U.S. Politics

[Steve M. Galbraith]

And why is that?  They have been indicted for serious crimes by a Grand Jury.  Unless they going to flee the country,or plead guilty, they are heading to trial.

I think there's a good chance the judge will grant a motion to dismiss the Comey charges before any trial. It's just too shaky of a case. As to the James's charges, I have no idea.

Actually, I have no idea in either case but on the internet you can pretend to be an expert on anything.

[Michael Capasse]

And why is that?  They have been indicted for serious crimes by a Grand Jury.  Unless they going to flee the country,or plead guilty, they are heading to trial.

  serious crimes? - no.

[Royell Storing]

  Comey is one of the conspirators that was discussing wearing a "wire" to entrap Trump. Comey is a total dirt bag.

[Richard Smith]

serious crimes? - no.

You don't think lying to Congress and obstruction of justice by the head of the FBi is not a serious crime?  LOL. 

[Michael Capasse]

You don't think lying to Congress and obstruction of justice by the head of the FBi is not a serious crime?  LOL.

Do you understand the context of the case against Comey?
It's about "standing by the testimony" he had previously stated, and there is a witness that undermines the entire case against him.
No prosecutor would touch it. She is a an insurance lawyer. 

[Benjamin Cole]

I think there's a good chance the judge will grant a motion to dismiss the Comey charges before any trial. It's just too shaky of a case. As to the James's charges, I have no idea.

Actually, I have no idea in either case but on the internet you can pretend to be an expert on anything.

I salute and join you.

[Tom Graves]

ME:

Was the provenance of some of the Steele Dossier’s allegations discredited by Igor Danchenko’s January 2017 statements to the FBI?

GROK:

Yes, it is correct to say that the provenance (i.e., the origins and chain of sourcing) of several key allegations in the Steele Dossier was effectively discredited by Igor Danchenko’s voluntary interviews with the FBI in late January 2017. These interviews, declassified in 2020, revealed that much of the raw intelligence Danchenko had passed to Christopher Steele—Steele’s primary sub-source—was based on uncorroborated rumors, hearsay, speculation, and second- or third-hand accounts from a small circle of contacts, rather than the high-level, well-sourced intelligence Steele presented in his reports. This undermined the dossier’s credibility for the FBI, which had relied on it in part for FISA warrant applications against Trump campaign adviser Carter Page.

Key Details from Danchenko’s FBI Interviews

Danchenko, a Russian-born analyst based in the U.S., was interviewed over three days starting around January 24, 2017, shortly after BuzzFeed published the dossier on January 10. He provided the following clarifications, which directly contradicted or weakened Steele’s sourcing:

Reliance on “Bar Talk” and Hearsay: Danchenko described most of his information as “rumor and speculation” gathered from “drinking buddies,” journalists, and casual conversations during a June 2016 trip to Moscow and an October 2016 conference there. He emphasized that he viewed it as unverified gossip, not confirmed facts, and was surprised when Steele framed it as more conclusive intelligence.

“Pee Tape” Allegation (Ritz-Carlton Hotel Claims): This sensational claim—that Russia had kompromat on Trump involving prostitutes in Moscow—was traced back to Danchenko’s discussions with a U.S.-based PR executive (later identified as Charles Dolan Jr., a Democratic operative) and a hotel manager acquaintance. Danchenko told the FBI it stemmed from “word of mouth and hearsay” over beers, with no direct evidence or eyewitness accounts. Steele had attributed it to multiple “senior Russian sources” at the hotel, but Danchenko’s account collapsed this into casual speculation.

Trump-Russia “Conspiracy” Claims: Allegations of a “well-developed conspiracy of cooperation” between the Trump campaign and the Kremlin (e.g., involving Michael Cohen and Paul Manafort) were largely based on an anonymous 15-minute phone call Danchenko claimed to receive in July 2016 from someone he “believed” was Sergei Millian (president of the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce). Danchenko later walked back this as possibly unreliable, and no records confirmed the call. Other elements came from friends’ unverified tips, not insider Kremlin sources as Steele implied.

