JFK Assassination Forum

The following is from Oswald's 201 File, Vol 1, Folder 1

Indications of witting intelligence involvement by Oswald

Use of intelligence terms

1. The single word "microdot” appears in the address book, with no further comment.

2. After the Oswalds returned from the USSR, when a special agent of the FBI tried to obtain a physical description and background data from Oswald, Oswald commented: “I know your tactics; there is a similar agency in Russia. You are using the soft touch and, of course, the procedure in Russia would be quite different.”

Realizations possibly brought about by recruitment

3. Oswald stated in a diary entry of 3 January 1961: “I am miserable about Ella. I love her but what can I do? It is the state of fear which was always in the Soviet Union.”

4. A diary entry under 1-16 March 1961 says that Oswald was living in expectation of returning to the US. “I confided with Zeger. He supports my judgment but warns me not to tell any Russians about my desire to return. I understand now why.”

Actions he might (or could) have taken if recruited but not otherwise

5. He went to Moscow in July 1961, expressly noting in his diary that he did so without police permission, although he had written the American embassy in February 1961 that he could not leave Minsk without permission and he did not think it appropriate to request permission. If there is some kind of document check before boarding train or plane in the USSR, and if it was waived in his case as it would have do you have Ben, he must have known that the authorities at least concurred in his travel, if they were not actually sponsoring it. When Marina joined him in Moscow it was suddenly, on little or no notice, so presumably she too circumvented the permission requirement or obtained it immediately without delay.

6. If the diary was really written in the USSR, he surely could or would not have left it lying around (with his various statements incriminating himself, Zeger, and others) unless he knew it was approved by the authorities.

Actions that might not have been his own idea

7. He insisted upon seeing the final version of the interview with him by Priscilla Johnson (he mistakenly said Aline Mosby), although it was not shown to him.

8. At least twice he took care to establish, in advance, a plausible reason for future action: 1) in November 1963 he told the man who gave him a ride between Dallas and Irving every weekend that he would be going to Irving on Thursday the 21st of November to get some curtain rods from Mrs. Paine, thus explaining both his break in pattern and his odd package the next morning. 2) in one of his letters to the Soviet Embassy in Washington during 1963, he said that they “might have to return to the Soviet Union in about five years so that his wife could visit her relatives.”

9. Was it Oswald’s own idea to exchange confidence with Zeger from almost the time they met up through correspondence after the Oswalds were in the US? If not, he or Zeger or both may have had a state security connection.

10. Oswald was restless; he was not a very original thinker and was obviously not a person who was used to expressing himself clearly in writing. Yet he sat down at some time or times and from notes or memory laboriously wrote out the historic diary. Was this his own idea? Or was he doing it at KGB direction in order to establish a legend for his stay in the USSR and the circumstances of his exit?

11. Whether he wrote the diary on his own initiative or not, the pattern of prominent omissions and additions (with regard to the other available accounts of the same period) may indicate deliberate planting in response to KGB wishes. Was it his own idea to cover his trip abroad by saying he intended to study at schools in Switzerland and Finland -- two good jumping off places for the Bloc?

Use of aliases

12. On numerous occasions Oswald used aliases: O. H. Lee when he rented the two furnished rooms in Dallas, Harvey Oswald Lee when he registered with the Mexican immigration authorities on his September 1963 trip, apparently ditto when he registered at the hotel in Mexico City (he told the Soviet Embassy / KGB officer Kostikov that he could not remain in Mexico indefinitely because he couldn't request a new visa without using his real name, (A. J. Hidell when he ordered a revolver from George Rose and Company in Los Angeles, A. Hidell when he ordered a rifle from Klein’s Sporting Goods in Chicago, A. J. Hidell when he created the fiction that such a person existed and was head of the (nonexistent except for Oswald himself) New Orleans chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, A. J. Hidell when he listed that name along with Marina’s and his own true name as entitled to receive mail at his New Orleans PO Box, and Alek James Hidell on a counterfeit draft card found on his person when he was arrested on 22 November 1963.

Use of PO boxes when he had a home address

13. Oswald did this in both Dallas and New Orleans.

Carrying a counterfeit document

14. Oswald did this only once that we know of in the United States: when arrested he was carrying a counterfeit draft card in the name of Alek James Hidell. TSD analysis of this document would undoubtedly help decide whether this card was a transparent phony made by Oswald himself or by some small-time operator or whether it was professionally produced.

