The first dissenter of the Warren Commission (WC) was ironically someone who served on the Commission ? Senator Richard Russell. He would express thoughts and views that would be corroborated over the years, and they did NOT support the official conclusion.
Senator Russell was the most famous and successful politician from Georgia (later only eclipsed by President Jimmy Carter) in their state history. He served for 10 years in the Georgia state house, was elected Governor and served as a U.S. Senator for Georgia for 38 years.
He did not want to serve on the WC. He told President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) that he "had no respect for Warren", but he was outfoxed by his old friend LBJ who had already announced it publicly so he had to serve. Russell often told people he was "conscripted on the Commission."
Russell would attend nearly all the executive sessions, but due to his Senate duties he was limited to attending only 6% of the Commission hearings where testimony was taken. He made up for this by reading the transcripts, with help from an assistant, of the testimonies and other documents submitted to the Commission.
Russell would repeatedly voice suspicions that have been the source of debate for 54 years. He would say that the FBI had rushed to judgment in concluding that Lee Harvey Oswald (LHO) was the lone assassin. He further stated that the FBI consequently was not thorough in investigating the assassination and appropriate in following up leads. Since the WC was reliant on the FBI, CIA, SS and other government agencies due to no investigators on their staff, this is a major concern for anyone looking into their report.
Russell would get confirmation on his suspicions later on as in 1976 the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SCIA) would conduct an investigation into this matter and release a report. The focus of the report was, "the performance of intelligence agencies in conducting their investigation of the assassination and their relationships to the Warren Commission." The report revealed that the Senate Committee "had developed evidence which impeaches the process by which the intelligence agencies arrived at their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission."
The report concluded that "both the CIA and the FBI failed in, or avoided carrying out, certain of their responsibilities in this matter.....The evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassination was deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission...".
The Senate Committee also found, in regard to the FBI specifically, that "during the Warren Commission investigation top FBI officials were continually concerned with protecting the Bureau's reputation and avoiding any criticism for not fulfilling investigative responsibilities.... The Bureau issued its report on the basis of a narrow investigation focused on Oswald, without conducting a broad investigation of the assassination which would have revealed any conspiracy, foreign or domestic."
In 1979 the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) would weigh in on this topic as well after fully investigating the matter. A final report said that the FBI (1) "performed with varying degrees of competency," (2) "failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President," and (3) "was deficient in its sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."
Russell, while on the Commission, also repeatedly expressed doubts as to whether the CIA could be trusted to provide the Commission with the full, unexpurgated truth. As history as shown he has been vindicated in this matter as the CIA kept from the WC their plots with the mafia against Castro. In 1976 the SCIA concluded that the CIA failed in, or avoided carrying out, certain of its responsibilities in investigating the assassination. And in 1979 the HSCA concluded that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination." According to the 1979 report, "the CIA did not always respond to the Commission's broad request for all relevant material," and the responses the CIA did make were often tardy. They also failed to share the information they had on LHO prior to the assassination with the WC.
In a 1964 telephone conversation Russell had with LBJ concerning "[t]hat danged Warren Commission business", which was recorded for posterity, he resoundingly said that the Single Bullet Theory (SBT) was a bunch of malarkey. In 1966 and 1970 Russell told the news media of his abiding dissatisfaction with the work of the Warren Commission. Once again, Russell stands vindicated by history.
Many consider Edward Jay Epstein's "Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth" (1966), to be the best single piece of work on the Commission and its internal workings. In his book he concluded that the Warren Commission, "sincerely convinced that the national interest would best be served by the termination of rumors, and predisposed by its make-up and by the pressure of time not to search more deeply, failed to answer some of the essential questions about the tragedy," and that the Warren Report "fails to contend with serious contradictions presented by the evidence."
In 1979 the HSCA concluded that (1) "the Warren Commission performed with varying degrees of competency," **(2) "the Warren Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President," (3) the Warren Commission "presented its conclusions in its report in a fashion that was too definitive," and **(4) the Warren Report "was not, in some respects, an accurate presentation of the evidence available to the Commission ...particularly on the issue of a possible conspiracy in the assassination."
The HSCA would further vindicate Russell in its final report by attributing the Warren Commission's failure to adequately investigate the possibility of conspiracy too, in part, "the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government [i.e., the FBI and the CIA]."
