Here's Tennent Bagley's entire personnel file

[Lance Payette]

Dear Fancy Pants Rants,

Please note that in his Bagley-attacking memo, Howard Osborn mentions that he’s “getting feedback on the Nosenko situation from [probable mole] Bruce Solie” — or words to that effect.

Wrong. Osborn only mentions Solie in connection with the fact that the Security Division - "(Bruce Solie)" - had followed up and found to be valid leads provided by Nosenko that the Soviet Russia Division had failed to follow up at all.

Since Solie and his team, all of whom worked for Osborn, had issued the report exonerating Nosenko in 1968 ... well, yeah, I would assume by the time Osborn wrote his 1970 memo that he had received a rather large amount of "feedback" from Solie. Duh.

You're not only getting spittle all over your keyboard, but you're starting to pee on yourself as well. You're living in a lunatic fantasy world.

[Tom Graves]

Wrong. Osborn only mentions Solie in connection with the fact that the Security Division - "(Bruce Solie)" - had followed up and found to be valid leads provided by Nosenko that the Soviet Russia Division had failed to follow up at all.

Since Solie and his team, all of whom worked for Osborn, had issued the report exonerating Nosenko in 1968 ... well, yeah, I would assume by the time Osborn wrote his 1970 memo that he had received a rather large amount of "feedback" from Solie. Duh.

You're not only getting spittle all over your keyboard, but you're starting to pee on yourself as well. You're living in a lunatic fantasy world.

Dear Fancy Pants Rants,

You left two words out of your otherwise excellent sentence.

I've inserted them for you in brackets:

Since Solie and his team, all of whom worked for Osborn, had issued the report exonerating Nosenko in 1968, I would assume by the time Osborn wrote his 1970 memo that he had received a rather large amount of "feedback" from [probable mole] Solie.


"Solie and his team"?

You mean it wasn't just Bruce and Yuri smoking stogies, playing billiards, and rehearsing what Yuri should say?


ME: Other than the polygrapher, when Bruce Solie was interviewing Yuri Nosenko for nine months in 1967 and 1968 and writing a report about his case, did he have helpers or a "team," or did he do it by himself?

GROK: Bruce Solie conducted the nine-month reinvestigation and interviews of Yuri Nosenko (starting late October 1967 and culminating in his October 1968 report) largely by himself, with no formal "team" or named assistants/helpers documented in declassified records or historical accounts.  [emphasis in original]

Key details from CIA files and related sources:

Declassified memos (e.g., from the National Archives JFK releases, such as 104-10150-10004 and similar documents) explicitly state that since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to Nosenko. This refers to Solie himself, emphasizing the shift to a single, fresh handler from the Office of Security (OS) to avoid bias from prior Soviet Russia/Soviet Bloc Division involvement (e.g., Tennent Bagley, David Murphy).

Solie, as the primary OS officer assigned by DCI Richard Helms (via DDCI Rufus Taylor oversight), handled the friendly reinterrogations, polygraph (in August 1968), file reviews, and drafting of the ~400-page (or sometimes cited as 263-page core) report concluding Nosenko was bona fide.

No sources mention Solie having a dedicated team, co-interrogators, research assistants, or support staff specifically for this effort. Accounts describe it as Solie's personal reinvestigation, focusing on obtaining more information from Nosenko (rather than trapping him) and evaluating anomalies with plausible explanations.

The polygrapher (separate from Solie) administered the 1968 exam, but this was a technical support role, not part of the ongoing interviews or report-writing.

Solie relied on existing files, consultations with other officers (e.g., possibly FBI inputs or prior defector insights), and Nosenko's cooperation, but the process was portrayed as solitary to maintain independence from the skeptical "Angleton camp."

Skeptics like Bagley (in Spy Wars) criticized Solie's report as "specious" and based on shallow KGB knowledge, but even they frame it as Solie's individual work—not a collaborative team effort.

Later reviews (e.g., John Hart's 1976 "Monster Plot" report, HSCA testimony) reference Solie's conclusions but do not indicate he had helpers during the 1967–1968 phase.

This solo approach aligned with the goal of a fresh, unbiased look amid ethical concerns over prior harsh handling. While Solie may have had routine OS administrative support (e.g., logistics, security), no evidence points to a formal team aiding his interviews or report. The clearance and resettlement followed directly from Solie's findings.

ME: Bagley wrote that some FBI agents like Elbert Turner were privy to Solie's and Nosenko's conversations.

