A time to receive and give (CE399)


Users Currently Browsing This Topic:
0 Members and 9 Guests are viewing this topic.

Author Topic: A time to receive and give (CE399)  (Read 11885 times)

Online Mitch Todd

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 748
Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #104 on: January 10, 2023, 12:51:48 AM »

MT: ["And why do you think that they had Dolce in the room with Shaw, Shires, and Gregory?"] was a rhetorical question, Martin.

Yeah, sure...

It was most certainly rhetorical. Also, I note that you were unable to answer it on the first pass and now on the second.


MT: My point is that Dolce's description of the meeting doesn't sounds like medical evidence is being screened. More like some confab is going on regarding how to interpret Connally's wounds, and where to go next with it. Something like what is described in Dolce's obit.

Another selfserving opinion.

That's what the Dolce obit said. This is the FBI summary of the April 21 meeting:

April 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO:  Mr. Conrad

FROM:  W.D. Griffith 

SUBJECT:  Assassination of President Kennedy

At the request of the President's Commission, Inspector J.R. Malley of the General Investigation Division, Inspector L.J. Gauthier of the Administrative Division and Special Agent Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt of the Laboratory on 4/21/64 were at the Commission for a review of the Zapruder film of the assassination. Purpose of this review was to determine from Governor and Mrs. John Connally, who were present, whether or not it could be established at what point in the film the Governor was shot. The following individuals were also present:

Dr. Gregory and Dr. Shaw who examined Governor Connally at Parkland Hospital in Dallas

Dr. F.W. Light, Jr. and Dr. A.G. Olivier from the Wound Assessment and Wound Ballistics Department of Edgewood Arsenal

Dr. Joseph Dolce, consultant to the Biophysics Division of Edgewood Arsenal

It is noted that representatives of the Secret Service who have attended past reviews were not present.

The principal fact brought out by the Governor and Mrs. Connally was their selection of a portion of the film where "he has been hit"; however, they could not pin point the exact frame of the motion picture film where the bullet struck. The portion of the sequence they selected is only one-fourth to one-half second after the approximate point where the President was believed to have been shot at the base of the neck. Allowing for variations in reaction times, this lends support to the theory that one bullet passed through the President's neck, the Governor's chest, hit in the Governor's leg, and lodged in his clothing.

Both the Governor and Mrs. Connally stated that they heard the first shot and the second shot was the one that hit the Governor, however, neither of them saw the President between the first and third shots or can state that the President was actually hit by the first shot.


This document says that the purpose of the meeting was to screen the Zapruder film for the attendees in order to determine "whether or not it could be established at what point in the film the Governor was shot."



JFK Assassination Forum

Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #104 on: January 10, 2023, 12:51:48 AM »


Online Mitch Todd

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 748
Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #105 on: January 10, 2023, 01:28:34 AM »
You started off arguing that Dolce went to see Specter on the 21st of April with the report generated from the shooting tests.

Lie number 1: I never said anything like that

In reality, the shooting tests didn't begin until the 27th of April, so Dolce couldn't have approached the April 21st meeting with any testing results in his hands.

Lie number 2: I never said that Dolce had testing results "in his hand"

This is what you said:

MW: All I can say is that Dolce and his team were hired by the WC to do the tests and when the WC got their report they buried it and Dolce's testimony

A couple of posts later in the exchange, you write:

MW: Specter screened all the medical and ballistic witnesses before any testimony was taken from them. In Dolce's case that was on April 21, 1964 when he "appeared before the investigating team of the Warren Commission". If Dolce had no information to share, why would he appear before the investigating team of the WC? The fact that Dolce did not go into details in his letter to the HSCA, 12 years later, doesn't mean that Specter and his team didn't question him. Also, are we to believe that the WC let Dolce review all the XĖrays and Zapruder film and then decided not to call him to testify, all without having questioned him?


If Dolce had no information to share, why would he appear before the investigating team of the WC?

What "information" was Dolce going to "share" if not the results of shooting tests?

PS, yes, you did say "Dolce's testimony" but I won't tell, I swear!  ;)


Online John Iacoletti

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 10181
Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #106 on: January 13, 2023, 10:28:26 PM »
The assumptions are simultaneous, not necessarily the events they describe.

But thereís nothing that precludes a bullet being there when Shaw made his statement, and no longer there when the X-rays were taken.

