A hole in Bledsoe's story?

[Michael Capasse]

“History Will Prove Us Right” by Howard Willens, page 39:

[At the second meeting of the Warren Commission on December 6, 1963:]

The commission agreed to ask Congress for the subpoena power and the authority to grant immunity to witnesses that it might summon to testify. This was the first step toward a thorough and independent investigation. The subpoena power grants the authority to require a person or organization to appear and provide oral testimony, documents, and physical objects. The authority to grant immunity prevents any state or federal prosecutor from using what a witness says, or the documents that a witness produces, to build a criminal case against that witness. The FBI did not have these investigative powers, which the commission could use to go far beyond what the FBI had produced in its investigation. Both were readily granted by a law enacted on December 13.40

Emphasis by me.

So what? - WC subpoenaed witnesses based on what the FBI told them. 
There were plenty of witnesses that gave different accounts, and should have been called.
Carolyn Walther and Richard Carr, both told the FBI similar stories of more than one man in the window. Neither were called.

[Charles Collins]

So what? - WC subpoenaed witnesses based on what the FBI told them. 
There were plenty of witnesses that gave different accounts, and should have been called.
Carolyn Walther and Richard Carr, both told the FBI similar stories of more than one man in the window. Neither were called.

Do you have evidence that the FBI withheld their stories from the WC? If so, how did you learn about them?

[John Mytton]

So what? - WC subpoenaed witnesses based on what the FBI told them. 
There were plenty of witnesses that gave different accounts, and should have been called.
Carolyn Walther and Richard Carr, both told the FBI similar stories of more than one man in the window. Neither were called.

Richard Carr, ... told the FBI ...... stories of more than one man in the window.

??

On 22nd November, 1963, Carr was working on the seventh floor of the new courthouse building on the corner of Houston Street in Dealey Plaza. Just before President John F. Kennedy was shot Carr saw a heavy-set man with horn-rimmed glasses and a tan sport jacket on the sixth floor of the Texas Book Depository.
After the shooting Carr saw the man emerge from the building. Carr followed the man and later told the FBI: "This man, walking very fast, proceeded on Houston Street south to Commerce Street to Record Street.
https://spartacus-educational.com/JFKcarrR.htm

Carolyn Walther lived in Dallas, Texas and on 22nd November, 1963, saw the motorcade of President John F. Kennedy from Elm Street. She later claimed that saw two men firing at Kennedy from the Texas School Book Depository.
She gave this information to the FBI. According to her testimony: "I saw a man with a gun, and there was another man standing to his right. I could not see all of this man, and I couldn't see his face. The other man was holding a short gun. It wasn't as long as a rifle. He was holding it pointed down, and he was kneeling in the window, or sitting. His arms were on the window. He was holding the gun in a downward position, and he was looking downward... I said the man was on the fourth or fifth floor, and I still feel the same way."
https://spartacus-educational.com/JFKwalther.htm

JohnM

[Martin Weidmann]

The questions should be:

Why wouldn’t they bring the actual shirt along?

Why wouldn’t they want to show this shirt to Bledsoe and any others who saw LHO that day?

Why is this supposed to be something sinister (in your imagination)?

What is wrong with your thinking?

Why wouldn’t they bring the actual shirt along?

You seem to be under the impression that there is nothing abnormal about FBI agents carrying pieces of evidence around, when in fact it's not normal at all.
Your opinion is just as wacky as the one you have about the chain of custody.

Why wouldn’t they want to show this shirt to Bledsoe and any others who saw LHO that day?

Except, they didn't show it to others. They only showed it to Bledsoe and it could be (and is) construed as witness tampering.

What is wrong with your thinking?

Nothing, but I'm afraid you will never understand that.

[Michael Capasse]

??

On 22nd November, 1963, Carr was working on the seventh floor of the new courthouse building on the corner of Houston Street in Dealey Plaza. Just before President John F. Kennedy was shot Carr saw a heavy-set man with horn-rimmed glasses and a tan sport jacket on the sixth floor of the Texas Book Depository.
After the shooting Carr saw the man emerge from the building. Carr followed the man and later told the FBI: "This man, walking very fast, proceeded on Houston Street south to Commerce Street to Record Street.
https://spartacus-educational.com/JFKcarrR.htm

