Tenet? Relying on "official documents" may not be the game-changer you seem to believe.
There is one other source for time in the Tippit case that you don't realize exists. The records of Dudley Hughes Funeral Home. Back in '64, George and Patricia Nash interviewed the folks at that establishment and were allowed access to the Hughes ambulance dispatch documentation for the Tippit case. The Dudley Hughes dispatcher received the call from the DPD to dispatch an ambulance to 501 E 10th (ie, responding to Mrs Wright's call) at 1:18PM. The radio logs showed the the ambulance crew reported reaching Methodist Hospital at 1:26, a bit late for Tippit to be declared DOA at 1:15, but consistent with the time declared dead in the FBI Liguori 302 and the DPD Homicide report. Oddly enough, Davenport's report provides some support, albeit weakly, for a ~1:25 declaration of death. He notes that Dr Moellenhoff removed a bullet and a button from Tippit's abdomen at 12:30. If the DPD wasn't too impatient to wait for Earl Rose to pull it out, then they wanted that bullet ASAP.
MT: What you've done is to try and center everything around up Markham's 1:06 estimate in order to show that the DPD recording is an anomaly, when the same data can just as easily be used to argue that the Markham timeline is actual outlier by starting with a different time stamp.
Wrong again. Markham's 1.06 estimate has nothing to do with me showing that the DPD recordings is wrong. It was the DPD supervisor of the dispatchers, J.C. Bowles, who told the HSCA that the recording could not be relied on to give the actual real time. For obvious reasons, you, being a LNr, may disagree with Bowles, but that would be something you would have to take up with him and not with me.
This is the timeline I reconstructed on the basis of the available evidence;
1:03 - 1.04 Markham leaves home at 9th street
1:06 - 1.07 Markham arrives at the corner of 10th street, after having walked one block. She has one more block to go, to
Jefferson, where she would arrive at around 1.09 or 1.10, well in time for the 1.12 bus.
1:06 - 1.09 Tippit is shot and killed.
1.10 Bowley arrives at the crime scene after having picked up his daughter from school at 12.55 and driving 7 miles
Upon arrival he looks at his watch which says 1.10
1.07 - 1.11 Callaway hears the shots and encounters a man with a revolver running towards him.
1.11 After the encounter, Callaway runs half a block and arrives at 10th street. He gets there after Bowley had already
finished operating the police radio
1.11 - 1.13 The ambulance, dispatched from a nearby funeral home on Jefferson, only a block away, arrives and Bowley and
Callaway help to put Tippit in the ambulance.
1.15 - 1.16 After a short 2 miles drive, the ambulance arrives at Methodist Hospital followed by Detective Davenport who saw
the ambulance and chased it to the hospital
1.16 - 1.17 Tippit - who was likely dead at the scene - is declared DOA @ 1.15
It fits perfectly, but only if the shooting happened between 1.06 and 1.10.
Feel free to start Markham's time later and make all the details fit. Go on then...
Let's start with giving us an explanation for the following;
Markham took the same bus to work every day. The bus stop was at Jefferson and she estimated that she would get the bus at 1.15. That could mean either the 1.12 bus or the 1.22 bus, because those were the scheduled times according to the FBI. It doesn't really matter which bus she actually took, a 1.12 running 3 minutes late or a 1.22. What matters is that she used to be at the bus stop at around 1.15.
In order to get to the bus stop, she had to walk two blocks, which would have taken her roughly 6 to 8 minutes. So, as a matter of routine she would leave home "just after 1". If we assume that means 1.04 or 1.05, it have taken her three to four minutes to get the corner of 10th street and Patton. In other words, she would have gotten there at 1.07 or 1.08.
Had she carried on, she would have arrived at the bus stop on Jefferson at around 1.11 or 1.12, perfectly in time to catch her regular bus.
So, the question is; how in the world could Markham witness Tippit being shot at 1.14 or 1.15 when she would have been at the bus stop on Jefferson by then?
