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Author Topic: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!  (Read 47097 times)

Offline Michael Clark

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #144 on: August 23, 2019, 03:02:10 PM »
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Biased Analysis

There was no effort to seek out alternative explanations for seemingly suspicious events. For example, one case officer who met with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964 wrote that he suspected him from the very first meeting on the basis of Nosenko's emotionless and mechanical delivery of his statement announcing his intention to defect. The statement appeared to have been rehearsed . At the time, Chief, SB Division, attributed considerable weight to this further indication of opposition control. But there are many reasons why Nosenko might have delivered the statement in this manner. Rather than being emotionless, his emotions may have been so strong that he forced himself, consciously or subconsciously, to repress them to avoid an emotional scene. Most intelligence officer defectors, under similar circumstances, probably pre- pare with great care what they want to tell us about their reasons for defection. In other words, the evidence used against Nosenko was also quite consistent with the alternative hypothesis- that he was bona fide.

Similarly, after hostile questioning began, it was noted that Nosenko "became quite erratic, contradicted himself many times, and became upset physically. . . . As a result of this session, we know that Subject can be thrown off balance by aggressive questioning in those areas which we know to be important parts of the entire KGB operation." No consideration was given to the fact that a bona fide defector whose entire future depends upon acceptance in his new homeland might react the same way when falsely accused of being a KGB plant. Some of the most important inconsistencies and gaps in knowledge that were held against Nosenko can also be interpreted as actually supporting his bona fides. The three different dates for the start of his KGB service are a case in point; surely, if it were all a KGB legend, this would have been one of the most important dates and one could expect him to remember it accurately. That he was far from consistent on this date certainly appears at least as explainable in terms of some personal idiosyncrasies as in terms of the deception theory.

Another example was Nosenko's inability to report on some KGB opera against American Embassy personnel during 1960-61. This did invalidate his claim to be knowledgeable of all such operations, but it did not necessarily support the deception theory. If the KGB wanted us to believe that Nosenko had the complete knowledge he claimed to have during this period, surely it would have researched how much CIA already knew or could be presumed to know, and it would have had Nosenko tell us about all of these operations. His failure to report on any single operation CIA knew about would discredit his claim to total knowledge. Thus, his false claim does not fit the deception hypothesis. More credible is the thesis that he was exaggerating, that he didn't have an accurate picture of the limitations of his own knowledge, or that we made false assumptions about how much a person in his position should know or remember.

A great many of the anomalies and inconsistencies cited in Bagley's Thousand pager and in the subsequent Green Book were of this type. That is, they were consistent with the deception hypotheSiS, but they were also consistent with the hypotheSis that Nosenko was not under control. Therefore, they had little analytical value.


Inaccurate Record of Nosenko's Reporting

During four of the five clandestine meetings with Nosenko in Geneva in 1962, two CIA case officers were present. The more senior officer, who took notes and wrote reports to Headquarters, spoke mediocre Russian and made many errors in his written record of the meetings. The second officer, who handled much of the discussion with Nosenko, was a native Russian speaker. After the series of meetings was completed, the tape recordings of the meetings were "transcribed" by the native speaker. The tapes were of poor quality and were difficult to follow. Therefore, the native speaker, who had little patience for detailed work, dictated from the Russian language tapes directly into English, generally following the faulty notes that the other officer had prepared. Thus, the many errors of translation and understanding were carried over from the meeting notes to the "transcripts." For example, an Army Sargent at the American Embassy who Nosenko reported was recruited by the KGB was described by Nosenko as a code machine repairman. This was trans-lated as a mechanic and generally assumed to refer to garage mechanic. When Nosenko corrected this misunderstanding in 1964, he was criticized for "changing his story."

These reports and transcripts formed the basis for the original judgment that Nosenko was a dispatched agent, but they were so flawed as to make any analysis subject to considerable error. These inadequacies were not discovered until 1965, when a faithful RUSSian-language transcript was finally prepared. The full impact of the inaccuracies was not realized until 1968-69, when the Russian was translated into English and a 35-page report was prepared on the major errors and the effects these errors had had in supporting the charge that Nosenko was a false defector.


Misunderstanding of Nosenko as a Person

CIA initially failed to understand Nosenko's background and how it affected his life and career. This failure was caused, in part, by questioning that was designed from the beginning to trap Nosenko rather than to understand him and by errors in the tape transcripts. It was, however, largely due to the fact that Nosenko himself was an anomaly within the KGB, so it is no wonder that his career seemed anomalous. Nosenko was the spoiled-brat son of a top leader and, in the mid-1960s, CIA had no experience with that type of Soviet official.

A story that came to light much later, from an independent source, is illustrative of Nosenko's background. In Naval Preparatory School m 1943, Nosenko was caught stealing and was beaten up by a number of his classmates. Nosenko's mother complained to Stalin, and the whole school was subjected to strict disciplinary punishment, with some of the students being sent to the front.Nosenko lied to CIA about his date of entry into the KGB to conceal the fact that his graduation from the Institute of International Relations had been delayed a year because he flunked the exam in Marxism-Leninism. He entered the KGB through the influence of a high-ranking family friend, bypassing the normal personnel procedures. The first few years he received a poor performance evaluation and was recommended for dismissal, his job being saved only by parental intervention. He contracted a venereal disease, concealed this by using false KGB documents to receive treatment under an alias, was caught, served 15 days in prison, and was dismissed from his position as Komsomol secretary. Nosenko's father refused to intercede yet again for his wayward son, but his mother intervened with high-level friends and saved hIs KGB Job.

