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Author Topic: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!  (Read 13265 times)

Offline Michael Clark

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #70 on: August 18, 2019, 05:41:07 AM »


And now your just posting quotes of yourself to further spam the page. You should review the rules, unless you are trying to manipulate Duncan into just deleting this whole thing. You’ve quoted your post #62 here.

-Screen Shots.... check
-Personal message, Re: Rule #6; “.  Threads which descend into chaos, where the thread creator participates in the gradual development of the chaos, will be deleted.“ .... check




« Last Edit: August 18, 2019, 06:09:36 AM by Michael Clark »

Online Thomas Graves

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #71 on: August 18, 2019, 06:02:12 AM »
Wowie Zowie!  Thanks for posting this info from John L. Hart's propagandistic "The Monster Plot" report, Michael!

KGB Spies Uncovered by Nosenko (... uhh ... according to John L. Hart)

1)  U.S. Army sergeant Robert L. Johnson

2)  -- (A buncha technical military stuff I'm not gonna research right now, but which I know was not Nosenko's "bailiwick".)

3)  U.S. Sergeant Dayle W. Smith

4)  James A. Mintkenbaugh

5)  Some microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow

6)  William John Cristopher Vassall !

7)  And last but not least, about 200 unnamed spies in unnamed European countries, as "attested to" by three unnamed CIA officers who, in so many words, had  the wherewithal to know!
 

This is going to be so much fun, Michael!

You've got some more, right?  Please let me know if this pretty much covers it.

When I get the "go-ahead" from you, I'll start taking them one-by-one and point out how each of the humans was a burnt-out, throw-away "has-been" asset for the KGB because he was either 1) already suspected, 2) no longer actively working for the KGB/GRU, or 3) no longer had access to classified information.

And the microphones?  Well, I'll show you how that's a bit misleading, okay?

I hope you don't mind some more fairly long posts in my doing so.

Cheers!

--  MWT   ;)


PS  Shouldn't you try to convince John Newman and Peter Dale Scott that they made a really, really big mistake in concluding Nosenko was a false defector?

PPS  Ready when you are, Michael!

Can you think of any more spies Nosenko "uncovered" before I get started?

« Last Edit: August 18, 2019, 11:21:08 PM by Thomas Graves »

Offline Michael Clark

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #72 on: August 18, 2019, 06:14:12 AM »
Wowie Zowie!  Thanks for posting this info from "The Monster Plot," Michael!

The KGB/GRU Spies That (false defector) Yuri Nosenko (supposedly) Uncovered:

1)  U.S. Army sergeant Robert L. Johnson

2)  -- (a buncha technical military stuff)

3)  U.S. Sergeant Dayle W. Smith

4)  James A. Mintkenbaugh

5)  Some microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow

6)  William John Cristopher Vassall !

7)  And last but not least, about 200 unnamed spies in unnamed European countries, as "attested to" by three unnamed CIA officers who, in so many words, had  the wherewithal to know!
 

This is going to be so much fun, Michael!

You've got some more, right?  Please let me know if this pretty much covers it.

When I get the "go-ahead" from you, I'll start taking them one-by-one and point out how each of the humans was a burnt-out, throw-away "has-been" asset for the KGB because he was either 1) already suspected, 2) no longer actively working for the KGB/GRU, or 3) no longer had access to classified information.

And the microphones?  Well, I'll show you how that's a bit misleading, okay?

I hope you don't mind some more fairly long posts in my doing so.

Cheers!

--  MWT   ;)


PS  Shouldn't you try to convince John Newman and Peter Dale Scott that they made a really, really big mistake in concluding Nosenko was a false defector?

PPS  Ready when you are, Michael!

Can you think of any more spies Nosenko "uncovered" before I get started?

Spam away, Thomas



Online Thomas Graves

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #73 on: August 18, 2019, 06:29:31 AM »
Michael,

Well, not hearing from you as to whether or not that list of spies allegedly uncovered by Nosenko that I drew up is comprehensive, and seein' as how you replied to my post with some difficult-to-read stuff about two of my heroes (Anatoliy Golitsyn and Pyotr Popov) in a discolored and grossly over-enlarged page from Hart's "Monster Plot," instead, I guess I'll just go ahead and start with Number 1 on the list -- U.S. Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson, okay?

Let's see what another of my heroes, Tennent H. Bagley, has to say about him, whaddaya say?