You still assume that Markham was a particularly time conscious person who would be expected to be correct about time, when there is no good reason to do so, and good reasons not to.
Now, let me make a counter-scenario here, and we'll see what the punters think.
Let me start off by defining some kind of standard time scale, I'll call it real time or RT, to represent true (presumed NBS) time. And I'll assert the observation that any clock in common usage in 1963 could be reasonably expected to be accurate to within +/5 minutes of RT. And I will note, again, that "time of death" is not necessarily the same thing as "time declared dead."
There are three sources where we can be sure that there is first-hand knowledge of a specific time, derived from direct observation of a clock during the events in question:
1.) TF Bowley and his watch. Bowley looked at his watch when he pulled up to the crime scene after the shooting and looked at his watch. He reports that it read "1:10" his time (hereafter "Bowley time" or "BT").
2.) The DPD channel 1 recordings. They have two dispatcher notations for 1:16 spaced about 10 seconds apart. 1:40 after the latter of these, Bowley radios in that a Policeman has been shot. About two and a half minutes after that, Callaway attempts to call the shooting in, but is cut short by the dispatcher. Dallas Police time is hereafter denoted by "DPT".
3.) The Dudley Hughes ambulance dispatch logs. They report that they received notice of the shooting at 1:18, dispatched an ambulance that arrived within a minute, and that the ambulance arrived at Methodist Hospital at 1:26, all "Dudley Hughes Time" or "DHT".
Some info about what people do in the aftermath of the shooting will probably be helpful:
1.) Bowley didn't mention seeing a fleeing suspect, so the suspect would have either already ran to a point where Bowley would not have been able to see him, or at least far enough away that he wouldn't distract Bowley's attention from Tippit.
2.) Domingo Benavides testified that, after the shooting, the gunman walked a few steps back to the sidewalk, hesitated (but did not stop), took a few more steps, then began running at "a pretty good trot." Benavides also said that he did not leave the cab of his truck until after he saw the gunman disappear behind the house at the end of the block.
3.) Callaway testified that, after he heard the shooting, he walked towards Patton. As he was just about to the east side sidewalk, he saw a man with a gun running across Patton, then southbound on Patton once on the other side. When the man with the gun reached a point slightly south of the alley between 10th and Jefferson, Callaway had a brief conversation with him. After that, the gunman continued on to Jefferson, and Callaway ran north, around the corner and to Tippit's squad car.
We can use these to get some idea of the amounts of time that lapsed between the shooting, when Bowley arrived, and the point where Callaway got to the quad car.
Let's say the gunman takes his first few steps due south to reach the 10th street sidewalk, then runs west along the sidewalk the sidewalk until he gets to the walk leading from the street to the Davises' front door. At that point, he cuts across their yard to reach the street behind where Scoggins' cab was parked on NB Patton, the continues on at about the same angle until he reaches the sidewalk on the west side of Patton, whereupon he heads straight down the sidewalk, at least to the point where he and Callaway have their tete a tete. This follows the path of the fleeing gunman as detailed by Benavides, Davis, Scoggins, Callaway, etc. Using Google Maps, and starting from location of the end of the driveway at 404 10th, the gunman reached the curb on the east side of Patton in 130 feet, the sidewalk on the west side of Patton in 175 feet, and the point where Callaway called out to him at 355 feet.
