JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)

[Jerry Freeman]

  JFK was pragmatic enough to realize that if communism couldn't have been stopped on an island some 90 miles from Miami...how could it be stopped 12,000 miles away?
Kennedy had military experience observing the logistics of an overseas war. Bush 41 also.
Now, the US military is being turned into some kind of social experiment. A conventional war just might mean its demise.

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2021/03/15/senator-demands-meeting-with-defense-leaders-over-their-response-to-criticism-of-women-in-the-ranks/

[Charles Collins]

Quite a few years ago I read the book “JFK and Vietnam” by John M. Newman. I don’t remember all of the details but in the book Newman makes a good argument for his ideas. And, if I remember correctly, he shows how the Diem coup support was based on a very hastily made decision which was based upon incomplete information.

Here are a couple of reviews from Amazon:


Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Had he lived, would President Kennedy have committed U.S. troops to Vietnam? According to the evidence marshalled here, the answer is a resounding no. Newman, who teaches international politics at the University of Maryland, argues that when JFK went to Dallas he already intended to withdraw U.S. advisers from Vietnam, but held off to ensure his reelection in 1964. The book traces the president's pullout plan back to April '62, when he stated that the U.S. should seize every opportunity to reduce its commitment to Vietnam. A month later Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara asked U.S. generals in Saigon how soon the South Vietnamese would be ready to take over the war effort. This well-documented study shows that JFK was for a time deceived by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, head of the joint chiefs, and others in a blizzard of briefings that claimed unadulterated progress and success. Newman maintains that although the president paid public lip service to a continued commitment to appease the right, his goal was to abandon a venture that he early recognized as a lost cause. No other study has revealed so clearly how the tragedy in Dallas affected the course of the war in Vietnam, since two days after the assassination Lyndon Johnson signed a National Security Action Memo that opened the way for the fateful escalation of the war. Photos.
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.


From Kirkus Reviews
Bold and authoritative revisionist analysis of Kennedy's Vietnam policy, by a US Army major who teaches history at the Univ. of Maryland. What was JFK's real agenda regarding Vietnam? Newman claims that the young President planned to withdraw American forces from that war-torn country--and his case is strong. The author pictures an isolated Kennedy battling both cold war jingoism and a military- industrial lobby avid for a war that would make tens of billions of dollars. Conventional wisdom generally sees JFK's early attacks on Eisenhower's covert liaison with France regarding Vietnam as simple political expediency, and Kennedy as another adherent to the domino theory. JFK's speeches buttress that position, but Newman, working with newly declassified material, argues that these speeches were simply requisite political twistings and turnings--and that Kennedy planned to get the US out of Vietnam despite a hawkish palace clique (led by Lyndon Johnson) that fed him disinformation on this most crucial foreign-policy issue. Document by document, incident by incident, the author reveals Kennedy as stranded within his own Administration, alienated by his desire to avoid this ultimate wrong-time, wrong-place war. Newman's research culminates in two crucial National Security Action Memos. In one, authored several weeks before Kennedy's death, the President formally endorsed withdrawal from Vietnam of a thousand advisors by the end of 1963 (to be followed by complete withdrawal by the end of 1965). In the second, written six days after the assassination, LBJ reversed the withdrawal policy and planned in some detail the escalation to follow. Crucial to any reevaluation of JFK as President and statesman, this electrifying report portrays a wily, stubborn, conflicted leader who grasped realities that eluded virtually everyone else in the US establishment. -- Copyright ©1992, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

[Steve M. Galbraith]

Quite a few years ago I read the book “JFK and Vietnam” by John M. Newman. I don’t remember all of the details but in the book Newman makes a good argument for his ideas. And, if I remember correctly, he shows how the Diem coup support was based on a very hastily made decision which was based upon incomplete information.

