JFK Assassination Forum

    There is a difference between a DPD "Officer" and a DPD Motorcycle Officer. A DPD motorcycle officer always wears a DPD UNIFORM and wears a White Helmet. DPD  Officer Buddy Walthers and DPD Officer Roger Craig were wearing dress suits that day. DPD Officer Luke Mooney was also wearing a dress suit. All 3 of these DPD Officers were wearing suits and were back inside the railroad yard immediately after the kill shot. There were other DPD Officers back inside the railroad yard that were wearing suits. This is what Buddy Walthers was referring to. DPD Officers that were wearing suits.

Walthers and Craig were not Dallas Police Department officers. They were deputies of the Dallas Sheriffs Department, a completely different agency.

  You guys continue bowing at the Kamp alter, but he did totally botch his Lovelady ID. And then there's his "Prayer Man" debacle. His scorecard has him right on track to become the next curator at the Sixth Floor Museum.

ME: Who was the first person to use the expression "The Deep State" to signify the so-called "Administrative State"?

GROK: The expression "Deep State" was not originally used in American discourse to refer to the "Administrative State" (i.e., the permanent federal bureaucracy, civil service, regulators, and unelected officials executing policy, often critiqued as overreaching or insulated from democratic control). That specific signification—equating or closely associating "deep state" with the administrative/bureaucratic apparatus—emerged prominently in conservative and populist circles during and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election, particularly in critiques of perceived resistance to Donald Trump's agenda.

Earlier Uses of "Deep State" in the U.S. Context

•   The term itself originated in Turkey (derin devlet) in the 1990s, describing alleged covert alliances among security forces, military, intelligence, and sometimes organized crime that operated beyond (or against) elected civilian government.

•   Its first notable application to the United States came from Peter Dale Scott (a former diplomat and UC Berkeley professor) in his 2007 book The Road to 9/11. Scott used it to describe a "deep state" of overlapping military, intelligence, and financial networks operating with partial autonomy from the public/constitutional state—often tied to covert operations, national security structures, and events like the JFK assassination. This was more aligned with critiques of the national security state or "invisible government" than with routine domestic bureaucracy or the administrative state. Scott's earlier work (e.g., 1993's Deep Politics and the Death of JFK) explored similar ideas without the exact phrase.

•   In the early 2010s, the term appeared sporadically in policy and conspiracy-oriented discussions (including via figures like Alex Jones), still largely evoking intelligence/military elites rather than everyday federal agencies or civil servants.
Shift to Signifying the "Administrative State"

The pivot toward using "deep state" as a shorthand or synonym for the administrative state—focusing on career bureaucrats, "Obama holdovers," regulators, intelligence officials seen as politicized, and the broader permanent government apparatus—occurred in the mid-2010s, accelerating sharply in 2016–2017. Key developments include:

•   An anonymous December 2016 Breitbart article by "Virgil" (widely linked to conservative circles and Steve Bannon's influence at the time) framed the "deep state" as a complex of bureaucrats, technocrats, and insiders (including liberal-leaning Obama appointees and career officials) resisting elected leadership and preserving the status quo. This broadened the term beyond Scott's security-focused usage to encompass the administrative bureaucracy.

•   Steve Bannon and Trump-aligned figures popularized this framing during the transition and early Trump presidency, portraying leaks, investigations, and bureaucratic pushback (e.g., on immigration, deregulation) as "deep state" sabotage. Trump himself began publicly using the term in mid-2017 (e.g., retweeting related commentary).

•   Conservative commentators and outlets increasingly equated or conflated it with long-standing critiques of the "administrative state" (a term itself popularized earlier by scholars like Dwight Waldo in 1948, referring to the New Deal-era expansion of federal agencies and expertise-driven governance). By the Trump era, "deep state" became a more pejorative, conspiratorial label for what critics saw as an unaccountable fourth branch of government.

No single individual is universally credited as the absolute "first" to explicitly equate "deep state" with the administrative state in this modern sense, as the usage evolved gradually through online conservative discourse, Breitbart, and Trumpworld rhetoric rather than a single seminal text. However, the 2016–2017 period—via Virgil/Breitbart and Bannon's promotion—marks the clear inflection point where the term shifted from its prior associations (Turkish origins, Scott's national security focus) to routinely signifying bureaucratic resistance and the permanent administrative apparatus.