After several years in the KGB, Nosenko seems to have matured and settled down to an adequate performance. His frequent transfers and lengthy trips abroad may have been because his superiors considered him a hot potato-a mediocre officer and a troublemaker with political connections that could destroy his boss's career; it is understandable that his supervisors were happy to transfer him, send him abroad, or award him undeserved honors. Nosenko lied to conceal his personal weaknesses, his professional limitations, and the fact that his entire career depended upon his parents' influence and intervention. A need to enhance his own self-esteem and to ensure acceptance by CIA led Nosenko to exaggerate his responsibilities and knowledge of KGB operations.

Interrogators under instructions to obtain evidence against Nosenko, rather than to evaluate him, persisted in judging his story by malapropiate standards. They failed to recognize, or to accept, that because of his family's status and privilege, Nosenko's life and to some extent his career had developed outside many of the rules, regulations, and restrictions imposed on the average KGB officer. They also failed to recognize that a person with Nosenko’s famIly background and poor performance record is certainly not the type KGB would select for the extremely important and difficult mission of going over to the enemy as a false defector.


Invalid Assumptions About the KGB

Before Nosenko's defection, CIA had very little information on the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (Internal Counterintelligence), where Nosenko served. To evaluate the plausibility of Nosenko's reporting, his interrogators formed a stereotype of the Second Chief Directorate against which to compare Nosenko's information. That stereotype contained assumptions regarding the Second Chief Directorate against which to compare Nosenko's information. That stereotype contained assumptions regarding the Second Chief Directorate's authority in the USSR, its relations with the KGB First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence), the relative weight the Second Chief Directorate placed on the recruitment of foreign embassy officials as compared with controlling or monitoring their activities, how much the Second Chief Directorate ought to know about certain events, and how much a specific officer, such as Nosenko, should have known and recalled.

Some of these assumptions were erroneous-based on an exaggerated view of overall KGB capabilities. This made possible a series of discoveries of "duplicity" by Nosenko and other counterintelligence sources who could rarely measure up to CIA's expectations of what they ought to have known, accomplished, or said. An important example concerns the gaps in Nosenko's knowledge of operations against the American Embassy in 1960 and 1961, while he was deputy chief of the responsible section. The interrogators developed their own job description for a deputy chief of a section, then used this as a criterion for judging what Nosenko should have known. The job description was faulty, as it was based on the American concept of a deputy who is fully informed, has authority paralleling the chief, and who automatically fills in for the chief when he is absent.

The Russian word that Nosenko applied to himself was zamestitel. When the meaning of this term was researched in 1968, it was found to be broader than the American concept of deputy. It is perhaps most accurately rendered in English as assistant. This different concept of Nosenko's position, his, at-best, mediocre performance as an officer and supervisor, a tendency to exaggerate his importance, and a perhaps unconscious self-delusion as to the extent of his own knowledge all combine to explain the gaps in Nosenko's knowledge during the 1960-61 period.

Honest Mistakes by Nosenko

There are other possible explanations for the previously noted anomaly in Nosenko's reporting on surveillance of the Penkovskiy dead-drop site on Pushkin Street. One is that Nosenko confused the Embassy officer's visit to the Pushkin Street drop with an earlier visit by this same officer to a different dead-drop site on Gorldy Street, which did occur about the time Nosenko described, and while he was responsible for covering this officer's activity. The subsequent notoriety given to the arrest of a CIA officer at the Pushkin Street site provides ample explanation for how Nosenko may have learned that his former target visited this site as well. After the publicity surrounding the arrest, it is normal that Nosenko would have discussed the background with his former colleagues. Nosenko apparently erred by confusing the two dead-drop sites, and by failing to recall when and how he learned of the Pushkin Street site. In any bona fides assessment, allowance must be made for this sort of faulty memory.


Legitimate Coincidence

The amount of overlap between Nosenko's and Golitsyn's reporting on KGB operations was, indeed, unusual. So was our good fortune in learning that the one Second Chief Directorate officer, with whom CIA was in contact, just happened to have been the KGB case officer for Lee Harvey Oswald and to report this to CIA just as the Warren Commission was beginning its investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. There were quite a few other equally fortuitous and, therefore, suspicious coincidences in other cases associated with the master plot. Coincidence is a normal part of life, but to a counter- intelligence officer it is like waving a red flag in front of a bull. Nosenko's interrogators made no allowance whatsoever for the fact that coincidences are not always sinister.

Although most of the discrepancies that generated suspicion have been resolved, there are still some unexplained anomalies. This is probably inevitable, given the complexity of Nosenko’s personality, the limits of our understanding of the Soviet system, and the confusion generated by the hostIle manner in which Nosenko was initially questioned.

