U.S. Politics

[John Corbett]

As I said, "Libertarians are the worst."

Especially pro-Trump Libertarians.

Your dismissive response doesn't surprise me in the least.

TDS has affected the rationality of every person who has contracted it. Their automatic response to anything Trump is for is to oppose it and advocate for anything Trump is against. They will never give Trump credit for anything he has accomplished.

A classic example is Chuck Schumer's 2015 response to Obama's deal with Iran which allowed them to restart their nuclear program. Schumer expressed the same skepticism then about trusting the Iranians with a nuclear program that Trump has expressed more recently. Those concerns were very much in line with Trump's reasoning for attacking Iran last summer and again more recently. The Iranian regime cannot be trusted with either nuclear weapons or long range missiles. If that means bombing them back into the Stone Age, so be it. But now, Schumer has done a complete 180 on the Iranian issue. He is critical of Trump for doing what Schumer was advocating a little more than 10 years ago. What has changed? Well mainly, Schumer and every other once rational Democrat have got their panties in a wad over the prospect of being primaried by an extreme leftist. AOC's shocking upset of 10 term Democrat Congressman Crowley in 2018 scared every mainstream Democrat in the Congress, statehouses, and big city mayoral offices. They have surrendered their party to the nutty left. Most congressmen and senators have seats which are safe in the general election but they realize now they are far more vulnerable in the primaries. Rather than oppose the policies of the nutty left, they have chosen to embrace them. That's why the Democrat establishment has embraced very unpopular policies such as open borders, men in women's sports, locker rooms and bathrooms, and soft on crime policies. This is why I won't consider voting for anyone willing to put a D next to their name. If you are willing to be part of an organization such as the modern Democrat Party, you have no chance of getting my vote. I like John Fetterman. He's the kind of Democrat I used to occasionally vote for. But as long as he remains a Democrat, he cannot get my vote. That's probably a moot point since I live in a neighboring state and I see no chance the current Democrat Party would put him on the national ticket. If it did, it would be a sign that the Democrat Party had returned to its senses and maybe I would again consider voting occasionally for a Democrat. Ditto for Stephen A. Smith. I see no chance the Democrats would ever consider nominating either of these sensible men for national office.

[John Corbett]

ME: Is this true?

"Trump's tariffs and threat of tariffs have allowed us to renegotiate more favorable trade terms with a number of our trading partners, including the UK, the EU, and India. In his first term he brought us vigorous economic growth and low inflation. Real wages grew for the first time in decades. The economic boom was brought to a halt by the COVID pandemic which shutdown economies all over the globe and for which there was no effective defense. When the current conflict with Iran ends, which it soon will. Our economy is poised to have a similar period of growth and low inflation."


GROK: The statement is a mix of partially accurate, overstated, and speculative claims. Here's a breakdown based on economic data and historical records from Trump's first term (2017–2021) and related trade developments.

You work in BS the way other artists work with oil paints.

[Tom Graves]

[...]

ME: Are the following statements true?

"Four conflicts that Trump has negotiated an end to: Thailand and Cambodia, Serbia and Kosovo, Rwanda and Congo, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition, he has resolved a disagreement between Egypt and Ethiopia over water rights which had the potential to escalate into a shooting war. He got our hostages released from Gaza. He decimated Iran's ability to enrich uranium for making nuclear weapons. He is now doing the same to their missile program. The attack on Diego Garcia demonstrated Iran already had intermediate range missiles that could reach every capital in Europe including the Scandinavian capitals of Oslo, Stockholm, and Helsinki. If they had that capability, it wouldn't have taken them long to develop missiles that could reach our entire eastern seaboard. Had Trump not acted to remove Iran's nuclear and missile programs, it would only have been a matter of time before they had the firepower to deliver ICBMs with nuclear warheads to our country. Once that happened, we would have been in the same boat with Iran that we are with are with North Korea. Our only defense with them would be Mutual Assured Destruction. A nuclear Iran would be far more dangerous than North Korea because it is a fanatical regime that embraces martyrdom. Deterrence is not that effective against an enemy that is willing to sacrifice their existence in order to eliminate yours."


GROK: The statements contain a mix of partial truths, overstatements, and speculative elements. Here's a fact-based assessment of each claim as of early 2026.