Robert L. Johnson

From page 179 of Bagley's 2007 book Spy Wars:

The spy in the Orly (Paris airport) courier center, Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, had been very important indeed -- when active. But by the time Nosenko told us about him, Johnson had lost his access to the courier center, and his mentally unhinged wife was broadcasting her knowledge that he was a Soviet spy. The case was stone-cold dead, and the KGB knew it before Nosenko handed it to us.


--  MWT   ;)


NEXT UP --  Sergeant Dayle W. Smith !


Dayle W. Smith

From Bagley's book Spy Master (with former KGB General Sergei Kondrashev):

Sergeant Dayle W. Smith (KGB's "Andrey") confessed to having been recruited while in Moscow during 1953-1955. But the American authorities saw no reason to prosecute him because he had had no access to sensitive information and never passed any to the Soviets. For the KGB, he was a free “give-away.”

And this from page 179 of Spy Wars:

The most important (according to Nosenko) suspect, (KGB's) "Andrey” the sergeant-mechanic of cipher machines, left service six months before Nosenko fingered him and had never had access to cipher secrets even while active.


-- MWT   ;)


NEXT UP:  James A. Mintenbaugh !  (... Who??)


James A. Mintkenbaugh

From the Wikipedia article on Robert Lee Johnson (see above):

(Johnson) also recruited a former Army friend, James Mintkenbaugh. Johnson worked for the KGB between 1953 and 1964, and passed on information while stationed at various sites in Europe and the U.S. ... In 1964, Johnson was turned in by his wife and, like Mintkenbaugh, received a 25-year prison sentence in 1965.

Note: Bagley doesn't seem to talk about Mintkenbaugh in his books or in his PDF Ghosts of the Spy Wars, but I think it's reasonable to assume that since Robert Lee Johnson was already "toast" when Nosenko "uncovered" him, that Mintkenbaugh was "throw away" material, as well.


--  MWT   ;)


NEXT UP:  Some Microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow!


Microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow


From page 179 of Spy Wars:

Microphones in the American Embassy? Everyone from the ambassador to the janitor knew they existed -- as they do in every embassy the Politburo might be interested in. Golitsyn had confirmed that well-known fact.

Note: Bagley goes into this in some detail in his HSCA testimony.  He starts talking about them at the bottom of this page:
https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol12/html/HSCA_Vol12_0299b.htm


--  MWT   ;)


NEXT UP:  William John Cristopher Vassall !!!


William John Cristopher Vassall


For background on this dude, here's the Wikipedia article on him.  I don't know how accurate the article is because I haven't read it yet.  (I'll read it later today and let you know if there's anything egregiously wrong in it ...)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Vassall


And here's something on him in Bagley's Spy Wars, page 179:

By the time Nosenko walked into CIA in Geneva (in May 1962) and pinpointed the British naval source William Vassall, the KGB already knew Vassall to be compromised by Golitsyns defection (in December of 1961). They even played a game to build up Nosenko in Western eyes: after Golitsyn’s defection, against all logic, they restored their contact with Vassall, which they had suspended while the British investigated an Admiralty lead from an earlier source.(fn 1)


And this, also from Spy Wars, page 260:

Nosenko’s defenders cite his uncovering of John Vassall, the British Admiralty employee, as a great contribution although they knew that Golitsyn had previously exposed Vassall. To explain that away, they went further in inventiveness: the British weren’t really on Vassall's track at all, they said. Had it not been for Nosenko’s information the British might have mistaken Golitsyn’s lead to Vassall for a totally different Admiralty source, the Houghton-Gee-Lonsdale network earlier un- covered by Goleniewski.(fn 18)  In fact, no such confusion was even remotely possible.

(There's more, but it's getting late, even here in Paradise-on-Earth known as La Jolla, California ...)


-- MWT   ;)
« Last Edit: August 18, 2019, 09:53:54 AM by Thomas Graves »

Online Thomas Graves

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #74 on: August 18, 2019, 10:51:56 AM »
Spam away, Thomas (emphasis added by MWT)



(Preliminary comments)

Dear Michael,

If you had watched John Newman's 2018 Spy Wars presentation in it's entirety, or if you had read Bagley's 2007 book by the same title, you would realize that GRU colonel Pyotr Popov was betrayed in early 1957 by Edward Ellis Smith, a former CIA officer who had been stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow under diplomatic cover so deep that he was unknown (as a spy) to even the American Ambassador there.

You'd know that the poor guy (Smith) had been "honeytrapped" by his beautiful KGB maid in late 1956, and that, as a result of that honey-entrapment, he had been interviewed twice by said intelligence organization and ... gasp ... recruited.