Broader Context and Distinctions

•   Left-leaning or critical uses (pre- and post-2016) tended to retain emphasis on military-intelligence complexes, surveillance, or "deep politics."

•   Conservative uses reframed it around domestic bureaucracy, regulation, and perceived liberal entrenchment in agencies—often overlapping with but distinct from earlier terms like "the swamp."

•   Mainstream scholars and critics (e.g., Jon D. Michaels) have noted that the American "deep state" in this bureaucratic sense is more accurately just the ordinary federal civil service and expertise-based administration, not a sinister conspiracy—differing markedly from Turkish or Egyptian models.

In short, while Peter Dale Scott introduced the term to U.S. analytical discourse in 2007 for covert power structures, the specific application to the "so-called administrative state" (as unelected bureaucracy thwarting elected officials) was a later development, crystallized in conservative political rhetoric around 2016–2017. It built on decades of administrative-state skepticism but repurposed the "deep state" label for contemporary partisan battles.

ME: Given it's inherited overtones of "military industrial intelligence-community complex," "national security state," and/ or "shadow government," has its use as a synonym for "administrative state" facilitated the spreading of pro-Trump conspiracy theories?

GROK: Yes, the repurposing of "deep state" as a near-synonym for the "administrative state" (unelected bureaucrats, career civil servants, and federal agencies) demonstrably facilitated the spread and mainstreaming of pro-Trump conspiracy theories, particularly from 2016–2020 and beyond. This occurred precisely because the term carried pre-existing, conspiratorial overtones from its earlier associations with the "military-industrial intelligence-community complex," "national security state," and "shadow/invisible government." Those roots—drawn from Peter Dale Scott's 2007 analysis of covert networks operating above the constitutional state, Turkish derin devlet precedents, and earlier critiques of CIA autonomy or the post-WWII security apparatus—lent the phrase an aura of sinister, unaccountable power. When applied to everyday bureaucracy (leaks, regulatory resistance, or investigations), it blurred the line between legitimate policy critique and claims of a secret cabal actively subverting an elected president.
 
How the Repurposing Worked and Why It Amplified Conspiracy Narratives

Prior to 2016, "deep state" in U.S. discourse (via Scott, Alex Jones/Infowars crossovers, or left-leaning critiques) evoked hidden intelligence/military/financial elites enabling "deep events" like alleged policy reversals after JFK or 9/11. It was not primarily about routine civil-service inertia or the New Deal-era administrative state. The shift happened rapidly in late 2016–early 2017:

•   A December 2016 Breitbart essay (widely attributed to Steve Bannon's orbit, under the pseudonym "Virgil") framed the "deep state" explicitly as a sprawling network of bureaucrats, technocrats, and insiders resisting Trump—explicitly equating it to the administrative state while retaining the shadowy connotations. This introduced the term to a mass conservative audience as a war between Trump and an entrenched "government-within-the-government."

•   Trump and allies (Bannon, Fox News, etc.) adopted it publicly from mid-2017, using it to explain leaks, the Russia investigation, FBI/DOJ actions, and later impeachments or COVID policies as deliberate sabotage. This was not neutral terminology; it invoked the inherited overtones of covert ops and shadow power to portray career officials as part of a coordinated plot.

This rhetorical move was effective because it tapped into longstanding conservative skepticism of the administrative state (e.g., critiques of Chevron deference or regulatory overreach) while supercharging it with conspiracy-friendly language. What might have been framed as "bureaucratic resistance" or "the swamp" became a "deep state" cabal—echoing earlier "invisible government" or "national security state" fears but now personalized as anti-Trump treason. Analyses from political scientists and journalists (e.g., David Rohde, Ryan Gingeras) note this hybridization turned an academic or niche term into a partisan weapon that delegitimized institutions and justified broader distrust.
Evidence of Facilitation and Spread

Polls provide clear indicators that the term's adoption correlated with heightened conspiracy belief among Trump supporters and Republicans:

•   A 2017 ABC News/Washington Post poll found ~48% of Americans (roughly even across parties initially) believed in a "deep state" of military/intelligence/government officials secretly manipulating policy.

•   By 2018, Monmouth University polling showed 74% of Americans believed unelected officials "secretly manipulate or direct national policy," with no major partisan gap on the broad concept—but subsequent polls revealed sharp divides on its anti-Trump intent.