GROK: Yes, in his 2007 book Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games, Tennent H. "Pete" Bagley wrote that FBI Special Agent Elbert Turner (sometimes referred to as "Bert Turner") was privy to Bruce Solie's conversations and interviews with Yuri Nosenko during the 1967–1968 reinvestigation phase.

Bagley described this as part of the process after the case shifted to Solie in the CIA's Office of Security (late October 1967 onward). He noted that Solie, starting in late 1967, sometimes conducted interviews accompanied by FBI Special Agent Turner. This joint involvement allowed the FBI to participate in debriefings, obtain leads (particularly counterespionage/serial information from Nosenko), and contribute to the assessment of his credibility.

Key points from Bagley's account and supporting declassified records:

The FBI had been involved in the Nosenko case since his 1964 defection (sharing info with the Warren Commission and later HSCA), but the 1967–1968 phase marked closer collaboration under DCI Richard Helms' push for resolution.
Turner, from the FBI's Washington Field Office, was one of the key Bureau representatives. Copies of interview transcripts and related memoranda were disseminated to the FBI and CIA's Counterintelligence Staff.

In October 1968, Turner authored a Top Secret working paper (disseminated to CIA) citing "significant confirmatory information" from the FBI's interrogations/debriefings with Solie. He concluded there was "no substantial basis to conclude that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector," aligning with Solie's exonerating report.

Bagley portrayed this FBI access critically, seeing it as contributing to the "whitewash" (his term for Nosenko's clearance). He argued the focus shifted to utility (Nosenko's leads identifying KGB officers) rather than resolving inconsistencies (e.g., rank lies, procedural gaps, Oswald claims). Turner and Solie emphasized new leads as proof of authenticity, which Bagley dismissed as insufficient.

This joint Solie-Turner handling was also referenced in later contexts (e.g., the 1970s Nicholas Shadrin/Igor Kochnov operation, where Solie and Turner teamed up again). Bagley viewed the FBI's role—via Turner—as enabling the pragmatic acceptance of Nosenko despite skepticism from the Soviet Bloc Division (himself, David Murphy) and Counterintelligence (James Angleton).

Declassified CIA files (e.g., from National Archives JFK releases) confirm Turner's involvement, including dissemination of transcripts and his 1968 paper supporting bona fides. Bagley used this to argue the clearance was influenced by interagency dynamics and a desire to end the controversy, not rigorous proof.

ME: In this context, would Turner be considered part of Solie's "team"?

GROK: No, in the context of the Yuri Nosenko case and Tennent H. "Pete" Bagley's descriptions in Spy Wars, FBI Special Agent Elbert Turner would not be considered part of Bruce Solie's "team."

Solie's 1967–1968 reinvestigation was explicitly designed as a solo, independent effort by a single CIA officer (Solie himself) from the Office of Security, with no prior personal knowledge of Nosenko, to provide a fresh and unbiased review after years of skeptical handling by the Soviet Russia/Soviet Bloc Division (including Bagley). Declassified CIA documents (e.g., summaries from October 1968 and related memos) repeatedly emphasize that "since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual"—Solie—without mention of co-interrogators or a dedicated support team from within the CIA.

Turner's involvement was limited and external:

As an FBI representative (from the Washington Field Office), he sometimes accompanied Solie during interviews or had access to transcripts/memoranda disseminated to the FBI and CIA's Counterintelligence Staff.

This allowed the FBI to gain leads (e.g., counterespionage/serial info from Nosenko) and contribute assessments, such as Turner's October 1968 working paper citing "significant confirmatory information" and concluding no substantial basis to doubt Nosenko's bona fides.
Bagley noted this joint aspect critically, portraying it as part of the process that helped enable the "whitewash" (Solie's exonerating report and clearance). However, Bagley framed Turner as an FBI collaborator or participant in specific sessions—not as a core member of Solie's internal CIA team.

The arrangement was interagency cooperation for debriefing utility and credibility checks, not a formal CIA team under Solie. No sources describe Turner (or any other FBI personnel like James Wooten, occasionally mentioned) as assistants, helpers, or integrated into Solie's solitary review/report-writing process. Solie handled the primary interviews, polygraph coordination, file analysis, and drafting alone, while Turner provided Bureau input as needed.

This distinction matters in Bagley's narrative: he saw the FBI's role (via Turner) as tilting toward acceptance of Nosenko for operational value, contrasting with the CIA skeptics' focus on inconsistencies. Turner was a key external ally/facilitator, but not "part of Solie's team" in the sense of being a CIA colleague or subordinate on the reinvestigation.