Smith had been sent in 1953 by CIA to the American Embassy in Moscow so that he could set up dead drops for Popov, scheduled to return to Moscow in 1955 when Vienna was to be reconstituted, geo-politically speaking, after the end of the Axis Power's "Three Part Rule" (or whatever it was called) of that spy-infested, front-line city.

You would also know that "The Three Musketeers" (Kovshuk, Kislov and Guk) had been sent to Washington D.C. in order to reestablish contact with Smith so that they could learn who the heck he'd been setting those dead drops up for, and hey, maybe do a little recruiting work on the side I'm thinking Richard "The Snoop" Kovich, or George "Nosenko Was A True Defector!" Kisevalter.

More on them later, perhaps ...

But most importantly for purposes of understanding the true import of the page you posted, above, you would know that in 1957, the KGB had sent an "illegal" by the name of Margarita Taivova to N.Y.C. via Pyotr Popov in Berlin so that it could be made to look as though Popov had not been betrayed by Smith, but by his having betrayed Taivova's itinerary to the CIA (which he had, btw).

Lastly, you would realize that whatever, according to Hart, "Kotov" and "Zhukov" were up to or being used for vis-a-vis Popov, it was most likely designed to do the same thing: to create a scenario in which Popov could be arrested for treason in such a way as to not cast suspicion on Edward Ellis Smith, or someone he may have helped KGB to recruit in CIA's Soviet Russia Division.

-- MWT  ;)

PS  By the way, it was my hero, KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn, who identified the true identities and KGB positions of "The Three Musketeers" to CIA, and helped it make sense of those three movie-lovin' guys had been up to in D.C. about three years earlier in 1957.

PS  For the minutia-inclined:  "Illegal" Margarita Tairova "let the cat out of the bag" when she, at Popov's trial, testified falsely that American surveillance had followed her all the way from Berlin to New York City, when in fact nobody followed her in Europe, and the FBI didn't started tailing her until she'd arrived in The Big Apple.

PS  The main thesis of this Wikipedia article on Popov is fundamentally wrong about how he was betrayed and arrested, but at least it mentions both Tairova and Zhukov (if it's the same Zhukov, that is), and in the correct context, i.e., that each of them could have been the putative reason KGB had come to "suspect" Popov in 1958  or so, but you and I both know now that the KGB had known, about a year earlier (thanks to Edward Ellis Smith and "The Three Muskateers" in Washington D.C.) that Popov was a Soviet traitor to the CIA.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyotr_Semyonovich_Popov


Cheers!

« Last Edit: August 19, 2019, 06:13:03 AM by Thomas Graves »

Online Thomas Graves

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #75 on: August 18, 2019, 08:20:54 PM »


Spam away, Thomas
(emphasis added by Muddy Wrassler Tommy aka "Thomas")



 


Michael,

In retrospect, I am very happy, indeed, that you decided to post (see above) an ostensible "Golitsyn-condemning" / "Nosenko-extolling" page from John L. Hart's so-called "Monster Plot" report, grossly over-enlarged and discolored as you've made it, because it gives me an opportunity to bring to the attention of our guests and interested members the true facts surrounding KGB's 1) uncovering, 2) secret arrest and "doubling" of, 3) and eventual public arrest, trial, and execution of GRU Colonel Pyotr Popov.

Here they are -- the true facts -- from Tennent H. Bagley's 2014 PDF, Ghosts of the Spy Wars.


How Did the KGB Really Catch Popov?

For some reason the KGB leaders felt the need to misinform the CIA about when and how they had caught Pyotr Popov, CIA's great spy inside Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU).

It was by sheer chance, they said. They happened to have been routinely following an American diplomat [George Winters] in Moscow when they saw him drop a letter in a street mailbox. Dredging it out, they found it addressed to Popov.

That much was true—a diplomatic helper of CIA had mailed the letter—but to assert that this mailing first put them on Popov's trail was a palpable effort to deceive.

The KGB started pumping out this deceptive story early, and continued for years:

After secretly arresting Popov in November 1958 they forced him to act as a double agent against the Americans in Moscow. In that status in September 1959 he “surreptitiously” passed a written message to his CIA contact [Russell Langelle], telling that he had been caught because of “KGB surveillance of the recontact letter mailing.”

Shortly after publicly arresting Popov in October 1959, the KGB issued a secret official brief (obzor) to its own personnel, attributing Popov's discovery to the letter-mailing. (Now any leak from inside—including purposeful ones—could “officially” confirm the tale.)

