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Author Topic: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?  (Read 3769 times)

Online John Iacoletti

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #20 on: May 14, 2018, 11:20:07 PM »
Are you aware that Mama Oswald created a "scene" that caused governments of at least two countries to focus on Lee Oswald?

Marguerite Oswald had not heard from Lee in months, and she became worried about her boy ( who she suspected had been sent to Russia by the US government) When JFK was inaugurated in January of 1961 Marguerite took a train to Washington in hope that she could talk to JFK about the disappearance of her son behind the "Iron Curtain".   

Marguerite did not get to talk to JFK but she did talk to one of JFK's aids...who took mama Oswald's plight to JFK.    JFK ordered an investigation to see what had happened to this Oswald kid...and that's when he learned that Lee Oswald was actually a spy for the US government.   JFK was astounded, and fascinated, that someone so young would have the guts to accept such a dangerous mission and  He ordered the US State department to work at bringing Lee Oswald  back to the US.

Cool story, bro.

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #20 on: May 14, 2018, 11:20:07 PM »

Offline Jake Maxwell

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #21 on: June 11, 2018, 03:00:39 AM »


"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Trump colluded with Russia to win the election."

How does that sound?
Any government official discovered making such a statement today would probably be fired on the spot and under close government investigation.

Why is it that reading Hoover's memo decades later - a memo that states our top law official's effort to destroy a person's life and family name without full investigation (only 2 days after the assassination) - doesn't bring down the wrath on Hoover and Katzenbach that they deserve?






 
« Last Edit: June 11, 2018, 03:05:42 AM by Jake Maxwell »

Offline Patrick Jackson

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #22 on: June 11, 2018, 09:25:15 AM »
J. Edgar Hoover's recently released memo below - only two days after the assassination, Nov. 24, 1963 - shows a rush to judgment regarding Oswald - and quite possibly a rush to cover-up...

Shouldn't this be considered the most relevant piece of evidence for a conspiracy?

"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin."

Is there a record of when this memo was done, before or after Oswald was murdered?

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #22 on: June 11, 2018, 09:25:15 AM »

Online Richard Smith

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #23 on: June 11, 2018, 03:17:46 PM »

"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Trump colluded with Russia to win the election."

How does that sound?
Any government official discovered making such a statement today would probably be fired on the spot and under close government investigation.

Why is it that reading Hoover's memo decades later - a memo that states our top law official's effort to destroy a person's life and family name without full investigation (only 2 days after the assassination) - doesn't bring down the wrath on Hoover and Katzenbach that they deserve?

Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians.  They had a legitimate, non-conspiratorial motive to convince the public of Oswald's guilt.  First, because the evidence proved Oswald was guilty beyond any doubt.  Second, because there was no reason to believe then or over 50 years later that the Russians, Cubans or anyone other than Oswald was responsible.   Because of Oswald's nutty political background, Hoover and others understood there was a very real possibility that some would try to use that to convince the public of the involvement of the Commies.   And the United States could have been drawn into a war on the basis of a falsehood.

Offline Gary Craig

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #24 on: June 11, 2018, 03:54:48 PM »
Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians.  They had a legitimate, non-conspiratorial motive to convince the public of Oswald's guilt.  First, because the evidence proved Oswald was guilty beyond any doubt.  Second, because there was no reason to believe then or over 50 years later that the Russians, Cubans or anyone other than Oswald was responsible.   Because of Oswald's nutty political background, Hoover and others understood there was a very real possibility that some would try to use that to convince the public of the involvement of the Commies.   And the United States could have been drawn into a war on the basis of a falsehood.

"Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians."

I call BS.

The government was full of hawks who pushed JFK to invade Cuba, send combat troops to SE Asia, some

even wanted the US fire off a nuclear first strike against the USSR. Ever hear of operation Northwoods?

They weren't afraid of American public opinion. If they were they wouldn't have sent millions of men

to fight in the rice paddies of Indochina.

Nothing more than a lame excuse for the failed cover up.