Overall Sourcing Gaps: Danchenko admitted he had no direct access to high-level Russian officials or Trump insiders. His network included low-level contacts like a former girlfriend and a journalist friend under FISA scrutiny for Russian ties. He also noted Steele had “misstated or exaggerated” his reports, portraying speculation as fact.

The FBI’s internal summary (FD-302 form) of these interviews noted Danchenko was “truthful and cooperative” but flagged potential “minimizing” of facts. A supervisory analyst assessed that Danchenko “may not have been completely truthful” on some points but wasn’t “completely fabricating” events.

Impact on the Dossier’s Provenance and FBI Handling

Internal FBI Recognition of Weaknesses: The interviews highlighted a “significant gap” between Steele’s confident reporting and Danchenko’s caveats, per the 2019 DOJ Inspector General (IG) report on FISA abuses. The IG found the FBI failed to fully incorporate these discrepancies into FISA renewals, but the revelations themselves discredited the dossier’s chain of custody for key claims—showing they were not the robust intelligence Steele sold to Fusion GPS (his handler, funded by the Clinton campaign and DNC).

Subsequent Investigations: Special Counsel John Durham’s 2023 report criticized the FBI for credulity toward the dossier despite Danchenko’s 2017 disclosures, calling it “raw, uncorroborated intelligence” that should have been treated skeptically. Durham indicted Danchenko in 2021 for allegedly lying about his sources in later 2017 interviews (e.g., fabricating the Millian call), but Danchenko was acquitted in 2022. The trial testimony reinforced that his January statements accurately portrayed the information as unreliable gossip.

Broader Fallout: No major dossier allegations have been corroborated by Mueller (2019), Senate Intelligence Committee (2020), or Durham probes. The “collapsed” provenance fueled claims of political bias, as the dossier’s flaws were evident to the FBI by early 2017 but not fully acted upon until much later.

In summary, Danchenko’s January 2017 statements didn’t invent new facts but exposed the dossier’s foundation as flimsy hearsay, effectively dismantling its provenance for the FBI and public scrutiny. This aligns with assessments from the IG, Durham, and declassified records, though the FBI’s delayed response remains a point of criticism.



ME:

Can it be said that Danchenko was acquitted on a semantic technicality?


GROK:

Yes, it can be reasonably argued that Igor Danchenko’s acquittal in October 2022 on charges of making false statements to the FBI was influenced by what could be described as a “semantic technicality,” though the situation is nuanced. The argument hinges on the nature of the charges brought by Special Counsel John Durham and the jury’s interpretation of the FBI’s questioning during Danchenko’s 2017 interviews about his Steele Dossier sources. Below is a concise analysis based on available evidence.

Background on the Charges and Acquittal

Charges: In November 2021, Durham indicted Danchenko on five counts of making false statements to the FBI during his January and subsequent 2017 interviews. The charges centered on two key issues:

Sergei Millian Call: Danchenko claimed he received an anonymous phone call in July 2016 from someone he “believed” was Sergei Millian, a source for dossier claims about Trump-Russia ties. Durham alleged this call never happened, citing a lack of phone records and Millian’s denial.

Charles Dolan’s Role: Danchenko allegedly lied about not discussing certain dossier allegations (e.g., the “pee tape”) with Charles Dolan Jr., a Democratic operative who provided him information.

Trial Outcome: On October 11, 2022, a federal jury in Alexandria, Virginia, acquitted Danchenko on all counts after a four-day trial. The defense successfully argued that the FBI’s questions were ambiguous and that Danchenko’s responses were not demonstrably false.

Why a “Semantic Technicality” Argument Holds Weight

Ambiguity in FBI Questioning:

Defense Argument: Danchenko’s legal team contended that the FBI’s questions were vague or open to interpretation. For example, when asked if he “talked” to Dolan about specific dossier allegations, Danchenko said no, which the defense argued was technically accurate because their exchanges were informal (e.g., emails or casual discussions) rather than direct conversations about specific claims. Similarly, his statement about “believing” Millian was the caller was framed as an honest impression, not a definitive assertion.

