Succession

[Walt Cakebread]

Surprisingly, I am just now getting around to reading William Manchester’s book, “The Death of a President”. It is a fascinating book to read. I am only part way through it but the accounts of the mass confusion that occurred on 11/22/63 are amazing. Anyway, here is a snip from the book about succession of the Vice President to the office of President. I was surprised to learn that the way that has evolved wasn’t the intent of the founding fathers. And learning why LBJ wanted to take the oath of office in Dallas (even delaying their flight back to Washington DC for it) solved one of the mysteries of that day that I have wondered about for almost sixty years. I was taught that the VP automatically became the President. Now, I feel like Paul Harvey has told “the rest of the story”.


Had Vice President Johnson assumed the Office of President at 1 P.M. in Parkland, there would have been no void. The transition would have been immediate. The fact that he failed to do so may be traced to the riddle of Presidential succession, which had confounded constitutional scholars for 122 years. The American Constitution, that imperfect classic, specifies in Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, that “In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President”—a solecism which should have made the Founding Fathers blush. What is meant by “the Same”? If the phrase to which it refers is “Powers and Duties,” then the Vice President remains Vice President, exercising those powers and performing those duties until the people can choose a new President. We know now that this was the desire of the men who framed the Constitution. The notes of James Madison, published long after his death, provide a cogent record of the secret deliberations of 1787. The founders never intended that any man should become Chief Executive unless he had been elected to that office. The wording they approved stated that in the event of the death of an incumbent the Vice President should serve as acting President “until another President be chosen.” This unequivocal provision was then dropped by the Constitutional Convention’s five-man committee on style, which made constitutional interpretation the art of the impossible. It is worth noting that the most perceptive analysis of the two versions of II, 1, 5 was written by the sixty-eighth Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, in 1961.1 Robert Kennedy concluded that it was the sense of the Convention that should a President die in office “merely the powers and duties devolve on the Vice President, not the office itself.”

 But the Madison papers appeared too late. The second possible antecedent for “the Same”—“the said Office”—had become hallowed by precedent. In 1841 William Henry Harrison caught cold during his inauguration and became the first American Chief Executive to die in office. His Vice President, John Tyler, learned the news while playing marbles with his children in Williamsburg, Virginia. Tyler, who didn’t know about Madison’s notes, never doubted that he was entitled to occupy “the said Office.” Several eminent American statesmen dissented, notably Henry Clay and former President John Quincy Adams, who, on April 16, 1841, seven days after Tyler’s inaugural address, made acid reference in his diary to “Mr. Tyler, who styles himself President… and not Vice-President acting as President.” Tyler, however, had powerful allies, chiefly Secretary of State Daniel Webster, and he had already moved into the White House. Time and custom were working for him. By the end of June even Adams was calling him “Mr. President.”

 During the next century death elevated six more Vice Presidents—Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Chester Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, and Harry Truman—and the claims of each to “the said Office” were uncontested. The Tyler precedent held, despite grumblings that few running mates to emerge from conventions were big enough to lead the ticket. Roosevelt and Truman excepted, the six were an uninspiring and undistinguished group. In the words of one scholar, the Vice Presidency was “a comfortable sinecure with which to honor some of the country’s more able politicians.” The qualifications of the second office in the land bore little relationship to the demands of the first. Nevertheless the silent engine of succession was still there, waiting to be used. Tyler had led the way. Succession had, in effect, become automatic.

 Or almost automatic. Tyler did something else which acquired a special significance in Dallas. His action arose from the realization that men like Adams were certain to contest his right to occupy the White House. When he picked up his marbles in Williamsburg, convinced in his own mind that he was already the tenth President of the United States, he was aware that Article II, Section 1, Clause 7, of the Constitution stipulated that a Chief Executive, “before he enter on the Execution of his Office,” must swear or affirm his support of that Constitution. Although he had already done that as Vice President, he resolved to make assurance doubly sure. Leading the Cabinet to the Indian Queen Hotel on Pennsylvania Avenue, he repeated the pledge on April 6, 1841. It was administered by Chief Justice William Cranch of the District of Columbia Circuit Court, who immediately afterward signed an affidavit setting forth the legal situation. The document declared that Harrison’s successor deemed himself qualified to take over “without any other oath than that which he has taken as Vice President,” but that he had asked to be sworn in again “as doubts may arise, and for greater caution.”

