JFK Assassination Forum
JFK Assassination Discussion & Debate => JFK Assassination Discussion & Debate => Topic started by: Jake Maxwell on May 10, 2018, 10:22:05 PM
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J. Edgar Hoover's recently released memo below - only two days after the assassination, Nov. 24, 1963 - shows a rush to judgment regarding Oswald - and quite possibly a rush to cover-up...
Shouldn't this be considered the most relevant piece of evidence for a conspiracy?
"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin."
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"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin."
Real as opposed to...?
This can be taken a couple of ways. It can be seen at face value as trying to cover up (if the 'real' assassin was not Oswald). But it can also be seen as a completely innocent way of trying to ensure the public know the truth and don't erroneously think they are being fed a story.
Translation of the first way:
"Cripes, we don't want the public to find out that this was a conspired job, how can we ensure the public believes that it was Oswald?"
Translation of the second way:
"We know Oswald did it, but how on Earth do we ensure the public knows for sure it was Oswald...?"
That's how I read it (the second way).
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Do you have it to hand?
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Shouldn't this be considered the most relevant piece of evidence for a conspiracy?
conspiracy - no
cover up - absolutely
WW III involving a nuclear exchange was a distinct possibility especially if either Russia or Cuba were implicated in the assassination of JFK.
Easier for everyone to blame everything on 2 random and demented LNers and leave it at that. Even better since one of them was killed on the 24th before testifying and the other died of cancer while in prison.
WW III averted = everyone can go back to business.
Or so it would seem......except for Lee Oswald and his family..... And this is NOT the American way. ( nor should it be for any christian nation.)
The murder of JFK was the way of the mob..... and John Edgar Hoover understood the tacit well.
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This can be taken a couple of ways. It can be seen at face value as trying to cover up (if the 'real' assassin was not Oswald). But it can also be seen as a completely innocent way of trying to ensure the public know the truth and don't erroneously think they are being fed a story.
Translation of the first way:
"Cripes, we don't want the public to find out that this was a conspired job, how can we ensure the public believes that it was Oswald?"
Translation of the second way:
"We know Oswald did it, but how on Earth do we ensure the public knows for sure it was Oswald...?"
That's how I read it (the second way).
If the intent was the second interpretation as you believe.... Then why did the authorities ( The DPD and Hoover's agents) create false evidence. If Lee Oswald had been guilty then there should have been no reason to create false evidence. The evidence should speak for itself.
False evidence announces a frame up.....
But the simple fact is..... The WR is obviously a damned lie. If Lee was guilty then there should have been no need to create the elaborate lie.
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This can be taken a couple of ways. It can be seen at face value as trying to cover up (if the 'real' assassin was not Oswald). But it can also be seen as a completely innocent way of trying to ensure the public know the truth and don't erroneously think they are being fed a story.
Translation of the first way:
"Cripes, we don't want the public to find out that this was a conspired job, how can we ensure the public believes that it was Oswald?"
Translation of the second way:
"We know Oswald did it, but how on Earth do we ensure the public knows for sure it was Oswald...?"
That's how I read it (the second way).
The second interpretation is "altered reality" .... It's ironic that Leonard Pitts wrote about this in an editorial.
'If reality is altered, as it is in the Warren Report, then what can we believe in?'
Mr Pitts article follows.....
Leonard Pitts Jr.
By Leonard Pitts Jr.
'If reality is altered, what can we believe in?'
By Leonard Pitts Jr., Tribune Content Agency on May 9, 2018
"If Reality Is Altered, What Can We Believe In?"
In 1994, that was the headline of the first column I ever wrote about the manipulation of images and words -- digital lies that made it difficult to know what was really real. Small wonder, I said, we were a nation "paralyzed by cynicism."
Twenty-four years later, the technology has improved while social media have made the lies ubiquitous. And "cynicism" would be a feeble word for the state of the union today, when the very idea of knowable truth is in controversy, an adviser to a lying president speaks airily of "alternative facts," the news is filled with conspiracy theories and it has become distressingly clear that many of us simply don't care, blithely rejecting all facts that collide with preferred fictions.
The scary thing is, it's about to get worse.
That's according to "After the Fact," a troubling and essential new book by USA Today reporter Nathan Bomey, which traces the course of this intellectual unraveling. He writes that new technology will soon open the door to an era of audio manipulation, the implications of which are staggering.
Consider that it is already possible, with a little tech savvy, to produce an image or video of you doing something you never did. Well, now it will be possible to pair that with audio of you saying -- in your own voice -- something you never said. As if it were not already hard enough to know the truth when you hear it.
So how did we reach this point? "Journalists," said Bomey in a telephone interview, "used to be gatekeepers in the sense that we took responsibility for authenticating information. And people trusted us to try to sort fact from fiction. Now social media has put individual people in charge of authenticating information on their own, and most people aren't trained to do that." Complicating matters, he said, is "the natural human tendency to ignore the truth."
Though the retreat from facts has been most noticeable among conservatives, thanks to their megaphone of cable news, talk radio and internet conspiracy sites, Bomey said it is not unique to them. While the right denies the fact of climate change, for instance, "Liberals are more likely to deny the facts about genetically modified food, which is a big issue when it comes to poverty in Africa."
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Shouldn't this be considered the most relevant piece of evidence for a conspiracy?
conspiracy - no
cover up - absolutely
WW III involving a nuclear exchange was a distinct possibility especially if either Russia or Cuba were implicated in the assassination of JFK.
Easier for everyone to blame everything on 2 random and demented LNers and leave it at that. Even better since one of them was killed on the 24th before testifying and the other died of cancer while in prison.
