JFK Assassination Forum

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ME: Are the following statements true?

"Four conflicts that Trump has negotiated an end to: Thailand and Cambodia, Serbia and Kosovo, Rwanda and Congo, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition, he has resolved a disagreement between Egypt and Ethiopia over water rights which had the potential to escalate into a shooting war. He got our hostages released from Gaza. He decimated Iran's ability to enrich uranium for making nuclear weapons. He is now doing the same to their missile program. The attack on Diego Garcia demonstrated Iran already had intermediate range missiles that could reach every capital in Europe including the Scandinavian capitals of Oslo, Stockholm, and Helsinki. If they had that capability, it wouldn't have taken them long to develop missiles that could reach our entire eastern seaboard. Had Trump not acted to remove Iran's nuclear and missile programs, it would only have been a matter of time before they had the firepower to deliver ICBMs with nuclear warheads to our country. Once that happened, we would have been in the same boat with Iran that we are with are with North Korea. Our only defense with them would be Mutual Assured Destruction. A nuclear Iran would be far more dangerous than North Korea because it is a fanatical regime that embraces martyrdom. Deterrence is not that effective against an enemy that is willing to sacrifice their existence in order to eliminate yours."


GROK: The statements contain a mix of partial truths, overstatements, and speculative elements. Here's a fact-based assessment of each claim as of early 2026.

Four Conflicts Trump "Negotiated an End To"

Thailand and Cambodia: Partially true. Trump administration pressure (including tariff threats) contributed to a July 2025 ceasefire and an October 2025 "Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord" signed in Trump's presence. However, the truce was fragile, broke down multiple times with renewed clashes, airstrikes, and accusations of violations. It was not a permanent "end" to the border conflict; fighting recurred, and the deal required ongoing mediation.

Serbia and Kosovo: Partially true from Trump's first term. In 2020, his administration brokered the "Washington Agreement" for economic normalization (e.g., infrastructure links, trade commitments), witnessed by Trump in the White House. It included side elements like Kosovo recognizing Israel and Serbia moving its embassy to Jerusalem. It did not resolve core political issues (e.g., mutual recognition, sovereignty). Progress was limited afterward, and it built on prior EU-led efforts rather than ending the underlying dispute.

Rwanda and Congo (DRC): Partially true but overstated. In late 2025, the Trump administration helped facilitate a peace deal signed in Washington between Rwanda and the DRC aimed at ending fighting in eastern Congo (involving M23 rebels with alleged Rwandan backing). Trump hosted leaders and claimed it as one of several "wars ended." However, violence continued afterward, with reports of violations, ongoing displacement, and U.S. sanctions later imposed related to breaches. It did not fully resolve the long-running conflict.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: Mostly true. In August 2025, Trump hosted a White House summit where Armenian PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev signed a joint declaration and initialed elements of a peace agreement/framework to normalize relations after decades of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. It included commitments to renounce force, open borders/communications, and U.S. involvement in a transit route (dubbed the "Trump Route"). It advanced peace but was described as a framework requiring further ratification and implementation, not a fully completed treaty ending all issues.

Overall, Trump played a mediating role (often leveraging U.S. economic/diplomatic pressure) in these, and some deals advanced de-escalation. But claims of definitively "negotiating an end" overstate durability—several faced breakdowns or remained incomplete.

Egypt and Ethiopia Water Rights Disagreement

Not resolved. The long-running dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile (with risks of escalation between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan) persisted into 2026. Trump offered to restart/mediate U.S. involvement multiple times (e.g., letters and statements in late 2025–early 2026), expressing desire to bring leaders together. Egypt and Sudan welcomed the offers, but no final resolution or binding deal occurred under Trump. Tensions continued without a shooting war breaking out.

Hostages Released from Gaza

True in part. In October 2025, as part of a U.S.-brokered ceasefire/peace plan to wind down the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, Hamas released the remaining living Israeli hostages (around 20 reported alive at that stage) in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. Trump visited the region, declared the war "over" or at a "new dawn," and took credit for the deal. Some deceased hostages' remains were also handled. This was a major phase of hostage/prisoner exchanges, though broader Gaza issues (reconstruction, governance) remained unresolved.