Carolyn Walther lived in Dallas, Texas and on 22nd November, 1963, saw the motorcade of President John F. Kennedy from Elm Street. She later claimed that saw two men firing at Kennedy from the Texas School Book Depository.
She gave this information to the FBI. According to her testimony: "I saw a man with a gun, and there was another man standing to his right. I could not see all of this man, and I couldn't see his face. The other man was holding a short gun. It wasn't as long as a rifle. He was holding it pointed down, and he was kneeling in the window, or sitting. His arms were on the window. He was holding the gun in a downward position, and he was looking downward... I said the man was on the fourth or fifth floor, and I still feel the same way."
https://spartacus-educational.com/JFKwalther.htm

JohnM

https://jfk.boards.net/post/7692/thread

[Charles Collins]

Another snip from “History Will Prove Us Right” by Howard Willens, page 42-42:

The commission had a long discussion about the FBI report and its annexes, which the members had received a week earlier. Warren and Russell noted that virtually everything contained in the FBI report had already appeared in the press. One major issue that came up right away was the bureau’s preliminary finding regarding the bullets that struck President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally. The FBI concluded that two bullets had struck the president and a third had wounded Connally. To support this assessment, the FBI relied in part on the initial, but inaccurate, information from Parkland Hospital that the first bullet that hit Kennedy had not exited from his body. As captured in the transcript of the meeting, the members did not react favorably. BOGGS: “There is nothing in there about Governor Connally.” CHAIRMAN: “No.” COOPER: “ And whether or not they found any bullets in him.” MCCLOY: “This bullet business leaves me confused.” CHAIRMAN: “It’s totally inconclusive.” […] MCCLOY: “I think you ought to have the autopsy documents.” CHAIRMAN: “By all means we ought to have the medical reports.” McCloy reminded members that the FBI had been under considerable pressure to complete the report.42 Warren proposed that the commission request all agencies submitting reports to provide the underlying investigative materials on which they were based. He told the members that after reading the FBI report he had the feeling that “unless we had the raw materials that went into the making of this report and had an opportunity to examine those raw materials and make our own appraisal, that any appraisal of this report would be little or nothing.” He added that the commission should continue to get such raw materials as they are obtained from the agencies so that it could be kept current regarding ongoing investigations. The commission unanimously approved his motion and followed this practice with respect to all the summary reports submitted by the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service. By emphasizing its need to see the basic investigative materials—the interview reports, the ballistic and other scientific analyses, and key documents—the commission was driving home the message that it alone had the responsibility to evaluate all the evidence and reach its own conclusions.43

This is not, I repeat not, depending solely on the FBI for their information.

[Michael Capasse]

Another snip from “History Will Prove Us Right” by Howard Willens, page 42-42:

The commission had a long discussion about the FBI report and its annexes, which the members had received a week earlier. Warren and Russell noted that virtually everything contained in the FBI report had already appeared in the press. One major issue that came up right away was the bureau’s preliminary finding regarding the bullets that struck President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally. The FBI concluded that two bullets had struck the president and a third had wounded Connally. To support this assessment, the FBI relied in part on the initial, but inaccurate, information from Parkland Hospital that the first bullet that hit Kennedy had not exited from his body. As captured in the transcript of the meeting, the members did not react favorably. BOGGS: “There is nothing in there about Governor Connally.” CHAIRMAN: “No.” COOPER: “ And whether or not they found any bullets in him.” MCCLOY: “This bullet business leaves me confused.” CHAIRMAN: “It’s totally inconclusive.” […] MCCLOY: “I think you ought to have the autopsy documents.” CHAIRMAN: “By all means we ought to have the medical reports.” McCloy reminded members that the FBI had been under considerable pressure to complete the report.42 Warren proposed that the commission request all agencies submitting reports to provide the underlying investigative materials on which they were based. He told the members that after reading the FBI report he had the feeling that “unless we had the raw materials that went into the making of this report and had an opportunity to examine those raw materials and make our own appraisal, that any appraisal of this report would be little or nothing.” He added that the commission should continue to get such raw materials as they are obtained from the agencies so that it could be kept current regarding ongoing investigations. The commission unanimously approved his motion and followed this practice with respect to all the summary reports submitted by the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service. By emphasizing its need to see the basic investigative materials—the interview reports, the ballistic and other scientific analyses, and key documents—the commission was driving home the message that it alone had the responsibility to evaluate all the evidence and reach its own conclusions.43

This is not, I repeat not, depending solely on the FBI for their information.

Absolutely they are. Their basis for the SBT was from the FBI report as a beginning point.
They had no independent investigators to conclude the SBT.  It was FBI Shaneyfelt.