 

'64 Memo by Joint Chiefs of Staff
              Discussing Widening of the War


     Memorandum from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defense Mc-
     Namara, Jan. 22, 1964, "Vietnam and Southeast Asia."

  1. National Security Action Memorandum No.  273  makes
clear the resolve of the President to ensure victory over the ex-
ternally directed and supported communist insurgency in South
Vietnam. In order to achieve that victory, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are of the opinion that the United States must be prepared
to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions which now
limit our efforts, and to undertake bolder actions which may em-
body greater risks.
  2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly mindful that our
fortunes in South Vietnam are an accurate barometer of our
fortunes in all of Southeast Asia. It is our view that if the U.S.
program succeeds in South Vietnam it will go far toward stabilizing
the total Southeast Asia situation. Conversely, a loss of South
Vietnam to the communists will presage an early erosion of
the remainder of our position in that subcontinent.
  3. Laos, existing on a most fragile foundation now, would not
be able to endure the establishment of a communist--or pseudo
neutralist--state on its eastern flank. Thailand,  less strong today
than a month ago by virtue of the loss of Prime Minister Sarit,
would probably be unable to withstand the pressures of infiltration
from the north should Laos collapse to the communists in its
turn. Cambodia apparently has estimated that our prospects in
South Vietnam are not promising and, encouraged by the actions
of the French, appears already to be seeking an accommodation
with the communists. Should we actually suffer defeat in South
Vietnam, there is little reason to believe that Cambodia would
maintain even a pretense of neutrality.
  4. In a broader sense, the failure of our programs in South
Vietnam would have heavy influence on the judgments of Burma,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea,
and the Republic of the Philippines with respect to U.S. durability,
resolution, and trustworthiness. Finally, this being the first real test
of our determination to defeat the communist wars of national
liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there
would be a corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in
Africa and in Latin America.
  5. All of this underscores the pivotal position now occupied by
South Vietnam in our world-wide confrontation with the com-
munists and the essentiality that the conflict there would be
brought to a favorable end as soon as possible. However, it
would be unrealistic to believe that a complete suppression of the
insurgency can take place in one or even two years. The British
effort in Malaya is a recent example of a counterinsurgency effort
which required approximately ten years before the bulk of the
rural population was brought completely under control of the
government, the police were able to maintain order, and the
armed forces were able to eliminate the guerrilla strongholds.
  6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that, in keeping
with the guidance in NSAM 273, the United States must make
plain to the enemy our determination to see the Vietnam cam-
paign through to a favorable conclusion. To do this, we must
prepare for whatever level of activity may be required and, being
prepared, must then proceed to take actions as necessary to
achieve our purposes surely and promptly.
   7. Our considerations, furthermore, cannot be confined en-
tirely to South Vietnam. Our experience in the war thus far leads
us to conclude that, in this respect, we are not now giving suffi-
cient attention to the broader area problems of Southeast Asia.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our position in Cambodia,
our attitude toward Laos, our actions in Thailand, and our great
effort in South Vietnam do not comprise a compatible and inte-
grated U.S. policy for Southeast Asia. U.S. objectives in Southeast
Asia cannot be achieved by either economic, political, or military
measures alone. All three fields must be integrated into a single,
broad U.S. program for Southeast Asia. The measures recom-
mended in this memorandum are a partial contribution to such
a program.
  8. Currently, we and the South Vietnamese are fighting the war
on the enemy's terms. He has determined the locale, the timing,
and the tactics of the battle while our actions are essentially re-
active. One reason for this is the fact that we have obliged our-
selves to labor under self-imposed restrictions with respect to
impeding external aid to the Viet Cong. These restrictions in-
clude keeping the war within the boundaries of South Vietnam,
avoiding the direct use of U.S. combat forces, and limiting U.S.
direction of the campaign to rendering advice to the Government