Decimated Iran's Uranium Enrichment for Nuclear Weapons

Partially true but debated in degree. In June 2025 (during the "Twelve-Day War" or related operations), the U.S. conducted airstrikes on key Iranian nuclear sites (Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan) as part of actions against Iran's program. Trump and officials claimed the sites were "completely and totally obliterated," setting the program back by 1–2 years or more per some Pentagon/Israeli assessments. Damage was severe (destroyed centrifuges, infrastructure hit), and enrichment halted or was severely curtailed post-strikes. However, assessments varied: some early reports (e.g., leaked DIA) suggested less total destruction, with sites damaged but not fully eliminated; IAEA had limited access afterward; and concerns persisted about remaining enriched uranium stockpiles (enough for potential weapons if further processed) and possible reconstitution efforts at other sites. Iran denied weaponization intent and claimed limited damage initially. The strikes significantly degraded capabilities but did not "decimate" the program to zero in all expert views.

Now Doing the Same to Iran's Missile Program; Diego Garcia Attack and Implications

Partially accurate on actions and the attack. In the ongoing 2025–2026 Iran conflict (involving U.S./Israeli strikes), the Trump administration targeted Iran's missile production, launchers, and related infrastructure as part of broader objectives to degrade capabilities. Trump claimed major progress (e.g., 90% of missiles/launchers degraded). In March 2026, Iran attempted a long-range ballistic missile strike on the U.S.-UK base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (using what analysts assessed as intermediate-range systems, ~2,000–4,000+ km range). One missile failed in flight; the other was intercepted. This demonstrated Iran had developed or modified missiles with greater range than previously emphasized in public claims—enough to theoretically threaten parts of Europe (including distant capitals) depending on exact systems and payloads. It highlighted expansion of Iran's strike envelope beyond the Middle East.

The extrapolation to U.S. eastern seaboard ICBMs is speculative. The Diego Garcia attempt showed intermediate-range capability, but developing true intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reliably reaching the U.S. mainland involves additional major technical hurdles (re-entry vehicles, guidance, range/payload trade-offs, testing). Iran had been pursuing longer-range systems, but pre-conflict assessments did not indicate imminent ICBM threat.

Had Trump Not Acted, Iran Would Soon Have ICBMs/Nuclear Delivery to U.S.; Comparison to North Korea and Martyrdom Risk

Highly speculative and debatable. Pre-strike intelligence indicated Iran was advancing its nuclear and missile programs (enriching to 60%, developing longer-range missiles), with breakout time for weapons-grade material estimated in weeks/months if unchecked. Strikes delayed this. However, claims of inevitable near-term ICBM + nuclear capability threatening the entire U.S. are forward-looking assumptions, not certainties — experts noted Iran was not "nowhere close" to a bomb but also not on the verge of deliverable ICBMs to America. North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons and ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S., relying on deterrence (MAD). Iran's regime has ideological elements embracing martyrdom/suicide tactics (via proxies), raising questions about rational deterrence, though state survival instincts have historically constrained it. A nuclear Iran would pose serious risks due to regional proliferation, terrorism ties, and regime ideology, but equating it directly as "far more dangerous" involves subjective threat assessment. The strikes and ongoing actions aimed to prevent escalation, but outcomes remain fluid amid ceasefire talks.

Summary: Trump administration diplomacy and military actions contributed to de-escalations, hostage releases, and degradation of Iranian capabilities. Several "peace deals" advanced normalization or ceasefires but faced fragility or incompleteness. Claims of fully ending conflicts or completely eliminating programs often overstate results or rely on optimistic interpretations amid ongoing disputes. The Iran section reflects real military pressure but includes debated effectiveness and speculative future risks. For the latest developments, conditions in active conflicts evolve quickly — check official sources like State Department, IAEA, or independent analyses.

As I said, "Libertarians are the worst."

Especially pro-Trump Libertarians.

Your dismissive response doesn't surprise me in the least.

TDS has affected the rationality of every person who has contracted it. Their automatic response to anything Trump is for is to oppose it and advocate for anything Trump is against. They will never give Trump credit for anything he has accomplished.

