Free Book Now Available -- Hasty Judgment: Why the JFK Case Is Not Closed

[Michael T. Griffith]

Why should we care about what the Houston Post "acknowledged"?  What makes them experts on photo analysis?

You still have not read my chapter on the backyard photos in Hasty Judgment, have you? Or did you overlook the fact that I note therein that the Houston Post contacted a photographic expert at Texas Tech University, Dr. Hershel Womack, regarding the DPD backyard rifle prints.

If you would read chapter 5, you would see that I corresponded with Dr. Womack about the backyard rifle photos. I include two of Dr. Womack’s e-mails to me regarding the photos, in which he explained some of the indications of tampering in them.

It doesn't alter the fact that the Backyard photos were confirmed to be authentic by the 21 members of the HSCA photographic analysis panel.

So you are going to rely on one giant appeal to authority? Is that it? I notice that you guys only insist on “trusting the experts” when they say what you want to hear. Do you regard the HSCA acoustical experts with the same slavish reverence? I’m guessing the answer is a big, whopping No.

It is almost as if you guys were born yesterday when it comes to your willingness to gullibly, uncritically accept whatever this or that government-hired expert says—that is, as long as he says what you are determined to believe.

Should we take several pages and go through the instances, in the JFK case alone, where government experts goofed, misrepresented their own experiments or the experiments of others, suppressed evidence that did not fit their conclusions, rigged their tests, etc., etc.? 

As I said, I'll leave the Backyard photo issue for John Mytton to deal with. Photo analysis is definitely not my forte. Neither is it yours. I'm terrible at it.

Yeah, well, after your reply, Mr. Mytton made the ludicrous claim that the backyard photos’ backgrounds are not virtually identical. Mytton might want to start by reading the HSCA PEP’s report, wherein the panel acknowledged that they found only “very small” differences in the background after photogrammetrically measuring them. This is especially telling because the PEP made this observation because outside experts had noted the virtual sameness of the backgrounds, but the panel didn’t bother to explain how in the world photos taken in the alleged manner could have produced backgrounds that were so similar that the variations between them could only be detected by photogrammetric measurement.

Then, perhaps Mytton will address the facts I present in my article “The HSCA and Fraud in the Backyard Rifle Photos”:

https://miketgriffith.com/files/fraud.htm

There aren't any holes in the palmprint's documented discovery or transmission.

Except for the failure to take a single photo of the print before lifting it—Lt. Day surely knew that such photos would be strong evidence of the print’s presence on the rifle on 11/22. Except for the unexplained delay in getting the print to FBI HQ. Except for Lt. Day’s sworn assertion that the print was still visible on the barrel when he gave the rifle to Drain, whereas Drain stated that Day said nothing about a print on the rifle barrel. Except for the unexplained visit of FBI agents to the funeral home to take prints of Oswald’s fingers and hands—gee, what was that all about? Except for the inexplicable silence of the DPD for several days about finding a palmprint on the rifle, when the DPD rushed to tell journalists about every other piece of seemingly incriminating evidence that they found. Except for the absence of any trace of fingerprint processing on the barrel when Latona examined the rifle on 11/23.

Where is that memo? Let's see it. Notice that the memo was dated July 1978. That was after Scalice had examined the palm print. Also, perhaps more importantly, notice that the article refers to fingerprints. Multiple fingerprints, not a single latent palm print.

I did miss that part.   I must have been having a rough day myself.    Because I also missed this part:

9. Lift from the rifle (designated commission exhibit 139) from the underside of the foregrip of a Mannlicher-Carcano  serial no. C2766. I identified five characteristics or points of identity which match the lift.

So, there you have it.

 

I think you might be right. Perhaps the memo was referring to the trigger-guard prints. But, as we’ll see in a moment, Scalice’s statements raise some interesting questions.

Not only did the HSCA get the original palm print lift, they were able to have it positively matched to Oswald's rifle as well.  Which was just a confirmation of what Latona et al had done 14 years prior. John Mytton has allowed us to see it for ourselves.

Scalice had the actual palm print itself to determine if it was Oswald's or not but for his own purposes he chose to use enlarged negatives of the print to make the identification.