of Vietnam. These restrictions, while they may make our inter-
national position more readily defensible, all tend to make the
task in Vietnam more complex, time-consuming, and in the end,
more costly. In addition to complicating our own problem, these
self-imposed restrictions may well now be conveying signals of
irresolution to our enemies--encouraging them to higher levels of
vigor and greater risks. A reversal of attitude and the  adoption
of a more aggressive program would enhance greatly our ability to
control the degree to which escalation will occur. It appears
probable that the economic and  agricultural disappointments
suffered by Communist China, plus the current rift with the
Soviets, could cause the communists to think twice about under-
taking a large-scale military adventure in Southeast Asia.
  9. In adverting to actions outside  of South Vietnam, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that the focus of the counter-
insurgency battle lies in South Vietnam itself, and that the war
must certainly be fought and won primarily in the minds of the
Vietnamese people. At the same time, the aid now coming to the
Viet Cong from outside the country in men, resources, advice, and
direction is sufficiently great in the aggregate to be significant--
both as help and as encouragement to the Viet Cong. It is our
conviction that if support of the insurgency from outside South
Vietnam in terms of operational direction, personnel, and ma-
terial were stopped completely, the character of the war in South
Vietnam would be substantially and favorably altered.  Because
of this conviction, we are wholly in favor of executing the covert
actions against North Vietnam which you have recently proposed
to the President. We believe, however, that it would be idle to
conclude that these efforts will have a decisive effect on the com-
munist determination to support the insurgency; and it is our
view that we must therefore be prepared fully to undertake a
much higher level of activity, not only for its beneficial tactical
effect, but to make plain our resolution, both to our friends and
to our enemies.
  10. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
United States must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder
actions in Southeast Asia; specifically as to Vietnam to:
  a. Assign to the U.S. military commander responsibilities for
the total U.S. program in Vietnam.
  b. Induce the Government of Vietnam to turn over to the
United States military commander, temporarily, the actual tac-
tical direction of the war.
  c. Charge the United States military commander with complete
responsibility for conduct of the program against North Vietnam.
  d. Overfly Laos and Cambodia to whatever extent is necessary
for acquisition of operational intelligence.
  e. Induce the Government of Vietnam to conduct overt ground
operations in Laos of sufficient scope to impede the flow of
personnel and material southward.
  f. Arm, equip, advise, and support the Government of Vietnam
in its conduct of aerial bombing of critical targets in North Viet-
nam and in mining the sea approaches to that country.
  g. Advise and support the Government of Vietnam in its con-
duct of large-scale commando raids against critical targets in
North Vietnam.
  h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, using
U.S. resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese
openly assuming responsibility for the actions.
  i. Commit additional U.S. forces, as necessary, in support of
the combat action within South Vietnam.
  j. Commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against
North Vietnam.
  11. It is our conviction that any or all of the foregoing actions
may be required to enhance our position in Southeast Asia. The
past few months have disclosed that considerably higher levels of
effort are demanded of us if U.S. objectives are to be attained.
  12. The governmental reorganization which followed the coup
d'etat in Saigon should be completed very soon, giving basis for
concluding just how strong the Vietnamese Government is going
to be and how much of the load they will be able to bear them-
selves. Additionally, the five-month dry season, which is just now
beginning, will afford the Vietnamese an opportunity to exhibit
their ability to reverse the unfavorable situation in the  critical
Mekong Delta. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will follow these im-
portant developments closely and will recommend to you pro-
gressively the execution of such of the above actions as are
considered militarily required, providing, in each case, their de-
tailed assessment of the risks involved.
  13. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the strategic im-
portance of Vietnam and of Southeast Asia warrants preparations
for the actions above and recommend that the substance of this
memorandum be discussed with the Secretary of State."