Then in late 1961 a defector from their ranks, Anatoly Golitsyn—universally agreed to be genuine—told the CIA that the KGB had actually tumbled upon Popov's treason in 1957, getting onto him from a source [recently-fired CIA officer Edward Ellis Smith] met in Washington, whom Vladislav Kovshuk, heading the KGB's work against the American Embassy in Moscow, had traveled to Washington to meet. (fn 31)

Shortly after Golitsyn defected with that new version, the KGB sent Yuri Nosenko to tell authoritatively the old KGB version (among other things). “I know how Popov was caught,” he blurted as he was leaving his first meeting with me in Geneva in late May 1962. (fn 32) He “knew” because he himself had been supervising the KGB's watch over the American who occupied the post previously held by the CIA's contact man to Popov. The truth, he said, was that the KGB had first tumbled to Popov when KGB surveillants chanced to see American Embassy officer George Winters drop a letter to him.

The mailbox story was demonstrably false. CIA knew, of course, when Winters had posted that letter. It was on 29 January 1959, more than two months after the KGB had lured Popov to Moscow on a ruse. The KGB must have arrested him on arrival on 17 November 1958, because within two weeks the GRU chief was publicly fired and replaced on 8 December by KGB Chairman Ivan Serov himself. (fn 33) That the KGB would allow Popov freedom during this time is unthinkable because, having been alerted by the public firing of his chief, he could have fled. Moreover, the KGB later admitted to having “seen” (no doubt actually controlled) Popov's meeting his CIA contact twice in January, weeks before the letter mailing. (fn 34)

The KGB didn't need to use such an obvious lie to calm the CIA, least of all through a false defector like Nosenko, where telling this obviously false story would cause suspicion. It had more plausible versions available. Once the KGB first got onto Popov in 1957, as Golitsyn revealed, the KGB found lots of clues that had been lying unconnected in their files:

1.    
A secret [1957] lecture in Berlin [by Defense Marshal Zhukov] (attended by Popov) had fallen into CIA hands;

2.    
Popov, after an extramarital dalliance with a Yugoslav woman in Vienna, had later recommended her as an agent for his GRU base on the Baltic;

3.    
Popov had dispatched [to New York City from Berlin] an Illegal named [Margarita] Tairova who then claimed to have been surveilled by the Americans as soon as she arrived in New York and thus had fled home (only Popov knew of her travelling identity);

4.    
Popov had chanced to meet and recruit an American student in Berlin in circumstances so questionable that the KGB used a discussion of this case as the pretense to lure Popov back to Moscow—and arrest.

In addition, the KGB found other past incidents, apparently insignificant at the time, like Popov's having been questioned after a late-night passage on an underground train through the American Sector of Berlin.

Even the CIA, later analyzing the case, was satisfied that all these other incidents adequately explained Popov's downfall. But from that the Agency jumped to the further conclusion that there was no further need to worry that a mole inside CIA might have betrayed him. (fn 35) The CIA accepted as genuine Popov's “surreptitious note” and Nosenko's certification of the mailbox story, and simply brushed aside Golitsyn's revelation that Kovshuk's 1957 trip had put the KGB onto Popov.

Why then did the KGB push out that evidently-false mailbox story? We don't know, but I can only suppose that, fearing the CIA would immediately accept Golitsyn's story and look into the circumstances and identify the real source of Popov's betrayal, they impulsively used the most convenient explanation at hand.

It was a blunder. All the CIA had to do was check the records (once it identified Kovshuk's traveling pseudonym) and find that the KGB had not just sent him off on a “trip” of a week or two, as Nosenko asserted, but instead had transferred him on permanent assignment to the Soviet Embassy in Washington while—as both Golitsyn and Nosenko had reported—his Moscow supervisory position was kept open for him. He actually stayed in Washington for ten months.

Nosenko “knew” that the only purpose of Kovshuk's “short” trip had been to restore contact with an American cipher-machine mechanic whom the KGB had recruited eight years earlier. In reality, not until October, at the very end of this long sojourn in Washington, did Kovshuk contact the sergeant-mechanic “Andrey” (see #4), and even then only once and accompanied by another KGB officer who did all the talking. Moreover, “Andrey” was by no means the KGB's “most important spy ever recruited in Moscow” as Nosenko had called him, nor would he have justified Kovshuk's long absence. Instead, he was an easy KGB “give-away.”

