JFK got the U.S into Vietnam (not Johnson)

[Colin Crow]

https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/nixons-retrospective-on-the-vietnam-war/

An interesting read. One could make an argument for Nixon at both ends.

[Charles Collins]

https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/nixons-retrospective-on-the-vietnam-war/

An interesting read. One could make an argument for Nixon at both ends.

There were way too many major and critical mistakes made by multiple entities during the US involvement. And spin and finger pointing are always a part of the political process. I believe that we have learned from the mistakes. Hopefully, we can use that knowledge to avoid future mistakes. Thanks for the link, a worthwhile read.

[Richard Smith]

In retrospect, it is easy to see where mistakes were made in Vietnam and the futility of that conflict.  In the context of those times, however, the Cold War including the containment of commie expansion was the highest political priority.  Dems politicians were vulnerable to suggestions that they were being soft on dealing with the Communists.  As a result, the political reality for JFK in running for re-election in 1964 was that he had no real option but to maintain the US presence in Vietnam.  LBJ was caught in the same trap.  There was no real political option to say whoops we made a mistake and let the commies overrun S. Vietnam. It was a trap.  As more and more resources and lives were devoted to the cause, it became all the more politically impossible to admit a miscalculation had been made.   It took over a decade and the façade of a peace treaty before that could happen.   As s result, it's highly unlikely JFK would have done anything much differently from LBJ.  But Oswald made what JFK might have done no longer relevant.  So thank him if you want to believe JFK would somehow have avoided that disaster.

[Steve M. Galbraith]

In retrospect, it is easy to see where mistakes were made in Vietnam and the futility of that conflict.  In the context of those times, however, the Cold War including the containment of commie expansion was the highest political priority.  Dems politicians were vulnerable to suggestions that they were being soft on dealing with the Communists.  As a result, the political reality for JFK in running for re-election in 1964 was that he had no real option but to maintain the US presence in Vietnam.  LBJ was caught in the same trap.  There was no real political option to say whoops we made a mistake and let the commies overrun S. Vietnam. It was a trap.  As more and more resources and lives were devoted to the cause, it became all the more politically impossible to admit a miscalculation had been made.   It took over a decade and the façade of a peace treaty before that could happen.   As s result, it's highly unlikely JFK would have done anything much differently from LBJ.  But Oswald made what JFK might have done no longer relevant.  So thank him if you want to believe JFK would somehow have avoided that disaster.

As cited in the original post - the discussion about the overthrow of Diem - JFK made a series of comittments to Vietnam that LBJ inherited and was forced to deal with. JFK may have not originally gotten the US into that swamp in the technical sense of being the first to send in troops et cetera; but his repeated statements about the dangers that a loss of the South posed to US interests and security (compounded by, as mentioned above, his support for the removal of Diem) made the possibility of simply reversing course, i.e., withdrawing troops, nonexistent.

One can argue that those statements were simply for domestic consumption, to fight off the charge of "losing Vietnam" the way Democrats earlier had to respond to the claim of "losing China", but they had real consequences for LBJ. JFK may have figured a way out of his rhetorical trap; but LBJ didn't have that option or ability. Or didn't think he did.  As LBJ himself said in several calls he felt trapped, that it was a mess but he didn't know how to get out.

In any case, the claim that JFK was murdered because, in part, he had decided by November of 1963 to withdraw from Vietnam is simply not, in my view, supported by the facts. RFK said no decision had been made; McNamara said no such decision had been made; Rusk said no such decision had been made; and the Pentagon Papers show no such decision had been made.

[Jon Banks]

As cited in the original post - the discussion about the overthrow of Diem - JFK made a series of comittments to Vietnam that LBJ inherited and was forced to deal with. JFK may have not originally gotten the US into that swamp in the technical sense of being the first to send in troops et cetera; but his repeated statements about the dangers that a loss of the South to US interests and security (compounded by, as mentioned above, his support for the removal of Diem) made the possibility of simply reversing course, i.e., withdrawing troops, nonexistent.

One can argue that those statements were simply for domestic consumption, to fight off the charge of "losing Vietnam" the way Democrats earlier had to respond to the claim of "losing China", but they had real consequences for LBJ. JFK may have figured out a way out of his rhetorical trap; but LBJ didn't have that option.  And LBJ himself said in several calls that he felt trapped; that it was a mess but he didn't know how to get out.

In any case, the claim that JFK was murdered because, in part, he had decided by November of 1963 to withdraw from Vietnam is simply not, in my view, supported by the facts. RFK said no decision had been made; McNamara said no such decision had been made; Rusk said no such decision had been made; and the Pentagon Papers show no such decision had been made.

I don't completely disagree with you, I just think a lot of folks in the LN community discount the huge amount of stuff we've learned about JFK, the Joint Chiefs, and Vietnam since the 1970s.

JFK clearly was reluctant to escalate in Vietnam and fought with the Joint Chiefs over it. He also was sympathetic to the anti-Colonial movements in Asia and Africa at the time. He understood the anti-Colonial aspect of the Vietnam conflict because he visited Vietnam in the 1950s back when the French had their Vietnam quagmire. he campaigned as a rabid Cold Warrior in 1960 but I think by now, most people understand that was just politics. Including the "Missile Gap" stuff that he knew was a lie. 