-- Tom

[Steve M. Galbraith]

Even if Nosenko was a fake defector (and they didn't know that with certainty), even if he was directly taking directions from Khrushchev through a implanted device in his damned head (to exaggerate my point), you *cannot* treat a person like he was treated. The denial of basic rights, of due process, the isolation, the mistreatment: all intended to break him down. That's unacceptable.

No fair minded American can defend that. That is, fair minded Americans who aren't deranged. I would think even a Joe McCarthy would say this was unacceptable. It seems to me that Bagley later recognized this and tried to cover his tracks (as Angleton did). But continued approving the mistreatment despite any contrary evidence showing he was wrong.

Just to note: Hoover thought Nosenko was a legitimate defector. Is the claim now that Hoover was a Soviet agent? Or he was surrounded by KGB agents in the FBI who manipulated him? How insane is this going to get?

At this point, as is usually the case with this conspiracy nonsense, it's useless. You are trying to reason with unreasonable people.

[Tom Graves]

Even if Nosenko was a fake defector (and they didn't know that with certainty), even if he was directly taking directions from Khrushchev through a implanted device in his damned head (to exaggerate my point), you *cannot* treat a person like he was treated. The denial of basic rights, of due process, the isolation, the mistreatment: all intended to break him down. That's unacceptable.

No fair minded American can defend that. That is, fair minded Americans who aren't deranged. I would think even a Joe McCarthy would say this was unacceptable. It seems to me that Bagley later recognized this and tried to cover his tracks (as Angleton did). But continued approving the mistreatment despite any contrary evidence showing he was wrong.

Just to note: Hoover thought Nosenko was a legitimate defector. Is the claim now that Hoover was a Soviet agent? Or he was surrounded by KGB agents in the FBI who manipulated him? How insane is this going to get?

At this point, as is usually the case with this conspiracy nonsense, it's useless. You are trying to reason with unreasonable people.

Dear Steve M.,

1) If you'd read Bagley's Spy Wars, and/or John M. Newman's Uncovering Popov's Mole (which he dedicated to Bagley), you'd realize that Nosenko was sent by KGB General Oleg Gribanov to the CIA in Geneva in June 1962 to discredit what recent true defector Anatoliy Golitsyn was telling James Angleton about possible KGB penetrations of the CIA, the FBI, and the intelligence services of our NATO allies. One of the things that convinced Bagley of this was the fact that, even though Nosenko had (supposedly) worked in a different part of the highly compartmentalized KGB than Golitsyn, the cases he told Bagley and Kisevalter about were exactly the same ones that Golitsyn had told Angleton about a few months earlier, but what Nosenko said about them contradicted Golitsyn in every respect and did so in such a way as to preclude the Agency's being penetrated by a mole or two (or three).

Bagley believed Nosenko was protecting Edward Ellis Smith, Pyotr Popov's incompetent and honey-trapped dead drop setter-upper in Moscow who was fired by the CIA in late 1956 and whom Bagley believed had betrayed Popov to KGB General Vladislav Kovshuk in Washington, D.C., movie houses in January 1957, and perhaps had helped Kovshuk recruit another unknown CIA officer.

Newman, on the other hand, believes Nosenko was protecting CIA's primary mole hunter, Bruce Solie, and that Solie had not only betrayed Popov to Kovshuk in those movie houses but had given him the specifications of the U-2 spy plane, as well, and had done so with logistical support from James McCord of future Watergate notoriety and the aforementioned Edward Ellis Smith.

Newman believes Angleton naively shared what Golitsyn was telling him with Solie, and that Solie was able to relay this intel back to Gribanov in Moscow through some high-level moles in French Intelligence and a travelling KGB officer by the name of Mikhail Tsymbal so that Gribanov could tailor Nosenko's "legend" right before he "walked in" to Bagley and (probable mole, imho) George Kisevalter in Geneva in June 1962.

2) Did you know that when Nosenko was caught in a couple of legend-destroying lies in 1964, he nearly "broke"?

Bagley recounts it in Spy Wars:

“You recently told about tailing Embassy security officer John Abidian and observing him setting up a dead drop on Pushkin Street.”

“Yes, we staked out the place but no one came. I was getting the reports week after week.”

“When was that?”

“I remember exactly. At the end of 1960.”

"And you left the American Embassy section at the very end of 1961?”
 
“Yes, I’ve told you that.”

“But in 1962 you were telling us about your systematic coverage of Abidian. Why didn’t you tell us then about seeing him set up a dead drop?”