WW III averted = everyone can go back to business.
Hi Tony.... I could not more profoundly and vociferously disagree with your position.
"conspiracy - no" "cover up - absolutely"
Hoover wrote the memo....
"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin."
Which clearly is the work of a desperate man. So, Why was Hoover in a panic?
We've examined a mountain of information and it's clear to me that J.Edger hoover had foreknowledge of the plot and sanctioned the plot.... He was a conspirator.
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"...On November 23,1963, J. Edgar Hoover forwarded the results of the FBI's preliminary investigation to him.(LBJ) This report detailed the evidence that indicated LHO's guilt.
On November 24, 1963, Hoover telephoned President Johnson aide Walter Jenkins and stated:"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin..."
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=39609&imageO... (http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=39609&imageO...)
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11/23/63
Lyndon B. Johnson: Have you established any more about the visit to the Soviet embassy in Mexico in September?
J. Edgar Hoover: No, that's one angle that's very confusing, for this reason - we have up here the tape and the photograph of the man who was at the Soviet embassy, using Oswald's name. That picture and the tape do not correspond to this man's voice, nor to his appearance. In other words, it appears that there is a second person who was at the Soviet embassy down there. We do have a copy of a letter which was written by Oswald to the Soviet embassy here in Washington, inquiring as well as complaining about the harassment of his wife and the questioning of his wife by the FBI. Now, of course, that letter information - we process all mail that goes to the Soviet embassy. It's a very secret operation.
No mail is delivered to the embassy without being examined and opened by us, so that we know what they receive... The case, as it stands now, isn't strong enough to be able to get a conviction... Now if we can identify this man who was at the... Soviet embassy in Mexico City... This man Oswald has still denied everything. He doesn't know anything about anything, but the gun thing, of course, is a definite trend.
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J. Edgar Hoover: I just wanted to let you know of a development which I think is very important in connection with this case - this man in Dallas (Lee Harvey Oswald). We, of course, charged him with the murder of the President. The evidence that they have at the present time is not very, very strong. We have just discovered the place where the gun was purchased and the shipment of the gun from Chicago to Dallas, to a post office box in Dallas, to a man - no, to a woman by the name of "A. Hidell."... We had it flown up last night, and our laboratory here is making an examination of it.
Lyndon B. Johnson: Yes, I told the Secret Service to see that that got taken care of.
J. Edgar Hoover: That's right. We have the gun and we have the bullet. There was only one full bullet that was found. That was on the stretcher that the President was on. It apparently had fallen out when they massaged his heart, and we have that one. We have what we call slivers, which are not very valuable in the identification. As soon as we finish the testing of the gun for fingerprints ... we will then be able to test the one bullet we have with the gun. But the important thing is that this gun was bought in Chicago on a money order. Cost twenty-one dollars, and it seems almost impossible to think that for twenty-one dollars you could kill the President of the United States.
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11/23/63
Lyndon B. Johnson: Have you established any more about the visit to the Soviet embassy in Mexico in September?
J. Edgar Hoover: No, that's one angle that's very confusing, for this reason - we have up here the tape and the photograph of the man who was at the Soviet embassy, using Oswald's name. That picture and the tape do not correspond to this man's voice, nor to his appearance. In other words, it appears that there is a second person who was at the Soviet embassy down there. We do have a copy of a letter which was written by Oswald to the Soviet embassy here in Washington, inquiring as well as complaining about the harassment of his wife and the questioning of his wife by the FBI. Now, of course, that letter information - we process all mail that goes to the Soviet embassy. It's a very secret operation.
No mail is delivered to the embassy without being examined and opened by us, so that we know what they receive... The case, as it stands now, isn't strong enough to be able to get a conviction... Now if we can identify this man who was at the... Soviet embassy in Mexico City... This man Oswald has still denied everything. He doesn't know anything about anything, but the gun thing, of course, is a definite trend.
The case, as it stands now, isn't strong enough to be able to get a conviction
At he time Hoover was telling LBJ that their case was very weak.....The authorities in Dallas were lying through their teeth and telling reporters all kinds of lies.... like saying they had found Lee Oswald's prints on the gun....and the gun was a deadly accurate rifle that was equipped with a telescopic sight...... and they had found the paper sack that Oswald had used to smuggle the rifle into the building..... and on and on....
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Translation of the second way:
"We know Oswald did it, but how on Earth do we ensure the public knows for sure it was Oswald...?"
That's how I read it (the second way).
How could Hoover (or anybody else) have known on Nov 24 that Oswald did it?
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The case, as it stands now, isn't strong enough to be able to get a conviction
At the time Hoover was telling LBJ that their case was very weak.....The authorities in Dallas were lying through their teeth and telling reporters all kinds of lies.... like saying they had found Lee Oswald's prints on the gun....and the gun was a deadly accurate rifle that was equipped with a telescopic sight...... and they had found the paper sack that Oswald had used to smuggle the rifle into the building..... and on and on....
Walt, Your quotes are poignant and your conclusions the most reasonable.
To Tony Fratini's previous suggestion, that Hoover was willing to rush to judgment and blame Oswald to protect the world from a possible nuclear war - by letting one man "take one" for the country (against his will) - This is the very same logic that would cause someone like Hoover to justify the killing of one person, the president, to change the political direction of the country (foreign policy, etc.), and frame another person to protect the country from internal social chaos and eternal distrust of the FBI, the CIA, the presidency, etc....