So while I think it would've been difficult politically for Kennedy to withdraw from Vietnam in his second term(assuming he would've won re-election) I don't think we know for certain that he would've followed the same path as LBJ, who clearly had a better relationship with the Pentagon than Kennedy.

[Gary Craig]

  Senator John F. Kennedy, US Senate, April 6, 1954:
 
 
'Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be
  told the blunt truth about Indochina.
 
  I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted
  as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu
  and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State
  just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in
  Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of
  the Congress which have been briefed--if not consulted--on this
  matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or alarmist in my evaluation
  of the situation.
 
  But to pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina without
  at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile
  and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes
  the inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike
  similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people
  for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper
  basis for determining the extent of American participation.
 
  Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory,
  every member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears
  to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous
  amounts of economic and materiel aid from the United States, and
  despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call
  for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations
  underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless
  of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons
  that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without
  greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time
  and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area
  is not to disparage their valor. If "united action" can achieve the
  necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the
  security and freedom of all Southeast Asia, then such united action is
  clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in
  our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in
  further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over
  aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions
  under which that pledge is made.
 
  I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military
  assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
  and at the same time nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has
  the sympathy and covert support of the people.
 
  Moreover, without political independence for the Associated States, the
  other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this
  as a war of colonialism; and the "united action" which is said
  to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely
  to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention,
  without participation by the armed forces of the other nations
  of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the people
  of the Associated States, with increasing reluctance and discouragement
  on the part of the French--and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese
  Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation
  of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground--such
  intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in
  the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.
 
  This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon
  my return from the Far East as follows:
 
      In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort
      of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There
      is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam government among
      the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism
      makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms.
      The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment
      within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather
      than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from
      and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed
      failure.
 
  In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act
  which would have provided for the distribution of American aid,
  to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom
  and independence desired by the people of the Associated States
  My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should
  not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation;
  and that the new French government could be expected to make "a
  decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment
  or resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland]
  assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our great
  ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states."
 
  Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that
  the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second,
  that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed
  under steps "now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory
  for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just
  around the corner, or lies two years off. But the stringent limitations
  upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain;
  and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is
  largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these
  prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of
  their reiteration, and they have caused this nation to delay definitive
  action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may
  well be past.
 
  It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the
  difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions
  of military victory and assurances of complete independence have
  given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first,
  that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated
  States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable
  officer corps, a military victory, even with American support,
  in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and,
  second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be
  obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which
  presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.
 
  If the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate
  independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated
  States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain
  aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is
  my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance
  at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men
  and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.
 
  The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But
  in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest
  appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be
  effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic
  retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once
  such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review,
  and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and
  security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence
  of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people,
  then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: "If we think them not enlightened
  enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
  remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion
  by education."

[Jon Banks]

  Senator John F. Kennedy, US Senate, April 6, 1954:
 
 
'Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be
  told the blunt truth about Indochina.
 
  I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted
  as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu
  and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State
  just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in
  Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of
  the Congress which have been briefed--if not consulted--on this
  matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or alarmist in my evaluation
  of the situation.
 
  But to pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina without
  at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile
  and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes
  the inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike
  similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people
  for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper
  basis for determining the extent of American participation.
 
  Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory,
  every member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears
  to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous
  amounts of economic and materiel aid from the United States, and
  despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call
  for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations
  underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless
  of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons
  that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without
  greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time
  and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area
  is not to disparage their valor. If "united action" can achieve the
  necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the
  security and freedom of all Southeast Asia, then such united action is
  clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in
  our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in
  further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over
  aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions
  under which that pledge is made.
 
  I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military
  assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
  and at the same time nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has
  the sympathy and covert support of the people.
 
  Moreover, without political independence for the Associated States, the
  other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this
  as a war of colonialism; and the "united action" which is said
  to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely
  to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention,
  without participation by the armed forces of the other nations
  of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the people
  of the Associated States, with increasing reluctance and discouragement
  on the part of the French--and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese
  Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation
  of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground--such
  intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in
  the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.
 
  This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon
  my return from the Far East as follows:
 
      In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort
      of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There
      is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam government among
      the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism
      makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms.
      The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment
      within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather
      than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from
      and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed
      failure.
 
  In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act
  which would have provided for the distribution of American aid,
  to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom
  and independence desired by the people of the Associated States
  My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should
  not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation;
  and that the new French government could be expected to make "a
  decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment
  or resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland]
  assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our great
  ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states."
 
  Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that
  the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second,
  that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed
  under steps "now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory
  for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just
  around the corner, or lies two years off. But the stringent limitations
  upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain;
  and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is
  largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these
  prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of
  their reiteration, and they have caused this nation to delay definitive
  action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may
  well be past.
 
  It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the
  difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions
  of military victory and assurances of complete independence have
  given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first,
  that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated
  States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable
  officer corps, a military victory, even with American support,
  in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and,
  second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be
  obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which
  presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.
 
  If the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate
  independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated
  States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain
  aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is
  my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance
  at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men
  and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.
 
  The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But
  in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest
  appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be
  effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic
  retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once
  such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review,
  and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and
  security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence
  of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people,
  then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: "If we think them not enlightened
  enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
  remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion
  by education."

Doesn't sound like a guy who bought into the "Domino Theory" stuff...