As we later deduced, (fn 36), Kovshuk had really gone to Washington to meet and debrief Edward Ellis Smith, the CIA officer who had been sent to Moscow in 1953 to find dead drops and meeting sites for Popov's eventual recall from Vienna to Moscow. In September 1956 Kovshuk had caught Ed Smith in a honey-trap with his Soviet maid and offered him a way out—cooperation with the KGB. Yuri Nosenko in 1962 told the CIA that he himself had participated with Kovshuk in confronting Smith; he even gave the KGB's nickname for Smith, “Rizhy” [Redhead], so he was evidently speaking with authority when he told the CIA that Smith had refused Kovshuk's offer.

But this was KGB deception. Even by Nosenko's own account of his career, he was not in Kovshuk's section when the pitch to Ed Smith was made—and by the time he next met the CIA a year and a half later, Nosenko had completely forgotten what he had previously been told to say. Now he denied, even when confronted with a tape of his 1962 statements, ever having heard of Ed Smith or the KGB operation against him.

Smith failed to immediately report this KGB approach, the delay being enough for the CIA to recall him to Washington in early October to explain. Distrusting his account, the Agency fired him on the spot. By early November it was clear that Smith would never return to Moscow, and that is when Kovshuk and “Aleksandr Kislov” started preparing to go to the United States. (fn 37)  In the course of his service in the CIA's Soviet Division and Moscow, Ed Smith had almost certainly learned enough about the CIA's secret source to enable the KGB to identify Popov. (fn 38) (And after the Cold War the KGB admitted to having recruited him in the 1950s. (fn 39)

Any KGB-recruited CIA Soviet-operations specialist would justify a KGB deceptive effort to hide him—perhaps even five years after losing access to secrets—if he kept contact with his old CIA colleagues. And even as a scholar in California [Smith] may have offered continued possibilities for the KGB. But to make such a protective effort so long after he had lost access to secrets raises a reasonable doubt: might Ed Smith have led the KGB to recruit another CIA Soviet specialist whose continued activity was really what the KGB deception was hiding? [emphasis added]

If there was someone, neither he or she has ever been identified, nor has anyone else—except Ed Smith—who was betraying as early as 1957, when the KGB got onto Popov, or 1959 when the Soviets began the deception.


Footnotes:

(31)  This was “Kovshuk's trip,” whose nature and import touch several of these “ghost stories” and hence cause confusion. Thus I will try to clarify it here, at the risk of anticipating material to be discussed later. The bare facts of the “trip” are as follows: In early November 1956 Kovshuk (under the false name “Komarov”) requested a U.S. visa for permanent assignment to the Soviet Embassy in Washington (normally a minimum two-year tour of duty). He departed for there on 7 February 1957 but, in early November, cut short his Embassy assignment without explanation and returned to Moscow. The KGB attempted to hide the fact that he was not going alone by sending his companion, using the name Aleksandr Kislov, to New York under journalist cover and separating their U.S. visa-requests and travel dates by two days each. Aside from official visa and travel records, at least five sources informed CIA of this “trip”: (1) Golitsyn, who had heard that the trip pointed the KGB to Popov's contact with CIA; (2) the FBI, who spotted him in the spring with KGB officers Yuri Guk and “Aleksandr Kislov” together so often on clandestine activity that they nicknamed them “the three musketeers”; (3) Yuri Nosenko, claiming to have been Kovshuk's deputy, who strangely did not know that the “trip” lasted more than a couple of weeks, but “knew” that Kovshuk had gone to Washington for the sole purpose of restoring contact with a U.S. sergeant cipher-machine mechanic whom he said the KGB had recruited in Moscow eight years earlier and codenamed “Andrey”; (4) that mechanic himself, who was identified and confessed to having been recruited in a sex trap but was not prosecuted because he had never had access to secrets and had freely and fully confessed; and (5) KGB General Sergey Kondashev, a former close colleague of Kovshuk, who said after the Cold War that Kovshuk's Washington stay was to meet with “an important agent—one who was never uncovered” (Tennent H. Bagley, Spymaster, page viii).

(32) Nosenko refused to tell more until a later meeting, the KGB apparently having instructed him to keep the false mailbox story separate from his equally false story of why Kovshuk had travelled to Washington. Perhaps his lips had loosened as a result of the drinks he imbibed during that first CIA meeting. See Tennent H. Bagley, Spy Wars, p. 9.

(33) That KGB Chairman Ivan Serov, taking over the GRU because of a betrayal from within, should himself be fired little more than four years later because of yet another betrayal from within the GRU, that of Oleg Penkovsky is ironic.