Quote
I'm unaware of any complexity or detail requirements for Occam's razor.

The more detailed the narrative, the greater number of assumptions there are.
« Last Edit: January 13, 2023, 10:38:08 PM by John Iacoletti »

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #106 on: January 13, 2023, 10:28:26 PM »


Online Mitch Todd

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 748
Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #107 on: January 13, 2023, 11:34:08 PM »
But thereís nothing that precludes a bullet being there when Shaw made his statement, and no longer there when the X-rays were taken.

If that's the story you want to advance, then it's up to you to put forth a convincing argument for it.



The more detailed the narrative, the greater number of assumptions there are.

There is no reason to automatically tie the detail of a narrative to the number of underlying assumptions.

Online John Iacoletti

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 10181
Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #108 on: January 14, 2023, 06:25:39 PM »
If that's the story you want to advance, then it's up to you to put forth a convincing argument for it.

Iím not ďadvancingĒ anything. This conversation started with me saying that Bill canít just assume that this definitive statement by Shaw was merely an assumption and nothing else, and then just state that as a fact.

Offline Jerry Organ

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 2084
  • Halifax - Canada
Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #109 on: January 14, 2023, 06:44:26 PM »
Iím not ďadvancingĒ anything. This conversation started with me saying that Bill canít just assume that this definitive statement by Shaw was merely an assumption and nothing else, and then just state that as a fact.

Yes, you certainly failed to put forth a convincing argument for Shaw's "definitive statement".

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #109 on: January 14, 2023, 06:44:26 PM »


Offline Tom Scully

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 1164
Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #110 on: January 14, 2023, 08:01:33 PM »
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-white-house-tapes/conversation-eugene-rostow-november-24-1963
Conversation with EUGENE ROSTOW, November 24, 1963

Recorded conversation above resulted in the drafting of this memo :
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"On November 25 1963, the day of the Kennedy funeral, Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach sent a memo to Bill Moyers of the new Johnson White House. He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's death at the hands of Jack Ruby.

The second paragraph stated: "The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial."

Given that the authorities could not possibly by November 25 know these things to be true, and Katzenbach later admitted he knew very little at this stage, the memo is clearly advocating a political course irrespective of the truth of the assassination. ..."

In a nutshell, the reason "it", the WC "investigation" and Report seem suspect is because instead of following rules of evidence, conclusions were drafted by January, 1964, and then the evidence supporting the conclusions was obtained, organized, and an attempt was made to knit it all together,

versus acquiring and then following the evidence wherever it lead.... permitting findings to evolve into conclusions on the weight of the evidence.

David Lifton and I cannot be described as close. I do not quote him often but I think this recent post of his is worth sharing.

https://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/27388-ce-2011/
David Lifton - Posted October 2, 2021
"...As everyone knows, the key "evidence against Oswald" consisted such items as "the rifle", "fingerprints at the sniper' nest", bullet fragments removed from JFK's body. And of course, thee was the body itself.  The President's body was critical evidence in "the case against Oswald.  So it, too, had to have a "chain of possession," (All  of this is discussed in Chapter 16 of Best Evidence.")

Had Oswald lived--and the case against him gone to trial--many of the key items could not have been "admitted into evidence" without a valid "chain of possession."

Oswald was murdered on Sunday 11/24/63, so the case being built against him began with the Dallas Police file, and then the FBI file, and --finally--the Warren Commission investigation.

So... faced with these legal requirements, how did the Warren Commission legal staff behave?

Basically, they accepted all the basic evidence --the "found rifle,"  the "found bullets" (or bullet fragments) etc. --as evidence, without paying sufficient attention to the "chain of possession."

Accepting the validity of these items of evidence, the Warren Commission legal staff then set out to write their "report".   But note: Just as when a high school or college student writes a term paper, the Warren Commission's legal staff first wrote an "outline" -- an "Oswald was guilty" outline as the basic structure for the Warren Report.  These outlines --in the "office files" at the National Archives (and designated the "REP" files) --were dated between January and March, 1964. Once these outlines were approved by Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin, the work for the individual chapters was parceled out to individual staff lawyers, who then proceeded  to write their 'preliminary drafts" for the document which, when completed, would emerge as the Warren Commission Report (the WCR). (All of this-- what I have just described here -- is documented in the "Office Files" of the Warren Commission -- abbreviated as the "REP" files in the "office files" of the Warren Commission.  (I examined this material -- the REP files -- back around 1970. (Arlen Specter, for example, wrote the "original drafts" for the section of the Warren Report about the autopsy.  Wesley Liebeler --and Albert Jenner -- were in charge of the chapters on Oswald's biography.)