•   2019 Economist/YouGov: 70% of Republicans (vs. 13% Democrats) agreed a deep state was "trying to overthrow Trump."

•   2020 NPR/Ipsos: 39% of Americans overall (majority of Republicans and Fox viewers) believed a deep state was working to undermine Trump specifically.

These beliefs tracked with pro-Trump media ecosystems (Breitbart, Infowars, Fox) and merged with other narratives: Russia probe as "hoax"/coup, QAnon (explicitly framing a deep-state cabal of elites), 2020 election denial, and later institutional critiques. Books by Trump allies explicitly cast the deep state as waging war on his agenda, popularizing the frame. Google Trends and media tracking show spikes in "deep state" searches and usage precisely during these controversies.
 
Scholars observing the phenomenon (e.g., in Public Administration Review or books like Rohde's In Deep) describe it as a "conspiratorial turn" that lowered the evidentiary bar: Routine bureaucratic pushback (e.g., leaks exposing policy chaos or legal challenges) was recast as evidence of the same shadowy forces long suspected in JFK or intelligence critiques. This facilitated spread by making conspiracy thinking feel continuous with earlier skepticism rather than fringe. Even some original users of the term (like Scott) noted it was "hijacked" for partisan ends.
Counter-Perspectives and Nuances

Not all analysts see this solely as facilitation of "conspiracy theories." Some conservative voices and administrative-law critics argue the term accurately highlighted real issues: bureaucratic overreach, leaks as political warfare, or an unaccountable "fourth branch" insulated from elections—concerns predating Trump (e.g., in Reagan-era or earlier scholarship on the administrative state). From this view, the inherited overtones simply made visible what was already happening, and polls reflect genuine distrust rather than manufactured paranoia. Trump-era events (Russia probe origins, Durham report findings of FBI errors) were cited as partial validation.

Critics counter that equating the administrative state with a "deep state" conspiracy (implying secret, coordinated sabotage akin to a shadow government) overstated intent, conflated policy disagreement with treason, and eroded institutional legitimacy—effects that extended to QAnon, election-related theories, and even intra-MAGA critiques of Trump for not fully "draining" it. The net result, per multiple academic and journalistic dissections, was polarization of trust: belief became a strong partisan marker, with pro-Trump audiences far more likely to endorse the frame.

In summary, the inherited conspiratorial resonances made "deep state" a potent vector for expanding pro-Trump narratives. It did not create distrust but reframed administrative-state critiques in ways that normalized and accelerated conspiracy-oriented interpretations among supporters—evidenced by polling trends, media adoption, and the term's integration into broader anti-establishment rhetoric. This dynamic persists in ongoing debates about government reform.

ME: Has Russian intelligence and/or its agents of influence done anything to encourage this double meaning?

GROK: Yes. Russian intelligence services (primarily through the Internet Research Agency/IRA troll farm, GRU-linked operations, and state-funded outlets like RT and Sputnik) and their agents of influence have actively amplified the Trump-era repurposing of “deep state” as a synonym for the administrative/bureaucratic state—while deliberately retaining and exploiting its older, more sinister overtones of a shadowy “military-industrial-intelligence complex,” “national security state,” or “shadow government.” This was not the invention of the double meaning (which originated in U.S. domestic conservative rhetoric around 2016–2017), but Russian actors systematically encouraged its spread, mainstreaming, and conspiratorial potency as part of a long-standing strategy to polarize American society, erode trust in U.S. institutions, and favor candidates (especially Donald Trump) perceived as disruptive to the status quo.

Mechanism and Evidence of Encouragement

Russian influence operations do not typically create new American political terminology from scratch. Instead, they pile on existing domestic divisions, hashtags, and narratives—boosting them through bots, trolls, fake accounts, state media, and proxy networks to make them go viral and appear more organic and widespread. “Deep State” was a perfect target: its pre-2016 connotations (from Peter Dale Scott’s national-security critiques and earlier “invisible government” language) already carried conspiratorial weight, while the post-2016 conservative reframing cast it as unelected bureaucrats and “Obama holdovers” sabotaging Trump. Russian operators exploited this ambiguity to frame routine bureaucratic or intelligence pushback (leaks, investigations, regulatory resistance) as evidence of a treasonous cabal.