Here are a couple of reviews from Amazon:


Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Had he lived, would President Kennedy have committed U.S. troops to Vietnam? According to the evidence marshalled here, the answer is a resounding no. Newman, who teaches international politics at the University of Maryland, argues that when JFK went to Dallas he already intended to withdraw U.S. advisers from Vietnam, but held off to ensure his reelection in 1964. The book traces the president's pullout plan back to April '62, when he stated that the U.S. should seize every opportunity to reduce its commitment to Vietnam. A month later Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara asked U.S. generals in Saigon how soon the South Vietnamese would be ready to take over the war effort. This well-documented study shows that JFK was for a time deceived by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, head of the joint chiefs, and others in a blizzard of briefings that claimed unadulterated progress and success. Newman maintains that although the president paid public lip service to a continued commitment to appease the right, his goal was to abandon a venture that he early recognized as a lost cause. No other study has revealed so clearly how the tragedy in Dallas affected the course of the war in Vietnam, since two days after the assassination Lyndon Johnson signed a National Security Action Memo that opened the way for the fateful escalation of the war. Photos.
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.


From Kirkus Reviews
Bold and authoritative revisionist analysis of Kennedy's Vietnam policy, by a US Army major who teaches history at the Univ. of Maryland. What was JFK's real agenda regarding Vietnam? Newman claims that the young President planned to withdraw American forces from that war-torn country--and his case is strong. The author pictures an isolated Kennedy battling both cold war jingoism and a military- industrial lobby avid for a war that would make tens of billions of dollars. Conventional wisdom generally sees JFK's early attacks on Eisenhower's covert liaison with France regarding Vietnam as simple political expediency, and Kennedy as another adherent to the domino theory. JFK's speeches buttress that position, but Newman, working with newly declassified material, argues that these speeches were simply requisite political twistings and turnings--and that Kennedy planned to get the US out of Vietnam despite a hawkish palace clique (led by Lyndon Johnson) that fed him disinformation on this most crucial foreign-policy issue. Document by document, incident by incident, the author reveals Kennedy as stranded within his own Administration, alienated by his desire to avoid this ultimate wrong-time, wrong-place war. Newman's research culminates in two crucial National Security Action Memos. In one, authored several weeks before Kennedy's death, the President formally endorsed withdrawal from Vietnam of a thousand advisors by the end of 1963 (to be followed by complete withdrawal by the end of 1965). In the second, written six days after the assassination, LBJ reversed the withdrawal policy and planned in some detail the escalation to follow. Crucial to any reevaluation of JFK as President and statesman, this electrifying report portrays a wily, stubborn, conflicted leader who grasped realities that eluded virtually everyone else in the US establishment. -- Copyright ©1992, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Newman argues that JFK showed in a series of key decisions such as his refusal to send in troops during the Laotian crisis at the beginning of his presidency despite calls from the Pentagon for troops and again during the Bay of Pigs disaster and a third time during the Missile Crisis that he was willing to ignore the suggestions by his military men and advisers and not send in troops.

And that he would have shown this same independence in Vietnam and not send in ground troops. He also says, by the way, that this why why elements in the Pentagon assassinated JFK; they viewed him as being "soft on communism" and that he was a threat to the security of the country.

In any case, maybe JFK would have rejected the suggestions to send in ground troops. Nobody knows. I don't think JFK knew on November 22, 1963 what he was going to do. But I think the evidence is pretty clear - to me - that at that time he had not made that decision to withdraw. It seems clear that at that stage they still thought - even JFK - that American power would win out and prevent the North from overruning the South.

[Gerry Down]

I don't think JFK knew on November 22, 1963 what he was going to do. But I think the evidence is pretty clear - to me - that at that time he had not made that decision to withdraw. It seems clear that at that stage they still thought - even JFK - that American power would win out and prevent the North from overruning the South.

Why do you think JFK authorized on paper in Oct 1963 the withdrawal of 1000 military personal by the end of 1963? To help him win re-election the following year rather than genuinely being sure the US would be pulling out of Vietnam in 1965?