Regarding the cover-up: I think Hoover was less fearful, if at all, that Russia and Cuba might be implicated, than that the citizens of our country would discover that we had leaders we can't trust.... And this is possibly what is behind the contemporary argument that we need to keep some JFK files classified because of national security concerns... These concerns have nothing to do with Russia or Cuba - and everything to do with how the US public perceives it's institutions that can become corrupt to the core.....
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How could Hoover (or anybody else) have known on Nov 24 that Oswald did it?
More to the point....How could Hoover have known on Nov 24 that Oswald did NOT commit the murder?
And only a bastroid who already knew the truth would want to initiate a campaign to convince the public that the man that he was railroading ( he admitted they had no case against LHO) was the killer.
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I may be wrong, but I don't think J. Edgar Hoover even turned over this memo to the WC indicating a possible Oswald imposter dated June of 1960?
(http://i65.tinypic.com/2it537b.jpg)
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I may be wrong, but I don't think J. Edgar Hoover even turned over this memo to the WC indicating a possible Oswald imposter dated June of 1960?
(http://i65.tinypic.com/2it537b.jpg)
I get the impression that Hoover was fishing when he drafted this letter.
Hoover wanted to know if Lee Oswald was a US agent and hoped that he would receive information about Lee Oswald's status.
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I get the impression that Hoover was fishing when he drafted this letter.
Hoover wanted to know if Lee Oswald was a US agent and hoped that he would receive information about Lee Oswald's status.
Yes, looks like one carbon copy, (CC) went to the Office of Naval Intelligence, per what I see on the last line of the document. Unusual Oswald was in the government's radar 3 1/2 years before the assassination.
BB
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Yes, looks like one carbon copy, (CC) went to the Office of Naval Intelligence, per what I see on the last line of the document. Unusual Oswald was in the government's radar 3 1/2 years before the assassination.
BB
Oswald was in the government's radar 3 1/2 years before the assassination.
Making a statement like this indicates that Lee Oswald was a suspect long before the coup d e'tat.
I believe Hoover was in the dark, and didn't know that Lee Oswald was one of the false defectors who went to Russia as agents of the US. Hoover was merely phising.....
Many of the most successful spies in history are looked upon as suspected agents for a foreign power by organizations that are not privy to the secret.
Lee Was sent to Russia by a US government organization..... Hoover wasn't informed.
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Oswald was in the government's radar 3 1/2 years before the assassination.
Making a statement like this indicates that Lee Oswald was a suspect long before the coup d e'tat.
I believe Hoover was in the dark, and didn't know that Lee Oswald was one of the false defectors who went to Russia as agents of the US. Hoover was merely phising.....
Many of the most successful spies in history are looked upon as suspected agents for a foreign power by organizations that are not privy to the secret.
Lee Was sent to Russia by a US government organization..... Hoover wasn't informed.
Your correct Walt. Hoover would not be informed! Unusual, a memo concerning Oswald however, issued personally by the Director himself, over what appears a minor matter. Perhaps it was as you said, "a fishing" expedition. I do find the whole matter suspicious, however, as I have always wondered about an "Oswald double."
BB
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11/23/63
Lyndon B. Johnson: Have you established any more about the visit to the Soviet embassy in Mexico in September?
J. Edgar Hoover: No, that's one angle that's very confusing, for this reason - we have up here the tape and the photograph of the man who was at the Soviet embassy, using Oswald's name. That picture and the tape do not correspond to this man's voice, nor to his appearance. In other words, it appears that there is a second person who was at the Soviet embassy down there. We do have a copy of a letter which was written by Oswald to the Soviet embassy here in Washington, inquiring as well as complaining about the harassment of his wife and the questioning of his wife by the FBI. Now, of course, that letter information - we process all mail that goes to the Soviet embassy. It's a very secret operation.
No mail is delivered to the embassy without being examined and opened by us, so that we know what they receive... The case, as it stands now, isn't strong enough to be able to get a conviction... Now if we can identify this man who was at the... Soviet embassy in Mexico City... This man Oswald has still denied everything. He doesn't know anything about anything, but the gun thing, of course, is a definite trend.
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J. Edgar Hoover: I just wanted to let you know of a development which I think is very important in connection with this case - this man in Dallas (Lee Harvey Oswald). We, of course, charged him with the murder of the President. The evidence that they have at the present time is not very, very strong. We have just discovered the place where the gun was purchased and the shipment of the gun from Chicago to Dallas, to a post office box in Dallas, to a man - no, to a woman by the name of "A. Hidell."... We had it flown up last night, and our laboratory here is making an examination of it.
Lyndon B. Johnson: Yes, I told the Secret Service to see that that got taken care of.
J. Edgar Hoover: That's right. We have the gun and we have the bullet. There was only one full bullet that was found. That was on the stretcher that the President was on. It apparently had fallen out when they massaged his heart, and we have that one. We have what we call slivers, which are not very valuable in the identification. As soon as we finish the testing of the gun for fingerprints ... we will then be able to test the one bullet we have with the gun. But the important thing is that this gun was bought in Chicago on a money order. Cost twenty-one dollars, and it seems almost impossible to think that for twenty-one dollars you could kill the President of the United States.
Hear yee ...Hear Yee.... Listen up you Lone Nuts who argue that the bullet fragments ( slivers) could be traced to the Carcano.
Your hero, J Edna Hoover said :.....We have what we call slivers, which are not very valuable in the identification.
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Your correct Walt. Hoover would not be informed! Unusual, a memo concerning Oswald however, issued personally by the Director himself, over what appears a minor matter. Perhaps it was as you said, "a fishing" expedition. I do find the whole matter suspicious, however, as I have always wondered about an "Oswald double."