A comfortable 5k pace for a young adult male is about 9-10 feet per second, and that seems to be a good assumption as to the fleeing gunman's average exit velocity. He was probably a bit slower reloading his gun, but picked up the pace afterward in order to leave the scene as quickly as practically possible. It's notable that Benavides described the pace as "a good trot" while Callaway described the man he saw crossing Patton as "running." At nine feet per second, the gunman would travel the 130' to the curb in 14 seconds, be across Patton in 19, and reach the Callaway point in 39 seconds. At 10 feet per second, the numbers are 13, 18, and 35. After the gunman reaches this point, he has the 'conversation' with Callaway, whereupon Callaway starts running up the Patton, around the corner, and to the squad car. I figure he cut the corner in his haste, and Google puts the length of his run at about 375 feet. At 9 feet per second, he covers the distance in 42 seconds. At 10fps, he makes it in 38. Since Callaway started running immediately after his encounter with the gunman, we can get an idea of the maximum time Bowley has to use the radio before Callaway gets there. The fastest estimate assumes both moving at 10fps, with the gunman taking 35 second to reach Callaway and Callaway needing another 38 seconds to reach the squad car. I'll add in another 15 seconds to factor in any hesitations, the gunman's first few walky steps, and the Callaway/gunman repartee. That leaves us with 35 + 38 + 15 = 88 seconds. The slowest estimate has the gunman reaching the Callaway point in 39 seconds, the Callaway reaching the squad car in 42 seconds, and I'll add in 20 seconds to account for the other activity. that comes out to 39 + 42 + 20 = 101 seconds, a bit more than a minute and a half.
We can do the same for the earliest that Bowley could have showed up on scene. Benavides said that he didn't leave his truck until the gunman had turned the corner and was out of sight. Again, using Google Maps, that would be about the point where the fleeing gunman reached the sidewalk on the west side of Patton, about 175' from his starting point. Given the postulated rates of movement, plus a pair of low (10s) and high (15s) fudge factors to account for interstitial events, The gunman disappears from Benavides' view 28-34 seconds after the shooting. Then there is another 20-30 seconds for Benavides to leave his truck, make his way to the police cruiser and try to call in. Add it up, and we're looking at about 45-60 seconds between the shooting and Benavides' abortive attempt to radio the police. Which is when Benavides notices Bowley standing there next to the cruiser. Since Bowley immediately takes over from there, we can put his call in at right about one minute, and his arrival shortly before. So he would have been looking at his watch between 45 and 60 seconds after the shooting. We can wrap all that up with, "about a minute."
Now, lets go back and deal with the people looking at clock faces. On the channel one tape, the Bowley transmission comes one minute and forty seconds after the channel one dispatcher calls out 1:16 PM for the second time. This timestamp is 10 seconds after the first. At a minimum, assuming that the first time call-out happened at exactly 1:16:00, then Bowley cut in no sooner than 1:17:50. More likely somewhere in 1:18:00 proper, so we'll just use that. So there's a tentative sync between the channel one dispatcher clock and Bowley's watch where 1:10 Bowley time equals 1:18 Dallas Police time. This isn't too far out of whack. If clocks tended to be accurate within 5 minutes, then 1:10 Bowley time could be anywhere from 1:05 to 1:15 "real" time; similarly, 1:18 channel one time could really be anywhere from 1:13 to 1:23 RT. That leaves an overlap between Bowley time and DPD channel one time from 1:13 to 1:15 RT. Since we've already determined that the shooting happened about one minute before Bowley's call, then the shooting would have occurred between 1:12 and 1:14 RT.
However, there's a wrinkle in this. As I've noted, the channel one and channel two clocks can easily be shown to be within a minute of each other using the traffic regarding clearing the approach to Parkland Hospital that occurs at 12:35 and 12:36 on both channels' recordings. Further, a number of researchers have over the years tried to pinpoint the exact moment of JFK's assassination. They've tried to do this by syncing up different sources, including but not limited to the DPD tapes. The "alternative" clock that I always remember offhand is in the McIntire photo of the Presidential limousine catching up to the lead car just west of the triple overpass. In the background, you can see that the Hertz clock atop the roof of the TSBD is showing "12:30." Anyway, the results of these inquiries have generally been in the 12:29-12:30 range, with IIRC one brave soul arguing for 12:28. I can't remember anyone claiming anything later than 12:30. I've taken two things away from these efforts: trying to nail it down exactly to within seconds or maybe even one minute is kinda foolish, and that we should be able to agree that JFK was shot between 12:28 and 12:30 PM. The channel two recording definitely stands in the 12:30 camp: the dispatcher calls out 12:30 between Curry's "approaching triple underpass" transmission and his urgent "go to the hospital" broadcast in the immediate aftermath of the shooting. This would indicate that channel two is running between zero and two minutes ahead of "real" time. Channel one is within a minute of channel two, though we don't know which is ahead of the other, so the channel one clock would be running no more than one minute behind RT and no more than three minutes faster than RT. Taking this approach changes how channel one syncs up with Bowley. His watch is still treated as being within +/- 5 minutes of real time, but channel one time is between -3 and +1 minutes of RT. That still allows for Bowley's watch to be five minutes slow, channel one three minutes fast, and 1:10 Bowley time being 1:18 DPD time at 1:15 real time. By this reckoning, Tippit would have been shot at 1:14 RT.