Jury’s Perspective: Legal analysts and post-trial reports suggest the jury found the FBI’s questions lacked precision, making it hard to prove Danchenko’s responses were intentionally false beyond a reasonable doubt. This focus on the wording and context of the questions supports the idea of a “semantic technicality.”

Evidence: Court documents and trial coverage (e.g., Reuters, October 2022) note the defense emphasized “materiality” and ambiguity, arguing the FBI’s phrasing allowed Danchenko to interpret questions narrowly.

Lack of Concrete Evidence:

Millian Call: Durham’s case relied on the absence of phone records to prove the call never occurred, but the defense argued this was not conclusive (e.g., the call could have used untraceable means like a burner phone or app). Danchenko’s “belief” about the caller’s identity was subjective, making it difficult to prove a deliberate lie.

Dolan’s Role: Emails showed Dolan and Danchenko discussed topics related to the dossier, but the defense argued these were not direct discussions of dossier “allegations,” aligning with Danchenko’s denials. The jury appeared to accept this narrow interpretation.

Legal Standard for False Statements:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a false statement must be knowingly and willfully false, material to the investigation, and clearly disproven. The jury likely found that Durham failed to meet this high bar, partly due to the FBI’s imprecise questioning, which allowed Danchenko’s responses to fall into a gray area.

Counterarguments

Not Just Semantics: Prosecutors argued Danchenko’s statements were materially false, as they misled the FBI about the dossier’s sourcing, impacting the Trump-Russia investigation. The Millian call was central to dossier claims, and Dolan’s involvement tied the dossier to partisan actors, which Danchenko downplayed.

Danchenko’s Intent: Durham’s team contended Danchenko deliberately obscured his sources to protect himself or others, not due to misunderstanding the questions. However, the jury found insufficient evidence of intent, influenced by the defense’s focus on question phrasing.

Trial Dynamics: Beyond semantics, the acquittal may reflect broader skepticism about Durham’s probe, seen by some as politically motivated. This context could have swayed the jury, though it’s not strictly a “technicality.”

Conclusion

Danchenko’s acquittal can be described as resulting from a “semantic technicality” because the defense leveraged ambiguities in the FBI’s questioning to argue his responses were not provably false or intentional lies. The jury’s decision hinged on the precise wording of questions and the high legal threshold for proving false statements, rather than a broader vindication of Danchenko’s actions or the dossier’s credibility. This aligns with trial analyses from sources like Reuters and Just Security (October 2022). However, the prosecution’s case was not frivolous, as Danchenko’s statements did obscure the dossier’s weak provenance, which had significant investigative implications.


ME:

Is it true that around 2006, Danchenko was observed meeting with at least one KGB agent?

GROK:

Yes, it is true that Danchenko was observed (through FBI investigation) to have had contacts around 2006 with at least one known Russian intelligence officer, as documented in declassified records and congressional reports related to his 2009–2010 FBI counterintelligence probe.

Key Details from FBI and DOJ Records

Context of the Contacts: During the FBI’s full counterintelligence investigation into Danchenko (upgraded in 2009 from a preliminary probe), agents uncovered that he had “prior contacts with Russian intelligence officers in 2005 and 2006.”

en.wikipedia.org

These interactions included meetings or communications with individuals identified by the FBI as known Russian intelligence officers, as well as contact with the Russian Embassy (a common cover for intelligence operations).

grassley.senate.gov

One specific element involved Danchenko appearing to transmit Russian documents at the request of a Russian intelligence officer during these contacts.

grassley.senate.gov

Terminology Note: The KGB (Soviet-era intelligence agency) was dissolved in 1991 and succeeded by the SVR (Russia’s foreign intelligence service). Public records consistently refer to these as “Russian intelligence officers” rather than “KGB agents,” but the phrasing in the query aligns with the nature of the contacts, as SVR officers are the direct post-KGB equivalents.