BB
Are you aware that Mama Oswald created a "scene" that caused governments of at least two countries to focus on Lee Oswald?
Marguerite Oswald had not heard from Lee in months, and she became worried about her boy ( who she suspected had been sent to Russia by the US government) When JFK was inaugurated in January of 1961 Marguerite took a train to Washington in hope that she could talk to JFK about the disappearance of her son behind the "Iron Curtain".
Marguerite did not get to talk to JFK but she did talk to one of JFK's aids...who took mama Oswald's plight to JFK. JFK ordered an investigation to see what had happened to this Oswald kid...and that's when he learned that Lee Oswald was actually a spy for the US government. JFK was astounded, and fascinated, that someone so young would have the guts to accept such a dangerous mission and He ordered the US State department to work at bringing Lee Oswald back to the US.
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Are you aware that Mama Oswald created a "scene" that caused governments of at least two countries to focus on Lee Oswald?
Marguerite Oswald had not heard from Lee in months, and she became worried about her boy ( who she suspected had been sent to Russia by the US government) When JFK was inaugurated in January of 1961 Marguerite took a train to Washington in hope that she could talk to JFK about the disappearance of her son behind the "Iron Curtain".
Marguerite did not get to talk to JFK but she did talk to one of JFK's aids...who took mama Oswald's plight to JFK. JFK ordered an investigation to see what had happened to this Oswald kid...and that's when he learned that Lee Oswald was actually a spy for the US government. JFK was astounded, and fascinated, that someone so young would have the guts to accept such a dangerous mission and He ordered the US State department to work at bringing Lee Oswald back to the US.
Cool story, bro.
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"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Trump colluded with Russia to win the election."
How does that sound?
Any government official discovered making such a statement today would probably be fired on the spot and under close government investigation.
Why is it that reading Hoover's memo decades later - a memo that states our top law official's effort to destroy a person's life and family name without full investigation (only 2 days after the assassination) - doesn't bring down the wrath on Hoover and Katzenbach that they deserve?
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J. Edgar Hoover's recently released memo below - only two days after the assassination, Nov. 24, 1963 - shows a rush to judgment regarding Oswald - and quite possibly a rush to cover-up...
Shouldn't this be considered the most relevant piece of evidence for a conspiracy?
"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin."
Is there a record of when this memo was done, before or after Oswald was murdered?
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"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Trump colluded with Russia to win the election."
How does that sound?
Any government official discovered making such a statement today would probably be fired on the spot and under close government investigation.
Why is it that reading Hoover's memo decades later - a memo that states our top law official's effort to destroy a person's life and family name without full investigation (only 2 days after the assassination) - doesn't bring down the wrath on Hoover and Katzenbach that they deserve?
Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians. They had a legitimate, non-conspiratorial motive to convince the public of Oswald's guilt. First, because the evidence proved Oswald was guilty beyond any doubt. Second, because there was no reason to believe then or over 50 years later that the Russians, Cubans or anyone other than Oswald was responsible. Because of Oswald's nutty political background, Hoover and others understood there was a very real possibility that some would try to use that to convince the public of the involvement of the Commies. And the United States could have been drawn into a war on the basis of a falsehood.
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Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians. They had a legitimate, non-conspiratorial motive to convince the public of Oswald's guilt. First, because the evidence proved Oswald was guilty beyond any doubt. Second, because there was no reason to believe then or over 50 years later that the Russians, Cubans or anyone other than Oswald was responsible. Because of Oswald's nutty political background, Hoover and others understood there was a very real possibility that some would try to use that to convince the public of the involvement of the Commies. And the United States could have been drawn into a war on the basis of a falsehood.
"Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians."
I call BS.
The government was full of hawks who pushed JFK to invade Cuba, send combat troops to SE Asia, some
even wanted the US fire off a nuclear first strike against the USSR. Ever hear of operation Northwoods?
They weren't afraid of American public opinion. If they were they wouldn't have sent millions of men
to fight in the rice paddies of Indochina.
Nothing more than a lame excuse for the failed cover up.
(http://i959.photobucket.com/albums/ae75/garcra/PageImage-1.jpg)
'64 Memo by Joint Chiefs of Staff
Discussing Widening of the War
Memorandum from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara, Jan. 22, 1964, "Vietnam and Southeast Asia."
1. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 makes
clear the resolve of the President to ensure victory over the ex-
ternally directed and supported communist insurgency in South
Vietnam. In order to achieve that victory, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are of the opinion that the United States must be prepared
to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions which now
limit our efforts, and to undertake bolder actions which may em-
body greater risks.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly mindful that our
fortunes in South Vietnam are an accurate barometer of our
fortunes in all of Southeast Asia. It is our view that if the U.S.
program succeeds in South Vietnam it will go far toward stabilizing
the total Southeast Asia situation. Conversely, a loss of South
Vietnam to the communists will presage an early erosion of
the remainder of our position in that subcontinent.
3. Laos, existing on a most fragile foundation now, would not
be able to endure the establishment of a communist--or pseudo
neutralist--state on its eastern flank. Thailand, less strong today
than a month ago by virtue of the loss of Prime Minister Sarit,
would probably be unable to withstand the pressures of infiltration
from the north should Laos collapse to the communists in its
turn. Cambodia apparently has estimated that our prospects in
South Vietnam are not promising and, encouraged by the actions
of the French, appears already to be seeking an accommodation
with the communists. Should we actually suffer defeat in South
Vietnam, there is little reason to believe that Cambodia would
maintain even a pretense of neutrality.