Nosenko's reporting on Lee Harvey Oswald is the most significant remaining mystery. As late as 1978, long after Nosenko's bona fides had been established, John Hart, in testimony to Congress, defended Nosenko as a reliable source but described his reporting on Oswald as "incredible" and suggested that it be ignored. Hart attributed the problem to compartmentation within the KGB and that Nosenko was uninformed even though he genuinely thought otherwise. Such a possibility is understandable in principle, but is hard to accept in this case because Nosenko plausibly claimed to have been inside the relevant "compartment" that would give him full knowledge. Nosenko's demonstrated tendency to exaggerate his importance and access may have played a role, but It may also be that we greatly exaggerate out own understanding of how the KGB might react to a low-level defector like Oswald.

At the start of this section, we noted that the anomalies and inconsistencIes approach is difficult to implement well. It underrates the frequency of coincidence, inaccurate translation, inadequate debriefing, and misunderstanding. It overrates an analyst's ability to judge what is normal or abnormal in an adversary’s organization or society. That assessment is certainly borne out in the Nosenko case.

Many of the problems were of our own making. Because of the a priori assumption of guilt, no attempt was made to resolve the many discrepancies; instead, the discrepancies were cherished as proof that Nosenko was dis- patched by the KGB. Even under more normal circumstances, this case would have presented difficulties for the anomalies and inconsistencies approach because of Nosenko's personality and unusual background, our limited knowledge of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, some noteworthy coincidences, and the historical time period in which it occurred.

 

Litmus Test Approach.

The information or source to be evaluated is compared with other information or another source of known reliability and accuracy. The known information or source serves as a litmus test for evaluating the new or suspect information or source. This approach is similar to that of the finished intelligence analyst who asks: Is the information consistent with the facts as we know them from other sources? For example, a statement by a Soviet leader or an article in a military journal may be compared with information from a classified source of certain reliability. If the open source differs from the reliable classified information, it may be judged deceptive.

Use of this approach presupposes that one can be certain of the reliability and accuracy of the information or source used for comparison. Unfortunately, such certainly is seldom available. When this degree of certainty is present, and is justified, the approach yields strong inferences about deception.

This litmus test strategy played an important role in extending the master plot theory. The conviction that Nosenko was under KGB control led to his case being used as a touchstone for evaluating other sources of information on Soviet intelligence. If another source supplied information supporting questionable elements of Nosenko's story, or supporting the line that Popov and Penkovsldy were detected by surveillance rather than penetration, or support- ing any other aspect of the theme that CIA was not penetrated, then that source automatically became suspect as part of the master plot. (Recall that belief in a well-placed penetration of CIA led to the further assumption that all CIA Soviet sources were probably known to, if not controlled by, the KGB. Knowledge of which additional sources were being actively manipulated by the KGB would, it was believed, lead to better understanding of Soviet goals and possibly offer clues to identification of the penetration.)

Nosenko was only one of about a dozen sources on Soviet intelligence who eventually came to be considered part of the master-or monster-plot. To illustrate the application of the litmus test approach in this case, we discuss only two of these other sources; both of whom may have lost their lives as a result of U.S. preoccupation with Soviet deception, one through no fault of CIA, the other as a direct consequence of the master plot theory.

Cherepanov was a former officer of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, the same department in which Nosenko had served for a time. He was known to CIA from an abortive attempt to contact the American Embassy in Yugoslavia. After his return to Moscow, he was assigned to the Second Chief Directorate. He was subsequently dismissed from the KGB and went to work for Mezhlmiga, the book distribution enterprise. In October 1963, Cherepanov gave a packet of documents to an American couple visiting Moscow to purchase books and asked that it be delivered to the American Embassy. The package, which contained KGB reports dealing mainly with surveillance techniques and operations against the American Embassy, was opened by the political counselor of the Embassy. He concluded this was a Soviet provocation and, after copying the documents for CIA, insisted they be returned to the Soviets. Nosenko reported that when the documents were returned, the KGB immediately identified Cherepanov as their source. A quick check revealed that Cherepanov had disappeared. Nosenko himself then became part of a team of KGB officers hastily organized to find and arrest him.

The legitimacy of the Cherepanov documents was questioned at the time they were first received and analyzed at CIA Headquarters, but no firm conclusion was reached. In 1962, Nosenko had reported that CIA's first penetration of the GRU, Colonel Popov, had been arrested in 1959 as a result of surveillance of an American diplomat in Moscow. This comfortable explanation deflected suspicion of a KGB penetration of CIA as the cause of Popov's demise. One of the Cherepanov documents, plus a note from Cherepanov that accompanied the documents, confirmed Nosenko's earlier report and provided additional plausible details.

A different Cherepanov document concerned another area of concern relating to Popov's compromise. It was a detailed KGB analysis of movements by FBI surveillance teams in New York City. It showed KGB awareness of a special FBI surveillance at precisely the time an illegal agent dispatched by Popov had arrived in New York City. CIA had given the FBI information on the illegal's arrival. A compromised FBI surveillance would have drawn suspicion to Popov, and there was speculation that it was a possible cause of Popov's compromise. The Cherepanov document could have been planted to exacerbate the already difficult relationship between CIA and the FBI.