Yes, but notice that Scalice could only identify five characteristics/points of identity when he reportedly examined the palmprint itself. The minimum number of matching characteristics for a print identification to be considered positive is 10. Some experts say 12 is the minimum number. Scalice could only find five, which might be why he decided to examine enlarged negatives of the print. But why could Scalice only see five characteristics on the palmprint itself but more on the negatives of the print?

And, of course, the palmprint is only valid evidence if it was not planted on the rifle barrel. If the palmprint was planted on the rifle after Oswald was killed, obviously it is worthless as evidence against him, and that’s why the glaring holes in the print’s chain of evidence are so important.

Saying that it was debunked is not the same as showing that it was debunked. Nothing in that excerpt of yours challenges what I said. By the time that Day was told to pack everything up he just had not got around to photographing the print and he felt rushed to get all of the items properly prepared for pick up.There's no way to debunk it. All you have is speculation.

 

I explained that Day had ample time to take 1 or 2 minutes to photograph the most important palmprint he would ever (supposedly) lift. Even if we buy the story that he was being rushed, he, as a senior crime-scene detective, surely could and would have said, “Ok, give me just a minute, because I need to take a photo of this palmprint.” Whoever was supposedly rushing him certainly would have understood the need to photograph the print in situ on the barrel. A rookie cop fresh from the police academy would have known this.

When Lt. Day was asked why he had not made a photograph of the palmprint, he claimed that he had been told by DPD Chief Curry “to go no further with the processing,” which is an unbelievable tale in and of itself. But in an earlier interview with the FBI, Day had claimed that he had not received this instruction from Curry until immediately before the rifle was due to be sent to Washington, more than three hours after he had worked on the prints (26 H 832-833 vs. CE 3145:7). So this “he was rushed” dog just won’t hunt.

Why are you focusing on minor inconsistencies in Day's foggy four month old recollection instead of dealing with the elephant in the room? That elephant being the lift itself and it having been positively matched to Oswald's rifle. Day's recollections on some minor details were faulty. No question about it.  However, none of it negates the fact that he lifted the palm print off of the barrel of the rifle. Yes, the print had been under the wooden stock and would not have been placed there by normal handling of the rifle. However, Oswald had disassembled the rifle before bringing it to work. Probably the night before.

“Minor inconsistencies”? “Minor”? He swore the print was still visible when he handed over the rifle. He knew he was supposed to photograph the print before lifting it, and he had ample time to do so. He somehow found the time to photograph the partial prints on the trigger guard, but supposedly just couldn’t squeeze in a minute or two to photograph the much more crucial palmprint. He said he told Drain about the palmprint on the barrel when he gave him the rifle, but Drain said he did not.

And we should pause to note that even the “we can see the emperor’s new clothes” Warren Commission doubted the authenticity of the palmprint and therefore asked Lt. Day to sign a separate affidavit about his lifting and processing of the print, and that Lt. Day refused to do so.

Latona never got the print until the 29th. However, the FBI got it on the 26th. And no, I'm not confusing the palmprint from the cardboard box with the palmprint taken from the rifle.

CE 738 does not include all of the evidence that Drain took possession of that day. Those are the items that he picked up at 2 PM. The piece of cardboard doesn't appear to be in that photo. According to Day, it was picked up by Drain at 11:45 that night. The lift of the partial palm print and the cardboard boxes would have been picked up at the time as well.

You realize that Agent Drain was in Dallas on 11/26, right? If Drain got the palmprint on 11/26, why did it not get to FBI HQ until 11/29? Every other item on that 11/26 DPD “Property Clerk’s Invoice or Receipt” arrived at FBI HQ the next day, 11/27. But the palmprint did not arrive until 11/29, as even Bugliosi acknowledges.

Again, why the delay? Why were items that were far less incriminating rushed to FBI HQ but not the palmprint? Did Drain need to wait until the FBI agents brought Oswald’s prints back from the funeral home?

You are aware that Agent Drain told Henry Hurt that he did not believe the palmprint was on the rifle on 11/22 but that it was planted, right? (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt: An Investigation into the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1985, p. 109)

[John Iacoletti]

And we should pause to note that even the “we can see the emperor’s new clothes” Warren Commission doubted the authenticity of the palmprint and therefore asked Lt. Day to sign a separate affidavit about his lifting and processing of the print, and that Lt. Day refused to do so.