Nosenko looked blank, speechless.

We resumed. “Are you absolutely sure of the date?”

"Absolutely.”

“But you’re wrong, and so is your story. Abidian went to that drop at the end of 1961, not 1960. How could you be getting the stakeout reports if you were no longer in the American Embassy Section?”

"That’s not true. I know it was 1960.”

"No. We know. It was our dead drop.”

Nosenko was flabbergasted. He fell into a sullen silence.

“Your job was to watch over John Abidian. Would you know of any trips he took outside Moscow?”

“Of course. We had him under full-time surveillance. Any travel by Embassy staff was reported in advance to us. In the case of Abidian, and of the code clerks, I would be told and we would prepare coverage where they were going.”

“Did Abidian make any trips outside Moscow?”

"None.”

"Think hard.”

"Of course I would have to know.”

"He made a very big trip. Where did he go?”

"He did not travel.”

"Not only did he travel, but he traveled to the land of his Armenian ancestors, to Armenia itself.”

"Impossible. That would be big news to us. It would offer opportunities.”

Silence. Nosenko, morose, remained sunken in thought. We waited. Suddenly we heard him muttering, as if talking to himself. "If I admit I wasn’t watching Abidian, then I’d have to admit that I’m not George, that I wasn’t born in Nikolayev, and that I’m not married.”

That strange sentence — recorded on tape — might have been nothing more than rhetoric, but to all evidence Nosenko was not serving in the American Embassy Section and of course was not watching Abidian. Such were the contradictions in his life story and his seeming forgetfulness of wife and children that we doubted he was telling the truth about them. His odd reaction suggested that now, for some reason, we had struck a chord that might impel him to confess.

The silence continued. Finally, perceptibly, he shook himself out of his near-trance and refused to answer any more questions. He tucked himself into a sort of crouch on his chair, his face closed and grim.


3) No, J. Edgar Hoover wasn’t a KGB agent, but his psychological makeup was such that it was easy for the KGB to manipulate him into unwittingly helping it take control of his beloved Bureau and the hated CIA. For more on that, google "wedge" "riebling" and "archive" simultaneously" and read Mark Riebling’s 1994 book, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA.

https://archive.org/details/WedgeFromPearlHarborTo911HowTheSecretWarBetweenTheFBIAndCIAHasEndangeredNationalSecurity


4) Mistreatment? You mean the barbarous torture that John L. Hart described in great detail in 1978 in a successful effort to deflect the HSCA's attention away from Nosenko's lies and contradictions?

Bagley in Spy Wars:

Nosenko’s defenders presented his case as essentially "a human phenomenon” and that the "human factors involved have a direct bearing on some of the contradictions which have appeared in the case.” As one put it, any questions of Nosenko’s truthfulness are “poignantly overshadowed by Nosenko’s personal tragedy, arising from CIA’s handling of his defection.” "We may not allow ourselves to forget," he wrote, “that this story deals with a living person.” 

The central issue of the case, they were implying, was CIA’s mistreatment of Nosenko. They expressed outrage that “duplicity” had been practiced against Nosenko and that the polygraph machine had been used more as an instrument of interrogation than as a fair test of Nosenko ’s truth. They misrepresented the reason Nosenko was incarcerated. They raised a horrifying vision of his being thrown into a “torture vault," as one put it, or a “dungeon,” in another’s words. By 1989 the former CIA senior officer John Hart had so lost touch with the truth that he asserted in writing that the interrogators had deprived Nosenko of sensory stimuli for more than three years, and another told an investigative reporter that Nosenko had been starving and close to death. 30 They must have been aware that Nosenko had regular (as I remember, weekly) visits by a doctor to ascertain his health and the adequacy of his diet. He was never ill, much less "close to death.”

They were contradicting the documented record. CIA director Richard Helms and Nosenko’s former handlers testified under oath that Nosenko had been incarcerated only to prevent him from evading questions about contradictions and anomalies in his stories. (These were the ones that touched upon Oswald, the possible breaking of American ciphers, and penetration of American Intelligence.) We were preventing what happened in 1985, when the later defector Vitaly Yurchenko walked out and back to the KGB.

Whereas this case had damning interconnections with other cases like that of Kulak/“Fedora,” Nosenko’s defenders avoided this subject. One mentioned the cases of Cherepanov and Loginov only to imply that they, like Nosenko, were innocent individuals whom CIA had stupidly misunderstood. 31


-- Tom