A classic example is Chuck Schumer's 2015 response to Obama's deal with Iran which allowed them to restart their nuclear program. Schumer expressed the same skepticism then about trusting the Iranians with a nuclear program that Trump has expressed more recently. Those concerns were very much in line with Trump's reasoning for attacking Iran last summer and again more recently. The Iranian regime cannot be trusted with either nuclear weapons or long range missiles. If that means bombing them back into the Stone Age, so be it. But now, Schumer has done a complete 180 on the Iranian issue. He is critical of Trump for doing what Schumer was advocating a little more than 10 years ago. What has changed? Well mainly, Schumer and every other once rational Democrat have got their panties in a wad over the prospect of being primaried by an extreme leftist. AOC's shocking upset of 10 term Democrat Congressman Crowley in 2018 scared every mainstream Democrat in the Congress, statehouses, and big city mayoral offices. They have surrendered their party to the nutty left. Most congressmen and senators have seats which are safe in the general election but they realize now they are far more vulnerable in the primaries. Rather than oppose the policies of the nutty left, they have chosen to embrace them. That's why the Democrat establishment has embraced very unpopular policies such as open borders, men in women's sports, locker rooms and bathrooms, and soft on crime policies. This is why I won't consider voting for anyone willing to put a D next to their name. If you are willing to be part of an organization such as the modern Democrat Party, you have no chance of getting my vote. I like John Fetterman. He's the kind of Democrat I used to occasionally vote for. But as long as he remains a Democrat, he cannot get my vote. That's probably a moot point since I live in a neighboring state and I see no chance the current Democrat Party would put him on the national ticket. If it did, it would be a sign that the Democrat Party had returned to its senses and maybe I would again consider voting occasionally for a Democrat. Ditto for Stephen A. Smith. I see no chance the Democrats would ever consider nominating either of these sensible men for national office.

[...]

As I said, "Libertarians are the worst."

Especially pro-Trump Libertarians.

The following is an excerpt from Tennent H. Bagley's 2007 book, Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games, which you can read for free by googling "spy wars" and "archive" simultaneously. My comments are in brackets.


“Isn’t it terrible?” said Jerry, as he stepped out of the elevator.

"Probably not as bad as all that, Jerry,” Sid said flippantly. Jerry stopped.
 
"No, listen. Haven’t you heard?” he said, "The President has been shot in Dallas!”

We rushed to our offices on the fifth floor where radios were on. Sickened, we talked in subdued voices, stirring each other’s hope for that brief moment before the sad, final news was flashed. Soon the radio announced that the assassin had been captured and, not long after that, identified him.

A later news bulletin galvanized us: Lee Harvey Oswald was an ex-Marine who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and had returned to the United States only a year and a half ago.

The Counterintelligence Staff, with its established liaison with the FBI and other government agencies, was quickly designated as the Agency’s coordinating point for all Clandestine Services efforts to collect information on Oswald and his connections. Among the traces that James Angleton’s shop first uncovered was a recent report from Mexico City on Oswald’s contact with the Soviet Embassy when he applied for a visa to return to the USSR. The “consular officials” he met were both KGB officers. By itself this was no surprise, because the KGB occupied almost all consular slots throughout the world. But one of those whom Oswald met was Valery V. Kostikov, whom we knew [sic; believed] to have been a member of the First Chief Directorate’s 13th Department, the one responsible for sabotage and “liquid affairs” abroad — murder.

The Counterintelligence Staff handled the microscopic search of Agency files, but everyone stretched to make any possible contribution. It was Lee Wigren, our Counterintelligence section research chief, who made the section's first contribution. On his own initiative he leafed through the Agency’s photographic files on the remote chance that some detail of Minsk, where Oswald had lived, might assist in visualizing his environment in the Soviet Union.

Photo in hand, Lee burst into my office.

“Look at this,” he exclaimed. “I asked for pictures of landmarks and public buildings in Minsk and got this one of the opera house.” An American tourist had taken photos in August 1961 during a trip to the USSR and, thinking they might be of some interest, he had turned them over to a CIA representative he knew. In due course, the snapshots were filed. Among them was the one in Lee’s hand, of the opera house in Minsk.

"So, what do you think?”

I thought as Lee did. Standing there, undeniably, was Lee Harvey Oswald himself. This useful confirmation of Oswald’s presence there was passed on to the investigators and later appeared in the Warren Commission Report on the assassination. 11

The circumstances — Oswald’s defection to the USSR, his return to the United States with a Soviet wife, his contact with Kostikov only two months before the assassination — opened the question of whether the Soviet government had had a hand in the assassination. It seemed entirely unlikely but could not be disregarded.

Incredibly, it was only a few weeks later that I would be listening to a denial of any Soviet involvement in the assassination, delivered with rare authority by my agent at work in the USSR.