 John Tyler has much to answer for. Apart from annexing Texas and taming the Seminoles he did little for his country during the next four years, and in tightening his grip on the Presidency at the Indian Queen Hotel he had left an exasperating constitutional trap for Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Roosevelt, Coolidge, and Truman, all of whom fell into it. No one remembered Cranch’s affidavit. The document was filed away in the National Archives and forgotten. But everyone recalled the dramatic oath, and each of the six men who were to stand in Tyler’s shoes felt obliged to repeat it. An act undertaken “for greater caution” was magnified out of all proportion. The ceremonies, conducted while the grieving republic mourned its fallen leaders, became folklore, and the very Bibles on which the new Chief Executives rested their hands were integrated into the myth. The Constitution, of course, mentions the Bible nowhere.

 In time of crisis the pull of myth increases tenfold. On November 22, 1963, the typical American, like the typical correspondent in 101–102, was under the impression that the oath was mandatory. He still is. His leaders (though lamentably few of them have thought the matter through) are divided. Speaker John McCormack, who with Kennedy’s death became next in line of succession, echoes the popular misconception. He thinks Johnson had to be sworn in as soon as possible “because the country had to have a President.” Chief Justice Warren agrees. The oath is needed in such circumstances, he argues, to put the new leader’s dedication to the Constitution on record. Reminded that Johnson had taken that vow at the Kennedy inaugural, he replies, “But he hadn’t taken it as President.”2

 The weight of informed opinion lies on the other side. Barefoot Sanders, who was the U.S. Attorney on the spot, thinks Johnson became President the moment Kennedy died. So does Robert Kennedy; so does Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, who followed Kennedy as the sixty-ninth Attorney General. Hubert H. Humphrey, whom Johnson chose as his own Vice President, declares emphatically, “A Vice President becomes President when there is no President. Later, when he takes the oath, he puts on the cloak of office. But that act is purely symbolic.” Former President Eisenhower takes the strongest position of all. In the view of Eisenhower—who scorns the second oath—Johnson became Chief Executive the moment it was obvious that Kennedy was dying; that is, before Kemp Clark pronounced him dead. The former President believes that Johnson was entitled to sign legislation at any time after 12:30 Central Standard Time. Had a national emergency arisen between then and 2:38 P.M., when he took that second oath, and had Johnson failed to act, Eisenhower holds that he would have been derelict in his duty and subject to impeachment.

 The cadre of professionals who serve the Presidency is similarly split, though they, too, are inclined to dismiss the oath as inconsequential. Because the Secret Service White House Detail lacked forceful leadership on November 22, individual agents are vague. Former Chief Wilson is a more vigorous witness than any of them. When Franklin Roosevelt died, Wilson left one man with Mrs. Roosevelt and immediately reassigned all others, including those who had been guarding the President’s grandchildren, to Truman. “As far as the Service is concerned,” Wilson declares, “when a President dies the Vice President becomes President at once, and all protection goes to him and his family.” Colonel McNally of the White House Communications Agency concurs: “It sounds coldblooded, but the instant President Kennedy died, communications-wise he disappeared off the face of the earth. Oath of office or not, Lyndon Johnson was President in our eyes and head of the government.”

 It is improbable that Johnson had considered these complex issues before a blaze of gunfire confronted him with them. Over a year and a half afterward he informed this writer that it was his opinion that “the Vice President becomes President immediately upon the death of the President. He is obligated thereafter to take the oath of office, but there is no lapse in the powers of the Presidency.” Having taken the second oath, he perhaps felt an obligation to defend it. Otherwise the statement conforms with judicial opinion. However, it was made after the full ramifications of the question had been laid before him. In Dallas, he conceded, he had felt differently. Although “immediately aware” of his new responsibilities, the “full realization,” the “subjective identification” of himself as Chief Executive, “came gradually.”

