Yeah, John W., sometimes in my reverie I would imagine another gunman or three in different locations (take your pick),ready to do the dirty deed as well when suddenly…….. it was Ozzie’s lucky day, and he never played a video game in his life, but his scope worked, it would seem.

That is something CTs conveniently ignore. They tell us what a crappy rifle the Carcano was. They tell us how badly the scope was misaligned. They ignore the fact that Oswald's Carcano was positively match to the three spent shells found at the sniper's nest, CE399,
and the fragmented bullet found in the limo the night of the assassination to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world. That means that SOMEBODY used that rife to kill JFK. We have ample forensic evidence that tells us that somebody was the guy who owned the rifle. The Carcano wasn't the greatest battlefield rifle ever produced but it was good enough to get the job done.

[...]

Dear Tom "A Beautiful Mind" Scully,

It's a pity you were too lazy to format it properly.
Here it is for you.

A few of my comments are in brackets; more will be forthcoming.

-- Tom


"The change that occurred in the mid-1970s began when Edward J. Epstein published a series of articles that later, in 1978, were the basis for his book Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald. The articles, and especially the book, publicized for the first time clashes that had occurred within the Agency between the Counterintelligence Staff and the Soviet Division over the bona fides of a KGB defector named Yuriy Nosenko. Because Epstein's writings contained so much information about sensitive CIA and FBI operations, it was generally assumed he had a willing and knowledgeable source, either a serving officer (considered doubtful) or a retired senior person with wide knowledge of anti-Soviet operations overseas and in the United States. Neither the articles nor the book was annotated, however. Epstein stated that he had spoken occasionally with James Angieton, the retired chief of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, but did not acknowledge that he was the source.1

Subsequently—in Deception, published in 1988, a year after Angleton's death—Epstein was more forthcoming regarding his sources He admitted that, from 1977 onward, he had obtained large amounts of highly classified information from Angleton, N. S. [Newton Scott] Miler, Tennent H. Bagley, and others in the CIA, all of whom shared Angleton's controversial views on the nature of the threat posed by Soviet intelligence operations.

                                                                             
Publication in 1978 of Edward J. Epstein's Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald provided enormous stimulus to the deception thesis by suggesting that Yuriy Nosenko, a Soviet defector, had been sent by the KGB to provide a cover story for Lee Harvey Oswald, whom the book alleged was a KGB agent. Epstein in effect wrote two books: one focused on Lee Harvey Oswald's Marine career in Japan, his time in Russia, and his return to the United States; the second gave Nosenko the key role in an alleged KGB deception operation designed to cover Oswald (and the Soviet Government) and negate Golitsyn's revelations. Because Epstein cited so much classified information that could only have come from someone with intimate knowledge of the Nosenko case, blame for the leak naturally focused on Angleton and his supporters.                                               

                                               
Thus, it came as no surprise when, ten years after the former CI chief's death, Epstein admitted his sources had included Angleton, Bagley, Miler, and other ex-Agency associates who shared his views. Despite some negative reviews, the book sold well and was important in spreading Angleton's theory of a super KGB manipulating American society and politics through its sophisticated deception apparatus. The theme of Legend was extended in a 1980 novel called The Spike by Amaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss. De Borchgrave, soon-to-be editor of the new Washington Times, and Moss were friends and admirers of Angleton, whose conspiracy theories were consistent with their own. Moss had been spreading Angleton propaganda [sic] for some time, such as the claim that Golitsyn had provided the lead to Philby. This caught the eye of Admiral Stansfield Turner, who was then DCI. When he asked the CI Staff about it, the staff replied from solid knowledge that the claim was false. The inferior quality and crudeness of The Spike exceed even that of the Latham novel. ...