4. In a broader sense, the failure of our programs in South
Vietnam would have heavy influence on the judgments of Burma,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea,
and the Republic of the Philippines with respect to U.S. durability,
resolution, and trustworthiness. Finally, this being the first real test
of our determination to defeat the communist wars of national
liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there
would be a corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in
Africa and in Latin America.
5. All of this underscores the pivotal position now occupied by
South Vietnam in our world-wide confrontation with the com-
munists and the essentiality that the conflict there would be
brought to a favorable end as soon as possible. However, it
would be unrealistic to believe that a complete suppression of the
insurgency can take place in one or even two years. The British
effort in Malaya is a recent example of a counterinsurgency effort
which required approximately ten years before the bulk of the
rural population was brought completely under control of the
government, the police were able to maintain order, and the
armed forces were able to eliminate the guerrilla strongholds.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that, in keeping
with the guidance in NSAM 273, the United States must make
plain to the enemy our determination to see the Vietnam cam-
paign through to a favorable conclusion. To do this, we must
prepare for whatever level of activity may be required and, being
prepared, must then proceed to take actions as necessary to
achieve our purposes surely and promptly.
7. Our considerations, furthermore, cannot be confined en-
tirely to South Vietnam. Our experience in the war thus far leads
us to conclude that, in this respect, we are not now giving suffi-
cient attention to the broader area problems of Southeast Asia.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our position in Cambodia,
our attitude toward Laos, our actions in Thailand, and our great
effort in South Vietnam do not comprise a compatible and inte-
grated U.S. policy for Southeast Asia. U.S. objectives in Southeast
Asia cannot be achieved by either economic, political, or military
measures alone. All three fields must be integrated into a single,
broad U.S. program for Southeast Asia. The measures recom-
mended in this memorandum are a partial contribution to such
a program.
8. Currently, we and the South Vietnamese are fighting the war
on the enemy's terms. He has determined the locale, the timing,
and the tactics of the battle while our actions are essentially re-
active. One reason for this is the fact that we have obliged our-
selves to labor under self-imposed restrictions with respect to
impeding external aid to the Viet Cong. These restrictions in-
clude keeping the war within the boundaries of South Vietnam,
avoiding the direct use of U.S. combat forces, and limiting U.S.
direction of the campaign to rendering advice to the Government
of Vietnam. These restrictions, while they may make our inter-
national position more readily defensible, all tend to make the
task in Vietnam more complex, time-consuming, and in the end,
more costly. In addition to complicating our own problem, these
self-imposed restrictions may well now be conveying signals of
irresolution to our enemies--encouraging them to higher levels of
vigor and greater risks. A reversal of attitude and the adoption
of a more aggressive program would enhance greatly our ability to
control the degree to which escalation will occur. It appears
probable that the economic and agricultural disappointments
suffered by Communist China, plus the current rift with the
Soviets, could cause the communists to think twice about under-
taking a large-scale military adventure in Southeast Asia.
9. In adverting to actions outside of South Vietnam, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that the focus of the counter-
insurgency battle lies in South Vietnam itself, and that the war
must certainly be fought and won primarily in the minds of the
Vietnamese people. At the same time, the aid now coming to the
Viet Cong from outside the country in men, resources, advice, and
direction is sufficiently great in the aggregate to be significant--
both as help and as encouragement to the Viet Cong. It is our
conviction that if support of the insurgency from outside South
Vietnam in terms of operational direction, personnel, and ma-
terial were stopped completely, the character of the war in South
Vietnam would be substantially and favorably altered. Because
of this conviction, we are wholly in favor of executing the covert
actions against North Vietnam which you have recently proposed
to the President. We believe, however, that it would be idle to
conclude that these efforts will have a decisive effect on the com-
munist determination to support the insurgency; and it is our
view that we must therefore be prepared fully to undertake a
much higher level of activity, not only for its beneficial tactical
effect, but to make plain our resolution, both to our friends and
to our enemies.
10. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
United States must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder
actions in Southeast Asia; specifically as to Vietnam to:
a. Assign to the U.S. military commander responsibilities for
the total U.S. program in Vietnam.
b. Induce the Government of Vietnam to turn over to the
United States military commander, temporarily, the actual tac-
tical direction of the war.
c. Charge the United States military commander with complete
responsibility for conduct of the program against North Vietnam.
d. Overfly Laos and Cambodia to whatever extent is necessary
for acquisition of operational intelligence.
e. Induce the Government of Vietnam to conduct overt ground
operations in Laos of sufficient scope to impede the flow of
personnel and material southward.
f. Arm, equip, advise, and support the Government of Vietnam
in its conduct of aerial bombing of critical targets in North Viet-
nam and in mining the sea approaches to that country.
g. Advise and support the Government of Vietnam in its con-
duct of large-scale commando raids against critical targets in
North Vietnam.
h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, using
U.S. resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese
openly assuming responsibility for the actions.
i. Commit additional U.S. forces, as necessary, in support of
the combat action within South Vietnam.
j. Commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against
North Vietnam.
11. It is our conviction that any or all of the foregoing actions
may be required to enhance our position in Southeast Asia. The
past few months have disclosed that considerably higher levels of
effort are demanded of us if U.S. objectives are to be attained.