The information from Nosenko and Cherepanovwas mutually reinforcing. The documents Cherepanov delivered in 1963 confirmed Nosenko's earlier report that Popov had not been compromised through penetration of CIA. Then, when the Cherepanov documents were questioned at CIA Headquarters, Nosenko came out in 1964 to confirm their authenticity. If a KGB team had been sent out to apprehend Cherepanov, then obviously the documents he provided were genuine rather than a KGB provocation. When Nosenko was judged to be under KGB control, it seemed clear that Cherepanov must have been under control as well, and that both were confirming each other's bona fides while pushing the view that Colonel Popov had not been compromised through penetration of CIA.
Yuriy Loginov was a KGB illegal who volunteered his services to CIA in May 1961 while abroad on an illegal's training mission. He came to the West again in 1962 and for a third time in 1964, shortly after Nosenko's defection. The purpose of his 1964 trip was to cultivate and prepare for recruitment an American military communicator stationed in Cairo. Loginov brought with him several items if interest, including a copy of a top secret KGB training manual, presenting KGB doctrine on the recruitment of Americans. After 15 months in the West, Loginov returned to Moscow to report that he had developed a good personal relationship with an American, but that the target did not appear recruitable and was being reassigned to the United States.


The Loginov case baffled SB Division from the start. Although the information he provided, particularly in the counterintelligence field, appeared to check out, this very fact gave rise to consternation, as Loginov did not conform to SB Division's conception of the type of man the KGB would select to train and dispatch as an illegal. Nor did the instructions Loginov received from the KGB while in the West conform to SB Division ideas of how the KGB would handle such an agent (anomalies and inconsistencies approach).

The decisive evidence that condemned Loginov, however, was his reporting that supported the bona fides of both Cherepanov and Nosenko. Loginov's father had a dacha next door to Cherepanov, and Loginov reported that, in the fall of 963, he witnessed the KGB search of Cherepanov’s dacha. Nosenko had reported participating in this search. Loginov's story seemed to confirm the reality of Cherepanov’s flight and capture, but the coincidence of the neighboring dacha that justified his knowledge seemed extraordinary. Loginov also reported on KGB reactions to Nosenko's defection, and said that, because of the defection, his own dispatch to Canada on a new mission had been canceled. (Unbeknownst to Loginov, Nosenko knew about another illegal also being readied for dispatch to Canada, which undoubtedly persuaded the KGB that it’s would be prudent to delay sending Loginov.)

As a result of these two reports, Loginov was immediately labeled part of the master deception plot, with the role of supporting the bona fides of Cherepanov’s and Nosenko. The document on KGB operational doctrine for recruitment of Americans was judged authentic and was exploited extensively to improve the security of American installations and businesses abroad. This was considered the price the KGB was prepared to pay to support Loginov's bona fides and, thus, make him more effective in his role as a deception agent. When Loginov traveled West again, on a Canadian passport with a mission to legalize himself in South Africa before moving permanently to Canada, CIA arranged for him to be arrested in South Africa. Under questioning by the South Africans, he admitted to being a KGB illegal doubled by the Americans. After Loginov spent six months in solitary confinement, two CIA officers interrogated him for over three months in an effort to force an admission that he had been directed by the KGB to contact CIA and pass disinformation. Despite optimal interrogation conditions, Loginov refused to change his story, so the South Africans were left with the same problem that CIA originally had with Nosenko-what to do with a Soviet who was not trusted but against whom one had no juridical evidence.

A fortuitous solution to this problem appeared when East Germany claimed Loginov as an East German citizen (a common ploy in such cases) and suggested he be included in an East-West German prisoner exchange. CIA encouraged the idea despite Loginov's pleas not to be exchanged. At the exchange point, in July 1969, Loginov resisted repatriation for four hours until he was forcibly turned over to the waiting KGB officers. Subsequent reporting indicates he may have been executed.

There is every reason to believe that both Cherepanov and Loginov were bona fide sources, not under KGB control. They produced valuable intelligence consistent with their access, but they failed the master plot litmus test. Consideration of other anomalies in the cases or the value of information supplied were all subordinated to the overwhelming importance attributed to the fact that both sources supported themes considered to be part of the master deception plot.


These clear examples of the litmus test strategy illustrate the major weakness of this strategy for analyzing deception. The strategy presupposes certainty about the information or source used as a basis for the test. In this instance, the analysts were certain about Nosenko being under control, but their certainty was unjustified and led to wrong conclusions in about a dozen cases, with immense consequences for CIA in lost operational opportunities, and often with adverse personal consequences for the Soviets involved.

« Last Edit: August 23, 2019, 03:06:07 PM by Michael Clark »

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #144 on: August 23, 2019, 03:02:10 PM »


Offline Michael Clark

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #145 on: August 23, 2019, 03:02:25 PM »
Cost Accounting Approach.

An analyst employing this strategy focuses on the cost incurred by the adversary to conduct a deception. If the cost is higher than any potential gain, the deception hypothesis is rejected. Most frequently considered is the cost of providing valid and valuable information to establish and maintain the credibility of a deception channel. This approach judges a source on the basis of it’s production. This is the strategy generally used by the Directorate of Operations (DO) reports officer, as distinct from the DO operations officer, who is more likely to focus on anomalies or inconsistencies in the circumstances under which the source obtained the information or passed it on to us.