Contacts

15. The Soviet Embassy dossier on Oswald contains a letter from him dated 9 November 1963, wherein he said That he had talked to "comrade Kostin" (actually Kostikov, a known KGB officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City). The call could have been referred to Kostikov because of his oddball nature or for some other innocent reason, but it could also have been referred to him on purpose -- i.e., because there was some kind of intelligence relationship between him and Oswald.

16. Oswald admitted having been quote interviewed by MVD officers upon arrival and departure from the USSR, not a standard procedure for arriving tourists or departing foreign residents. Any of the officials by whom Oswald was interviewed at the so-called passport and visa department could have been KGB, and all the Inturist personnel he knew were certainly co-opted or more.

Fabrications

18. The elaborate A. J. Hidell falsification, complete with phony draft card, may be more than just the devious clandestiny of Oswald himself.

19. The set of questions with double answers may be connected with preparation of a cover story.

20. Various events recorded in the diary seemed to be possible fabrications, such as Oswald suicide attempt, Marina's hospitalization for nervous exhaustion, etc.

Number of occasions and periods when clandestine contact would have been possible and/or probable

21. Oswald’s arrival and departure interviews with the NKVD.

22. Two-month residence in Moscow hotel room, with Inturist representative as only contact with the outside world and with “the ministry.”  (“Ministry” could refer to MVD and simply refer to processing of his request to stay in the USSR, but since he referred to that as the passport and visa department or passport and registration department, this may be significant.)

23. Oswald’s interviews at the passport and visa department and the passport and registration department.

24. Oswald had a hunting license in the USSR, but we do not know of a single instance of his actually going hunting, in the USSR or in the US. Marina said, per the New York Times, that her impression was that he might only have gone as the guest of a hunt club, so apparently he did at least once go off saying he was going hunting. This would have been a good method for the KGB to meet and train him.

25. His visit to Mexico and the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

26. The three strange reports of his appearing at a nightclub near Milwaukee on 16 September 1963, at the draft board in Austin, Texas, about 25 September 1963, and the Red Cross office in Wytheville, Virginia, about 8 November 1963 (where he asked for the fare to Amstead, West Virginia) could indicate case officer meetings.

Indicated knowledge of KGB

27. See items one, 2, 3, and 4 above.

28. When attempting to renounce his US citizenship at the American Embassy in Moscow on 31 October 1959, Oswald said that he had told Soviet officials that “as a Soviet citizen he would make known to them information he possessed about the Marine Corps and his specialty, indicating he might know something of special interest to them.”

Outright statement

29. According to the FBI investigation report, “Oswald indicated in FBI interview after arrest that he considered the monthly payments which came to him through ‘Red Cross’ as payments from the MVD in return for his denunciation of the US; that he accepted the money because he was hungry; as soon as he had become completely disgusted with the Soviet Union and began negotiations with the American Embassy in Moscow for return to the US, this ‘Red Cross’ allotment was disconnected. He wrote, ‘I have never mentioned the fact of these monthly payments to anyone. I do so in order to state that I shall never sell myself intentionally, or unintentionally, to anyone again.’”

Equivocal points of his story and other items

30. His transfer from the insanity ward to a regular ward was amazingly fast. This, plus the statement that the nurses were suspicious of him because “they know,” might possibly indicate that he was getting special treatment that indicated special connection to KGB.

31. His only comment upon being shown the picture of himself holding a rifle and wearing a holstered pistol was that the police could have superimposed his face onto someone else's photograph.

32. In the text of his proposed book, he turned against the USSR. This could certainly have been one of his own erratic shifts, but he might also have done it on orders from the KGB to disassociate themselves from the pro-Soviet course.

33. Oswald apparently made no bones about his anti-American feelings during his first weeks in Moscow. Therefore, his mysterious and secretive behavior toward the alleged American in the Moscow hospital may have had other causes.