In a 1970 television interview Senator Russell said, "I have never believed that Oswald planned that altogether by himself.... have doubts that he planned it all by himself. I think someone else worked with him." Obviously most of the people of this country believe the same thing as only a small, die-hard group still believe LHO to be the sole assassin with no help from anyone else. The final report of the HSCA in 1979 concluded that "there was a high probability that two gunmen were firing at the President" and that "President John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy."
Senator Russell had much experience with the intelligence community as he was the chair of a Senate subcommittee on CIA oversight. As Russell biographer Gilbert C. Fite has written, Russell might have "possessed secret information others did not have, [and] he may have had reason to suspect some kind of conspiracy. Whatever he knew, if anything, he carried to the grave."
As mentioned earlier, Senator Russell adamantly opposed the SBT. Russell expressed his vehement disagreement with the SBT in a proposed dissenting statement dictated on September 16, 1964; he argued against the theory at the final meeting of the Commission on September 18, 1964 (although the doctored transcript of this meeting contains no reference to Russell's arguments), and then criticized the SBT again that very day in a telephone conversation with LBJ; and he emphatically rejected the theory in interviews with the press in 1966 and 1970.
The two principal reasons Russell rejected the single bullet theory: (1) John B. Connally's (JBC) WC testimony, in which JBC absolutely, positively, and unequivocally asserted that before he was hit he heard a previous shot that struck JFK ("It's a certainty. I'll never change my mind"), and, (2) Russell's own examination of the Zapruder film. (Two other of the seven members of Commission shared Russell's doubts about the SBT; thus, nearly half the Commission questioned the theory.) These same reasons have been mentioned for 54 plus years in regards to why the SBT is not valid by researchers.
Unfortunately for us, Senator Russell never seemed to grasp the significance of his statements regarding the SBT. In his September 18, 1964, telephone conversation with LBJ, Russell said that his rejection of the SBT "don't [sic] make much difference" and was "just a little thing." He didn't seem (or want to see) grasp the fact that if the SBT was false there had to be more than one assassin involved.
Overall though, he did far more than the other members as he labored to improve the quality of its investigation, to point out the bureaucratic pitfalls besetting the Commission, and to preserve its integrity. If the rest of the Commission had done the same to get to the truth no matter what, the strange and inexplicable investigative lapses of the FBI and the CIA, the WC's performance would certainly have been vastly improved, and the Warren Report would have been a different, more persuasive document.
Sadly, he was only one man and he could only do so much, but his public comments and remarks pointed us in the right direction many years ago.
Rob Caprio:
"The two principal reasons Russell rejected the single bullet theory: (1) John B. Connally's (JBC) WC testimony, in which JBC absolutely, positively, and unequivocally asserted that before he was hit he heard a previous shot that struck JFK ("It's a certainty. I'll never change my mind"), and, (2) Russell's own examination of the Zapruder film. (Two other of the seven members of Commission shared Russell's doubts about the SBT; thus, nearly half the Commission questioned the theory.) These same reasons have been mentioned for 54 plus years in regards to why the SBT is not valid by researchers.
Unfortunately for us, Senator Russell never seemed to grasp the significance of his statements regarding the SBT. In his September 18, 1964, telephone conversation with LBJ, Russell said that his rejection of the SBT "don't [sic] make much difference" and was "just a little thing." He didn't seem (or want to see) grasp the fact that if the SBT was false there had to be more than one assassin involved. "
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The principle discussion among the WC members was about whether there was two shots or three. That is the reason for the two shot language in the WC conclusion and the testimony of several of the witnesses, Joseph Nicol and Major Anderson, was to establish the fact that three shots was anything but a certainty.
Gov Connally was the only person in the car to state there was a shot between the first shot and the headshot. His first statement in the Hospital conflicts with subsequent statements to the commission as did Nellie's. Over time their statements became similar which is to be expected.
Statement of Senator Cooper and Mr McCloy to the HSCA about the Warren Commission debate and did not agree on the number of shots. The only thing they agreed on was LHO was the assassin.
Mr. CORNWELL - Senator Cooper, I am sure that the committee will wish to explore with you whatever areas you may wish to elaborate on or that you may have any disagreement with in respect to the President's testimony. I just have one question I would like to ask you. You are quoted as stating in a televised broadcast recently that there were disagreements among the commission members, that, and I quote:
I think the most serious one of the ones that come to me most vividly, of course, it the question of whether or not the first shot went through President Kennedy and then through Governor Connally.
Would you mind explaining to us the nature of that disagreement and how it was resolved?
Senator COOPER - ........We did have disagreements at times in the commission and, as I have noted,
I think the chief debate grew out of the question as to whether there were two shots or three shots and whether the same shot that entered President Kennedy's neck penetrated the body of Governor Connally.........