                                                         
The year 1980 was not entirely one of wine and roses for the Angletonians because Wilderness of Mirrors, written by David Martin, also appeared. Now considered a classic of intelligence literature, the book was the product of more than two years of interviewing CIA retirees, including Angleton. The latter at first favored the author with many secrets but then cut him off when he learned Martin was also in touch with Angleton's CIA critics. One of these was Clare E. Petty, who had worked on Angleton's staff and accepted his conspiracy theories but by this time had concluded his boss was either a giant fraud or a KGB agent. Martin originally intended to publish Petty's view in Newsweek but abandoned that plan when Angleton threatened legal action. Wilderness of Mirrors exposed Golitsyn as an unimportant defector who caused more trouble than he was worth, suggested Nosenko was genuine, and punched many holes [sic] in the Angleton myth. Publication provoked a lengthy and denunciatory review by Epstein in The New York Times and a long public statement by Angleton claiming Martin had robbed him of his phrase "wilderness of mirrors." In fact, Angleton had himself lifted it from "Gerontion," a poem by T. S. Eliot. Events, however, were weakening Epstein's faith in his master. In 1981, Prime Minister Thatcher was forced by the publication of Chapman Pincher's Their Trade Is Treachery to admit that her government had investigated Sir Roger Hollis, the former Director General of MI-5, as an alleged Soviet agent. Mrs. Thatcher stated in Parliament that a high-level investigation of these charges found them to be false. Some months later Epstein managed to interview Michel Goleniewski, a defector who had become convinced he was the last of the Romanovs but otherwise remained a sensible person. Epstein asked if Goleniewski thought Hollis was a KGB mole, an idea supported by Angleton. The defector replied in the negative and then listed the Soviet agents MI-5 had apprehended from the information he had provided, adding, "If the KGB had had a mole at the head of MI-5, you can be sure all these men would somehow have escaped."

The next significant book involving Angleton was Henry Hurt's Shadrin, published in 1981. While working on Legend as an assistant to Epstein, Hurt had become aware of the mysterious disappearance of Shadrin, a Soviet defector. Sensing there was a story there, Hurt began interviewing the missing defector's wife and her lawyer. The Reader's Digest agreed to provide financial support for the project, which began as a magazine article but quickly grew into a book. Fulton Oursler, then the chief editor of The Reader's Digest, was a man of strong rightwing views and much influenced by the Angleton-Epstein theories. The inability of the US authorities to provide an answer to the mystery of Shadrin's disappearance had provoked wide criticism. Hurt's account not only revived the old Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy but also made it more current by citing the appearance of a mysterious KGB man referred to as "Igor." [KGB Major Igor Kochnov, aka Igor Kozlov]

'At the time, this writer had interviewed Angleton on several occasions in conjunction with a history being written of the years when he was in charge of counterintelligence at CIA. (The interviews had ended because it had become evident that his judgment and veracity could no longer be trusted.) When Angleton queried the writer about whether he was responsible for the leaks to Trento, he was assured they had come from others. Angleton then proceeded to accuse Admiral [Stansfield] Turner of being the source — a totally unfounded accusation.
                                   

Angleton doubtlessly contributed information to Hurt, but so did a number of FBI people who talked more than they should have. In sum, much classified information was made public that could only have endangered the safety of [Kremlin-loyal triple agent] Igor, assuming he was genuine. This was a matter on which Agency people again divided: Angleton believed Igor was not genuine; others thought his valuable information proved his bona fides. The Hurt book, however, was essentially propaganda [sic] intended to benefit Mrs. Shadrin. Its attack on the Agency, the FBI, and the new CI Staff did not help her cause, and the book's many inaccuracies [sic] distorted an already confused situation.