34. His refusal of Soviet citizenship when it was reportedly offered to him at the date for renewal of his residence document could be taken either way. If he was really disaffected, it was the natural thing to do. If he was not disaffected, he would presumably have asked for Soviet citizenship unless he had been recruited and told not to do so for the obvious purpose of facilitating his return to the US.  (* see attached note)

35. Oswald’s foot-dragging about not thinking it appropriate for him to request travel permission from the authorities in Minsk so that he might appear at these American Embassy about his return request, at a time when he had already been in correspondence with the Embassy to the presumed knowledge of the Soviet authorities, suggests deliberate delay for some reason. Also, he would presumably have no reason to know that getting permission was a long-drawn-out matter, nor would he have had first-hand experience as he implies in the statement that “I find that there is a hesitation on the part of local officials to even start the process.”

#36 Since Erick must have gotten wind of Oswald’s departure plans and preparation by March 1962, Oswald’s diary entry of March 1962 (that he still hadn't told Erick) might refer to something else than their departure.

Additions:

Actions taken if recruited but probably not otherwise common

New York Times 10 December 1963 reported that Oswald went to Dallas rifle range 17 November 63; was assigned to target #8 but fired at 7, 8, and 9.

Ditto: All indications are that Oswald’s Russian was ungrammatical but fluent. Then why the “broken Russian” in phone call to Soviet Embassy Mexico City? Explanation could be that he was excited and did speak brokenly or that the tape evaluator used “broken” to mean ungrammatical rather than its usual sense of quote “halting,” “disjointed,” etc. But explanation could also be that speaking barely understandable Russian was a means of getting put through to a certain Soviet on the phone.

Ditto: Almost unheard-of ease with which Marina married him and left country with him.

Ditto: Did he deliberately scotch send off when train transited Kharkiv?

Even his basic salary, not counting the “Red Cross” addition, was higher than skilled workers, MD's, etc.

* It may be asked why Oswald would have been eager to leave the USSR. He had an excellent income, was accepted in a fairly wide circle of friends, got attention by being different and a foreigner, and was living big, as he himself noted in his diary – all things which he had never enjoyed in the US and had no real prospect of ever enjoying there. Against this we have only the complaints that he couldn’t stand the Russian winters (though he stood three of them with no apparent ill effects), disliked the compulsory factory meetings and lectures (though he was exempted from compulsory labor on Sundays), and was bored without bowling alleys, etc. (although he spoke of movies, opera, etc., and had a hunting license).


Indications of witting intelligence involvement by Marina


1. [MVD] Uncle’s persuading her to change her mind and go to dance (at which she met Lee). We have only her word for this [two words unintelligible]

2. She did not realize Lee was American until told by a third party.

3. Request to Soviet Embassy Washington to be allowed to return to USSR. This could as well be evidence that she was witting, though, because as a Soviet citizen she would surely know that she could expect even less for the rest of her life than she had had before leaving USSR.

4. Move to Minsk was late August 59 –- i.e., almost two months before Oswald’s arrival in USSR. This could show that she was not set up for him. But what if the Soviets had expected Oswald, i.e., had learned of his intentions or had even instructed or invited him? Then, witting or unwitting on her part, the move could have been part of plan. She could have moved there innocently, invited by Uncle Illya or nudged by Alexander or etc. -- but never then why wouldn’t she tell that to us unless guilty?

5. Refusal to identify certain persons in her story, while identifying and giving information on others. This might show innocence, since a cover story would (if good and well-learned) probably not be erratic. Cover story incomplete or forgotten?

6. Mystery of fatherless patronymic. Could be deliberate to obscure a cover-damaging father.

7. Apparently-unexceptional reason for requesting specialized training, and apparent ease with which request granted.

8. Habitual eating out and avoidance of stepfather’s family circle. Would one-third of a death pension support that plus her other expenses such as clothes?

9. Refusal of first job assignment, with no apparent ill-effects.

10. Two-month vacation. What did she live on, even if pension continued? It would be expected that the pension would cease once she was through school and able to support herself.

11. Discrepancy between Marina’s voluntary move to Minsk and easily-found job there AND her later request to live in Leningrad if allowed to return to the USSR because there are more pharmacies there and it is easier to find work there. It may be suspicious that she found a job as a pharmacist immediately in Minsk.

12. Uncle’s (supposedly innocuous) MVD status and obvious importance as shown by VIP apartment, vacation in Gagra, etc.

13. Questionable aspects of her move to Minsk in 1959: where did she get travel funds? What did she expect to do there, since job prospects were poorer and she did not know in advance that she could stay and live with the Prusakovas? At the time she went there, did she intend to bury herself in Minsk, when she was used to and apparently preferred the big city (Leningrad)?