 Perhaps anticipation of the consequences of a President’s death should be obligatory for Vice Presidents, but it wouldn’t come easily. There is little evidence that Johnson’s seven predecessors had given the matter much thought. The attitude of national politicians toward the White House is highly ambivalent; they simultaneously crave it and recoil from it. Vice Presidents, like Presidents, are loath to dwell upon the fact that they are a heartbeat away from the executive mansion, and when the beat suddenly stops they are dumfounded. “I don’t know if any of you fellows ever had a load of hay or a bull fall on him,” Truman told reporters on April 14, 1945, “but last night the whole weight of the moon and stars fell on me.”

 Truman’s reaction should be mulled over if the Dallas transition is to be put in perspective. When the news arrived from Warm Springs, with which he had no connection, he was in Washington. His predecessor had died peacefully. There had been no violence. Johnson’s plight, on the other hand, was ghastly. The President had been visiting the Vice President’s home grounds, and in twenty-four hours the Connally-Yarborough feud had transformed the trip into a Johnsonian disaster. At 12:29 P.M. his career was at a low ebb. He sat sluggishly in the back seat of his convertible, insensitive to the cheers around him, seeking refuge in the blare of a dashboard radio. His prestige had come apart, and for the moment he had apparently abandoned hope of reassembling it. Then, sixty seconds later, the elected President and his lady lay in a welter of blood, and Lyndon Johnson was the leader of the nation.

 In the moment it takes to drive over a crack of gray Texas asphalt his life and his country’s history had been transformed. He had no way of knowing why it had happened, but he had been a political creature since youth. The instant his antennae began to sweep the scene he had to deal with the stupendous fact that in the eyes of the United States and the world beyond, a Texas murder had put a Texan in power. The catastrophe had struck him harder than any other man in Dallas. If he was mesmerized, if some of his actions were incomprehensible, the nature of that unprecedented shock has to be borne in mind constantly, and to recapture its impact on him the reel of events must be wound back to 12:36 P.M., when Lady Bird, after a frightened glance at the pink blur at SS 100 X, darted into the hospital behind the wedge of agents surrounding her husband.

The catastrophe had struck him harder than any other man in Dallas. If he was mesmerized, if some of his actions were incomprehensible, the nature of that unprecedented shock has to be borne in mind constantly, and to recapture its impact on him the reel of events must be wound back to 12:36 P.M.,

William Manchester apparently didn't see photos of LBJ on board AF1 at about 1:30  ..... LBJ was most certainly not upset by the murder of JFK ....  he was photographed winking at Congressman Thomas and smiling at his 
loyal band of folowers.

[Walt Cakebread]

It's a "dumb question" to ask you what the basis of your claim is?  I don't have the book.  Are you saying that it indicates that LBJ approached RFK and asked him for his opinion on succession prior to the assassination?

Clearly you aren't smart enough to understand what Charles Collins wrote in the opening post of the thread....

[Walt Cakebread]

Surprisingly, I am just now getting around to reading William Manchester’s book, “The Death of a President”. It is a fascinating book to read. I am only part way through it but the accounts of the mass confusion that occurred on 11/22/63 are amazing. Anyway, here is a snip from the book about succession of the Vice President to the office of President. I was surprised to learn that the way that has evolved wasn’t the intent of the founding fathers. And learning why LBJ wanted to take the oath of office in Dallas (even delaying their flight back to Washington DC for it) solved one of the mysteries of that day that I have wondered about for almost sixty years. I was taught that the VP automatically became the President. Now, I feel like Paul Harvey has told “the rest of the story”.


Had Vice President Johnson assumed the Office of President at 1 P.M. in Parkland, there would have been no void. The transition would have been immediate. The fact that he failed to do so may be traced to the riddle of Presidential succession, which had confounded constitutional scholars for 122 years. The American Constitution, that imperfect classic, specifies in Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, that “In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President”—a solecism which should have made the Founding Fathers blush. What is meant by “the Same”? If the phrase to which it refers is “Powers and Duties,” then the Vice President remains Vice President, exercising those powers and performing those duties until the people can choose a new President. We know now that this was the desire of the men who framed the Constitution. The notes of James Madison, published long after his death, provide a cogent record of the secret deliberations of 1787. The founders never intended that any man should become Chief Executive unless he had been elected to that office. The wording they approved stated that in the event of the death of an incumbent the Vice President should serve as acting President “until another President be chosen.” This unequivocal provision was then dropped by the Constitutional Convention’s five-man committee on style, which made constitutional interpretation the art of the impossible. It is worth noting that the most perceptive analysis of the two versions of II, 1, 5 was written by the sixty-eighth Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, in 1961.1 Robert Kennedy concluded that it was the sense of the Convention that should a President die in office “merely the powers and duties devolve on the Vice President, not the office itself.”

