JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)

[Steve M. Galbraith]

Doesn't sound like a guy who bought into the "Domino Theory" stuff...

Then you're again saying that all of those statements by him - and RFK - were lies? And you think a speech on the Senate floor in 1954 - in '54? - is evidence of his later views in 1963? When he later said - to Cronkite in September of '63 - that he believed in the theory he was, well, openly lying? And when RFK said similar things in 1964 he too was lying?

We have the statements by McNamara, the statements by Rusk, by Bundy, by RFK and all sorts of documents indicating that the theory was believed by the Administration. And on the other hand we have a floor speech in 1954. So which to believe?

Here is RFK on JFK's reason for winning: "Just the loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite clear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fall."

You seem to believe, again, that all of these statements could be later simply made to disappear. That he could explicitly and repeatedly say that a loss in Vietnam would lead to the loss of SE Asia and would harm American security and then just say he didn't mean it?

Look, clearly JFK wanted to try and normalize and "calm" down US-Soviet relations, to reduce the chances of war between the two sides. He recognized something that many of his top advisers - particularly in the Pentagon - didn't: that a nuclear war was simply not winnable, that, as he said, after such a war the living would envy the dead, and that the use of such horrible weapons had to be a very last resort. Very last. But that doesn't mean he was some sort of dove, someone who didn't believe that Moscow and communism (read his views on Mao) weren't were existential threats to the West. He wanted peace but he wasn't going to surrender.

FWIW, I think the situation in Vietnam in 1954, which was well before Moscow and Beijing started supporting Hanoi, was completely different than in 1963 when they were clearly supporting the North. In '54 it looked to be a quite different situation in terms of the Cold War then in 1963.

[Colin Crow]

At least LN theory fared better.

[Jon Banks]

Then you're again saying that all of those statements by him - and RFK - were lies? And you think a speech on the Senate floor in 1954 - in '54? - is evidence of his later views in 1963? When he later said - to Cronkite in September of '63 - that he believed in the theory he was, well, openly lying? And when RFK said similar things in 1964 he too was lying?

We have the statements by McNamara, the statements by Rusk, by Bundy, by RFK and all sorts of documents indicating that the theory was believed by the Administration. And on the other hand we have a floor speech in 1954. So which to believe?

Both men were politicians. In those times, Democrats had to take a tough line on Communism publicly in order to defend against the "soft on Communism" label.

Given JFK's somewhat sympathetic view of anti-Colonial movements in his time combined with his well documented resistance to the Pentagon's efforts to escalate US involvement in Vietnam during his first term, it remains plausible that he wouldn't have made the same mistakes as LBJ. I don't think we can assume that he would've taken the same exact path.

But I'm also aware of the fact that it was politically risky for him to be viewed as "losing Vietnam to the Commies" and in the end, politics might have won.

It's very similar to the logic that has kept the US in Afghanistan for almost 20 years.

[Tom Scully]

Well we know now that JFK lied about the Missile Gap stuff during the 1960 campaign. So why not extend that to other contradictory things that he said?

We also know that RFK basically endorsed the Warren Report publicly while privately investigating his brother's murder because he suspected a conspiracy from day 1.

So RFK's public statements can't be taken at face value either. 

Both men were politicians. In those times, Democrats had to take a tough line on Communism publicly in order to defend against the "soft on Communism" label.

Given JFK's somewhat sympathetic view of anti-Colonial movements in his time combined with his well documented resistance to the Pentagon's efforts to escalate US involvement in Vietnam during his first term, it remains plausible that he wouldn't have made the same mistakes as LBJ. I don't think we can assume that he would've taken the same exact path.

But I'm also aware of the fact that it was politically risky for him to be viewed as "losing Vietnam to the Commies" and in the end, politics might have won.

It's very similar to the logic that has kept the US in Afghanistan for almost 20 years.