Is there even a hypothetical innocent explanation for this?

[Michael T. Griffith]

Is there even a hypothetical innocent explanation for this?

Indeed. The guy who was sent to get Day to do an affidavit, as luck would have it, was . . . Agent Drain. Perhaps this is one reason that Drain later told Henry Hurt that he did not believe Oswald's palmprint was on the rifle on 11/22 but that it was planted later (Reasonable Doubt, p. 109).

[Tim Nickerson]

I really don't care what your Kook mates say, the backyard photos were taken from different positions but why believe me, a picture's worth a thousand words.

In the following gif I lined up 3 palings of the fence and as can be seen there is literally a bazillion parallax changes, the building, window and roof behind shifts, all the stairs and supporting post show major perspective changes as do the other posts on the right side, the windows and shutter also demonstrate this difference in the cameras location. So in conclusion, I'll state the bleeding obvious once again, there is absolutely no possible way to take 1 photo and tilt it to create all the following parallax changes because all the objects within the image are shifting relative to each other.



JohnM

Michael Griffiths calls that abject quackery.  He has got himself so mired in the Kook bog that he'll never get out.

[Tim Nickerson]

You still have not read my chapter on the backyard photos in Hasty Judgment, have you? Or did you overlook the fact that I note therein that the Houston Post contacted a photographic expert at Texas Tech University, Dr. Hershel Womack, regarding the DPD backyard rifle prints.

If you would read chapter 5, you would see that I corresponded with Dr. Womack about the backyard rifle photos. I include two of Dr. Womack’s e-mails to me regarding the photos, in which he explained some of the indications of tampering in them.
 

So you are going to rely on one giant appeal to authority? Is that it? I notice that you guys only insist on “trusting the experts” when they say what you want to hear. Do you regard the HSCA acoustical experts with the same slavish reverence? I’m guessing the answer is a big, whopping No.

It is almost as if you guys were born yesterday when it comes to your willingness to gullibly, uncritically accept whatever this or that government-hired expert says—that is, as long as he says what you are determined to believe.

Should we take several pages and go through the instances, in the JFK case alone, where government experts goofed, misrepresented their own experiments or the experiments of others, suppressed evidence that did not fit their conclusions, rigged their tests, etc., etc.? 

Yeah, well, after your reply, Mr. Mytton made the ludicrous claim that the backyard photos’ backgrounds are not virtually identical. Mytton might want to start by reading the HSCA PEP’s report, wherein the panel acknowledged that they found only “very small” differences in the background after photogrammetrically measuring them. This is especially telling because the PEP made this observation because outside experts had noted the virtual sameness of the backgrounds, but the panel didn’t bother to explain how in the world photos taken in the alleged manner could have produced backgrounds that were so similar that the variations between them could only be detected by photogrammetric measurement.

Then, perhaps Mytton will address the facts I present in my article “The HSCA and Fraud in the Backyard Rifle Photos”:

https://miketgriffith.com/files/fraud.htm
 

Except for the failure to take a single photo of the print before lifting it—Lt. Day surely knew that such photos would be strong evidence of the print’s presence on the rifle on 11/22. Except for the unexplained delay in getting the print to FBI HQ. Except for Lt. Day’s sworn assertion that the print was still visible on the barrel when he gave the rifle to Drain, whereas Drain stated that Day said nothing about a print on the rifle barrel. Except for the unexplained visit of FBI agents to the funeral home to take prints of Oswald’s fingers and hands—gee, what was that all about? Except for the inexplicable silence of the DPD for several days about finding a palmprint on the rifle, when the DPD rushed to tell journalists about every other piece of seemingly incriminating evidence that they found. Except for the absence of any trace of fingerprint processing on the barrel when Latona examined the rifle on 11/23.
 

I think you might be right. Perhaps the memo was referring to the trigger-guard prints. But, as we’ll see in a moment, Scalice’s statements raise some interesting questions.