 But the Madison papers appeared too late. The second possible antecedent for “the Same”—“the said Office”—had become hallowed by precedent. In 1841 William Henry Harrison caught cold during his inauguration and became the first American Chief Executive to die in office. His Vice President, John Tyler, learned the news while playing marbles with his children in Williamsburg, Virginia. Tyler, who didn’t know about Madison’s notes, never doubted that he was entitled to occupy “the said Office.” Several eminent American statesmen dissented, notably Henry Clay and former President John Quincy Adams, who, on April 16, 1841, seven days after Tyler’s inaugural address, made acid reference in his diary to “Mr. Tyler, who styles himself President… and not Vice-President acting as President.” Tyler, however, had powerful allies, chiefly Secretary of State Daniel Webster, and he had already moved into the White House. Time and custom were working for him. By the end of June even Adams was calling him “Mr. President.”

 During the next century death elevated six more Vice Presidents—Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Chester Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, and Harry Truman—and the claims of each to “the said Office” were uncontested. The Tyler precedent held, despite grumblings that few running mates to emerge from conventions were big enough to lead the ticket. Roosevelt and Truman excepted, the six were an uninspiring and undistinguished group. In the words of one scholar, the Vice Presidency was “a comfortable sinecure with which to honor some of the country’s more able politicians.” The qualifications of the second office in the land bore little relationship to the demands of the first. Nevertheless the silent engine of succession was still there, waiting to be used. Tyler had led the way. Succession had, in effect, become automatic.

 Or almost automatic. Tyler did something else which acquired a special significance in Dallas. His action arose from the realization that men like Adams were certain to contest his right to occupy the White House. When he picked up his marbles in Williamsburg, convinced in his own mind that he was already the tenth President of the United States, he was aware that Article II, Section 1, Clause 7, of the Constitution stipulated that a Chief Executive, “before he enter on the Execution of his Office,” must swear or affirm his support of that Constitution. Although he had already done that as Vice President, he resolved to make assurance doubly sure. Leading the Cabinet to the Indian Queen Hotel on Pennsylvania Avenue, he repeated the pledge on April 6, 1841. It was administered by Chief Justice William Cranch of the District of Columbia Circuit Court, who immediately afterward signed an affidavit setting forth the legal situation. The document declared that Harrison’s successor deemed himself qualified to take over “without any other oath than that which he has taken as Vice President,” but that he had asked to be sworn in again “as doubts may arise, and for greater caution.”

 John Tyler has much to answer for. Apart from annexing Texas and taming the Seminoles he did little for his country during the next four years, and in tightening his grip on the Presidency at the Indian Queen Hotel he had left an exasperating constitutional trap for Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Roosevelt, Coolidge, and Truman, all of whom fell into it. No one remembered Cranch’s affidavit. The document was filed away in the National Archives and forgotten. But everyone recalled the dramatic oath, and each of the six men who were to stand in Tyler’s shoes felt obliged to repeat it. An act undertaken “for greater caution” was magnified out of all proportion. The ceremonies, conducted while the grieving republic mourned its fallen leaders, became folklore, and the very Bibles on which the new Chief Executives rested their hands were integrated into the myth. The Constitution, of course, mentions the Bible nowhere.

 In time of crisis the pull of myth increases tenfold. On November 22, 1963, the typical American, like the typical correspondent in 101–102, was under the impression that the oath was mandatory. He still is. His leaders (though lamentably few of them have thought the matter through) are divided. Speaker John McCormack, who with Kennedy’s death became next in line of succession, echoes the popular misconception. He thinks Johnson had to be sworn in as soon as possible “because the country had to have a President.” Chief Justice Warren agrees. The oath is needed in such circumstances, he argues, to put the new leader’s dedication to the Constitution on record. Reminded that Johnson had taken that vow at the Kennedy inaugural, he replies, “But he hadn’t taken it as President.”2