The cost accounting approach assumes an accurate understanding of how much an adversary is willing to sacrifice to achieve his goals. This is difficult because, in principle, there always can be a goal that is important enough to justify any cost. Such analysis, therefore, may be correct in routine cases that follow the established pattern, but wrong in the rare, exceptionally high-stakes situation when it counts the most. Traditional theory holds that deception is most likely when the stakes are highest; for example, when an adversary would be willing to pay the greatest price to achieve his goals.


The three previous approaches, motive, anomalies and inconsistencies, and litmus test, are best used to show the presence of deception. One cannot do that with the cost accounting strategy. This strategy can be used only to prove the absence of deception, not its presence. This is because high cost may (or may not) imply the absence of deception, but low cost does not necessarily imply its presence. Cost accounting was the primary strategy employed by those who believed Nosenko was a bona fide defector. Briefly, it was argued that information provided by Nosenko was so valuable to CIA and so damaging to the USSR that it was inconceivable the KGB would willingly give it away. The KGB would never deliberately place one of its own officers into the hands of its principal adversary.

Bruce Solie, the Office of Security officer who handled Nosenko's rehabilitation, believed a source should be judged on the quality of information received. He felt that too much attention had been paid to challenging Nosenko’s story, and not enough to finding out everything he could tell us about KGB operations. Accordingly, Solie's debriefing concentrated on obtaining more information. Since the value of Nosenko's information created a presumption of bona fides, Solie's approach to anomalies and inconsistencies was to seek some plausible explanation and to recognize that, given the nature of the case, some anomalies may never be explained. Subsequently, the FBI reported that a minimum of nine new counterintelligence cases were developed as a result of Solie's reexamination, and that new information of considerable importance was developed on old cases; additional detailed information was also obtained on KGB operations in other countries, and on KGB organization, modus operandi, and personnel. Altogether, the information pointed to a valuable, bona fide source.


Nosenko provided identification of, or leads to, some 238 Americans and about 200 foreign nationals in whom the KGB had displayed varying degrees of interest, and against whom they had enjoyed varying degrees of success. He provided information on about 2,000 KGB staff officers and 300 Soviet national agents or contacts of the KGB. His information on the methods and scope of Second Chief Directorate operations against foreign diplomats and journalists in Moscow and visitors to the Soviet Union filled a large gap in our knowledge and had an enormous impact on the raising of CIA's consciousness of these operations; the result was important improvements in the physical security of U.S. installations and the personal security of U.S. officials and advisors to the USSR. The Soviet Union suffered additional costs through the adverse publicity and deterrent effect of Nosenko's defection and the arrest of several agents he identified.

The master plot theorists also assessed the value of Nosenko's information, not as the overriding criterion for evaluating his bona fides, but certainly as a relevant consideration. They came to the opposite conclusion. They argued that KGB operations reported by Nosenko had been previously reported by Golitsyn or other sources, involved agents who had lost their access, who the KGB had reason to believe had been compromised, who were unimportant, or where the information could not be confirmed. At times, this argument was made with a stacked deck, and Nosenko always came out the loser. If Nosenko reported on a KGB operation previously reported by an- other defector, this was not counted as a plus for Nosenko, because the KGB already knew the operation had been compromised. If he reported an operation not previously known, the information was judged doubtful because it could not be confirmed.The argument that Nosenko's information was unimportant was always difficult to sustain, as it kept being contradicted by reality. For a time, various rationalizations were possible, but eventually Solie's supplemental debriefing of Nosenko, a more objective interpretation of his information, and successful investigation of the leads developed a clear record to Nosenko's credit. For example, Bagley argued that Nosenko's information on microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow was a KGB giveaway, as Golitsyn had already reported on this subject. Golitsyn's report, however, was only a general statement that the Embassy was bugged. Nosenko identified which offices, where in these offices the mikes were located, and what conversations had been monitored. It was only Nosenko's more detailed, first-hand information that persuaded the State Department to incur the significant cost and disruption involved in tearing out walls to find and neutralize the installation. They found 52 mikes, 47 of them still active, covering many of the most interesting offices in the Embassy.

Nosenko's supporters and detractors largely ignored each other's arguments, as they approached the analysis of Nosenko's bona fides from entirely different paths and used different criteria for judging the truth. In the context of the master plot, the value of information provided by Nosenko measured only the magnitude of the deception to come. To believers in Nosenko, on the other hand, the list of espionage cases the FBI had developed from his information and the many leads to KGB agents in other countries were ample proof of his bona fides. As the KGB would not willingly sacrifice this information, there must be some other explanation for the conflicts in his story. Ironically, one of the strongest points in favor of Nosenko was not made in any of the studies of his bona fides. This is because of the tacit agreement by Nosenko's detractors and supporters alike that he should be considered on his own merits, without reference to the master plot as a whole. This was an artificial limitation, as almost everyone on both sides of the issue recognized that, if Nosenko were bona fide, the master plot theory would collapse. Conversely, if the master plot theory could be disproved, the case against Nosenko would be difficult to sustain.

The point is that Nosenko's information was only a small part of the total information on Soviet intelligence being received at that time from multiple sources believed to be part of the master plot. If all the valuable information from all the supposedly controlled sources had been collected in one massive compendium to show the incredible magnitude of what was allegedly being sacrificed, it would have made a most powerful argument against the master plot theory and, therefore, against the argument that Nosenko was under control.