http://www.jfk-info.com/files.htm
« Last Edit: June 11, 2018, 04:20:54 PM by Gary Craig »

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #24 on: June 11, 2018, 03:54:48 PM »

Offline Gary Craig

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #25 on: June 11, 2018, 04:30:48 PM »
Is there a record of when this memo was done, before or after Oswald was murdered?

"...On November 23,1963, J. Edgar Hoover forwarded the results of the FBI's preliminary investigation to him.(LBJ) This report detailed the evidence that indicated LHO's guilt.

On November 24, 1963, Hoover telephoned President Johnson aide Walter Jenkins and stated:"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin..."


http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=39609&imageO...

Online Richard Smith

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  • Posts: 817
Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #26 on: June 11, 2018, 04:31:41 PM »
"Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians."

I call BS.

The government was full of hawks who pushed JFK to invade Cuba, send combat troops to SE Asia, some

even wanted the US fire off a nuclear first strike against the USSR. Ever hear of operation Northwoods?

They weren't afraid of American public opinion. If they were they wouldn't have sent millions of men

to fight in the rice paddies of Indochina.

Nothing more than a lame excuse for the failed cover up.


 

'64 Memo by Joint Chiefs of Staff
              Discussing Widening of the War


     Memorandum from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defense Mc-
     Namara, Jan. 22, 1964, "Vietnam and Southeast Asia."