14. Casual attitude about ignoring Komsomol; no apparent ill effects.

15. Several vacations in Minsk while she was still living in Leningrad. Finances? Time off? Why?

16. Complete uncheckableness of her story.

17. Her easy circumvention of hospital regulations merely because she wore a white uniform, especially since visiting Oswald would have drawn special attention because of his being American.

18. Her line of questioning about his motivation, citizenship, plans, etc., when he was in the hospital in Minsk. Knowing that their conversation might be overheard (even if she was unaware of bugging), she would probably have hesitated to put him through this catechism just out of curiosity or in line with a growing romantic interest in him.

19. Discrepancies in various statements attributed to her (such as father unknown OR died when she was two, childhood “gruesome” or just considered unhappy because of her unmanageableness after going to live with her mother and stepfather, etc). Could all of these discrepancies be due to garbling inherent in many interviews (FBI, press, Secret Service)?

20. [MVD Colonel] Prusakova's approval and encouragement of her relationship with Oswald, when he was not only a turncoat American but also a known misfit whom “everybody hated.”

21. Marina's statement that she had not been interviewed by any officials in connection with her marriage and that the only documentation necessary was registration of intent and then certification ten days later. Even Oswald said in the diary that he had to get permission to marry a foreigner.

22. Failure to mention many apparent relatives whom we have managed (or been allowed?) to ferret out from the letters and documents available.

23. Possible open code in letters to her from USSR: the cemetery go-round, coincidence of two correspondents suddenly getting pet dogs and writing her enthusiastically about them (one consuming summer delicacies – hard to get even in summer – in winter), etc.

24. Her quick trip to Moscow in July 1961. How did she get time off? Travel permit? What did she tell friends and relatives, since Oswald was apparently keeping the whole thing quiet (or thought he was)? If she just took off and burned her bridges, it looks as though she might have had reason to believe that they WOULD get out of the USSR and therefore have no consequences to suffer.

25. Her surprisingly quick decision to marry an ill-tempered misfit foreigner.

26. Possibly-strange fact that the Prusakovas were the only relatives to write to her in the US.

27. Whereabouts while briefly separated from Oswald in fall 1962.

28. Possibility that that she was not at Aunt Polina’s for a month in fall 1961, since we have only heard word that she was -- or even that Aunt Polina exists: Oswald, and Aunt Valya are our only say-so.

29. Is it significant that it was Marina who was called to the Minsk passport office 25 December 61 and was told that the visas were granted, when it was Lee who had been dealing with them?

30. Any conclusion to be drawn from the fact that she told the Soviet Embassy in Washington that she would have no one to go to in the USSR because her family and friends had not wanted her to leave, although their letters to her had indicated excitement, curiosity, encouragement parentheses in general and about returning to USSR (a request from one friend to come to Minsk if they returned and were allowed to, etc.?

31. Moroccan student episode, early 1961. If her story is true, it is impossible that she was the girl in this episode, since her residence in Minsk, daily visits to Lee during his hospital stay, etc., would preclude her being in Moscow and dating the Moroccan four-times-a-week till late May. But we have only her words for her story up till the meeting with Lee and only their stories for the subsequent period, and one one way or another, the Moroccan could have been slightly off on his dates, too, and/or could have confused the exact time of his transfer of interest from Marina to Loussa.

32. On 28 July 1961, [KGB defector Pyotr] Deryabin points out, her work booklet shows that she was transferred (apparently promoted) to assistant druggist. This seems very strange, in light of the facts 1) she had just made her visit to the American Embassy and was being subjected to heckling at her place of work (to the extent, Oswald said, that she was hospitalized five days for nervous exhaustion), and 2) plans to leave the USSR, in addition to casting suspicion on her, would remove her from the job shortly.

33. Irregularities in her trade union booklet: 1) no dues from 1956 to 1959, hence she must have had another booklet; Why? How? Where? 2) why no year given in registration and deregistration entries regarding pharmacy school?

34. Length of validity of her passport. Why was it valid from 11 January 62 to 11 January 64, when she was expected to use it just once, before the end of 1962, to immigrate to the US? Even if she asked for long validity with the idea of returning for a visit (but where would she get the money, being married to a man who even had to borrow passage money home?), would the Soviets normally accede to such a request?