To the few who were informed of all these other cases and saw events from the master plot perspective, it began to appear as though the entire KGB might have become a sacrificial lamb on the altar of deception and diversion. The diehards (some would call them paranoids) rationalized this by concluding that the deception must be even bigger and more important than previously believed; as the KGB sacrifices mounted, the level and importance of the assumed penetration went higher and higher. Others, however, who initially had accepted the inherent plausibility of the master plot, began to have doubts. There had to be some limit on how much the KGB would give away.

A former Chief of the CI Group in SB Division told me, for example, that he first began to doubt the master plot theory when he learned about a senior East European military officer who had been supplying CIA with very important Warsaw Pact documents for many years. Giving away counterintelligence leads to divert opposition security services was one thing, but the wholesale sacrifice of military secrets was quite another. Continuation of this operation seemed to belie the existence of a well-placed KGB penetration of CIA, which was an essential part of the master plot theory.


In 1976, John Hart visited Tennant Bagley, who had retired four years earlier, to inquire whether, after so much time, he still rejected Nosenko's bona fides. Bagley asked if there had been any new evidence confirming Nosenko's story, to which Hart replied there had not. I believe that Hart was wrong; there was much additional evidence to refute the master plot theory. During the intervening years, old sources continued and new counterintelligence sources were developed that produced a continuous flow of very valuable information, thereby greatly increasing the total cost to the Soviets if the master plan theory were valid. The most knowledgeable new sources would have failed the master plot litmus test, for they confirmed genuine KGB distress at Nosenko's defection, reported that the KGB would be unwilling to use a KGB staff officer as a double agent or false defector, and failed to report any massive counterintelligence deception program or penetration of CIA at the level that had been feared.


In summary, this cost accounting strategy led to an accurate judgment of Nosenko's bona fides. Our discussion does, however, illustrate the principal weakness of this approach, namely, how to determine what the adversary might regard as an acceptable cost. Analysts on both sides of the issue recognized that a source's production is a useful criterion for judging bona fides, but they had radically different views on how much information and the kinds of information the KGB would be willing to sacrifice in the interest of deception.

Predictive Test Approach.

This approach is not normally used in intelligence analysis, but it could and should be used under select circumstances. It might also be called the scientific approach, for it addresses a problem the way a scientist does. The scientist develops a tentative hypothesis to explain the phenomenon under study, then devises tests to prove or disprove the hypothesis. The same approach can be used in deception analysis. A tentative hypothesis about deception can often be tested by using the presumption of deception to make a series of predictions. If the deception theory generates predictions that are borne out by subsequent experience, this suggests that the hypothesis is true. If expectations are contradicted by experience, this suggests that the hypothesis may be wrong.

The principal value of testing views in this manner is that it makes it more difficult to rationalize contradictory evidence. There is a human tendency to interpret new information in ways that do not require us to change our minds. By using a hypothesis about deception to make explicit predictions, one specifies the circumstances under which one could be proved wrong. The predictions are either confirmed or they are not. The latter outcome points to possible flaws in one's understanding of the subject and provokes thought as to where reasoning went astray. If one has not made explicit predictions, one may not concede or even recognize that the reasoning was ill founded.

The weakness of this strategy is that it presupposes some form of ongoing activity, so that one can make short-term predictions and see if they come true. Another weakness is that it requires more self-conscious introspection and willingness to question one's own assumptions than most intelligence analysts are comfortable with, and therefore is seldom used.

This strategy was not used explicitly in any of the analyses of the Nosenko case. This form of reasoning did, however, implicitly affect the thinking of some persons involved in the case. The master plot theory did lead to certain expectations, or implied predictions, and when they were not borne out in practice this did engender doubts about the theory. The most obvious expectation was that it might be possible to break Nosenko. Of course, one could never be certain Nosenko would break even if he were under KGB control, but the interrogators had important psychological advantages. They had total control over Nosenko, were "certain" he was a KGB-dispatched agent, and even "knew" the purpose of the KGB operations.Yet Nosenko did not confess to anything more than a few self-serving lies. Similar advantages existed in the CIA interrogation of Loginov in South Africa; again, the interrogation was unsuccessful.

The master plot theory assumed the existence of a well-placed KGB penetration of CIA. It predicted that KGB agents, such as Nosenko, were either being directed with guidance from the penetration, or were being used to build up or protect the penetration. This limited the suspects to a finite number of CIA officers. It was estimated that astute counterintelligence analysis and security investigation would identify the penetration, but no such penetration was discovered despite extensive investigation. Again, the theory was contradicted by events. This might logically have led the proponents of the theory to question their assumptions, but it did not. Additional expectations concerned the KGB operations on which Nosenko reported. One would expect the KGB to try to achieve its deception goals with the minimum necessary cost to itself. This led to the view that Nosenko's revelations about KGB operations were probably less important than they appeared to be. Specifically, if was anticipated that investigation of Nosenko's leads to seemingly well-placed KGB agents would show that these agents had recently lost their access or were, for some other reason, expendable to the KGB. Further, it was expected that investigation of tantalizing leads to agents who could not be fully identified by Nosenko would lead to dead ends, so the KGB would really have sacrificed nothing at all. In some cases, these expectations were accurate, but in a significant number of cases investigations did identify valuable KGB agents.