Yes, but notice that Scalice could only identify five characteristics/points of identity when he reportedly examined the palmprint itself. The minimum number of matching characteristics for a print identification to be considered positive is 10. Some experts say 12 is the minimum number. Scalice could only find five, which might be why he decided to examine enlarged negatives of the print. But why could Scalice only see five characteristics on the palmprint itself but more on the negatives of the print?

And, of course, the palmprint is only valid evidence if it was not planted on the rifle barrel. If the palmprint was planted on the rifle after Oswald was killed, obviously it is worthless as evidence against him, and that’s why the glaring holes in the print’s chain of evidence are so important.
 

I explained that Day had ample time to take 1 or 2 minutes to photograph the most important palmprint he would ever (supposedly) lift. Even if we buy the story that he was being rushed, he, as a senior crime-scene detective, surely could and would have said, “Ok, give me just a minute, because I need to take a photo of this palmprint.” Whoever was supposedly rushing him certainly would have understood the need to photograph the print in situ on the barrel. A rookie cop fresh from the police academy would have known this.

When Lt. Day was asked why he had not made a photograph of the palmprint, he claimed that he had been told by DPD Chief Curry “to go no further with the processing,” which is an unbelievable tale in and of itself. But in an earlier interview with the FBI, Day had claimed that he had not received this instruction from Curry until immediately before the rifle was due to be sent to Washington, more than three hours after he had worked on the prints (26 H 832-833 vs. CE 3145:7). So this “he was rushed” dog just won’t hunt.
 

“Minor inconsistencies”? “Minor”? He swore the print was still visible when he handed over the rifle. He knew he was supposed to photograph the print before lifting it, and he had ample time to do so. He somehow found the time to photograph the partial prints on the trigger guard, but supposedly just couldn’t squeeze in a minute or two to photograph the much more crucial palmprint. He said he told Drain about the palmprint on the barrel when he gave him the rifle, but Drain said he did not.

And we should pause to note that even the “we can see the emperor’s new clothes” Warren Commission doubted the authenticity of the palmprint and therefore asked Lt. Day to sign a separate affidavit about his lifting and processing of the print, and that Lt. Day refused to do so.

You realize that Agent Drain was in Dallas on 11/26, right? If Drain got the palmprint on 11/26, why did it not get to FBI HQ until 11/29? Every other item on that 11/26 DPD “Property Clerk’s Invoice or Receipt” arrived at FBI HQ the next day, 11/27. But the palmprint did not arrive until 11/29, as even Bugliosi acknowledges.

Again, why the delay? Why were items that were far less incriminating rushed to FBI HQ but not the palmprint? Did Drain need to wait until the FBI agents brought Oswald’s prints back from the funeral home?

You are aware that Agent Drain told Henry Hurt that he did not believe the palmprint was on the rifle on 11/22 but that it was planted, right? (Hurt, Reasonable Doubt: An Investigation into the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1985, p. 109)

==================================================================================
Yes, but notice that Scalice could only identify five characteristics/points of identity when he reportedly examined the palmprint itself. The minimum number of matching characteristics for a print identification to be considered positive is 10. Some experts say 12 is the minimum number. Scalice could only find five, which might be why he decided to examine enlarged negatives of the print. But why could Scalice only see five characteristics on the palmprint itself but more on the negatives of the print?
==================================================================================

I'll  address the post tonight but for now  I just wanted to address this part of it. The five points that Scalice identified did not have to do with print identification. They had to do with matching the lift to the barrel of the rifle. Scalice didn't say how many points of identity that he found to make the determination that the palmprint was Oswald's.

[Michael T. Griffith]

As late as August 1964, WC attorneys Wesley Liebeler, Burt Griffin, and David Slawson had serious doubts about Lt. Day’s claims regarding the palmprint. In a memo dated August 28, 1964, Liebeler expressed the reasons for these doubts to J. Lee Rankin, the WC’s chief counsel, and told Rankin that he, Griffin, and Slawson believed that further investigation was needed. Liebeler even outlined issues that needed to be pursued. The HSCA was nice enough to enter the memo into the record. Here it is:

JFK Exhibit No. 34
[Memorandum]
AUGUST 28, 1964

To: J . Lee Rankin .
From: Wesley J . Liebeler.