The following is a Substack article by Craig Unger, author of American Kompromat and House of Trump, House of Putin.

In June 2015, when Donald Trump famously descended the golden escalator (it was really brass) at Trump Tower to announce his candidacy, the media focused largely on his inflammatory insults about Mexican immigrants as drug dealers and rapists.

In fact, like an all-too-credulous audience falling for the misdirection of a magician, those who were present were missing the real story. Trump was putting together a presidential campaign that was doing everything the Russians wanted.

Indeed, just four months later, Trump did something that went almost completely unnoticed but which should have set off alarms throughout the entire national security establishment. On October 28, 2015, he signed a letter of intent to develop Trump Tower Moscow. Even though Trump repeatedly asserted that he had “no business” in Russia, the deal continued to be negotiated throughout his campaign.

The deal included a big upfront fee for Trump — $4 million, plus a percentage of sales—with no costs for him at all. But it also had one other condition in it that violated the most fundamental tenets of national security: it required Vladimir Putin’s approval.

And so, as he began his campaign for the presidency, Trump pursued a private campaign for highly remunerative deal with Russian developer Andrey Rozov to build a high-rise tower that would feature 250 luxury condos, a hotel, and an Ivanka Trump Spa.

All of which meant that as Trump’s presidential campaign got underway, Russian intelligence was able to develop a sophisticated, multi-pronged penetration of his campaign through Michael Cohen and Felix Sater, who helped with his business affairs; Paul Manafort, who became his campaign manager; foreign policy adviser George Papadopoulos; and Michael Flynn who became Trump’s first national security adviser.

Even though the deal would be a clear violation of the emoluments clause of the Constitution, if Trump won, his operatives thought it would help his chances. On November 3, 2015, less than a week after the letter of intent was signed, Felix Sater emailed Michael Cohen: “I will get Putin on this program and we will get Donald elected...Buddy our boy can become President of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get all of Putin's team to buy in on this.”

Then, a month later, on December 10, 2015, Michael Flynn, who later became Trump’s first, but short-lived, National Security Adviser attended the tenth anniversary gala for RT, Russia’s state TV in Moscow. When it came time for dinner, Flynn was conveniently seated next to Vladimir Putin.

Meanwhile, Cohen and Sater greased the wheels of the proposed by Moscow Trump Tower development by suggesting they give Vladimir Putin a free $50 million penthouse in the proposed tower. “In Russia, the oligarchs would bend over backwards to live in the same building as Vladimir Putin,” Sater told Cohen.

Then, in January 2016, Cohen emailed Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov seeking assistance with the Trump Tower Moscow deal. The Kremlin confirmed receiving the email—but there was little follow up, so Sater arranged for Cohen to get an invitation to attend the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where he could meet Putin or Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

Then, in March, foreign policy adviser George Papadopoulos joined the Trump campaign, and, while traveling in Italy, met Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who “claimed to have substantial connections with Russian government officials."

Later that month, on March 19, the email account of John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, was successfully phished by the GRU (Russian military intelligence). Two days later, Trump named Papadopoulos as a foreign policy adviser to the campaign. Then, on March 24, Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos to a Russian woman who falsely claimed to be Putin’s niece. They discuss Clinton’s “dirt.”

Four days later, on March 28, Paul Manafort, who had spent a decade as an operative for a pro-Putin party in Ukraine, joined Trump’s entourage as campaign manager, hoping to do in the United States what he had already done for Putin in Ukraine—namely, install a pro-Putin president.

Now that he was playing a major role in Trump’s campaign, Manafort stayed in contact with his former deputy, Konstantin Kilimnik, who was later revealed to be a Russian intelligence officer. Through Kilimnik, Manafort offered to provide private briefings for Oleg Deripaska, the Russian oligarch to whom Manafort allegedly owed almost $20 million. (Manafort’s lawyers have denied that this was the intent behind the emails, and dispute that Manafort owes Deripaska money.)

According to The Guardian, Manafort also visited Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London in March 2015.