Jon, for someone as sensitive as you seem to be about accuracy, please explain to readers how any of what is presented in the academic research and analysis below was JFK's fault. He was a politician in 1960 running for the office of POTUS against Nixon, of all people. What are you actually accusing JFK of doing in that 1960 campaign that you've had no similar negative reaction to a republican or Trump party candidate doing, 1960 to 2020?

https://www.academia.edu/4849570/Who_Ever_Believed_in_the_Missile_Gap_John_F_Kennedy_and_the_Politics_of_National_Security

[Jon Banks]

Jon, for someone as sensitive as you seem to be about accuracy, please explain to readers how any of what is presented in the academic research and analysis beow was JFK's fault. He was a politician in 1960 running for the office of POTUS against Nixon, of all people. What are you actually accusing JFK of doing in that 1960 campaign that you've had no similar negative reaction to a republican or Trump party candidate doing, 1960 to 2020?

https://www.academia.edu/4849570/Who_Ever_Believed_in_the_Missile_Gap_John_F_Kennedy_and_the_Politics_of_National_Security

You're correct. It's not accurate to say JFK lied about the Missile Gap. He wasn't brought into the loop about the issue until he became President.

My broader point still stands. We shouldn't take everything politicians say at face value. In JFK's case, what he said and did privately sometimes contradicted his public stances on the Soviets and Southeast Asia.

[Gary Craig]

http://www.jfk-info.com/files.htm

THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON TRANSITION:
THE CASE FOR POLICY REVERSAL
 by DR. JOHN M. NEWMAN.

~snip~

Combat Troops:   Just Another Notch or a Fork in the Road?

   "What was American policy in Vietnam in the early 1960s?  From early in his administration,

President Kennedy accepted that the primary American objective was to prevent the communist

domination of South Vietnam.  There was never any argument over the ends of American Vietnam policy

under Kennedy, but there was an argument over the means to be employed to achieve those ends.  More

specifically, President Kennedy's policy was to assist the South Vietnamese to prevent the communist

domination of their country.  The prohibition against engaging in another American land war in

Asia was a fundamental policy of the Kennedy Administration, and one which President Johnson actually

endorsed in 1964.

   To deny that the decision to send in ground combat units did not reverse this long-standing feature

of American Vietnam policy simply ignores the most basic facts.  A popular proposition used by observers

who dispute that the use of combat troops reversed US policy is the "gradual slide" argument, which holds

that, on a so-called "policy continuum", ground combat units simply represent the next rung on the ladder

of escalation.  In other words, when the marines waded ashore it was as if the mercury in the

thermometer went from 72 to 73 degrees.  Under Kennedy the temperature increased so

many degrees and under Johnson it increased so many degrees and, since both were in the same

direction, Johnson simply continued the policy.

   Such arguments blur the crucial distinction between a policy of advising the South Vietnamese army

how to fight the war and a policy using the American army to fight the war.  From any perspective, not the

least of which was the Viet Cong's, the difference between the South Vietnamese army and the American

army was not subtle, and neither was the difference between the Special Forces, on the one hand, and the

Marines or 82D  Airborne Division, on the other.  These differences are fundamental, and to construe a

large increase in advisors as something only slightly less or a little different than brigades and divisions of

ground forces is just nonsense.   

   Presidents Kennedy and Johnson could have further deepened American commitments and ratcheted

up American participation in the war effort without crossing the Rubicon of conventional forces in Vietnam.

Sending in the American army was nothing less than taking a different turn at the main fork in the

road to Vietnam.  There are those who argue that the Kennedy Administration never faced this fork in

the road, and that the dire situation faced by Johnson only developed after Kennedy's unfortunate demise.

This argument is misinformed, as the record of Kennedy's first year in office makes unequivocally

clear."
 
        1961:  NSAM-111 and the Limits to American Involvement

   "What does the record of the Kennedy Administration's first year reveal about Vietnam policy?

What was the situation?  What was the President told and how were the policy choices framed?  What

policy did Kennedy choose?

   The political and military situation in Vietnam was already critical and deteriorating further by the

time Kennedy was inaugurated in January 1961. For the first three months the worsening situation in

Vietnam was overshadowed by the crisis in Laos, but over the summer and fall of 1961 Vietnam became

the focus of American attention in Indochina.  As the military situation became increasingly critical, calls

within the Administration for the use of American combat forces in Vietnam prompted a major debate over

Vietnam policy in October-November 1961, a debate Kennedy finally resolved with one of his most

important decisions on Vietnam: National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)-111, promulgated on

November 22, 1961.

   The President sent his top experts to Vietnam for a look while the concerned departments and

intelligence agencies in Washington studied the situation anew.  All of this activity produced a veritable

slew of proposals about what to do, and although there were differences between many of them, most all

advocated sending American combat troops to Vietnam.  The argument that Kennedy was never

confronted with the situation that Johnson was, that Kennedy did not face the sort of difficult choices that

Johnson later did, is an argument which ignores the heart of the Kennedy record on this matter.