Significance and Broader Context

Trigger for FBI Probe: These 2005–2006 contacts, combined with Danchenko’s 2008 comments to Brookings Institution colleagues about profiting from classified U.S. information, prompted the initial 2009 investigation.

en.wikipedia.org

The FBI sought a FISA warrant in 2010 but closed the case prematurely in 2011, believing Danchenko had fled to Russia (he had not).

Relevance to Later Scrutiny: This history was cited in Special Counsel John Durham’s 2023 report and 2021 indictment of Danchenko for unrelated false statements to the FBI about Steele Dossier sources. It fueled concerns about his reliability as Steele’s primary sub-source, though no charges stemmed directly from the 2006 contacts, and Danchenko was acquitted in 2022.

No Public Details on Specific Meetings: Declassified summaries (e.g., from Senate Judiciary Committee releases and Durham filings) confirm the contacts but do not specify dates, locations, or the exact number of officers involved beyond “at least one.” Danchenko has denied being a Russian agent.

This information originates from official U.S. government sources, including Wikipedia’s synthesis of FBI disclosures, Sen. Chuck Grassley’s 2020 letter citing FBI records, and Durham’s court filings. No contradictory evidence was found in public records.


ME:

Is it significant that Danchenko was investigated by the FBI as a possible Russian intelligence agent in 2009 and 2010, and that the reason the Bureau curtailed its investigation of him was because the FBI thought he’d moved back to Russia?

GROK:

Yes, it is significant that Igor Danchenko was investigated by the FBI as a possible Russian intelligence agent in 2009–2010 and that the investigation was curtailed because the FBI believed he had fled to Russia. This context is relevant to understanding Danchenko’s role as the primary sub-source for the Steele Dossier and raises questions about the FBI’s handling of his information in 2016–2017. Below is a detailed assessment of the significance based on available information.

Background on the FBI’s 2009–2010 Investigation of Danchenko

Investigation Trigger: In 2009, the FBI opened a counterintelligence investigation into Danchenko, then a Washington, D.C.-based analyst at the Brookings Institution, after a colleague reported him making comments suggestive of espionage. Specifically, in late 2008, Danchenko allegedly approached a coworker about classified information, offering money to a government employee for details on a specific program and implying he could pass it to Russian contacts. This raised red flags about possible ties to Russian intelligence.

FISA Surveillance: By 2010, the FBI had gathered enough evidence to seek a FISA warrant to surveil Danchenko as a suspected foreign agent. The warrant was in the final stages of preparation, indicating significant concern about his activities.

Curtailment Due to Disappearance: In 2010, Danchenko abruptly left his job and appeared to have departed the U.S., leading the FBI to believe he had returned to Russia. Lacking a subject to investigate, the FBI closed the case in early 2011 without resolving whether Danchenko was a Russian agent. It later emerged that he had not left the U.S. permanently but had moved to a different U.S. location, continuing to work as an analyst.

Significance of the Investigation and Its Termination

Relevance to the Steele Dossier:

Unvetted Source Credibility: Danchenko’s prior investigation as a potential Russian agent casts doubt on the FBI’s decision to rely on his information for the Steele Dossier in 2016 without thoroughly revisiting his counterintelligence file. The dossier, which alleged ties between the Trump campaign and Russia, was based heavily on Danchenko’s unverified hearsay from Russian contacts. His earlier red flags should have prompted greater scrutiny of his motives and reliability, especially given the dossier’s high-stakes use in the Trump-Russia investigation (e.g., Carter Page FISA warrants).

FBI Oversight: The 2019 DOJ Inspector General (IG) report on FISA abuses noted that the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane team was unaware of Danchenko’s prior investigation until late 2016 or early 2017, despite his name appearing in Steele’s reports. This disconnect within the FBI allowed Danchenko’s dossier contributions to be treated as credible until his January 2017 interviews exposed their weaknesses (as discussed in the prior response).