12. The governmental reorganization which followed the coup
d'etat in Saigon should be completed very soon, giving basis for
concluding just how strong the Vietnamese Government is going
to be and how much of the load they will be able to bear them-
selves. Additionally, the five-month dry season, which is just now
beginning, will afford the Vietnamese an opportunity to exhibit
their ability to reverse the unfavorable situation in the critical
Mekong Delta. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will follow these im-
portant developments closely and will recommend to you pro-
gressively the execution of such of the above actions as are
considered militarily required, providing, in each case, their de-
tailed assessment of the risks involved.
13. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the strategic im-
portance of Vietnam and of Southeast Asia warrants preparations
for the actions above and recommend that the substance of this
memorandum be discussed with the Secretary of State."
http://www.jfk-info.com/files.htm
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Is there a record of when this memo was done, before or after Oswald was murdered?
"...On November 23,1963, J. Edgar Hoover forwarded the results of the FBI's preliminary investigation to him.(LBJ) This report detailed the evidence that indicated LHO's guilt.
On November 24, 1963, Hoover telephoned President Johnson aide Walter Jenkins and stated:"The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin..."
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=39609&imageO... (http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=39609&imageO...)
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"Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians."
I call BS.
The government was full of hawks who pushed JFK to invade Cuba, send combat troops to SE Asia, some
even wanted the US fire off a nuclear first strike against the USSR. Ever hear of operation Northwoods?
They weren't afraid of American public opinion. If they were they wouldn't have sent millions of men
to fight in the rice paddies of Indochina.
Nothing more than a lame excuse for the failed cover up.
(http://i959.photobucket.com/albums/ae75/garcra/PageImage-1.jpg)
'64 Memo by Joint Chiefs of Staff
Discussing Widening of the War
Memorandum from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara, Jan. 22, 1964, "Vietnam and Southeast Asia."
1. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 makes
clear the resolve of the President to ensure victory over the ex-
ternally directed and supported communist insurgency in South
Vietnam. In order to achieve that victory, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are of the opinion that the United States must be prepared
to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions which now
limit our efforts, and to undertake bolder actions which may em-
body greater risks.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly mindful that our
fortunes in South Vietnam are an accurate barometer of our
fortunes in all of Southeast Asia. It is our view that if the U.S.
program succeeds in South Vietnam it will go far toward stabilizing
the total Southeast Asia situation. Conversely, a loss of South
Vietnam to the communists will presage an early erosion of
the remainder of our position in that subcontinent.
3. Laos, existing on a most fragile foundation now, would not
be able to endure the establishment of a communist--or pseudo
neutralist--state on its eastern flank. Thailand, less strong today
than a month ago by virtue of the loss of Prime Minister Sarit,
would probably be unable to withstand the pressures of infiltration
from the north should Laos collapse to the communists in its
turn. Cambodia apparently has estimated that our prospects in
South Vietnam are not promising and, encouraged by the actions
of the French, appears already to be seeking an accommodation
with the communists. Should we actually suffer defeat in South
Vietnam, there is little reason to believe that Cambodia would
maintain even a pretense of neutrality.
4. In a broader sense, the failure of our programs in South
Vietnam would have heavy influence on the judgments of Burma,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea,
and the Republic of the Philippines with respect to U.S. durability,
resolution, and trustworthiness. Finally, this being the first real test
of our determination to defeat the communist wars of national
liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there
would be a corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in
Africa and in Latin America.
5. All of this underscores the pivotal position now occupied by
South Vietnam in our world-wide confrontation with the com-
munists and the essentiality that the conflict there would be
brought to a favorable end as soon as possible. However, it
would be unrealistic to believe that a complete suppression of the
insurgency can take place in one or even two years. The British
effort in Malaya is a recent example of a counterinsurgency effort
which required approximately ten years before the bulk of the
rural population was brought completely under control of the
government, the police were able to maintain order, and the
armed forces were able to eliminate the guerrilla strongholds.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that, in keeping
with the guidance in NSAM 273, the United States must make
plain to the enemy our determination to see the Vietnam cam-
paign through to a favorable conclusion. To do this, we must
prepare for whatever level of activity may be required and, being
prepared, must then proceed to take actions as necessary to
achieve our purposes surely and promptly.
7. Our considerations, furthermore, cannot be confined en-
tirely to South Vietnam. Our experience in the war thus far leads
us to conclude that, in this respect, we are not now giving suffi-
cient attention to the broader area problems of Southeast Asia.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our position in Cambodia,
our attitude toward Laos, our actions in Thailand, and our great
effort in South Vietnam do not comprise a compatible and inte-
grated U.S. policy for Southeast Asia. U.S. objectives in Southeast
Asia cannot be achieved by either economic, political, or military
measures alone. All three fields must be integrated into a single,
broad U.S. program for Southeast Asia. The measures recom-
mended in this memorandum are a partial contribution to such
a program.
8. Currently, we and the South Vietnamese are fighting the war
on the enemy's terms. He has determined the locale, the timing,
and the tactics of the battle while our actions are essentially re-
active. One reason for this is the fact that we have obliged our-
selves to labor under self-imposed restrictions with respect to
impeding external aid to the Viet Cong. These restrictions in-
clude keeping the war within the boundaries of South Vietnam,
avoiding the direct use of U.S. combat forces, and limiting U.S.
direction of the campaign to rendering advice to the Government
of Vietnam. These restrictions, while they may make our inter-
national position more readily defensible, all tend to make the
task in Vietnam more complex, time-consuming, and in the end,
more costly. In addition to complicating our own problem, these
self-imposed restrictions may well now be conveying signals of
irresolution to our enemies--encouraging them to higher levels of
vigor and greater risks. A reversal of attitude and the adoption
of a more aggressive program would enhance greatly our ability to
control the degree to which escalation will occur. It appears
probable that the economic and agricultural disappointments
suffered by Communist China, plus the current rift with the
Soviets, could cause the communists to think twice about under-
taking a large-scale military adventure in Southeast Asia.