Messrs. Griffin and Slawson and I raise questions covering the palmprint which Lt. Day of the Dallas Police Department testified he lifted from the underside of the barrel of the K-1 rifle on November 22, 1963. That story is set forth on pages 7-10 of the proposed final draft of Chapter IV of the Report, copies of which are attached.

We suggest that additional investigation be conducted to determine with greater certainty that the palmprint was actually lifted from the rifle as Lt. Day has testified. The only evidence we presently have on that print is the testimony of Lt. Day himself. He has stated that although he lifted the palmprint on November 22, 1963, he did not provide a copy of the lift to the FBI until November 26, 1963 (9 R 260-61). He also testified that after the lift he "could still see traces of the print under the barrel and was going to try to use photography to bring off or bring out a better print." Mr. Latona of the FBI testified with respect to the lift of the palmprint that "evidently the lifting had been so complete that there was nothing left to show any marking on the gun itself as to the existence of such—even an attempt on the part of anyone else to process the rifle" (Id. at 24).

Additional problems are raised by the fact that:

(1) Agent Latona testified that the poor finish of the K-1 rifle made it absorbent and not conducive to getting a good print;

(2) None of the other prints on the rifle could be identified because they were of such poor quality;

(3) The other prints on the rifle were protected by cellophane while the area where the palmprint had been lifted was not, even though Lt. Day testified that after the lift the "([palm] print on gun was their best bet, still remained on there," when he was asked why he had not released the lift to the FBI on November 22, 1963.

We should review the above circumstances at our conference with Agent Latona and Inspector Malley. The configuration of the palmprint should be reviewed to determine, if possible, whether or not it was removed from a cylindrical surface . The possibility that the palmprint or evidence of the lift was destroyed while the rifle was in transit should be reviewed with them. The exact condition of the rifle at the time It was turned over to the FBI Dallas office should be ascertained . Agent Latona should be asked if he can think of any explanation for the apparent conflict in the above testimony.

We should also:

(1) Determine whether or not Lt. Day had assistance when he worked with the prints on the rifle. If he did, we should obtain statements from those who assisted him.

(2) Lt. Day should be asked why he preserved the fingerprints on the rifle, which were not sufficiently clear to make positive identification, and yet did not preserve the palmprint, which was clear enough for that purpose.

(3) Lt. Day should also be asked why he removed only the palmprint and should be re-questioned covering his recollection that he saw the palmprint still on the rifle after he made the lift.

(4) Lt. Day should be asked if he took any photographs of the palmprint on the rifle after the lift. He may have done so, since he did photograph the less valuable fingerprints, and the palmprint on the rifle, according to his testimony, was still the "best bet" for identification. It is also significant that Lt. Day stated that he was going to attempt to get a better print through use of photography. (11 HSCA 218-219, my emphasis)

No wonder the WC asked Lt. Day to sign a separate affidavit about his processing of the palmprint, and no wonder Day refused.

As for the belated tale that Agent Drain wasn't paying attention to Day when Day supposedly told him about the print on the barrel, Drain told Henry Hurt that he was certain Day did not say a word about any print on the barrel when he handed over the rifle. Hurt interviewed Day as well, and Day repeated his tale that he both told Drain about the print, showed him where it was, and advised him to ensure the area of the print was not disturbed en route the FBI HQ:

In 1984, the author interviewed both Lieutenant Day and Agent Drain about the mysterious print. Day remains adamant that the Oswald print was on the rifle when he first examined it a few hours after the shooting. Moreover, Day stated that when he gave the rifle to Agent Drain, he pointed out to the FBI man both the area where the print could be seen and the fingerprint dust used to bring it out. Lieutenant Day states that he cautioned Drain to be sure the area was not disturbed while the rifle was in transit to the FBI laboratory.

Drain flatly disputes this, claiming that Day never showed him such a print. "I just don't believe there was ever a print," said Drain. He noted that there was increasing pressure on the Dallas police to build evidence in the case. (Reasonable Doubt, p. 109)

[John Iacoletti]

I'll  address the post tonight but for now  I just wanted to address this part of it. The five points that Scalice identified did not have to do with print identification. They had to do with matching the lift to the barrel of the rifle.

And like in the Hoover memo, there is nothing beyond a claim that this was done.