JFK Assassination Plus General Discussion & Debate > JFK Assassination Plus General Discussion And Debate
Here's Tennent Bagley's entire personnel file
Tom Graves:
--- Quote from: Steve M. Galbraith on January 28, 2026, 11:16:06 PM ---Nosenko could have sued the US government, the CIA, and would have won if not hundreds of thousands of dollars many tens of thousands for the abuse they inflicted on him; viz., the denial of due process, of habeas, for the isolation and harsh treatment. He could have really embarrassed the CIA - Bagley and Angleton specifically (although Angleton denied knowing about the mistreatment) - in open court to the world and done severe damage to it and the US. I'm sure the government would have to tried to settle out of court; but he could have insisted otherwise.
But he didn't. And he said he wouldn't either. I would think that a genuine KGB double agent, someone working for the Soviets and against the US, would have done exactly that. Sued, gone to court. Why wouldn't one?
In 1975, Nosenko was asked to speak before a group of CIA agents at Langley. Here's the account in part (taken from Tom Mangold's book on Angleton):
--- End quote ---
Dear Steve M.,
Tom Mangold?
The guy whose primary source was probable KGB mole Leonard V. McCoy, and in whose anti-Angleton book, Cold Warrior, Bagley found seventy errors in seven pages (142-49)?
THAT Tom Mangold?
https://archive.org/details/coldwarriorjame000mang
-- Tom
Lance Payette:
--- Quote from: Benjamin Cole on January 29, 2026, 02:50:52 AM ---"Well ... in 1970, in his capacity as Chief of the European Division, Hart was enthusiastically recommending Bagley for "supergrade" promotion to GS-17 (page 7 of the above PDF).
According to Hart, Bagley was "one of our very finest station chiefs, possessed of imagination, intellect and ability personally to handle operations which very few of his colleagues can match. He is one of those on whom the future of the Organization is going to depend, and I believe that the promotion is more than justified." --LP, citing Hart.
Something is fishy here. Obviously, and by all accounts, Bagley was a smart guy, experienced, knowledgable, and earnest. Give him that.
One would think that someone in the CIA would say (even if this were true), "OK, Bagley went overboard on Nosenko. One mistake in a lifetime of high-quality service. Assign Bagley to an equal position elsewhere."
But instead Bagley is jettisoned.
Reminds me of the US Ambassador to Mexico, Mann, and Charles Thomas, the State Department guy in MC, both of whom thought LHO was a G2 asset.
They were jettisoned too.
There was streak there in the 1960s-70s when even suspecting KGB-G2 in the JFKA was radioactive.
That is normal?
Seems fishy like the National Aquarium.
--- End quote ---
I really don't think it's fishy at all. Bagley had been almost solely (no pun intended) responsible for the handling of Nosenko. The CIA reached a conclusion that Bagley's handling and conclusions were flat-out wrong. The CIA put its weight solidly behind Nosenko's bona fides. Bagley, as we well know, wouldn't let the matter rest. It had been extremely divisive within the CIA, and the Agency finally said "Enough." Bagley willingly took retirement as an alternative to being terminated. How many other Nosenko unbelievers met the same fate, I don't know. I just thought Hart's recommendation less than two years before the forced retirement was interesting. My guess would be that he, as the European Division Chief, had no real knowledge of the Nosenko affair or of how badly Bagley had handled it. Perhaps that's precisely why Hart was brought back out of retirement to write his report.
I have posted this previously. It's a 2012 event at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and Georgetown University entitled "Moles, Defectors and Deception: James Angleton and His Influence on US Counterintelligence" -
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/event/moles_defectors_and_deceptions_james_angleton_conference_report.pdf
Bagley, Royden and many others participated. No fistfights erupted.
Bagley noted that unnamed - always unnamed - KGB sources had described to him their "handling" of Nosenko's false defection. Royden responded politely:
In response, to Mr. Bagley’s saying that he’s had
contacts in the East with former KGB officers who
have told him that, in fact, Nosenko was run by
them; I would hope that you would all have healthy
skepticism for former KGB officers telling the truth
to Tennent Bagley, who of course has always been a
supporter of the Angleton thesis. I have not found
that former KGB officers sitting in Moscow have
been good sources of honesty about their operations
against the U.S.
But I realize that attempting to bring a rational perspective to these discussions is fruitless. The KGB stuff is a virus like every other CT virus. Once it takes hold, there is no cure. (Gotta add that to my "Beginner's Guide," too!)
Tom Graves:
--- Quote from: Lance Payette on January 29, 2026, 12:46:43 PM ---I really don't think it's fishy at all. Bagley had been almost solely (no pun intended) responsible for the handling of Nosenko. The CIA reached a conclusion that Bagley's handling and conclusions were flat-out wrong. The CIA put its weight solidly behind Nosenko's bona fides. Bagley, as we well know, wouldn't let the matter rest. It had been extremely divisive within the CIA, and the Agency finally said "Enough." Bagley willingly took retirement as an alternative to being terminated. How many other Nosenko unbelievers met the same fate, I don't know. I just thought Hart's recommendation less than two years before the forced retirement was interesting. My guess would be that he, as the European Division Chief, had no real knowledge of the Nosenko affair or of how badly Bagley had handled it. Perhaps that's precisely why Hart was brought back out of retirement to write his report.