These beliefs and expectations were, in effect, logical deductions or predictions based on the master plot hypothesis.If they had been set forth explicitly as predictions, and recognized as valid if partial and imperfect tests of the hypothesis, it would have been far more difficult to ignore the implications of their being contradicted by events. Unfortunately, the advocates of the master plot theory were seeking to prove it, not to test it. They regarded the master plot as a fact, not as a hypothesis to be subjected to critical examination, so developments that seemed to contradict this view were ignored, rationalized, or misinterpreted.

III: Conclusions

Heretofore, I have tried to present an objective account of the diverse arguments used, or in some cases not used, by those on both sides of the Nosenko issue. What follows is personal opinion. The reader is cautioned that opinions on this case are as numerous and varied as the many CIA and FBI officers who were personally involved in one or another phase of it. The opinions expressed here are certainly not the final word.

I will start by making my personal bias clear. I became a believer in the master plot theory in 1965 when first exposed to the reasoning described above under the motive approach. Although initially a believer, I never put much stock in Bagley's Thousand Pager, as I had learned from experience to be skeptical of conclusions based on the anomalies and inconsistencies approach to counterintelligence analysis. My first doubts arose when, one by one, various expectations failed to materialize, which is the reasoning described above under the predictive test approach. Subsequently, for reasons discussed under the cost accounting approach-the high volume of significant intelligence being received through multiple sources-I rejected the master plot theory and concluded that Nosenko was not acting under KGB control. This conclusion was recently reinforced when, in doing research for this study, I learned how the many anomalies and contradictions were eventually explained.

I remain firmly opposed to the view that the master plot was an irresponsible, paranoid fantasy. Given the information available at the time, as described under the motive approach, it would have been irresponsible not to have seriously considered this possibility. The mistake was not in pursuing the master plot theory, but in getting so locked into a position that one was unable to question basic assumptions or to note the gradual accumulation of contrary evidence. This type of analytical error is not uncommon, and all of us are susceptible to it. It can lead one to overlook deception as well as to perceive deception when it isn't there, as happened in the Nosenko case.

Gordon Stewart was correct in criticizing Bagley's analysis for assuming guilt and then interpreting every discrepancy as evidence of this guilt. After serious doubts began to be raised about this analysis, the Soviet Bloc Division should have assigned an officer in a devil's advocate role to do an analysis that assumed innocence, then examined how the evidence could be interpreted as being consistent with this view. By failing to give a fair shake to the opposing view, SB Division lost control of the case to another component that approached the analysis from a totally different perspective. This lesson should be taken to heart by any component involved in a serious controversy over deception .

Most important for this study is not what we learn about the Nosenko case, but what can be learned about deception analysis in general. There seem to be five quite separate and distinct paths to reaching judgments about deception. Which path one chooses is strongly influenced by one's past experience and the patterns of thought associated with one's functional responsibilities or organizational affiliation. The path one take determines, in turn, the evidence one seeks and, in large measure, the conclusion one reaches"

Generally, analysts in the Nosenko case gave greatest weight to the islands of evidence they were most familiar and most comfortable with, and this in turn determined which approach they took. Some counterintelligence personnel were very familiar with and influenced by the concern about penetration of CIA. Speaking for myself, for example, I had been the Headquarters desk officer on the Goleniewsld case at the time we received both of his reports, the one on the penetration of CIA and the one that led to identification of Felfe as a KGB penetration of West German intelligence. I had also seen first hand how much damage a well-placed penetration, such as Goleniewsld, could do to an opposition service. This personal experience made the master plot seem very real and very plausible. Other counterintelligence specialists, more directly involved in the Nosenko case than I, had personal experience with the seeming contradictions and extraordinary coincidences in his story, so this is what most influenced them.

One's professional experience and organizational affiliation play important roles in determining the strategy one employs to analyze deception. Counterintelligence officers, DO reports officers, and DI intelligence analysts look at deception through different conceptual lenses. The strategy employed, in turn, largely determines what evidence one seeks and the conclusion one reaches. Examination of Soviet motives led Bagley to review the entire history of CIA and KGB counterintelligence operations. Anomalies and inconsistencies perceived by counterintelligence personnel in the initial debriefing of Nosenko led to hostile interrogation to develop still more anomalies and inconsistencies. Solie's cost accounting approach led to friendly interrogation designed to produce as much information as possible, while playing down the anomalies. The litmus test approach focused attention on how other sources' information related to the Nosenko case, while overlooking the total value of these sources' information.

The Nosenko case vividly illustrates the weakness inherent in each of the five strategies for analyzing deception. Bagley identified a plausible motive for Soviet deception and supported it with voluminous circumstantial evidence, yet Nosenko was not under Soviet control. There was an enormous number of anomalies and inconsistencies in Nosenko's story, yet they were all produced by sloppy translation and inadequate debriefing, the unique aspects of Nosenko’s background and personality, genuine accident and coincidence, and the circumstances of his handling; they were not truly indicative of hostile control.