Implications of the FBI’s Assumption He Fled:

Missed Opportunity for Resolution: The FBI’s erroneous belief that Danchenko had left for Russia meant they never fully resolved whether he was a Russian intelligence asset. Had they continued tracking him in the U.S., they might have clarified his status before he became a key figure in the dossier. This lapse is significant because it left open the possibility that a potentially compromised individual was feeding information into a politically sensitive investigation.

Reappearance in 2016: Danchenko’s continued presence in the U.S. and his work with Steele (hired by Fusion GPS, funded by the Clinton campaign and DNC) went unnoticed by the FBI until after the dossier surfaced. This gap underscores flaws in the FBI’s counterintelligence processes, as highlighted by Special Counsel John Durham’s 2023 report, which criticized the Bureau’s handling of Danchenko and the dossier.

Broader Context and Public Perception:

Fuel for Controversy: The fact that Danchenko was previously suspected of Russian ties but later became a central figure in allegations against Trump amplified claims of bias in the FBI’s Trump-Russia probe. Critics, including Durham, argued that the FBI’s failure to cross-reference Danchenko’s prior investigation allowed unverified and potentially tainted information to influence the 2016 election narrative.

Danchenko’s Acquittal in 2022: Durham’s 2021 indictment of Danchenko for lying to the FBI about his dossier sources (e.g., the alleged Sergei Millian call) referenced his earlier counterintelligence file to question his trustworthiness. However, Danchenko’s acquittal in October 2022—partly because the jury found the FBI’s questions to him vague—meant no legal consequences tied directly to his 2009–2010 investigation. Still, the earlier probe remains a point of contention in debates over the dossier’s legitimacy.

Why It Matters

Counterintelligence Risks: A prior suspect in a Russian espionage case providing raw intelligence for a dossier alleging Kremlin influence operations is a red flag. The FBI’s failure to fully investigate Danchenko’s status before or during his dossier work raises questions about whether Russian disinformation could have infiltrated the process, intentionally or otherwise.

FBI’s Handling Criticized: Both the IG and Durham reports flagged the FBI’s compartmentalization and lack of diligence. The 2009–2010 investigation’s premature closure due to Danchenko’s perceived departure exemplifies these lapses, potentially allowing an unvetted source to shape a major investigation.

No Definitive Evidence of Russian Agency: Despite the suspicions, no public evidence confirms Danchenko was a Russian agent. His January 2017 FBI interviews, where he described his dossier inputs as “rumor and speculation,” suggest he was more of an opportunistic collector of gossip than a directed operative. However, the unresolved 2009–2010 case leaves lingering doubts.

Conclusion

The FBI’s 2009–2010 investigation of Danchenko as a possible Russian intelligence agent, and its closure due to his apparent disappearance, is significant because it highlights missed opportunities to vet a key dossier source, potentially compromising the Trump-Russia investigation. The failure to resolve his status allowed unverified information to gain traction, fueling distrust in the FBI’s processes. While Danchenko was never proven to be a Russian agent, the episode underscores systemic issues in how the FBI handled sensitive intelligence, as later critiqued by the IG and Durham.


ME:

If the Kremlin wanted Trump to win the 2016 election so he could tear the U.S. apart, would it have had anything to gain, either before or after the election, by having Danchenko feed Christopher Steele false or unfalsifiable “intel” starting in March 2016?

GROK:

If Igor Danchenko were a Russian intelligence agent and the Kremlin aimed to support Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory while sowing discord in the U.S., feeding false or unfalsifiable “intel” to Christopher Steele starting in March 2016 could have served several strategic purposes, both before and after the election. Below, I analyze the potential gains for the Kremlin under this hypothetical scenario, grounded in the context of the Steele Dossier, Danchenko’s role, and Russia’s broader interference tactics as documented in U.S. investigations (e.g., Mueller Report, Senate Intelligence Committee, and declassified records).Context and Assumptions

Hypothetical: Danchenko is a Russian intelligence agent (no definitive evidence supports this, but we assume it for the scenario). His role as Steele’s primary sub-source for the dossier, starting in March 2016, involves passing unverified, uncorroborated, or fabricated information.