 The weight of informed opinion lies on the other side. Barefoot Sanders, who was the U.S. Attorney on the spot, thinks Johnson became President the moment Kennedy died. So does Robert Kennedy; so does Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, who followed Kennedy as the sixty-ninth Attorney General. Hubert H. Humphrey, whom Johnson chose as his own Vice President, declares emphatically, “A Vice President becomes President when there is no President. Later, when he takes the oath, he puts on the cloak of office. But that act is purely symbolic.” Former President Eisenhower takes the strongest position of all. In the view of Eisenhower—who scorns the second oath—Johnson became Chief Executive the moment it was obvious that Kennedy was dying; that is, before Kemp Clark pronounced him dead. The former President believes that Johnson was entitled to sign legislation at any time after 12:30 Central Standard Time. Had a national emergency arisen between then and 2:38 P.M., when he took that second oath, and had Johnson failed to act, Eisenhower holds that he would have been derelict in his duty and subject to impeachment.

 The cadre of professionals who serve the Presidency is similarly split, though they, too, are inclined to dismiss the oath as inconsequential. Because the Secret Service White House Detail lacked forceful leadership on November 22, individual agents are vague. Former Chief Wilson is a more vigorous witness than any of them. When Franklin Roosevelt died, Wilson left one man with Mrs. Roosevelt and immediately reassigned all others, including those who had been guarding the President’s grandchildren, to Truman. “As far as the Service is concerned,” Wilson declares, “when a President dies the Vice President becomes President at once, and all protection goes to him and his family.” Colonel McNally of the White House Communications Agency concurs: “It sounds coldblooded, but the instant President Kennedy died, communications-wise he disappeared off the face of the earth. Oath of office or not, Lyndon Johnson was President in our eyes and head of the government.”

 It is improbable that Johnson had considered these complex issues before a blaze of gunfire confronted him with them. Over a year and a half afterward he informed this writer that it was his opinion that “the Vice President becomes President immediately upon the death of the President. He is obligated thereafter to take the oath of office, but there is no lapse in the powers of the Presidency.” Having taken the second oath, he perhaps felt an obligation to defend it. Otherwise the statement conforms with judicial opinion. However, it was made after the full ramifications of the question had been laid before him. In Dallas, he conceded, he had felt differently. Although “immediately aware” of his new responsibilities, the “full realization,” the “subjective identification” of himself as Chief Executive, “came gradually.”

 Perhaps anticipation of the consequences of a President’s death should be obligatory for Vice Presidents, but it wouldn’t come easily. There is little evidence that Johnson’s seven predecessors had given the matter much thought. The attitude of national politicians toward the White House is highly ambivalent; they simultaneously crave it and recoil from it. Vice Presidents, like Presidents, are loath to dwell upon the fact that they are a heartbeat away from the executive mansion, and when the beat suddenly stops they are dumfounded. “I don’t know if any of you fellows ever had a load of hay or a bull fall on him,” Truman told reporters on April 14, 1945, “but last night the whole weight of the moon and stars fell on me.”

 Truman’s reaction should be mulled over if the Dallas transition is to be put in perspective. When the news arrived from Warm Springs, with which he had no connection, he was in Washington. His predecessor had died peacefully. There had been no violence. Johnson’s plight, on the other hand, was ghastly. The President had been visiting the Vice President’s home grounds, and in twenty-four hours the Connally-Yarborough feud had transformed the trip into a Johnsonian disaster. At 12:29 P.M. his career was at a low ebb. He sat sluggishly in the back seat of his convertible, insensitive to the cheers around him, seeking refuge in the blare of a dashboard radio. His prestige had come apart, and for the moment he had apparently abandoned hope of reassembling it. Then, sixty seconds later, the elected President and his lady lay in a welter of blood, and Lyndon Johnson was the leader of the nation.

 In the moment it takes to drive over a crack of gray Texas asphalt his life and his country’s history had been transformed. He had no way of knowing why it had happened, but he had been a political creature since youth. The instant his antennae began to sweep the scene he had to deal with the stupendous fact that in the eyes of the United States and the world beyond, a Texas murder had put a Texan in power. The catastrophe had struck him harder than any other man in Dallas. If he was mesmerized, if some of his actions were incomprehensible, the nature of that unprecedented shock has to be borne in mind constantly, and to recapture its impact on him the reel of events must be wound back to 12:36 P.M., when Lady Bird, after a frightened glance at the pink blur at SS 100 X, darted into the hospital behind the wedge of agents surrounding her husband.