That leaves Dudley Hughes, who received the Tippit call at 1:18 by their clock. The ambulance they dispatched arrived on scene within a minute, and then arrived at Methodist at 1:26. On the channel one recording, Ted Callaway's attempt to alert the DPD via Tippit's radio occurs two and a half minutes after Bowley's call, somewhere in 1:20 PM territory. The ambulance obviously hadn't arrived yet, so the Callaway transmission tells us that the Dudley Hughes clock was at least two minutes slower than the DPD channel clock. If we adjust the Dudley Hughes clock by two minutes to match the earliest possible sync with the DPD clock, then Hughes' dispatch received the call at 1:20 at the earliest. The ambulance would then have arrived at Methodist hospital at 1:28 DPD time. Applying the +/- 5 minute rule, that would be no earlier than 1:23 real time. This is a problem for the idea that Liguori was with Tippit's body at 1:15. Even with the five minute rule, this would have been no later than 1:20 PM, still too early to sync with the Hughes ambulance arrival time. Even if we use original, unadjusted Dudley Hughes time, the earliest the ambulance could have arrived is 1:21 PM real time, which is still too late. The Dudley Hughes dispatch logs, then, support putting the declaration of death at 1:25-1:30PM, consistent with the FBI interview with Liguori and the DPD homicide report. Conflict within the references to Tippit being declared dead @ 1:15 is resolved by taking into account that time of death is not necessarily the same as time declared dead. That is, you wind up with something like "at 1:25PM, Dr Liguori declared that Tippit had died at the scene at ~1:15PM." This interpretation fits the known data better than any other scenario than anyone has come up with.
That leaves Helen Markham as the odd woman out. It continually amazes me that the people who would have you believe that she was some wild-eyed moonbat drama queen who couldn't be trusted to give you the time of day suddenly becomes a model of reason when she does, in fact, try to give you the time of day.
This leaves us with this interpretation of the Tippit shooting in RT, using the more liberal (+/- 5 minute) margin of error for the DPD channel one radio dispatcher clock.
1:12-1:14 Tippit is shot
1:13-1:15 Bowley arrives and transmits news of the shooting to DPD channel 1
1:15- The Hughes ambulance arrives at 404 10th St
1:23- The ambulance arrives at Methodist Hospital
1:23- Dr Liguori declares Tippit dead, puts time of death at 1:15
If we use the stricter margin of error implied by the to-a-minute sync of the channel one and two clocks, it looks like this:
1:14 Tippt shot
1:15 Bowley arrives and alerts the DPD via radio
1:17- The ambulance arrives on scene
1:25- The ambulance arrives at Methodist
1:27- Liguori pronounces Tippit DOA and assigns the TOD as 1:15
The empty dash that appears after a the third, fourth and fifth entries in each timeline reflects that we can only know that the Hughes clock was at least 2 minutes slower than the channel one clock, but could be even slower.
I'm not saying that this is the be-all-and-end-all. There isn't really much that can be precisely quantified and the timeline I created still relies on a few estimates and a couple of fudge factors. But it's better than simply assuming that Bowley's watch was right on, Markham could correctly estimate time, and then ignoring some important additional data, like the Hughes funeral home logs.