Kremlin Goals:

Support Trump’s 2016 campaign (per U.S. intelligence findings, Russia preferred Trump due to his perceived favorable stance on Russia and disruption of U.S. foreign policy).

Sow division and undermine trust in U.S. democratic institutions, regardless of the election outcome.

Dossier Background: The Steele Dossier, funded by the Clinton campaign and DNC via Fusion GPS, alleged ties between Trump and Russia. Danchenko’s inputs, collected from March to October 2016, were based on hearsay, rumors, and unconfirmed sources (per his January 2017 FBI interviews). The dossier was shared with the FBI in July 2016, leaked to BuzzFeed in January 2017, and became a focal point of controversy.

Potential Kremlin Gains from Danchenko Feeding False/Unfalsifiable Intel
Pre-Election (March–November 2016)

Discrediting the Clinton Campaign:

Gain: By feeding Steele inflammatory but unverifiable allegations (e.g., Trump-Russia “conspiracy,” the “pee tape”), the Kremlin could ensure the dossier would eventually leak, tainting Clinton’s campaign with accusations of spreading unproven rumors. A discredited dossier could weaken Clinton’s credibility, especially if its funding (via Fusion GPS) became public, framing it as a partisan hit job.

Mechanism: False or exaggerated intel would create a “boomerang effect.” If the dossier surfaced before the election, its weak sourcing (exposed later by Danchenko’s FBI interviews) could be exploited by Trump’s campaign to portray Clinton as desperate or dishonest, rallying his base.

Evidence: Russian interference tactics in 2016 included amplifying divisive narratives (per Mueller and Senate reports). A dossier with dubious claims could fuel pro-Trump narratives about a “witch hunt,” even if it initially aimed to harm Trump.

Sowing Chaos and Mistrust:

Gain: Unfalsifiable allegations (e.g., vague claims of Kremlin-Trump coordination) would spark media frenzy and public suspicion, polarizing voters. This aligns with Russia’s documented strategy of “active measures” to erode trust in U.S. institutions.

Mechanism: The dossier’s circulation among journalists and the FBI (starting July 2016) could amplify rumors without requiring verification, creating a fog of controversy. Even if the intel was false, it would distract from Russia’s actual interference (e.g., DNC hacks, WikiLeaks).

Evidence: The Senate Intelligence Committee (2020) noted Russia’s use of proxies to spread disinformation. Danchenko, as a hypothetical agent, could serve as such a proxy, feeding Steele just enough plausible gossip to keep the dossier alive without risking exposure of Russia’s true operations.

Covering Russia’s Tracks:

Gain: False intel could misdirect U.S. authorities away from real Kremlin activities (e.g., hacking, social media campaigns). By focusing the FBI on unprovable dossier claims, Russia could delay or dilute scrutiny of its genuine interference.

Mechanism: Danchenko’s vague, second-hand “intel” (e.g., the unverified Sergei Millian call) lacked actionable details, keeping investigators chasing dead ends. This could buy time for Russia’s other operations to unfold.

Evidence: Mueller’s 2019 report detailed Russia’s multi-pronged interference, including efforts to obscure its role. A dossier with no corroboration could serve as a distraction, especially if Danchenko’s prior FBI scrutiny (2009–2010) made him a plausible but deniable cutout.



Post-Election (November 2016 Onward)


Undermining U.S. Institutions:

Gain: After Trump’s victory, the dossier’s public leak (January 2017) and its weak provenance (exposed by Danchenko’s FBI interviews) could fuel accusations of a politicized FBI and “deep state” conspiracy against Trump. This would deepen public distrust in government, aligning with Russia’s goal of tearing the U.S. apart.

Mechanism: The dossier’s reliance on Danchenko’s uncorroborated gossip, combined with its Clinton/DNC funding, provided fodder for Trump and supporters to claim bias in the FBI and media. If Danchenko were a Russian agent, his role in crafting a flawed dossier could amplify this narrative, portraying U.S. institutions as corrupt or incompetent.