. . . 

"Come in, Pete. There’s news,” said David Murphy over the internal phone line. I hurried along the corridor to the corner office of the chief of the Soviet Russia Division.

It was 23 January 1964, eighteen months after [probable mole] George Kisevalter and I had said farewell to Yuri Nosenko [in Geneva]. Meanwhile, Jack Maury had been assigned abroad, Howard Osborn had held the post for a short time, and in August 1963 David Murphy had taken over as division chief. His appointment added hugely to the professionalism of CIA’s operations against the USSR. He had a keen interest in and deep knowledge of the Soviet Union, he spoke Russian, he had long operated in the held against Soviet bloc targets (and had overseen the handling in Berlin of Pyotr Popov), and he came to this job directly from years of supervising our operations against the Eastern European satellites of the Soviet Union. He brought to the task a unique verve, activism, and initiative — tempered by a well-informed, realistic insight into Soviet bloc counterintelligence capabilities. It was one of those rare cases of the right man in the right job, and a major influence on the course of events I will describe here.

As I stepped into his office I saw that Kisevalter was there. Dave greeted me with a smile. "Nosenko’s back.”

Kisevalter, in evident good cheer, added, "The telegram came in last night, exactly as we arranged it. Even better, it’s Geneva again.”

I clenched my fist and faked a short right-hand punch. "We’re off.” We were ready. In the months since Nosenko had left Geneva, George and I had had time to prepare and update meeting plans and questions for future encounters.

Dave reviewed our communications arrangements. No one would be told where we were going or why we were away, and we would book separate flights to avoid notice that we had gone out together. Our messages to Headquarters from the held would carry a special indicator to ensure that the smallest possible number of people would become aware of this source.

As we left his office Dave said, “Let’s hope he can stay for a while.’’

"Amen to that,’’ I muttered, and, as we went off to pack for the trip, I reminded George that Geneva was cold and wet in January.

Thirty-six hours later we were in Geneva, checking the safe house accommodation. This time we had a larger apartment in a handsome building in the residential district in which I had lived as a student. The techs had already rigged the audio equipment, and an administrative clerk was providing the food and drink supply. (Neither they nor other officers in Geneva knew whom we would be meeting in the apartment they so carefully arranged for us.) The problem of getting the safe house address to Nosenko was more to the point. All things being equal, according to plan he would be expecting to meet us tonight at seven forty-five.

"The first movie theater in the phone book is the ABC,” I told George. “I know it well. I’ll go there tonight, slip him a paper with this address, and we’ll assume he can get here on his own. If he arrives before I can get back, you’ll be here. And if he doesn’t show up, I’ll phone you and then hang around in town for the alternate meeting an hour later.”

An hour before the appointed time, I bundled into my overcoat and donned a black Styrian hat. With the horn-rimmed glasses that I rarely wore, this minimal effort would at least lessen the chances of being recognized by someone who might know me from my earlier years here. I strolled awhile in the chilly air, caught a bus to the town center, and got off a few blocks from the theater.

Walking toward the brightly lit open foyer by the ticket booth of the "ABC,” I spotted Nosenko standing off to the left, a typical moviegoer waiting for his date. It was movie time and others were milling about, so he didn’t see me coming. I brushed quickly past, thrusting a paper with the address and phone number into his hand and moving without pause out of the foyer into the darkness of the street.

Nosenko must have found a taxi immediately because by the time I got back to the apartment he and Kisevalter were standing in the living room chatting. I left my coat and hat in the vestibule and, rubbing my hands from the cold, walked into a warm reunion. But right off, Nosenko asked with apparent concern, “Who was it that passed me the note?”

“Didn’t you recognize me?” He shook his head in disbelief as I led him out to the vestibule, opened the closet, and pointed to the black hat. He continued to shake his head, surprisingly upset that he had failed to spot his own contact.

“Yuri has a bit of a surprise for us,” said George with less than his usual enthusiasm. "He wants to stay.”

“What?” I exclaimed. “Stay where?” I turned to Nosenko, “You don’t mean defect, do you?”

Nosenko nodded. “Yes, and right now. I don’t want to go back.”

"Well, well,” I said. “We’d better sit down and talk about this — and let’s have a drink. I could use one.” On a scale of safe house surprises, this ranked close to the top. But higher was yet to come.