  1. National Security Action Memorandum No.  273  makes
clear the resolve of the President to ensure victory over the ex-
ternally directed and supported communist insurgency in South
Vietnam. In order to achieve that victory, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are of the opinion that the United States must be prepared
to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions which now
limit our efforts, and to undertake bolder actions which may em-
body greater risks.
  2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly mindful that our
fortunes in South Vietnam are an accurate barometer of our
fortunes in all of Southeast Asia. It is our view that if the U.S.
program succeeds in South Vietnam it will go far toward stabilizing
the total Southeast Asia situation. Conversely, a loss of South
Vietnam to the communists will presage an early erosion of
the remainder of our position in that subcontinent.
  3. Laos, existing on a most fragile foundation now, would not
be able to endure the establishment of a communist--or pseudo
neutralist--state on its eastern flank. Thailand,  less strong today
than a month ago by virtue of the loss of Prime Minister Sarit,
would probably be unable to withstand the pressures of infiltration
from the north should Laos collapse to the communists in its
turn. Cambodia apparently has estimated that our prospects in
South Vietnam are not promising and, encouraged by the actions
of the French, appears already to be seeking an accommodation
with the communists. Should we actually suffer defeat in South
Vietnam, there is little reason to believe that Cambodia would
maintain even a pretense of neutrality.
  4. In a broader sense, the failure of our programs in South
Vietnam would have heavy influence on the judgments of Burma,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea,
and the Republic of the Philippines with respect to U.S. durability,
resolution, and trustworthiness. Finally, this being the first real test
of our determination to defeat the communist wars of national
liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there
would be a corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in
Africa and in Latin America.
  5. All of this underscores the pivotal position now occupied by
South Vietnam in our world-wide confrontation with the com-
munists and the essentiality that the conflict there would be
brought to a favorable end as soon as possible. However, it
would be unrealistic to believe that a complete suppression of the
insurgency can take place in one or even two years. The British
effort in Malaya is a recent example of a counterinsurgency effort
which required approximately ten years before the bulk of the
rural population was brought completely under control of the
government, the police were able to maintain order, and the
armed forces were able to eliminate the guerrilla strongholds.
  6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that, in keeping
with the guidance in NSAM 273, the United States must make
plain to the enemy our determination to see the Vietnam cam-
paign through to a favorable conclusion. To do this, we must
prepare for whatever level of activity may be required and, being
prepared, must then proceed to take actions as necessary to
achieve our purposes surely and promptly.
   7. Our considerations, furthermore, cannot be confined en-
tirely to South Vietnam. Our experience in the war thus far leads
us to conclude that, in this respect, we are not now giving suffi-
cient attention to the broader area problems of Southeast Asia.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our position in Cambodia,
our attitude toward Laos, our actions in Thailand, and our great
effort in South Vietnam do not comprise a compatible and inte-
grated U.S. policy for Southeast Asia. U.S. objectives in Southeast
Asia cannot be achieved by either economic, political, or military
measures alone. All three fields must be integrated into a single,
broad U.S. program for Southeast Asia. The measures recom-
mended in this memorandum are a partial contribution to such
a program.
  8. Currently, we and the South Vietnamese are fighting the war
on the enemy's terms. He has determined the locale, the timing,
and the tactics of the battle while our actions are essentially re-
active. One reason for this is the fact that we have obliged our-
selves to labor under self-imposed restrictions with respect to
impeding external aid to the Viet Cong. These restrictions in-
clude keeping the war within the boundaries of South Vietnam,
avoiding the direct use of U.S. combat forces, and limiting U.S.
direction of the campaign to rendering advice to the Government
of Vietnam. These restrictions, while they may make our inter-
national position more readily defensible, all tend to make the
task in Vietnam more complex, time-consuming, and in the end,
more costly. In addition to complicating our own problem, these
self-imposed restrictions may well now be conveying signals of
irresolution to our enemies--encouraging them to higher levels of
vigor and greater risks. A reversal of attitude and the  adoption
of a more aggressive program would enhance greatly our ability to
control the degree to which escalation will occur. It appears
probable that the economic and  agricultural disappointments
suffered by Communist China, plus the current rift with the
Soviets, could cause the communists to think twice about under-
taking a large-scale military adventure in Southeast Asia.
  9. In adverting to actions outside  of South Vietnam, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that the focus of the counter-
insurgency battle lies in South Vietnam itself, and that the war
must certainly be fought and won primarily in the minds of the
Vietnamese people. At the same time, the aid now coming to the
Viet Cong from outside the country in men, resources, advice, and
direction is sufficiently great in the aggregate to be significant--
both as help and as encouragement to the Viet Cong. It is our
conviction that if support of the insurgency from outside South
Vietnam in terms of operational direction, personnel, and ma-
terial were stopped completely, the character of the war in South
Vietnam would be substantially and favorably altered.  Because
of this conviction, we are wholly in favor of executing the covert
actions against North Vietnam which you have recently proposed
to the President. We believe, however, that it would be idle to
conclude that these efforts will have a decisive effect on the com-
munist determination to support the insurgency; and it is our
view that we must therefore be prepared fully to undertake a
much higher level of activity, not only for its beneficial tactical
effect, but to make plain our resolution, both to our friends and
to our enemies.
  10. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
United States must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder
actions in Southeast Asia; specifically as to Vietnam to:
  a. Assign to the U.S. military commander responsibilities for
the total U.S. program in Vietnam.
  b. Induce the Government of Vietnam to turn over to the
United States military commander, temporarily, the actual tac-
tical direction of the war.
  c. Charge the United States military commander with complete
responsibility for conduct of the program against North Vietnam.
  d. Overfly Laos and Cambodia to whatever extent is necessary
for acquisition of operational intelligence.
  e. Induce the Government of Vietnam to conduct overt ground
operations in Laos of sufficient scope to impede the flow of
personnel and material southward.
  f. Arm, equip, advise, and support the Government of Vietnam
in its conduct of aerial bombing of critical targets in North Viet-
nam and in mining the sea approaches to that country.
  g. Advise and support the Government of Vietnam in its con-
duct of large-scale commando raids against critical targets in
North Vietnam.
  h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, using
U.S. resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese
openly assuming responsibility for the actions.
  i. Commit additional U.S. forces, as necessary, in support of
the combat action within South Vietnam.
  j. Commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against
North Vietnam.
  11. It is our conviction that any or all of the foregoing actions
may be required to enhance our position in Southeast Asia. The
past few months have disclosed that considerably higher levels of
effort are demanded of us if U.S. objectives are to be attained.
  12. The governmental reorganization which followed the coup
d'etat in Saigon should be completed very soon, giving basis for
concluding just how strong the Vietnamese Government is going
to be and how much of the load they will be able to bear them-
selves. Additionally, the five-month dry season, which is just now
beginning, will afford the Vietnamese an opportunity to exhibit
their ability to reverse the unfavorable situation in the  critical
Mekong Delta. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will follow these im-
portant developments closely and will recommend to you pro-
gressively the execution of such of the above actions as are
considered militarily required, providing, in each case, their de-
tailed assessment of the risks involved.
  13. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the strategic im-
portance of Vietnam and of Southeast Asia warrants preparations
for the actions above and recommend that the substance of this
memorandum be discussed with the Secretary of State."