Evidence: Durham’s 2023 report criticized the FBI’s handling of the dossier, noting its failure to verify Danchenko’s claims. Russia could exploit this to portray the U.S. as divided and dysfunctional, a tactic consistent with its post-2016 disinformation campaigns (per ODNI reports).

Protecting Trump’s Presidency:

Gain: If the Kremlin wanted Trump to succeed, a discredited dossier would weaken investigations into his Russia ties (e.g., Crossfire Hurricane). False or unfalsifiable intel would collapse under scrutiny, making legitimate probes seem like part of a broader smear.

Mechanism: Danchenko’s January 2017 FBI interviews, where he called his intel “rumor and speculation,” effectively dismantled the dossier’s credibility. If orchestrated by Russia, this could ensure Trump faced less pressure from dossier-based allegations, preserving his pro-Russia stance.

Evidence: No dossier allegations were substantiated by Mueller or Senate probes, suggesting limited impact on Trump legally. A Russian-orchestrated dossier could have been designed to self-destruct, shielding Trump while still causing chaos.

Long-Term Polarization:

Gain: The dossier’s fallout—debates over its veracity, FBI misconduct, and partisan funding—could sustain U.S. division long after 2016, weakening national cohesion and trust in elections.

Mechanism: By 2017, the dossier was a lightning rod, with Trump supporters citing it as evidence of a rigged system and opponents using it to question Trump’s legitimacy. A Russian agent like Danchenko could amplify this by feeding Steele just enough salacious but unverifiable material to keep the controversy alive.

Evidence: Russia’s interference aimed at long-term disruption (per 2017 ODNI assessment). The dossier’s role in fueling “Russiagate” debates played into this, regardless of its truth.


Counterarguments and Risks for Russia


Risk of Backfiring: False dossier claims could have drawn more scrutiny to Russia’s actual interference (e.g., if the FBI dug deeper into Danchenko’s contacts). However, the dossier’s lack of corroboration minimized this risk, as it led to dead ends.

Danchenko’s Exposure: If Danchenko were an agent, his FBI interviews risked exposing him. Yet, his candid admission of weak sourcing could be a calculated move to distance himself from espionage while still serving Russia’s goals.

No Direct Evidence: The scenario assumes Danchenko’s agency, but his 2009–2010 FBI investigation was inconclusive, and his 2022 acquittal suggests no clear ties to Russian intelligence. His role may have been opportunistic rather than directed.


Conclusion


If Danchenko were a Russian intelligence agent, the Kremlin could have gained significantly by having him feed false or unfalsifiable intel to Steele starting in March 2016. Pre-election, it could discredit Clinton, sow chaos, and distract from Russia’s real interference. Post-election, it could undermine U.S. institutions, protect Trump’s presidency, and sustain polarization. The dossier’s weak provenance, as revealed by Danchenko’s 2017 FBI interviews, aligns with a potential Russian strategy to create a self-destructing narrative that maximizes disruption without exposing Moscow’s hand. While speculative (no evidence confirms Danchenko’s Russian agency), this scenario fits Russia’s documented 2016 tactics of disinformation and division, per Mueller, Senate, and Durham findings.

[Royell Storing]

  This stuff with Comey and James is ALL about Where the charges are brought. Virginia is better than NY, but both are loaded with biased judges and biased prospective jurors. Trump got railroaded in NY, knew it, and took it like a Man. Comey, James, and the Fake Newser's whine like babies when these people are now treated like common folk. Kimmel too. James is flat-out guiltier than sh*t. She lied on her loan application and when called on it whines about being a victim and NEVER DIRECTLY addresses the charges. Comey is just a flat-out dirt bag that cries like a wimp. Which he is. These people demand to be treated like deity. They ain't squat and in the real world  at a real job would be ridiculed and laughed at 24-7. What we are seeing from Comey and James is no different than we saw from Fanni Willis when she stormed into that courtroom and waved papers at the sitting judge while she was being questioned. These are Prima Donna Sleaze Balls with literally no skill set to even merit the thought of such treatment.