George had already put zakouskies — snacks — on a tray, and I served Nosenko the scotch whisky that he preferred. We raised our whisky glasses to this reunion, and I broke the silence. “I don’t understand. You said you would never leave your country and family. Is something wrong?”

“Yes, I don’t know exactly what, but I’ve been getting the feeling that they might be onto me. It would be too risky to go on.”

Odd, I thought. He had left the USSR three days before, again to act as security officer for the Soviet delegation to the resumed disarmament talks. We knew — and as a KGB officer, he knew much better — that if there had been the slightest reason for distrust, the KGB would not have signed off on this assignment abroad, especially for a mission unrelated to his Moscow responsibilities.

“Can you give us any specifics? This is damned important.”

"No, nothing special. Just the way people look at me. I’m worried.”

Suppressing my astonishment I said, matter-of-factly, “Of course, you can come over any time you want, and we will welcome you. But I still don’t understand. What about your family, the little girls?”

"Oh, they’ll be okay,” he answered offhandedly. Doubts flashed through my mind. We knew how the regime treated the families left behind by defectors, and it was anything but "okay.” Close relatives were fired from responsible jobs and ostracized by friends and colleagues. The family would be kicked out of their apartment and probably be exiled to a distant city, the children shunned as the offspring of a traitor. They would never be allowed to join him in the West, and he would never return to Russia, for he would be under sentence of death for treason.

After a glance at Kisevalter, who just shrugged, I turned to Nosenko, “Okay, but give yourself and us a little time. Stay where you are, at least for a few days. If you sense any real danger, you can come here any time. They won’t kidnap you in Switzerland. Well need the time to make arrangements with Washington for your entry into the U.S. And we want to know what you might learn here.’’

George and I knew that CIA would strongly have preferred that he stay where he was. An agent in place has a future and offers opportunities,
while the value of most defectors is finite. But as we sipped at our drinks and nibbled at the snacks I began to see the brighter side of Nosenko’s
decision. At least now there would be the opportunity to question him in detail about things we had barely touched upon in the hurry of spy meetings abroad. There would also be the chance to plumb any knowledge of political and strategic matters that he might have learned during his years in the inner core of the system.

He agreed to wait "maybe for a week or so,” and we settled down to our meeting.

On the register of operational surprises, Nosenko’s next remark scored a perfect ten.

He had personal, not to say intimate, knowledge of the stay in the Soviet Union of Lee Harvey Oswald, who two months earlier had assassinated President Kennedy.

For weeks the Warren Commission had been turning Washington inside out in investigating every conceivable aspect of the crime. High on the list were the circumstances of Oswald’s bizarre decision to defect to the Soviet Union, his apparent change of heart and return to the United States with a Soviet wife; his pro-Cuban political activity; and his visit to the Soviet consulate in Mexico City two months before the assassination. Now, in this most timely fashion, CIA’s only source inside the KGB had come out with direct knowledge. If President Johnson himself had been sitting in this safe house, his first question would have been, "What can you tell us about the assassination of President Kennedy?” And George and I had spent all this time discussing Nosenko’s future!

"I was personally involved in this case,” he said. "When Oswald came to the Soviet Union in 1959, he told his Intourist guide he wanted to stay in the country and become a Soviet citizen. I was deputy chief of our section dealing with American and British Commonwealth tourists to the USSR.
Krupnov, one of my case officers, was handling the young guide. When Krupnov reported to me, I called up everything we knew about Oswald—
from the guide, from his visa application, and from the staff at the Hotel Berlin, where he was staying. On the basis of this, Krupnov and I judged
that Oswald was of no interest and would probably just be a nuisance. So, I decided to reject his request.”

George and I listened without interrupting Nosenko’s story. It seemed unlikely to me that a KGB officer at Nosenko’s level would be allowed to make such a decision but this was not the time to mention it.

“When Oswald was told he couldn’t stay, he went back to the hotel and tried to commit suicide. They found him in his room with his wrist cut open, and got him to a hospital. We still didn’t want to let him stay, but higher-ups decided it would be too embarrassing if he should really succeed in killing himself in our country. So they let him stay. But we saw to it that he would not be allowed to stay in the Moscow area. The Red Cross found him a job in Minsk.”

As I moved to top off Nosenko’s glass with soda water, he motioned me to stop, took the whiskey bottle himself, and poured more on top of the
soda. “Didn’t you even suspect he might be an American spy?” I asked.