 LBJ wanted to take the oath of office in Dallas (even delaying their flight back to Washington DC for it)

Keep reading and you'll find that  John Mc Cormac was hurrying back from lunch after learning of the death of JFK and Mc Cormac assumed that he had become the acting President and needed to return to the House to be sworn in.   LBJ heard that Mc Cormac was about to be sworn in and he nearly soiled his skivvies..     THAT"S why he insisted that a Federal Judge be brought to AF1 immediately  to swear him in.

[Walt Cakebread]

I am in the process of reading chapter four for the first time. So far, the only time that LBJ asked for information about the oath of office was on Air Force One, immediately after the assassination. There were a lot of people involved in this, not just LBJ and RFK.

I believe you'll find that William Manchester was a brilliant and clever author.....   He often presents the truth about the assassination, but then he cleverly conceals  the truth in a proposing a counter theory.   ( He would never have gotten the book published if he hadn't )

[Charles Collins]

The catastrophe had struck him harder than any other man in Dallas. If he was mesmerized, if some of his actions were incomprehensible, the nature of that unprecedented shock has to be borne in mind constantly, and to recapture its impact on him the reel of events must be wound back to 12:36 P.M.,

William Manchester apparently didn't see photos of LBJ on board AF1 at about 1:30  ..... LBJ was most certainly not upset by the murder of JFK ....  he was photographed winking at Congressman Thomas and smiling at his 
loyal band of folowers.

12:36 P.M. is when LBJ entered Parkland Hospital. Manchester is mainly referring to LBJ’s actions (and lack of actions) while at the hospital. The so called “wink” was supposedly at LBJ, not by LBJ.

[Richard Smith]

Clearly you aren't smart enough to understand what Charles Collins wrote in the opening post of the thread....

Enlighten me by quoting your source instead of playing a thousand questions.  I didn't see anything in the OP to support what you have suggested (i.e. that LBJ consulted with RFK prior to the assassination on succession in the death of a president).  To the contrary it contains this quote:  "It is improbable that Johnson had considered these complex issues before a blaze of gunfire confronted him with them."

[Charles Collins]

LBJ wanted to take the oath of office in Dallas (even delaying their flight back to Washington DC for it)

Keep reading and you'll find that  John Mc Cormac was hurrying back from lunch after learning of the death of JFK and Mc Cormac assumed that he had become the acting President and needed to return to the House to be sworn in.   LBJ heard that Mc Cormac was about to be sworn in and he nearly soiled his skivvies..     THAT"S why he insisted that a Federal Judge be brought to AF1 immediately  to swear him in.

I have already read this account and you (as usual) have it all wrong. I am assuming this is the passage you are referring to:


For Walton, Moynihan, Horsky, and Duke, mourning thus began early; for John W. McCormack the confirmation was a private anticlimax. The Speaker had still been in the House restaurant when two reporters came to his table and said that Kennedy had been shot. Other reporters and Congressmen then began to dart up with bits and pieces of information. The appearance of priests convinced McCormack that the President had succumbed. Then, in the next minute, he was told that the Vice President had been shot and, in the minute after that, that Secret Service agents were on their way to the Hill to protect him. Although the first report was inaccurate, the second was true; under the succession act of July 18, 1947, inspired by Harry Truman’s affection for Sam Rayburn, the Speaker (rather than the Secretary of State, as in the past) was second in line of succession, and if both Kennedy and Johnson had been murdered, Rayburn’s aged successor was now President of the United States. At 2:18 P.M. in Washington the possibility seemed very real. It struck McCormack, he later recalled, with “a terrific impact.” He rose unsteadily from his chair and immediately suffered a severe attack of vertigo. Linen, waiters, tableware swam before his eyes; he thought he was going to lose consciousness and tumble to the floor. Passing a palsied hand over his eyes, he sank back to his seat, and he was still there, trembling, when a Congressman called over that Johnson was unharmed.


McCormack had been told that LBJ had also been shot (see the part that I underlined). So your idea has no merit.