Both Manafort and Assange deny having met, and The Guardian’s report remains unconfirmed. Nevertheless, by late Spring 2016, all the pieces were in place. Trump clinched the Republican nomination in May — all while privately pursuing a prestigious and potentially enormously lucrative deal that required Vladimir Putin’s blessing. Meanwhile, Russian intelligence had completed a multi-pronged penetration of the Trump campaign that breached the future president’s business, political, foreign policy and national security operations.

More specifically, Russian operatives had acquired advance knowledge that Podesta’s stolen emails could be deployed as oppo research when necessary. At the same time, the Trump campaign’s messaging (anti-NATO, anti-immigrant, anti-trade deals) had become perfectly aligned with Russia’s strategic objectives.

Finally, on April 27, Trump gave a major foreign policy address at Washington's Mayflower Hotel sponsored by the Center for the National Interest (CNI). That Trump chose the Center was in itself of interest in that Putin, in 2013, referred to its director, Dimitri Simes as his “American friend and colleague.”

For his part, Simes had pledged his full support for Russia’s aggressive stand on Syria. Moreover, according to Yuri Shvets, a former major in the KGB who now lives in the United States, Simes was working for Russian intelligence. (I first reported this for American Kompromat in 2021. At the time Simes and the CNI declined to return multiple phone calls.)

By late spring 2016, all the pieces were in place. Trump’s campaign had assembled a team of high-level advisors with extensive—and compromising—Russian connections. The Moscow deal negotiations continued in secret. Russian intelligence had successfully hacked Democratic emails and offered them to the Trump campaign through Papadopoulos. And the campaign had shown it was willing to listen.

If your name was Vladimir Putin, you very well might ask, “What’s not to like?”

Cast of Characters

Michael Cohen: Trump’s longtime fixer working on Moscow deal while publicly denying Russia connections. Later sentenced to three years in prison for lying to Congress about the deal’s timeline.

Felix Sater: Russian-American developer with mob ties and history as FBI informant. Promised to deliver Putin’s support for both the tower and Trump’s candidacy.

Paul Manafort: Political operative with decade-long history working for Russian-aligned Ukrainian oligarchs. In debt to Oleg Deripaska for nearly $20 million.

George Papadopoulos: Young foreign policy advisor who became key conduit for Russian outreach about Clinton emails.

Michael Flynn: Former Defense Intelligence Agency director who developed compromising Russia connections, including $45,000 RT payment for Moscow gala.

   Ok.  I'm aware of all this, thank you. 

  However, you still haven't answered my question to you, above.

  Here it is , again-albeit corrected because of some typing errors I made:

    My question is:  How does a number from an officer's transmission over the radio become a part of a "transcript" until someone transcribes the recording-like Bowles did for the WC?  This doesn't have anything to do with the radio Haygood is using.  Officers have a call# they use, and they give that number to the dispatcher.  So what number are you referring to?
 

   You are claiming that Officer Haygood used the radio on Officer Harkness's 3 wheel motorcycle. The Haygood WC Testimony proves he used the radio on his own motorcycle parked at the Elm St curb.
    I don't know who Bowles is. I am referring to the # being cited in the WC QA's of Haygood, Harkness, and Inspector Sawyer.

                          - OFFICER HAYGOOD WARREN COMMISSION TESTIMONY -

    OFFICER HAYGOOD - "The railroad yard would be located at the - - it consists of going over Elm St and back north of Elm St"

    ATTORNEY BELIN    - "What did you do when you got there?"

    OFFICER HAYGOOD - "Well, there was nothing. There was quite a few people in the area, spectators, and at that time I went back to my motorcycle it was on the street - - To The RADIO.

             Officer Haygood's WC Testimony proves he made his 12:35 police radio transmission over the radio on his own DPD motorcycle. After 62+ years, the mountain of Evidence I continue to compile proves the "No Glove Cop" on the Darnell Film is NOT Officer Haygood. Who is this man? Is he really a DPD Motorcycle Officer? Or, is he an impostor?   

 

   Ok.  I'm aware of all this, thank you. 

  However, you still haven't answered my question to you, above.

  Here it is , again-albeit corrected because of some typing errors I made:

    My question is:  How does a number from an officer's transmission over the radio become a part of a "transcript" until someone transcribes the recording-like Bowles did for the WC?  This doesn't have anything to do with the radio Haygood is using.  Officers have a call# they use, and they give that number to the dispatcher.  So what number are you referring to?
   

What a giant baby of a President.