http://www.jfk-info.com/files.htm

You are mixing apples and oranges.  Hoover and many others were undoubtedly anti-commies and supported strong measures including military measures in many instances to combat it.  That differs vastly, however, from being pressured by hysterical kooks into a nuclear war with Russia due to a false claim that Oswald was involved with the Russians or Cubans in assassinating JFK.  You have undermined your own fantasy, however, if you are suggesting that Hoover and others involved in the cover up would have wanted a war with Russia or Cuba.  If that were the case, then why not go with the conspiracy nonsense that the Russians or Cubans were behind the assassination rather than putting the blame all on Oswald?   It would have been a golden opportunity.  Instead these anti-communists officials put all the blame on poor old Lee. 

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #26 on: June 11, 2018, 04:31:41 PM »

Offline Gary Craig

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #27 on: June 11, 2018, 04:46:45 PM »
You are mixing apples and oranges.  Hoover and many others were undoubtedly anti-commies and supported strong measures including military measures in many instances to combat it.  That differs vastly, however, from being pressured by hysterical kooks into a nuclear war with Russia due to a false claim that Oswald was involved with the Russians or Cubans in assassinating JFK.  You have undermined your own fantasy, however, if you are suggesting that Hoover and others involved in the cover up would have wanted a war with Russia or Cuba.  If that were the case, then why not go with the conspiracy nonsense that the Russians or Cubans were behind the assassination rather than putting the blame all on Oswald?   It would have been a golden opportunity.  Instead these anti-communists officials put all the blame on poor old Lee.

The idea that the government would be forced into a nuclear war with Russia if the public wasn't convinced

Ozzie was the real assassin is BS. 

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #27 on: June 11, 2018, 04:46:45 PM »

Online Royell Storing

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #28 on: June 11, 2018, 05:00:41 PM »
Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians.  They had a legitimate, non-conspiratorial motive to convince the public of Oswald's guilt.  First, because the evidence proved Oswald was guilty beyond any doubt.  Second, because there was no reason to believe then or over 50 years later that the Russians, Cubans or anyone other than Oswald was responsible.   Because of Oswald's nutty political background, Hoover and others understood there was a very real possibility that some would try to use that to convince the public of the involvement of the Commies.   And the United States could have been drawn into a war on the basis of a falsehood.

         Not sure how you arrive at, "the evidence proved Oswald was guilty Beyond any Doubt", only 2 Days after the assassination. This sort of so called Justice is  right in line with Judge Roy Bean's, "You'll get a fair trial and the hangin' will be in the morning"

Offline Richard Rubio

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Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #29 on: June 11, 2018, 05:07:16 PM »
You are mixing apples and oranges.  Hoover and many others were undoubtedly anti-commies and supported strong measures including military measures in many instances to combat it.  That differs vastly, however, from being pressured by hysterical kooks into a nuclear war with Russia due to a false claim that Oswald was involved with the Russians or Cubans in assassinating JFK.  You have undermined your own fantasy, however, if you are suggesting that Hoover and others involved in the cover up would have wanted a war with Russia or Cuba.  If that were the case, then why not go with the conspiracy nonsense that the Russians or Cubans were behind the assassination rather than putting the blame all on Oswald?   It would have been a golden opportunity.  Instead these anti-communists officials put all the blame on poor old Lee.

I agree and even if, IF stating nuclear war is an overstatement, we certainly had hot wars going on and the red scare still thriving.

Nuke war if we knew the Soviets/Castroites killed our president? Sounds like a possibility.

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: Hoover's recently released memo; does it prove conspiracy?
« Reply #29 on: June 11, 2018, 05:07:16 PM »

 

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