9. In adverting to actions outside of South Vietnam, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that the focus of the counter-
insurgency battle lies in South Vietnam itself, and that the war
must certainly be fought and won primarily in the minds of the
Vietnamese people. At the same time, the aid now coming to the
Viet Cong from outside the country in men, resources, advice, and
direction is sufficiently great in the aggregate to be significant--
both as help and as encouragement to the Viet Cong. It is our
conviction that if support of the insurgency from outside South
Vietnam in terms of operational direction, personnel, and ma-
terial were stopped completely, the character of the war in South
Vietnam would be substantially and favorably altered. Because
of this conviction, we are wholly in favor of executing the covert
actions against North Vietnam which you have recently proposed
to the President. We believe, however, that it would be idle to
conclude that these efforts will have a decisive effect on the com-
munist determination to support the insurgency; and it is our
view that we must therefore be prepared fully to undertake a
much higher level of activity, not only for its beneficial tactical
effect, but to make plain our resolution, both to our friends and
to our enemies.
10. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
United States must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder
actions in Southeast Asia; specifically as to Vietnam to:
a. Assign to the U.S. military commander responsibilities for
the total U.S. program in Vietnam.
b. Induce the Government of Vietnam to turn over to the
United States military commander, temporarily, the actual tac-
tical direction of the war.
c. Charge the United States military commander with complete
responsibility for conduct of the program against North Vietnam.
d. Overfly Laos and Cambodia to whatever extent is necessary
for acquisition of operational intelligence.
e. Induce the Government of Vietnam to conduct overt ground
operations in Laos of sufficient scope to impede the flow of
personnel and material southward.
f. Arm, equip, advise, and support the Government of Vietnam
in its conduct of aerial bombing of critical targets in North Viet-
nam and in mining the sea approaches to that country.
g. Advise and support the Government of Vietnam in its con-
duct of large-scale commando raids against critical targets in
North Vietnam.
h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, using
U.S. resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese
openly assuming responsibility for the actions.
i. Commit additional U.S. forces, as necessary, in support of
the combat action within South Vietnam.
j. Commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against
North Vietnam.
11. It is our conviction that any or all of the foregoing actions
may be required to enhance our position in Southeast Asia. The
past few months have disclosed that considerably higher levels of
effort are demanded of us if U.S. objectives are to be attained.
12. The governmental reorganization which followed the coup
d'etat in Saigon should be completed very soon, giving basis for
concluding just how strong the Vietnamese Government is going
to be and how much of the load they will be able to bear them-
selves. Additionally, the five-month dry season, which is just now
beginning, will afford the Vietnamese an opportunity to exhibit
their ability to reverse the unfavorable situation in the critical
Mekong Delta. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will follow these im-
portant developments closely and will recommend to you pro-
gressively the execution of such of the above actions as are
considered militarily required, providing, in each case, their de-
tailed assessment of the risks involved.
13. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the strategic im-
portance of Vietnam and of Southeast Asia warrants preparations
for the actions above and recommend that the substance of this
memorandum be discussed with the Secretary of State."
http://www.jfk-info.com/files.htm
You are mixing apples and oranges. Hoover and many others were undoubtedly anti-commies and supported strong measures including military measures in many instances to combat it. That differs vastly, however, from being pressured by hysterical kooks into a nuclear war with Russia due to a false claim that Oswald was involved with the Russians or Cubans in assassinating JFK. You have undermined your own fantasy, however, if you are suggesting that Hoover and others involved in the cover up would have wanted a war with Russia or Cuba. If that were the case, then why not go with the conspiracy nonsense that the Russians or Cubans were behind the assassination rather than putting the blame all on Oswald? It would have been a golden opportunity. Instead these anti-communists officials put all the blame on poor old Lee.
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You are mixing apples and oranges. Hoover and many others were undoubtedly anti-commies and supported strong measures including military measures in many instances to combat it. That differs vastly, however, from being pressured by hysterical kooks into a nuclear war with Russia due to a false claim that Oswald was involved with the Russians or Cubans in assassinating JFK. You have undermined your own fantasy, however, if you are suggesting that Hoover and others involved in the cover up would have wanted a war with Russia or Cuba. If that were the case, then why not go with the conspiracy nonsense that the Russians or Cubans were behind the assassination rather than putting the blame all on Oswald? It would have been a golden opportunity. Instead these anti-communists officials put all the blame on poor old Lee.
The idea that the government would be forced into a nuclear war with Russia if the public wasn't convinced
Ozzie was the real assassin is BS.
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Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians. They had a legitimate, non-conspiratorial motive to convince the public of Oswald's guilt. First, because the evidence proved Oswald was guilty beyond any doubt. Second, because there was no reason to believe then or over 50 years later that the Russians, Cubans or anyone other than Oswald was responsible. Because of Oswald's nutty political background, Hoover and others understood there was a very real possibility that some would try to use that to convince the public of the involvement of the Commies. And the United States could have been drawn into a war on the basis of a falsehood.