Key documented actions include:

•   IRA troll farm and social-media amplification (2016 onward): The St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency—indicted by Mueller for election interference—routinely pushed “deep state” content on platforms like Twitter (now X). Hamilton 68 trackers and Twitter’s own 2018 data release showed IRA-linked accounts aggressively promoting the term to discredit the Mueller investigation, the FBI/DOJ, and any institutional resistance to Trump. Themes included “deep state” as a bureaucratic shadow force undermining the elected president, often paired with pro-Trump messaging. This continued into later cycles; retrospective analyses of Russian propaganda in 2020 and 2024 elections identified “deep state” conspiracies involving Trump as a core narrative for sowing division.

•   RT and Sputnik state media ecosystem: These Kremlin-funded outlets (described by U.S. officials as functioning like a “de facto arm of Russia’s intelligence apparatus”) repeatedly echoed and elevated the term. They portrayed Trump as a victim of a “deep state” plot by bureaucrats, intelligence officials, and the “administrative state”—directly blending the bureaucratic synonym with older shadow-government tropes. For instance, RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan explicitly linked 2024 assassination attempts on Trump to “the deep state,” invoking JFK-style conspiracy imagery. Similar framing appeared in fake videos and AI-enhanced content traced to IRA offshoots or successor operations.

•   Broader influence networks and proxies: Russian-linked accounts and websites (including proxies like NewsFront or Strategic Culture Foundation) integrated “deep state” into anti-U.S. narratives, attacking mainstream media, elections, and institutions. Machine-learning analyses of Russian election disinformation (2024) confirmed “deep state” references as a recurring theme aimed at undermining democratic legitimacy and polarizing audiences. This included claims of a bureaucratic “deep state” rigging systems against Trump while retaining the term’s conspiratorial cachet.

Strategic Intent and Effects

U.S. intelligence assessments (Senate Intelligence Committee, Mueller report, and subsequent analyses) consistently describe Russia’s goals as undermining faith in U.S. democracy, exacerbating societal divisions, and supporting preferred outcomes—without needing direct coordination with U.S. actors. The double meaning served this perfectly: it delegitimized both the intelligence community (old meaning) and the permanent bureaucracy (new meaning), making institutional checks on power appear sinister and anti-democratic. Polling spikes in “deep state” belief among Republicans tracked with these amplification efforts, and the term became a partisan marker that Russian operators could exploit on both sides of the aisle (left-leaning critiques of the national-security state were also occasionally echoed, but the dominant vector post-2016 was the pro-Trump frame).

Russian operations did not originate the administrative-state synonym—that was a domestic development via Breitbart, Bannon, and Trumpworld rhetoric. But by flooding social media, search results, and media ecosystems with the blended narrative, they encouraged its rapid spread, normalization, and fusion with QAnon-style conspiracies. Later efforts (AI bot farms, fake videos) continued this into 2024, painting Trump as perpetually besieged by the “deep state.”

In short, while the semantic shift was homegrown, Russian intelligence and proxies demonstrably encouraged and supercharged its conspiratorial double meaning through sustained, documented influence operations. This aligns with their broader playbook of amplifying U.S. internal fractures for strategic gain—making the term more potent and divisive than it would have been otherwise.

ME: I thought the "Deep State" in Turkey was in the 1920s.

GROK: You're right to connect the Turkish "deep state" (derin devlet) to the early republican era and even earlier roots—the structures and practices people later labeled as the "deep state" have deep historical precedents going back to the late Ottoman period and the founding of modern Turkey in the 1920s. However, the specific expression "derin devlet" (and its English translation "deep state") did not enter widespread Turkish political discourse until the 1990s.Historical Roots vs. the Term ItselfPre-1990s foundations: Clandestine networks, secret societies, and extra-legal security structures existed long before the term was coined. These trace back to:The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in the late Ottoman era (1889 onward), which used covert operations, special organizations like the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization), and paramilitary groups during the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and World War I.

The Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923) and the founding of the Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923. Atatürk and his allies repurposed or built on similar informal networks (e.g., intelligence and resistance groups) to consolidate the secular, nationalist Kemalist state. The military and bureaucracy positioned themselves as guardians of this new order against perceived threats (Islamists, leftists, Kurds, etc.).
Cold War-era "stay-behind" or Gladio-style networks (trained with Western/NATO help) and operations during periods of political violence in the 1970s.