[Charles Collins]

Newman argues that JFK showed in a series of key decisions such as his refusal to send in troops during the Laotian crisis at the beginning of his presidency despite calls from the Pentagon for troops and again during the Bay of Pigs disaster and a third time during the Missile Crisis that he was willing to ignore the suggestions by his military men and advisers and not send in troops.

And that he would have shown this same independence in Vietnam and not send in ground troops. He also says, by the way, that this why why elements in the Pentagon assassinated JFK; they viewed him as being "soft on communism" and that he was a threat to the security of the country.

In any case, maybe JFK would have rejected the suggestions to send in ground troops. Nobody knows. I don't think JFK knew on November 22, 1963 what he was going to do. But I think the evidence is pretty clear - to me - that at that time he had not made that decision to withdraw. It seems clear that at that stage they still thought - even JFK - that American power would win out and prevent the North from overruning the South.

He also says, by the way, that this why why elements in the Pentagon assassinated JFK; they viewed him as being "soft on communism" and that he was a threat to the security of the country

I can’t go along with that assessment. And I don’t have access to the book currently. But if I did I would probably take the time to refresh my memory on the details that Newman documented regarding the decision for supporting the Diem coup. That decision seems to be a major point in the argument that JFK was not going to withdraw from Vietnam.

[Steve M. Galbraith]

Why do you think JFK authorized on paper in Oct 1963 the withdrawal of 1000 military personal by the end of 1963? To help him win re-election the following year rather than genuinely being sure the US would be pulling out of Vietnam in 1965?

The withdrawal was, in my view, to put pressure on Diem to change his policies on the Buddhists. The plan to withdraw troops over time was always contingent on the ability of the South to take on more of the war. The US would draw down as the South ramped up its efforts.

The question then was what would happen if the South couldn't ramp up those efforts? RFK answered that question in 1964. Well, not directly:

Question: "And if [the South] Vietnamese were about to lose it, would he [JFK] propose to go in on land if he had to?

Kennedy: "Well, we'd face that when we came to it."

In November of 1963 they hadn't had to face that yet.

RFK also said this about the war:

Question: "What was the overwhelming reason [for our support of the South]?

Kennedy: "Just the loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite clear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fall."

Question:  "What if it did?"

Kennedy: "Just have profound effects as far as our position throughout the world, and our position in a rather vital part of the world. Also, it would affect what happened in India, of course, which in turn has an effect on the Middle East. Just, it would have, everybody felt, a very adverse effect. It would have an effect on Indonesia, hundred million population. All of these countries would be affected by the fall of Vietnam to the Communists, particularly as we had made such a fuss in the United States both under President Eisenhower and President Kennedy about the preservation of the integrity of Vietnam."

Question: "There was never any consideration given to pulling out?"

Kennedy: "No."

I don't think that was RFK engaging in public relations or blowing smoke. The Pentagon Papers and the biographies of McNamara and Rusk show this was true. There was no consideration at that time to simply leave.

Full RFK interview here: http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/vietnam.htm

[Steve M. Galbraith]

Here is RFK explaining how the Kennedy Administration viewed the importance of Vietnam and the ramifications if it fell (1964):

Kennedy: "Just the loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite clear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fall."

Question: "What if it did?"

Kennedy: "Just have profound effects as far as our position throughout the world, and our position in a rather vital part of the world. Also, it would affect what happened in India, of course, which in turn has an effect on the Middle East. Just, it would have, everybody felt, a very adverse effect. It would have an effect on Indonesia, hundred million population. All of these countries would be affected by the fall of Vietnam to the Communists, particularly as we had made such a fuss in the United States both under President Eisenhower and President Kennedy about the preservation of the integrity of Vietnam."

If you tell the public these things - that a loss in Vietnam would have "profound effects" on the US position globally - then it's hard to walk that back and say "Nevermind" and simply leave. This is what JFK would have had to face. And what LBJ did face.

[Colin Crow]