Not sure how you arrive at, "the evidence proved Oswald was guilty Beyond any Doubt", only 2 Days after the assassination. This sort of so called Justice is right in line with Judge Roy Bean's, "You'll get a fair trial and the hangin' will be in the morning"
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You are mixing apples and oranges. Hoover and many others were undoubtedly anti-commies and supported strong measures including military measures in many instances to combat it. That differs vastly, however, from being pressured by hysterical kooks into a nuclear war with Russia due to a false claim that Oswald was involved with the Russians or Cubans in assassinating JFK. You have undermined your own fantasy, however, if you are suggesting that Hoover and others involved in the cover up would have wanted a war with Russia or Cuba. If that were the case, then why not go with the conspiracy nonsense that the Russians or Cubans were behind the assassination rather than putting the blame all on Oswald? It would have been a golden opportunity. Instead these anti-communists officials put all the blame on poor old Lee.
I agree and even if, IF stating nuclear war is an overstatement, we certainly had hot wars going on and the red scare still thriving.
Nuke war if we knew the Soviets/Castroites killed our president? Sounds like a possibility.
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Not sure how you arrive at, "the evidence proved Oswald was guilty Beyond any Doubt", only 2 Days after the assassination. This sort of so called Justice is right in line with Judge Roy Bean's, "You'll get a fair trial and the hangin' will be in the morning"
That all may be so ... but this isn't about that, it would be about avoiding frightening escalations with the Soviets.
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You are mixing apples and oranges. Hoover and many others were undoubtedly anti-commies and supported strong measures including military measures in many instances to combat it. That differs vastly, however, from being pressured by hysterical kooks into a nuclear war with Russia due to a false claim that Oswald was involved with the Russians or Cubans in assassinating JFK. You have undermined your own fantasy, however, if you are suggesting that Hoover and others involved in the cover up would have wanted a war with Russia or Cuba. If that were the case, then why not go with the conspiracy nonsense that the Russians or Cubans were behind the assassination rather than putting the blame all on Oswald? It would have been a golden opportunity. Instead these anti-communists officials put all the blame on poor old Lee.
"If that were the case, then why not go with the conspiracy nonsense that the Russians or Cubans were behind the assassination rather than putting the blame all on Oswald?"
Some think that was the original intent of the people involved, a pretext for invading Cuba etc, - not me -
but was shelved when officials realized invading Cuba meant war with Russia.
A dead LN assassin cleans up all the loose ends and limits any investigation into who was responsible.
IMO
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"If that were the case, then why not go with the conspiracy nonsense that the Russians or Cubans were behind the assassination rather than putting the blame all on Oswald?"
Some think that was the original intent of the people involved, a pretext for invading Cuba etc, - not me -
but was shelved when officials realized invading Cuba meant war with Russia.
A dead LN assassin cleans up all the loose ends and limits any investigation into who was responsible.
IMO
So it didn't occur to the conspirators in the months or years spent preparing the plot that blaming it on the Cubans would mean war with Russia? But within a couple hours of the assassination it suddenly dawns on them. LOL. And they immediately abandon the entire purpose of the assassination plot and entirely reverse course on a dime to put all the blame on Oswald and cover up the involvement of Cuba. The whole matter becomes a waste of time at enormous risk. Those nutty conspirators.
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Putting an ear-ring on a pig doesn't make the pig smell any better...
Any law enforcement officer who is willing destroy someone's life and family because the officer is trying to save the neighborhood - or even trying to avert WWIII - is just as much a thug deserving of our full disdain, as the law enforcement officer who is willing to destroy someone's life and family to cover-up his involvement in killing a president for whatever reason....
There is no justification here at all... the end result, does not justify the means to that end....
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Putting an ear-ring on a pig doesn't make the pig smell any better...
Any law enforcement officer who is willing destroy someone's life and family because the officer is trying to save the neighborhood - or even trying to avert WWIII - is just as much a thug deserving of our full disdain, as the law enforcement officer who is willing to destroy someone's life and family to cover-up his involvement in killing a president for whatever reason....
There is no justification here at all... the end result, does not justify the means to that end....
Trying to shame others with faux righteousness won't work either. Oswald may well have been dead already when Hoover wrote this. Yeah, trying to save millions of lives is worse than feeling you've caught the assassin but are unsure.
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Putting an ear-ring on a pig doesn't make the pig smell any better...
Any law enforcement officer who is willing destroy someone's life and family because the officer is trying to save the neighborhood - or even trying to avert WWIII - is just as much a thug deserving of our full disdain, as the law enforcement officer who is willing to destroy someone's life and family to cover-up his involvement in killing a president for whatever reason....
There is no justification here at all... the end result, does not justify the means to that end....
Except that is not what happened. Hoover and the FBI believed Oswald was guilty based on the evidence. They had the same basic evidence to link him to this crime at that time as we do today. Gun, flight, nutty political background, murder of a police officer etc. Hoover didn't want WWIII based on the erroneous assumption that the Cubans or Russians were involved. That was a very sensible and admirable course of action. Thus, it was important to convince the public of Oswald's guilt because he was guilty and baseless rumors of the involvement of other countries could have led to the deaths of millions.
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Within 2 to 3 days, two top government officials express their common concern that the public must be convinced that Oswald is the real assassin of the president, and that there is no conspiracy.
Nicholas Katzenbach, the deputy attorney general at the time, wrote a memo the day after Hoover wrote his memo, restating similar concerns:
"The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial."
For any investigator to think he or she has all the evidence to rule out any accomplices in an assassination within 3 days, is ridiculous. It was an effort to frame Oswald - most likely motivated as a cover-up.
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That all may be so ... but this isn't about that, it would be about avoiding frightening escalations with the Soviets.
This Thread is about the Hoover Memo which was dated 2 days after the assassination. Hoover basically Tarring Oswald only 2 days after the assassination is Wrong whatever his motivation(s) might be.