   Kennedy was told in no uncertain terms that the military situation in Vietnam was critical and that

the fate of South Vietnam hung in the balance.  Moreover, Kennedy's advisors framed the issue this way:

that the loss of South Vietnam to the communists would affect vital US interests regionally and globally,

and that the only way to prevent such an outcome was to send in American ground forces.4   The

President was told that nothing short of several American combat divisions could save South Vietnam.  It

was in that dire context and against those forceful arguments that Kennedy said no to American combat

forces in Vietnam.  The record on this permits no argument and no wiggle room.  Kennedy was

irreconcilably opposed to an American ground war in Vietnam.

   Instead of combat troops, Kennedy agreed to a substantial increase in American advisors.  This

decision was implemented under the provisions of NSAM-111.  Those observers who cite this decision as

evidence that Kennedy pushed a reluctant military into Vietnam obviously haven't a clue about the context

in which this decision was made.  When the situation, the recommendations and Kennedy's decision are

looked at as a whole, they boil down to this:  even when Kennedy was told the only workable solution

was conventional American forces, he would only agree to assisting the South Vietnamese army fight their

war."

~snip~

[Steve M. Galbraith]

Both men were politicians. In those times, Democrats had to take a tough line on Communism publicly in order to defend against the "soft on Communism" label.

Given JFK's somewhat sympathetic view of anti-Colonial movements in his time combined with his well documented resistance to the Pentagon's efforts to escalate US involvement in Vietnam during his first term, it remains plausible that he wouldn't have made the same mistakes as LBJ. I don't think we can assume that he would've taken the same exact path.

But I'm also aware of the fact that it was politically risky for him to be viewed as "losing Vietnam to the Commies" and in the end, politics might have won.

It's very similar to the logic that has kept the US in Afghanistan for almost 20 years.

Well, we're going around in circles.

As I've said (sorry for the repetition), the evidence that JFK was sincere in his beliefs is supported by the statements by the men around him - McNamara, Bundy, Rusk, JFK RFK - and the documents. The Pentagon Papers document the internal discussions going on in the Administration as to what to do about Vietnam.

This isn't just JFK spouting off lines to protect himself from criticism about "losing Vietnam." They sincerely thought that a loss of the South would have ramifications for all of SE Asia and would danger American interests and security. They didn't view this as a internal anti-colonial effort by the North. They saw it through the perspective of the Cold War. And the evidence is they were worried about Chinese support for Hanoi more than Moscow's. And from what I've read, Moscow, both under Stalin and then Khrushchev, was reluctant to support Hanoi; they thought it was useless for their interests, that Mao's interests would be better served by a conflict there if they helped (the Sino/Soviet split was deep and real); and they were more concerned with other matters such as Berlin. That all changed after Khrushchev was removed.

The Pentagon Papers says this, something that I think accurately summarizes JFK's view:

"In the course of these policy debates [i.e., how to deal with Diem], several participants pursued the logical but painful conclusion that if the war could not be won with Diem, and if his removal would lead to political chaos and also jeopardize the war effort, then the war was probably unwinnable. If that were the case, the argument went, then the U.S. should really be facing a more basic decision of either an orderly disengagement from an irretrievable situation, or a major escalation of the U.S. involvement, including the use of U.S. combat troops. These prophetic minority voices were, however, raising an unpleasant prospect
that the [Kennedy] Administration was unprepared to face at that time. In hindsight, however, it is clear that this was one of the times in the history of our Vietnam involvement when we were making fundamental choices. The option to disengage honorably at that time now appears an attractively low-cost one. But for the Kennedy Administration the costs no doubt appeared much higher. In any event, it proved to be unwilling to accept the implications of predictions for a bleak future. The Administration hewed to the belief that if the US be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately have its way in world affairs.

Again: "The costs [for a withdrawal] no doubt appeared higher..... [And they] hewed to the belief that if the US be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately have its way in world affairs." Whether or not JFK himself believed in the "domino theory" or not the evidence is powerful, for me, that he simply didn't believe we could just walk away.

The entire section, well worth a read, on the Diem crisis and its aftermath is here: https://nara-media-001.s3.amazonaws.com/arcmedia/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-IV-B-5.pdf