I have posted this previously. It's a 2012 event at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars and Georgetown University entitled "Moles, Defectors and Deception: James Angleton and His Influence on US Counterintelligence" -
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/event/moles_defectors_and_deceptions_james_angleton_conference_report.pdf
Bagley, Royden and many others participated. No fistfights erupted.
Bagley noted that unnamed - always unnamed - KGB sources had described to him their "handling" of Nosenko's false defection. Royden responded politely:
In response, to Mr. Bagley’s saying that he’s had
contacts in the East with former KGB officers who
have told him that, in fact, Nosenko was run by
them; I would hope that you would all have healthy
skepticism for former KGB officers telling the truth
to Tennent Bagley, who of course has always been a
supporter of the Angleton thesis. I have not found
that former KGB officers sitting in Moscow have
been good sources of honesty about their operations
against the U.S.
But I realize that attempting to bring a rational perspective to these discussions is fruitless. The KGB stuff is a virus like every other CT virus. Once it takes hold, there is no cure. (Gotta add that to my "Beginner's Guide," too!)
--- End quote ---
Dear Fancy Pants Rants,
One of your big problems is that you can't seem to grasp the idea that the person who "cleared" Yuri Nosenko (via a bogus polygraph exam -- one of the worse that polygraph expert Richard O. Arther had ever seen, according to what he told the HSCA -- and a coached and specious report) was none other than probable mole Bruce Leonard Solie (look him up).
Bagley's primary source from 1994 to 2007 was former KGB General Sergey Kondrashev (look him up) who was still living when Bagley's Yale University Press book, Spy Wars, was published. Do you think he should have revealed the name of still-living Kondrashev?
As far as your boy Royden's and Pete Bagley's not exchanging haymakers, the latter was always pretty diplomatic, he was 86 years old, he was dying of cancer, and he was calling in from Brussels (where he'd chosen to be COS in 1967, and where he retired to in 1972).
You keep bringing up HSCA perjured John L. Hart.
Evidently you don't have the cajones to read Bagley's 170-page HSCA testimony in which he ripps Hart "a new one."
What's the matter?
Won't your wife let you?
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32273600.pdf
Note: "Mr. X" is KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn.
-- Tom
Lance Payette:
Just to add to the mystery: Angleton was still on board when Bagley was sent packing. Did he kick and scream and march in protest, or was he happy not to be (at that point) one of the sacrificial lambs? According to Wikipoodia, in 1974 three of Angleton's senior aides resigned the week it was made clear they would be reassigned to Siberia, and the counterintelligence staff was reduced from 300 to 80. I know nothing about all the intrigue, but it seems pretty clear that Bagley was scarcely the only one who was deemed "surplus." I read that it was Stansfield Turner who brought Hart out of retirement to investigate the handling of Nosenko. Turner did not join the CIA as Director until 1977, so he seemingly had no Nosenko axe to grand. My guess would be that Hart was chosen precisely because he wasn't involved either and obviously had no bias against Bagley. The subsequent history of Nosenko's information proving true and other defectors vouching for his bona fides would seem to make Bagley the odd man out unless the KGB was indeed the Omniscient Villain that the KGB Virus demands it to be. Virtually every article on Bagley mentions that his late-in-life supposed KGB informants were always conveniently unnamed.
Tom Graves:
--- Quote from: Lance Payette on January 29, 2026, 01:08:33 PM ---Just to add to the mystery: Angleton was still on board when Bagley was sent packing. Did he kick and scream and march in protest, or was he happy not to be (at that point) one of the sacrificial lambs? According to Wikipoodia, in 1974 three of Angleton's senior aides resigned the week it was made clear they would be reassigned to Siberia, and the counterintelligence staff was reduced from 300 to 80. I know nothing about all the intrigue, but it seems pretty clear that Bagley was scarcely the only one who was deemed "surplus." I read that it was Stansfield Turner who brought Hart out of retirement to investigate the handling of Nosenko. Turner did not join the CIA as Director until 1977, so he seemingly had no Nosenko axe to grand. My guess would be that Hart was chosen precisely because he wasn't involved either and obviously had no bias against Bagley. The subsequent history of Nosenko's information proving true and other defectors vouching for his bona fides would seem to make Bagley the odd man out unless the KGB was indeed the Omniscient Villain that the KGB Virus demands it to be. Virtually every article on Bagley mentions that his late-in-life supposed KGB informants were always conveniently unnamed.
--- End quote ---
Dear Fancy Pants Rants,
One of your big problems is that you can't seem to grasp the idea that the person who "cleared" Yuri Nosenko via a bogus polygraph exam (one of the worse that polygraph expert Richard O. Arther had ever seen, according to what he told the HSCA) and a coached and specious report was none other than probable mole Bruce Leonard Solie (look him up).
Bagley's primary source from 1994 to 2007 was former KGB General Sergey Kondrashev (look him up) who was still living when Bagley's Yale University Press book, Spy Wars, was published. Do you think he should have revealed the name of still-living Kondrashev?
As far as your boy Royden's and Bagley's not exchanging haymakers, the latter was always diplomatic, he was 86 years old, he was dying of cancer, and he was calling in from Brussels (where he'd chosen to be COS in 1967, and where he retired to in 1972).
You keep bringing up HSCA perjurer John L. Hart.
Evidently you don't have the cajones to read Bagley's 170-page HSCA testimony in which he rips him "a new one."
What's the matter?
Won't your wife let you?
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32273600.pdf
Note: "Mr. X" is KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn.
-- Tom
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