Four Conflicts Trump "Negotiated an End To"

Thailand and Cambodia: Partially true. Trump administration pressure (including tariff threats) contributed to a July 2025 ceasefire and an October 2025 "Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord" signed in Trump's presence. However, the truce was fragile, broke down multiple times with renewed clashes, airstrikes, and accusations of violations. It was not a permanent "end" to the border conflict; fighting recurred, and the deal required ongoing mediation.

Serbia and Kosovo: Partially true from Trump's first term. In 2020, his administration brokered the "Washington Agreement" for economic normalization (e.g., infrastructure links, trade commitments), witnessed by Trump in the White House. It included side elements like Kosovo recognizing Israel and Serbia moving its embassy to Jerusalem. It did not resolve core political issues (e.g., mutual recognition, sovereignty). Progress was limited afterward, and it built on prior EU-led efforts rather than ending the underlying dispute.

Rwanda and Congo (DRC): Partially true but overstated. In late 2025, the Trump administration helped facilitate a peace deal signed in Washington between Rwanda and the DRC aimed at ending fighting in eastern Congo (involving M23 rebels with alleged Rwandan backing). Trump hosted leaders and claimed it as one of several "wars ended." However, violence continued afterward, with reports of violations, ongoing displacement, and U.S. sanctions later imposed related to breaches. It did not fully resolve the long-running conflict.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: Mostly true. In August 2025, Trump hosted a White House summit where Armenian PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev signed a joint declaration and initialed elements of a peace agreement/framework to normalize relations after decades of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. It included commitments to renounce force, open borders/communications, and U.S. involvement in a transit route (dubbed the "Trump Route"). It advanced peace but was described as a framework requiring further ratification and implementation, not a fully completed treaty ending all issues.

Overall, Trump played a mediating role (often leveraging U.S. economic/diplomatic pressure) in these, and some deals advanced de-escalation. But claims of definitively "negotiating an end" overstate durability—several faced breakdowns or remained incomplete.

Egypt and Ethiopia Water Rights Disagreement

Not resolved. The long-running dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile (with risks of escalation between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan) persisted into 2026. Trump offered to restart/mediate U.S. involvement multiple times (e.g., letters and statements in late 2025–early 2026), expressing desire to bring leaders together. Egypt and Sudan welcomed the offers, but no final resolution or binding deal occurred under Trump. Tensions continued without a shooting war breaking out.

Hostages Released from Gaza

True in part. In October 2025, as part of a U.S.-brokered ceasefire/peace plan to wind down the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, Hamas released the remaining living Israeli hostages (around 20 reported alive at that stage) in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. Trump visited the region, declared the war "over" or at a "new dawn," and took credit for the deal. Some deceased hostages' remains were also handled. This was a major phase of hostage/prisoner exchanges, though broader Gaza issues (reconstruction, governance) remained unresolved.

Decimated Iran's Uranium Enrichment for Nuclear Weapons

Partially true but debated in degree. In June 2025 (during the "Twelve-Day War" or related operations), the U.S. conducted airstrikes on key Iranian nuclear sites (Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan) as part of actions against Iran's program. Trump and officials claimed the sites were "completely and totally obliterated," setting the program back by 1–2 years or more per some Pentagon/Israeli assessments. Damage was severe (destroyed centrifuges, infrastructure hit), and enrichment halted or was severely curtailed post-strikes. However, assessments varied: some early reports (e.g., leaked DIA) suggested less total destruction, with sites damaged but not fully eliminated; IAEA had limited access afterward; and concerns persisted about remaining enriched uranium stockpiles (enough for potential weapons if further processed) and possible reconstitution efforts at other sites. Iran denied weaponization intent and claimed limited damage initially. The strikes significantly degraded capabilities but did not "decimate" the program to zero in all expert views.

Now Doing the Same to Iran's Missile Program; Diego Garcia Attack and Implications

Partially accurate on actions and the attack. In the ongoing 2025–2026 Iran conflict (involving U.S./Israeli strikes), the Trump administration targeted Iran's missile production, launchers, and related infrastructure as part of broader objectives to degrade capabilities. Trump claimed major progress (e.g., 90% of missiles/launchers degraded). In March 2026, Iran attempted a long-range ballistic missile strike on the U.S.-UK base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (using what analysts assessed as intermediate-range systems, ~2,000–4,000+ km range). One missile failed in flight; the other was intercepted. This demonstrated Iran had developed or modified missiles with greater range than previously emphasized in public claims—enough to theoretically threaten parts of Europe (including distant capitals) depending on exact systems and payloads. It highlighted expansion of Iran's strike envelope beyond the Middle East.