What I found-- again, back around 1970, when I first examined the Warren Commission's "working paper's" at the National Archives-- was simply this: : The Warren Commission legal staff wrote their "first drafts" of the "Oswald-did-it" Warren Report in mid-January 1964!

Just consider what this means: President Kennedy was murdered on 11/22/63; the Warren Commission was created by 11/29/63; several weeks passed while staff was hired, the nation was told that the Warren Commission was hard work.  Meanwhile,  by January 1964, the earliest "Oswald did it" outlines were already created!  (This same bizarre situation was addressed by author Howard Roffman, whose book -- appropriately titled "Presumed Guilty"  --was published around 1970,

Bottom line: the "Oswald did it" fix was in by January 1964. 

All i can say is: "Wow! What a betrayal of the public trust!"

Once this bizarre "preliminary outline"  was adopted (i.e., "green lighted") by the WC's General Counsel), what happened next was predictable.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT --i.e., starting in January 1964

Between January and June 1964, when the senior  Warren Commission staff lawyers (e.g., Stuart Eisenberg, and Norman Redlich)  were already drafting the document that became known as "the Warren Report-- some of the senior legal staff in effect recognized the emerging legal problem. Indeed, the documents show that senior members had a serious "Oops!" moment. Someone apparently realized "Oops!  We are constructing this "Oswald did it" narrative  based on the "sniper's nest evidence"  (e.g the rifle, the bullet fragments, etc.) --but we (the WC legal staff) have  neglected to establish a "chain of possession" on the key items of evidence!

 In other words, it was as if they (the WC legal staff)  were building a house that had no proper legal foundation!

So now, having conducted their investigation without bothering to establish a chain of possession, senior attorneys Eisenberg and Redlich let out an enormous "OOPS!" exclamation;  consulted with Gen. Counsel Rankin, and that's how (and why) it wasn't until May 1964, that the Warren Commission legal staff set out to repair the situation.  At this rather "late" date, the FBI was requested (by the Warren Commission) to establish a "chain of possession" on a whole array of "sniper's nest" items of evidence: i.e., the rifle, the bullets, the shells, etc.

All I can say is: "Welcome to law school, and the "legal way" of viewing theWarren Commission's view of 11/22/63. 

This --of course--  was akin to putting the cart before the horse, but the legal eagles of the WC staff behaved as if none of this mattered. It was as if their attitude was: "Oswald killed the President. Here's the official narrative; we can worry about the legal details later."

The country deserved better."

https://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/17951-ce-399s-broken-chain-of-custody/
Gil Jesus     Posted July 19, 2011

"Commission Exhibit 2011 ( 24 H 412 ) shows the break in the chain of custody of bullet 399.

"Darrell C. Tomlinson...cannot positively identify the bullet as the one he found and showed to Mr. O. P. Wright."

"Mr. O.P. Wright could not positively identify C1 ( CE 399 ) as the bullet that was found on November 22, 1963."

"Special Agent Richard E. Johnson, United States Secret Service, could not identify this bullet as the one he obtained from O.P. Wright, Parkland Hospital, Dallas Texas, and gave to James Rowley, Chief, United States Secret Service, Washington, D.C. on November 22, 1963."

"James Rowley, Chief, United States Secret Service, advised that he could not identify this bullet as the one he received from Special Agent Richard E. Johnson and gave to Special Agent Todd on November 22, 1963."

All four of the people who handled the "stretcher bullet" before it came into the possession of the FBI could not identify CE 399 as being that bullet."
« Last Edit: January 14, 2023, 08:17:53 PM by Tom Scully »

Online John Iacoletti

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 10181
Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #111 on: January 14, 2023, 09:38:28 PM »
Yes, you certainly failed to put forth a convincing argument for Shaw's "definitive statement".

Be honest, only the official theology convinces you.

I donít give a damn what people believe ó knock yourself out. I do care about assumptions being stated as if they were facts.

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: A time to receive and give (CE399)
« Reply #111 on: January 14, 2023, 09:38:28 PM »


 

Mobile View