Comparing the value of information received from a source against some criterion of the cost the adversary would be willing to incur also leads to strong inferences about deception, but only if the putative threshold of acceptable cost is correct; in the Nosenko analysis, that threshold was itself a major point of disagreement. Comparing suspect information against some objective criterion of truth can lead to strong inferences about deception, but only If the criterion does indeed represent the truth; in the Nosenko case, it did not. Making test predictions can prompt reconsideration of one's views if they fail the test of experience, but, typically, this was not done in the Nosenko case; analysts were too busy trying to prove they were right, rather than testing their assumptions.
If there is a single lesson to be learned from this, it is that all five approaches are useful for complete analysis. Exclusive reliance on anyone strategy is dangerous. The cost accounting approach led to a correct conclusion in the Nosenko case, but it, too, has inherent vulnerabilities, and there is no guarantee it will be correct in all future cases. This places a heavy burden on the deception analyst. To do a thorough analysis of all the possibilities, one must examine the diverse bodies of evidence relevant to each of these strategies. This will often require investment of substantial time to gain understanding of previously unfamiliar fields.

 

 

 
« Last Edit: August 23, 2019, 03:07:39 PM by Michael Clark »

Offline Thomas Graves

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #146 on: August 23, 2019, 06:07:10 PM »

.....



Michael,

Wow, that was a regular "tour de force" by you!  You must be very proud of yourself!

However, there are several problems in Heuer's propaganda piece.

One of the main ones is that on page 391 Heuer talks about "thief powder" (what the Ruskies called "Metka" according to Bagley) and how it was allegedly used by the KGB to uncover Pyotr Popov in Moscow.  Heuer, regardless of the fact that he's apparently mixing up here two false narratives that were told by Nosenko, makes no mention whatsoever of KGB's Vladislav Kovshuk, Yuri Guk, and "Alexander Kislov" (aka "The Three Musketeers") who were sent to Washington D.C. in early 1957 to reactivate Edward Ellis Smith (aka "Popov's Mole"), the first CIA officer recruited by the KGB (in Moscow in late 1956) .

What's up with that?

It's a major clue as to how terribly right Golitsyn was, and how terribly deceptive your false-defector-hero, Yuri Nosenko, was. Tennent H. Bagley writes about it in great detail in his book Spy Wars and in his 35-page follow-up PDF Ghosts of the Spy Wars.

https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362


Cheers!

--  MWT   ;)

PS  Why doesn't Heuer have any footnotes, any "sources"?  Bagley has lots of them in his writings ...
« Last Edit: August 23, 2019, 10:27:05 PM by Thomas Graves »

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #146 on: August 23, 2019, 06:07:10 PM »



Offline Thomas Graves

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #148 on: August 23, 2019, 11:31:43 PM »
From: http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf






Michael,

Why such large text and such huge gaps?  Are you afraid your posts won't get noticed otherwise?  Do you have any idea how troll-ish you look?

How's that letter you're going to send Newman and Scott coming along?

--  MWT   ;)

PS  Never heard of Vladislav Kovshuk, Yuri Guk, and "Alexander Kislov" (aka "The Three Musketeers")?

Pity that.

PPS  I'm starting to get emails from people from around the country (who've evidently gotten my address from my EF "bio") saying what a "jerk" you are ...



« Last Edit: August 23, 2019, 11:46:23 PM by Thomas Graves »

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #148 on: August 23, 2019, 11:31:43 PM »


Offline Michael Clark

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #149 on: August 23, 2019, 11:48:42 PM »
Michael, Why such large text?  Are you afraid your posts won't get noticed otherwise?  Do you have any idea how troll-ish you look?
How's that letter you're going to send Newman and Scott coming along?--  MWT   ;) PS  Never heard of Vladislav Kovshuk, Yuri Guk, and "Alexander Kislov" (aka "The Three Musketeers")? Pity that.

Thomas, do you have anything relevant to post? If so, when will you get to it?

Also, you promised, 4 times, last night, to shower this thread wilth at least ten rebuttles to one of my posts, we are still waiting.
« Last Edit: August 24, 2019, 12:05:09 AM by Michael Clark »

Offline Michael Clark

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #150 on: August 23, 2019, 11:53:59 PM »

Michael,

PPS  I'm starting to get emails from people from around the country (who've evidently gotten my address from my EF "bio") saying what a "jerk" you are ...

If that were true, I certainly would like to know about it. I don’t want to come-off as a jerk. To be sure, I received no PM’s from within the community saying as much.

JFK Assassination Forum

Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #150 on: August 23, 2019, 11:53:59 PM »


Offline Thomas Graves

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #151 on: August 23, 2019, 11:57:56 PM »
Thomas, do you have anything relevant to post? If so, when will you get to it?

Also, you promised, 4 times, last night, to shower this thread wilth (sic) at least ten rebulttles (sic) to one of my posts, we are still waiting.

Michael,

Patience is a virtue.  I'll get to it, don't you worry.  Like around 3 AM, maybe 4 AM, your time tomorrow ...

In the meantime, what's your "take" on what Vladislav Kovshuk, Yuri Guk and "Alesandr Kislov" (aka "The Three Musketeers") were doinf in Washington D.C. in early 1957?

Never heard of them?  Pity that.

You can read about them (and traitor Edward Ellis Smith) in these two works by Tennent H. Bagley:

https://archive.org/details/SpyWarsMolesMysteriesAndDeadlyGames/page/n77

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2014.962362


Cheers!

--  MWT   ;)




« Last Edit: August 24, 2019, 12:07:19 AM by Thomas Graves »