These elements created a tradition of parallel or "shadow" power within the military, intelligence (MIT), police, and ultranationalist circles that operated with limited accountability to elected civilians—often to "protect" the secular republic. Rumors and accusations of such hidden influences circulated earlier (e.g., during Bülent Ecevit's premiership in the 1970s), but without the specific label.

The term "derin devlet" emerges in the 1990s: The phrase itself became popularized in everyday Turkish politics after the Susurluk scandal (November 1996). A car crash revealed close ties between a senior police official, a wanted ultranationalist hitman linked to the Grey Wolves, a parliamentarian, and criminal elements—exposing alleged collaboration in "dirty war" tactics against Kurdish PKK insurgents (including extrajudicial killings and drug trafficking). This event made derin devlet a household term for a shadowy nexus of security forces, organized crime, and politicians operating beyond formal government control.

Subsequent events, like the Ergenekon investigations (starting around 2007–2008), further embedded the term as prosecutors targeted alleged ultranationalist networks plotting against the AKP government.Why the Distinction MattersThe concept (entrenched, unelected networks safeguarding Kemalist secularism and national interests through covert means) has 1920s–Ottoman-era origins and evolved through coups (1960, 1971, 1980) and counter-insurgency. But the catchy label "deep state" is a 1990s coinage that crystallized public suspicion after high-profile scandals. It was later borrowed into English-language discourse (via academics like Peter Dale Scott in the 2000s) and applied to other contexts, including the U.S.In short: Your intuition about the 1920s is spot-on for the phenomenon and its ideological roots in Atatürk's republic-building project. The expression, however, is much more recent—1990s Turkey, exploding into prominence via Susurluk. This gap between long-standing practices and the modern terminology is common in political slang.

The car was always there but the ladies in front are blocking most of it.
The first image below is from the above photo gallery and you can see some of the car next to the lady with the folded arms and you can see the roof a little bit to her right.
I believe the car to our left is directly in front of this car and as can be seen the perspective angle relatively shortens the length and when approximately sized, fits well within the block of obscuring ladies.



Royell's Car on the extreme left and a car directly behind, shows that the car in the above image was behind Royell's car.



In this Couch frame, the end of the car is a good match compared to the folded arm lady and the roof section as compared to the ladies in Wiegman is a similar height.



JohnM

   I have conclusively destroyed the Bart Kamp baloney regarding 1 of the 2 men above being Billy Lovelady. And with both Lovelady and Shelley having given WC testimony that they BOTH went down the Elm St Extension together, this rules out both of these guys being Lovelady and Shelley.
   There is only 1 place these "2 Guys" could have come from and arrived at this position only 20 seconds after the kill shot. They have just gotten out of the car. And they are now distancing themselves from the car and moving down the Elm St Ext. Toward the "wide open" Huge Gates. Why else would these 2 men get out of that car and then move down the Elm St Ext? These "2 Guys" are now moving in the direction that this car just came from. Why are they now "doubling back" on foot? They are doing this because they need to intercept shooter(s) that will be exiting the TSBD via the "wide open" Huge Gates 

After leaving the RR yard Murray stood on the grassy knoll and photographed the crowd gathered on N Elm, including the area near the parked motorcycle of Clyde Haygood. His helmet is visible in the photo near his bike. Murray also caught the north peristyle wall with an advancing shadow moving southward about 3-4” per minute. Modeling this wall shadow allows an estimation of the time as 12:36.


My original posting on this technique can be found in this forum here.
https://www.jfkassassinationforum.com/index.php/topic,2013.msg54679.html#google_vignette

    The above further proves that the motorcycle cop on the Darnell Film still frame is NOT Officer Haygood. We see Officer Haygood above at 12:36 near his motorcycle at the Elm St curb. How can Officer Haygood be on that Darnell Still Frame with Officer Harkness? Harkness made a documented 12:36 radio transmission that he was bringing an eyewitness/Amos Euins to the TSBD. After doing this, Harkness then secured the rear of the TSBD. This is where we see Harkness above. Officer Harkness is securing the rear of the TSBD as the alleged Motorcycle Officer Haygood walks passed him. The above further proves Haygood can NOT be on the Darnell still frame. This is a Slam Dunk. That DPD Motorcycle Officer on the Darnell Film is an impostor.