...... I must say, to be very honest about it, that I held in my mind during the life of the Commission, as I have since, that there had been three shots and that a separate shot struck Governor Connally. It was determined, as shown in the report of the Commission, which I can read to you, but I know you are familiar with the report. It states there was disagreement on this issue, particularly as the subject was debated, that there were different opinions about it. The majority believed that the same shot struck both President Kennedy and Governor Connally, but the report ended by saying, in effect, whatever was the fact, whether there was one, whether two or three shots, that it did not alter the conclusion of the Commission that Oswald was the sole assassin and there was no conspiracy
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Mr. McCLOY - Warren Commission Member to the HSCA about SBT
Twice in my life, and I am sure a number of people in this room may have had a somewhat similar experience, I stood right alongside of a man as he was shot. The first man--it was in World War I in France--was killed. The second man recovered from his wound. The circumstances of the second experience were really quite amazing. I am convinced, after my experience, that on occasion, when you are shot, you don't know the minute you are hit. There is a sort of a perceptible period following the impact before you get the full realization that you have been hit. In the first case, it was a fellow officer in World War I. We were not far apart and he quietly said, "Jack, I think I am hit." He shortly collapsed subsequently and died of his wound. The other experience, which is almost unbelievable, was in Berlin when we were rehearsing for the reception of President Truman, who was going to visit us at the American headquarters in Berlin after the war. I had been, as you know, an official of the Government, Military Governor, and later High Commissioner for Germany, and Gen. Lucius Clay, my predecessor as Military Governor was with me, and we began to rehearse the ceremony because President Truman was coming along that afternoon to visit the headquarters. We were rehearsing, for example, who would step up and first shake hands with the President, when the bugles should sound off, et cetera--"You are going to do this and you that." There was a friend of mine who was on Clay's staff and who later became a very distinguished jurist in Massachusetts. He became Chief Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court. His name was Cutter, and we designated him to pose as the President. We said, "you are going to be President Truman, you are going to be the President and are to stand here." We started through the rehearsal. This was in front of the headquarters in Berlin and, by George, Cutter turned to me at a certain point, sort of hesitated and said, "Jack, I think I'm shot," and in a little while, he collapsed. You can imagine what a tizzy that created.
I know Governor Connally very well; I have shot quail with him and I know he's a good shot and I know he is familiar with firearms. Frankly, I don't think he knew exactly when he was hit. I saw his recent testimony--at least somebody reported to me, perhaps indirectly, that he wasn't as certain now as when he first appeared before us--before our Commission when he said he was sure it wasn't the same shot which hit President Kennedy which hit him. I don't know where that bullet could have gone if it didn't go through Governor Connally. Moreover, Governor Connally didn't know until the next day, I think it was, that he had been shot in the hand, as well as in the body. I am suggesting that the certainty which he felt earlier isn't entirely reliable. The Germans have a word for it. They call it the "nachschlag." I believe those who had been close to places where people have been shot are frequently aware of a perceptible delay on the part of the victim in registering an awareness of the shot.
Mr. McCLOY - I don't think it could have missed Connally. I think we were a little lax in the Commission in connection with the use of those X-rays. I was rather critical of Justice Warren at that time. I thought he was a little too sensitive of the sensibilities of the family. He didn't want to have put into the record some of the photographs and some of the X-rays taken at the time. We took the testimony of course, of the doctors and probably with the X-rays--we wouldn't have been able to read the X-rays if we hadn't had the doctors' testimony. I believe later on a more thorough examination of those pictures and the X-rays and photographs with the respective positions of the President and Connally did produce a more convincing proof of where that bullet went. As I say, I don't know where else it could have gone. I have talked with Governor Connally about it on a number of occasions, and I was very much interested to see he was a little shaken the last time he testified here. He had a conviction earlier that it was a second bullet that hit him.
Mr. SAWYER - I think we have had some evidence that would tend to bear out Governor Connally's recollection. I think there has been considerable evidence now that the first bullet missed everything, and it was the second bullet that hit the President and Governor Connally which then coincides with his testimony because he probably would not have heard the shot that hit him. But in any event, I also wanted to commend you on your conclusionary statement in the Warren Commission that there was no evidence of a conspiracy because you, as a lawyer, I am sure, appreciate about as far as you can go in proving a negative is to say that there was no evidence of the affirmative.
Mr. McCLOY - That's right.
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SBT was the general belief no matter how they struggled to understand the shots.