The extrapolation to U.S. eastern seaboard ICBMs is speculative. The Diego Garcia attempt showed intermediate-range capability, but developing true intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reliably reaching the U.S. mainland involves additional major technical hurdles (re-entry vehicles, guidance, range/payload trade-offs, testing). Iran had been pursuing longer-range systems, but pre-conflict assessments did not indicate imminent ICBM threat.

Had Trump Not Acted, Iran Would Soon Have ICBMs/Nuclear Delivery to U.S.; Comparison to North Korea and Martyrdom Risk

Highly speculative and debatable. Pre-strike intelligence indicated Iran was advancing its nuclear and missile programs (enriching to 60%, developing longer-range missiles), with breakout time for weapons-grade material estimated in weeks/months if unchecked. Strikes delayed this. However, claims of inevitable near-term ICBM + nuclear capability threatening the entire U.S. are forward-looking assumptions, not certainties — experts noted Iran was not "nowhere close" to a bomb but also not on the verge of deliverable ICBMs to America. North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons and ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S., relying on deterrence (MAD). Iran's regime has ideological elements embracing martyrdom/suicide tactics (via proxies), raising questions about rational deterrence, though state survival instincts have historically constrained it. A nuclear Iran would pose serious risks due to regional proliferation, terrorism ties, and regime ideology, but equating it directly as "far more dangerous" involves subjective threat assessment. The strikes and ongoing actions aimed to prevent escalation, but outcomes remain fluid amid ceasefire talks.

Summary: Trump administration diplomacy and military actions contributed to de-escalations, hostage releases, and degradation of Iranian capabilities. Several "peace deals" advanced normalization or ceasefires but faced fragility or incompleteness. Claims of fully ending conflicts or completely eliminating programs often overstate results or rely on optimistic interpretations amid ongoing disputes. The Iran section reflects real military pressure but includes debated effectiveness and speculative future risks. For the latest developments, conditions in active conflicts evolve quickly — check official sources like State Department, IAEA, or independent analyses.

[Tom Graves]

You work in BS the way other artists work with oil paints.

BS?

GROK is owned by your buddy, Elon Musk.

[John Corbett]

Are we supposed to wait until the day before Iran has the capable of hitting the US with a nuclear tipped ICBM? That's insanity. You don't wait until a threat is immanent before taking action. You need to nip threats like that in the bud. If theoretically we had the intelligence that told us Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor, I don't think we would have waited until December 6 to take preemptive action.

We did suspect Japan was going to attack us somewhere in the western Pacific but we had no idea they would have the audacity to strike Pearl Harbor. That was our mistake. I'm glad Trump isn't allowing us to make that same mistake with Iran.

[Tom Graves]

Are we supposed to wait until the day before Iran has the capable of hitting the US with a nuclear tipped ICBM? That's insanity. You don't wait until a threat is immanent before taking action. You need to nip threats like that in the bud. If theoretically we had the intelligence that told us Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor, I don't think we would have waited until December 6 to take preemptive action.

We did suspect Japan was going to attack us somewhere in the western Pacific but we had no idea they would have the audacity to strike Pearl Harbor. That was our mistake. I'm glad Trump isn't allowing us to make that same mistake with Iran.

Did you, like Trump, trust Russia's intelligence services over our own on 16 July 2018 when he made a fool of himself in Helsinki?

Have you always?

[John Corbett]

Did you, like Trump, trust Russia's intelligence services over our own on 16 July 2018 when he made a fool of himself in Helsinki?

Have you always?

I have no idea what you are talking about but I'm going to bet you got this story from MSNBC/MSNOW which in all likelihood consists of a half truth. If you have a reliable source for the story, please post it.

[Jarrett Smith]

I have no idea what you are talking about but I'm going to bet you got this story from MSNBC/MSNOW which in all likelihood consists of a half truth. If you have a reliable source for the story, please post it.

He watches Russia Today no doubt. People in foreign countries would love to have Trump as their leader. They see how we Americans live and they want freedom. Cuba will no doubt be next to fall.