TG--
I defer to Tennent Bagley, widely regarded as a smart, experienced CIA'er, deeply knowledgeable about Russia, who after a large amount of interrogation and exposure to Nosenko, concluded that Nosenko was a phony.
Bruce Solie's sniveling to the WC and HSCA...who knows, maybe the Russians threatened to expose Solie unless he derailed the investigation into Nosenko.
There was a lot of connections between LHO and the KGB and G2, and the Minsk KGB'er said he was running LHO there.
Investigations into LHO-G2-KGB ties were snuffed out, when the LN narrative was asserted.
What happened in Bagley, and US Ambassador Mann to Mexico, Thomas Mann, and State Dep't'er Charles Thomas suggest that looking into LHO-KGB-G2 would end one's career.
Dear "BC"
Bagley didn't conclude that Nosenko was fake "after a large amount of interrogation and exposure" -- he was pretty convinced of that as soon as he'd read the thick file on Anatoliy Golitsyn at CIA headquarters a few days after his final 6/15/62 meeting with Nosenko in Geneva and realized that what Nosenko said implausibly overlapped -- and contradicted -- what Golitsyn had said six months earlier even though they worked in different parts of the highly compartmentalized KGB.
Bagley didn't know, until Malcolm Blunt showed him around 2012, that John M. Newman had demonstrated in his 1995 book,
Oswald and the CIA, that all of the incoming non-CIA cables (i.e., from State, the Navy Attache in Moscow, and the Department of the Navy) on Oswald's defection were routed to the Office of Security's mole-hunting Security Research Staff (where Solie was Deputy Chief) instead of where they normally would have gone -- the Soviet Russia Division. The fact that such rerouting arrangements had to be made in advance with the Records Integration Division and the Office of Mail Logistics led Bagley to exclaim to Blunt that Oswald had to be a "witting," i.e., dispatched, defector.
Newman believes that when Popov allegedly told (probable mole, imho) George Kisevalter in Berlin in April 1958 that the Kremlin had the top-secret specifications of the U-2, Mole Solie protected himself by sending Oswald to Moscow as an ostensible "dangle' in a planned-to-fail mole hunt in the Soviet Russia Division for "Popov's U-2 Mole" (Solie in the Office of Security).
When Golitsyn defected to the U.S. on 12/15/61, his leads threatened to expose Solie, so when Nosenko showed up in Geneva in June 1962 to discredit Golitsyn, Solie had no choice but to support him from there on out.
-- "TG"