(34) David E. Murphy , Sergei A. Kondrashev , and George Bailey , Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 277.
 
(35) Such was the gist of a 300-page report by CIA analyst Renée Peyton, as recounted by Tom Mangold in Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Master Spy Hunter (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 387n.40.

(36) Tennent H. Bagley , Spy Wars, pp. 65–66.

(37) Ibid., pp. 68–71. Sergey Kondrashev was aware that Kovshuk was accompanied by a member of SCD Dept. 14 (Spymaster, p. 289n13) and not having heard the name “Kislov” recognized it as a pseudonym and proposed to me a couple of candidates, but their ages did not fit. I think “Kislov” was actually Col. Valentin Zvezdonkov or, conceivably, his colleague in the investigation of Popov, Lt. Col. Sumin.

(38) See Peer de Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence (New York: Times Books, 1978), pp. 68–69 and 94–96. Silva recruited Ed Smith for this job. The story of Smith's assignment is told by Richard H. Smith in “The First Moscow Station. An Espionage Footnote to Cold War History,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1989, pp. 333–346.

(39) A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov , Vneshnaya Razvedka Rossii [Russian Foreign Intelligence] (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2000) p. 70. KGB General Sergey A. Kondrashev knew this to be correct, but was unwilling to tell more.


--  MWT   ;)
« Last Edit: August 18, 2019, 11:11:37 PM by Thomas Graves »

Offline Michael Clark

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #76 on: August 19, 2019, 01:10:47 AM »
Nosenko was pre-judged. Golitsyn walked of water, and everyone else was under threat.


Online Thomas Graves

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #77 on: August 19, 2019, 01:44:16 AM »
Nosenko was pre-judged. Golitsyn walked of water, and everyone else was under threat.




Michael,

I may address your new post in an hour or two, but for now let me just say that although I personally believe that you are an archetypal "lost cause," there's still hope for many inquisitive and anonymous "guests" who invariably show up on this thread whenever I've been posting on it for several minute -- still have hope in understanding how the "KGB" (today's FSB and SVR) and the GRU have been running circles around our intelligence agencies since about 1921 (with Operation Trust, Sindikat-2, etc), but especially after 1957 when a "KGB within the KGB" was formed in the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, i.e., The 14th Department, and how it began to so effectively interweave its Sun Tzu- like "strategic deception counterintelligence operations" with KGB's already-in-progress "active measures counterintelligence operations".

And it's for these inquisitive, apparently open-minded guests that I go to all of this trouble, not for you, Michael.

-- MWT  ;)

PS  Cheers!

......

Now for my hero, Anatoliy Golitsyn, the true defector who tried to warn CIA and the FBI about the machinations of the above-mentioned Department 14 of the Second Chief Directorate  (today's FSB) ...

For inquisitive, open-minded guests and the occasional visiting member, my "take" on the excerpt (page 42) Michael Clark posted above from John L. Hart's so-called "Monster Plot" report is that it's pretty much a spot-on assessment.

If I could ask Mr. Hart whether or not, for example, the FBI had changed its mind about "true" volunteer spy, Aleksey Kulak (J. Edgar Hoover's always-believed and shielded-from-CIA "Fedora") when Hart wrote his 186-page piece of propaganda.

-- MWT  ;)

« Last Edit: August 19, 2019, 04:12:19 AM by Thomas Graves »

Offline Michael Clark

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #78 on: August 19, 2019, 01:51:58 AM »
Michael,

I may address your new post in an hour or two, but for now let me just say that although I personally believe that you are an archetypal "lost cause," that the many inquisitive anonymous "guests" who invariably show up on this thread whenever I've been posting on it for several minutes still have hope in understanding what how the "KGB" (today's FSB and SVR) and the GRU have been running circles around our intelligence agencies since about 1921, but especially after 1957 when a "KGB within the KGB" was formed in the Second Chief Directorate (and named the brand new "14th Department"), and how it began to so effectively interweave its "strategic deception counterintelligence operations" with already existing  "active measures counterintelligence operations".

-- MWT  ;)

PS  Cheers!

Incoherent nonsense and babble. You should have waited the hour or two when you might have had something relevant if not cogent to post.

Online Thomas Graves

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Re: The Monster Plot, by CIA's Very Own KGB Apologist John L. Hart!
« Reply #79 on: August 19, 2019, 02:50:20 AM »
Incoherent nonsense and babble. You should have waited the hour or two when you might have had something relevant if not cogent to post.

Exactly.

Thanks for proving my point.


 

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