DiEugenio did pretty good work in showing JFK intended to withdraw from Viet Nam...He met Ambassador Gullion in Viet Nam in the 1950's and knew it was unwinnable...Douglass showed that JFK intended a neutralization policy in Laos...I mean Johnson would not have needed to reverse NSAM 263...
I'm a bit embarrassed that you would make these erroneous statements in this thread, because some people might infer that I agree with you on this issue since you are defending me against Corbett's brain-dead, juvenile attacks.
I have shredded DiEugenio's case that JFK intended to unconditionally withdraw from Vietnam after the election. Even the vast majority of liberal scholars reject this dubious theory.
As for NSAM 263, this is a prime example of DiEugenio's severely flawed arguments for the unconditional-withdrawal-after-the-election myth. I respect James DiEugenio and believe he has produced some excellent research on the JFK case, but his research on JFK's Vietnam policy is inaccurate and vacuous.
Any objective person who reads NSAM 263 and the report upon which it is based can see (1) that they refute any notion that JFK was considering an unconditional withdrawal after the election, and (2) that the withdrawal they discuss was clearly conditioned on military success. This is surely one of the reasons that the overwhelming majority of scholars who have written about NSAM 263 have made the same point, from Stanley Karnow to Noam Chomsky to Marc Selverstone to Ed Moise.
NSAM 263 says that Kennedy approved the recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3) of the McNamara-Taylor report on their trip to South Vietnam, including the withdrawal of 1,000 "U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963." Let's read what the NSAM says on this:
At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.
The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.Obviously, nothing was said about an unconditional withdrawal of all military personnel in the NSAM.
Now, let's read some telling statements in Section I B (1-3) of the McNamara-Taylor report that prove the withdrawal plan was conditional and that military victory remained the primary goal. General Harkins was to meet with Diem to discuss the military changes needed to "complete the military campaign" in the I, II, and III Corps areas "by the end of 1964" and in the IV Corps area by "the end of 1965":
General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965 (McNamara-Taylor, paragraph 1).Obviously, "complete the military campaign" meant to achieve the goal of the campaign, i.e., victory. The I, II, III, and IV Corps areas constituted all of South Vietnam.
To accomplish mission completion, certain changes were recommended, including the following:
An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas. . . .
Emphasis on “clear and hold operations” instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.
The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength.
The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.
A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced. (McNamara-Taylor report, paragraphs 1:b-f)Clearly, victory was the goal. There is not a hint of a slackening of the war effort, much less an unconditional withdrawal.
A telling statement comes in the next paragraph, paragraph 2, where we read that a crucial goal is to have Vietnamese personnel, i.e., South Vietnamese personnel, trained in essential functions now performed by American military personnel so that the Vietnamese can take over those functions by the end of 1965, and that it "should be possible" to withdraw "the bulk" of American personnel by that time. There is no hint of "all American personnel will be withdrawn regardless of the situation" or "we will withdraw all U.S. military personnel even if the South Vietnamese are not ready to handle current operations on their own." Let's read:
A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time. (McNamara-Taylor report, paragraph 1)Needless to say,
"should be possible" is clearly conditional and is worlds away from an unconditional withdrawal,
and "bulk of" is not "all of." If the "bulk" of U.S. military personnel were to be (conditionally) withdrawn by the end of 1965, that means that quite a few would remain. More on this in a moment.
Now we come to the paragraph about the 1,000-man withdrawal. We read that the proposed withdrawal is "in accordance with" the program to train the South Vietnamese to take over operations now done by American military personnel, and that the small partial withdrawal (1,000 out of over 16,000) should be explained as an "initial step" in a "long-term" program to replace American soldiers with South Vietnamese soldiers
"without impairment of the war effort":
In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort. (McNamara-Taylor report, paragraph 3)So the primary goal was to complete the military campaign in South Vietnam by the end of 1965 and to do so partly by replacing American soldiers with South Vietnamese soldiers
"without impairment of the war effort."Following the section on the 1,000-man withdrawal, we read in paragraph B.6.A that "the security of South Vietnam remains vital" and that "we adhere to the overriding objective of denying this country to communism and of suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency":
The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States security. For this reason, we adhere to the overriding objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible. (McNamara-Taylor Report, paragraph B.6.A)So the idea that JFK didn't care if South Vietnam fell under Communist rule is baseless.
In a 2013 article in
The Nation, even James K. Galbraith, the chief advocate of the theory that JFK was going to pull out of Vietnam after the election, acknowledged that under JFK’s withdrawal plan,
we were going to leave 1,500 troops in South Vietnam for supply purposes and would continue to aid South Vietnam:
Training would end. Support for South Vietnam would continue. . . . After the end of 1965, even under the withdrawal plan, 1,500 US troops were slated to remain, for supply purposes. (“JFK’s Vietnam Withdrawal Plan Is a Fact, Not Speculation,” The Nation, online edition, November 22, 2013, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/jfks-vietnam-withdrawal-plan-fact-not-speculation/).Galbraith ignores the evidence that the withdrawal plan was also expressly conditional on the progress of the war effort, but at least he admits that the withdrawal was not going to be total and that aid to South Vietnam would continue after 1965.
I don’t understand how anyone can read NSAM 263 and its underlying report, the McNamara-Taylor report, and conclude that either of those documents supports the claim that JFK was going to unconditionally withdraw all U.S. forces from South Vietnam after the election.
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