The Decline of Conspiracism

In the years after Legend was published, Epstein became a specialist on Soviet disinformation and deception that, along with "active measures" to which they are related, preoccupied a number of scholars and writers during the 1980s. They were encouraged by the testimony of several Soviet defectors as well as the indefatigable Golitsyn, who in 1984 added his own volume, New Lies for Old. Epstein's Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA was published in 1988, a year after Angleton's death. Like Legend, its predecessor, it has two parts. The second part describes various deceptions practiced through the centuries and can be ignored; it says nothing new. The first 105 pages, however, are interesting. Therein Epstein repeats the old theories about Nosenko and, in his acknowledgments, names all his sources for the past years, including Angleton, Bagley, Miler, and Sullivan. He also asserts that his informants wittingly gave him sensitive information.

i would be happy to engage you with an old bière anytime, Mother.  Or an Old Crow, if you wish.

Not engaged, you silly boy.

Scraped, incised, de-barnacled.

Now here’s a thread for mssr. Graves to grovel over.

How would you like to get engraved down by the old Bièvre?

The idea that Bruce Solie and James McCord were both KGB assets [sic; moles] is riveting. The idea holds water, given Solie's actions.

From pages 395-96 in John M. Newman’s 1995/2008 Oswald and the CIA:

Where were the cables between headquarters and the Mexico City station filed before the assassination? During the 1975 Church Committee investigation, investigators Dan Dwyer and Ed Greissing visited the CIA on November 3 and examined Oswald's 201 file. Their report contained this passage on the comments of Mr. Wall, a member of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff: [My comment: This was eleven months after probable mole Leonard V. McCoy had become Deputy Chief of CIA Counterintelligence.]

“Mr. Wall explained that some of the documents now filed in the Oswald 201 were not filed there at the time of the President's assassination. Some were located in file 200, (miscellaneous international file); others in file 100 (miscellaneous domestic file); others in the WH Division files (those generated by the Mexico City station; and, others in the files reserved for documents with sensitivity indicators.” [7] [emphasis added by Newman]

According to the documents lists, the cables to and from the CIA station in Mexico City, as well as the CIA reports to the FBI and other governmental departments, were also placed in Oswald's 201 file. [8]

From the above, it is apparent that Oswald's documents were going to several different locations. Was there anyone who had access to all of them? Again, the 100-300-11 location seems to be the latchkey. Besides those directly involved in Cuban operations, such as the SAS and the Mexico City desk, other CIA elements had been involved with FPCC operations. As previously discussed, Birch O'Neill had written reports about the FPCC for CI/SIG, and in the Security Office, James McCord had been connected to counterintelligence operations against the FPCC since at least early 1961 [9]. Were either of these offices associated with the special handling of the New Orleans FBI reporting on Oswald?

The answer is yes. One of the two documents lists contains an interesting note in the “Formerly Filed” column. For the September 10th Hosty report, it states, “Copy CI/SIG [351164] 100-300-11.” [10] The other documents list has a column with the heading “Location of Original” that has this entry: “CI/SI File 100-300-11.” [11] CI/SI was short for CI/SIG, and it appears that the mole hunting unit was again connected with a key change in Oswald's CIA file designators. [12] Moreover, the association of Oswald's security number (351164) with the 100-300-11 file denotes a security office tie-in. They had been tracking Oswald all along and now had access to this file too. Thus, it appears that it was Angleton's CI/SIG which, in conjunction with the Security Office, had all the pieces to the Oswald puzzle. (emphasis added)


[7] Church Committee memorandum from Dan Dwyer and Ed Greissing to Paul Wallach on review of Oswald 201 file, November 3, 1975; NARA, JFK files, SSCI box 265-15, 10091.

[8] Page 26 of “List of Documents for Release,” [to HSCA]: NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.08.04.08:21:00:780053.

[9] McCord may have been reassigned by 1963.

[10] Page 26. “List of Documents for Release,” [to HSCA]; NARA, JFK files, RIF 1993.08.04.08:21:00:780053.

[11] Document number 40. CIA response to HSCA request of March 9, 1978; NARA, JFK: files, RIF 1993.0.02.13:25:25:180530.

[12] CI/SIG already had Oswald's 201 restricted to Egerter. See Chapters Four and Eight.