"We thought of it, but it was clear he was somehow abnormal, and not the type. Anyway, that sort of thing would be looked into only if he was to be allowed to remain in the country. And we didn’t think that would happen.”

“Didn’t any KGB people at least interview him, to get their own impressions? To see if he might be useful to the KGB? After all, he had just left the
marines. Even if that was of no importance to you, wouldn’t the GRU have an interest?”

"No. No one ever bothered. He was obviously low level, just a corporal or something. And after the suicide attempt it was even clearer that he was not normal.” 1 George and I took notes (neither waiting for nor relying on the tapes that were recording everything) and avoided interrupting Nosenko’s account with detailed questions.

“Then came the news about his assassination of President Kennedy. When the top people found out that the killer had recently lived for three
years in our country, they went into a spin. The Americans might get the idea that they had something to do with it. So Khrushchev himself asked
my boss Gribanov if the KGB had had anything to do with Oswald. Immediately, Gribanov told me to get the KGB file from Minsk. I phoned Minsk
and they flew a man right away with their file on Oswald.

"The guy from Minsk delivered it to me, and as Khrushchev had ordered, I personally reviewed it to see if the KGB there had had any relation-
ship whatever with Oswald.”

George and I leaned forward, expectantly. "And?”

"And nothing. There was no sign whatever that the KGB in Minsk had taken any interest in him.”

"Didn’t they watch him, or bug his apartment, or put agents next to him?” George asked.

"No, nothing of the sort.”

"What did the file look like? How big was it?”

"One volume, thick like this,” Nosenko answered, holding his thumb and index finger about an inch and a half apart.

"Did you read it all?”

“I had to. I had to be absolutely sure of my answer to Gribanov and Khrushchev. I read it carefully.”

He paused, then added, “If anyone wants to know whether the Soviet government was behind Oswald, I can answer. It wasn’t. No one in the
KGB paid any attention to him.”

Yes, I thought, you can damned well be sure that the Warren Commission and just about everyone else will be interested. George and I ex-
changed glances, but did not interrupt our guest.

After a long swallow of his drink, Nosenko recalled another contact with the Oswald affair.

"A few months ago, in September, long before the assassination, I happened to be visiting an office in the First Chief Directorate. One of the guys said it was good I was there, because I might be able to throw some light on a cable that had just come in from the residency in Mexico City. They showed it to me. The cable reported this guy Oswald had come into the consulate saying he had lived in the USSR and wanted to go back. He was asking for a visa to return here. I told them I vaguely remembered something about his visit and request to stay, and the problems we’d had with that.”

“How long was the cable, exactly what did it say?” George asked.

"About half a page, no more. As I remember, it just gave the identifying data on Oswald and his Soviet wife, and told what he had said about
having lived in the USSR and gone back to the States. I heard the guys talking it over. They decided there would be no good reason to let him
come back. So they sent a cable telling Mexico to refuse the request.”

By any measure we were getting a most extraordinary break — and witnessing a stunning coincidence. CIA’s only source among the thousands of
KGB officers in the USSR arrives straight from Moscow two months after the JFK assassination, to report having had no fewer than four points of
contact with the case of Lee Harvey Oswald in the USSR. First, he’d been a key figure in 1959 in the initial refusal (later rescinded) to let him stay. Second, he had personally observed Moscow’s refusal to let Oswald return to the USSR in September 1963. Third, he had personally intervened to get the file from Minsk, and fourth, he had reviewed the entire KGB file on Oswald.

The Nosenko operation had clearly taken a major turn. Now our agent in place had placed himself as a witness — probably the only one — to a question facing the American government concerning one of the most dramatic and potentially dangerous incidents of the Cold War. This overwhelmed all the questions and doubts and shadows that had fallen over this case in the preceding months, all the reservations that piled up about Nosenko’s truthfulness. I doubted that this sensational turn of events was coincidence — new doubts added to so many — but that didn’t matter. Now it was certain: his defection would be accepted, and he would be brought into the United States [where, in October of 1968, he would be "cleared" by probable mole Bruce Leonard Solie and hired by the CIA a couple of years later to teach "counterintelligence" to its and the FBI's new recruits].

TG-

You are a special and wonderful human being, standing like the Colossus of Rhodes over the JFKA research community.

Please tell me something that I don't already know.